

Z.M. Buniyatov

# A HISTORY OF THE KHOREZMIAN STATE UNDER THE ANUSHTEGINIDS 1097-1231





INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE  
FOR CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES

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**A History of the Khorezmian State  
under the Anushteginids,  
1097-1231**

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## PREFACE

During the 1930s and 1940s, in the period immediately before and after World War II, an archeological expedition under the leadership of S.P. Tolstov revealed to the world the existence of a previously unfamiliar ancient Central Asian civilization on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea. This was the civilization of ancient Khorezm, which we find mentioned in the works of such ancient and medieval Greek and Muslim authors as Herodotus, Strabo, Al-Biruni, Maqdisi, Al-Istakhri, Yaqut al-Khamawi; S.P.Tolstov himself called it “the Egypt of Central Asia”. \* The Khorezm expedition was one of the most extensive and well-equipped archeological undertakings of its time, and its findings became known all over the world. In the years which followed, the history of Khorezm became a leading focus of research in the field of oriental studies in the former USSR.

Meanwhile, in the Moscow Institute of Oriental studies a young Azerbaijani man called Ziya Buniyatov, an active duty officer who had fought on the frontline of World War II and was discharged with the rank of captain, started his education. Buniyatov was one of the millions whose bravery and dedication – together with the enormous sacrifice of life – helped secure victory in the war for the USSR. He had served in one of the units established by the Stalin regime known as ‘penal battalions’. These were combat units comprising political and criminal prisoners, who were promised their freedom in return for undertaking particularly dangerous military operations. In practice, however, the Soviet military authorities used these penal battalions simply as cannon fodder, sending them into environments where their chances of survival were minimal. Placed in command over one such penal battalion, the young lieutenant Ziya Buniyatov made a name for himself with his bravery and adroit leadership, overcoming injury and severe shellshock – the consequences of which would stay with him for the rest of his life – to win the distinguished military title ‘Hero of the Soviet Union’ for his resolve in crossing the river Pilitsa in Poland.

After the war, Buniyatov entered the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, where he started to study Arabic and the history of Islamic world. He was doubtless influenced in his choice of academic focus by the experiences of his father: Musa Buniyatov had been a professional Arabic- and Persian-language interpreter with the Russian Cossack ataman Lyakhov, who was stationed in Iran at the request of Nasser ad-Din Shah Qajar to help oversee the organization of Cossack units in the Persian army. \*\* Buniyatov’s more distant family background may also have played a role in determining his academic interests. He was descended from the eminent 16<sup>th</sup>-century Azeri Shiite figure Sheikh Buniyad al-Bakuvi, from whom the name Buniyatov is derived. On the orders of the Safavid Shah Tahmasp (1524 – 1576), Sheikh Buniyad was appointed as a keeper (*mutawalli*) of the Bibi-Heybat waqf and mosque in Baku. \*\*\* This institu-

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\* S.P.Tolstov. *Drevniy Khorezm*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo MGU, 1948, p. 8.

\*\* T. Buniyatova, ‘Ziya – moya sud’ba’, in *Sil'neye smerti. Ziya Buniyatov v vospominaniyakh sovremennikov*. Baku: Elm, 2002, p. 57

\*\*\* Sh. Farzaliyev. ‘Sheykh Bunyad nesli ve onun XVI-XIX esrler Baki tarikhine dair bezi senedlerde eks olunmasi’, in *Orta esrler Sherqi*. Baku: Elm, 2000, pp.134-138

tion had been founded in the late 13<sup>th</sup> century, during the rule of Farrukhzad Shirvanshah, on what was believed to be the burial place of Ukeyma Khanum, daughter of the 7<sup>th</sup> Shiite imam Musa al-Kazim (745-799). The position of *mutawalli* remained under the control of Sheikh Buniyad's family for several centuries, right down until the period of tsarist imperial rule; in later years, Buniyatov's family carefully preserved their genealogical documents in defiance of anticlerical measures introduced by the Stalin regime.

After graduating from the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, Ziya Buniyatov surprised people by opting not, as many contemporaries did, for a diplomatic career but instead for a life of scholarly research. Drawing on his training as an Arabist, he focused particularly on the history of what is today known as Azerbaijan in the period of the Arab Caliphate. His early research resulted in a 1965 monograph entitled *Azerbaijan in the 7<sup>th</sup>-9<sup>th</sup> Centuries*,\* which drew admiring notices from scholars including V. Minorsky\*\*, V. Beilis\*\*\* and others. The originality of this work lay in his situating the territory of Azerbaijan, as no one had previously done, within the wider workings of the Caliphate, and in conceptualizing the relation between Caucasian Albania and the subsequent Azerbaijani nation.

Another area of longstanding interest was the history of Turkic peoples in the early Middle Ages. This interest appears to have emerged from his engagement, when researching *Azerbaijan in the 7<sup>th</sup>-9<sup>th</sup> Centuries*, with the history of the Khazars, a still little-known Turkic nation which played an important role in the ethnopolitics of the Caucasus from the 7<sup>th</sup> to the 11<sup>th</sup> century. Step by step, Buniyatov began to study the most remarkable sources of the history of the Turkic peoples written in Arabic. The fruits of this painstaking work included the edition and translation into Russian of several significant medieval treatises, including *The Life of Sultan Jalal ad-Din Mankburni*\*\*\*\* by An-Nasawi and the *Akhbar ad-Dawla as-Seljuqiyya*\*\*\*\*\* by Sadr ad-Din Al-Husayni. During this period, he also produced a monograph about the history of the Ildenizid Atabeks who ruled the territory of Azerbaijan from the mid-12<sup>th</sup> to the first quarter of 13<sup>th</sup> century.\*\*\*\*\*The appearance of this work in 1978 was a milestone in Soviet and Azerbaijani historiography, constituting as it did the first detailed study of that highly important state which played a significant role after the collapse of the Great Seljuq Empire and during the time of the Crusades, and which ushered in a cultural revival producing such outstanding poets as Nizami Ganjavi and Khaqani Shirvani.

It was while researching the Atabeks of Azerbaijan that Buniyatov began to turn his atten-

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\* Z.M. Buniyatov. *Azerbaijan v 7-9 vv.* Baku: Izdatel'stvo AN AzSSR, 1965

\*\* T. Buniyatova, 'Ziya – moya sud'ba', in *Sil'neye smerti. Ziya Buniyatov v vospominaniyakh sovremennikov*. Baku: Elm, 2002, p. 145

\*\*\* V.M. Beylis. 'Retseziya na knigu Z.Buniyatova Azerbaijan v 7-9 vv.', in *Narodi Azii i Afriki*. 1966, # 2, p. 194

\*\*\*\* Shihab ad-Din Muhammad an-Nasawi. *Zhizneopisanie sultana Jalal ad-Dina Mankburni*. (Per. s arab. Z.M.Buniyatova). Baku: Elm, 1973

\*\*\*\*\* Sadr ad-Din 'Ali al-Husayni. *Akhbar ad-Dawlat as-Seljuqiyya* (Zubdat at-Tavarikh fi Akhbar al-Umara' va-l-Muluk as-Seljuqiyya). (Izdaniye teksta, perevod, vvedeniye, primechaniya i prilozheniya Z.M.Buniyatova). Moscow: Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literaturi, 1980

\*\*\*\*\* Z.M. Buniyatov. *Gosudarstvo Atabekov Azerbaijan (1136-1225)*. Baku: Elm, 1978



tion to the history of Central Asia and Khorezm, and more particularly to the Anushteginid dynasty of Khorezmshahs. This was perhaps unsurprising, since the Anushteginids were contemporary with the Atabeks and, following the collapse of the Great Seljuq empire, were their rivals for the Seljuq heritage and for politico-military supremacy in the Middle East. When the Ildenizid Atabek state finally collapsed, it was at the hands of Jalal ad-Din Mankburni, the last Anushteginid Khorezmshah, who was himself in flight from the Mongol invasion coming from the east. Jalal ad-Din was known all over the Muslim East as Chinghis Khan's biggest foe, the last resort of the Abbasid Caliphate in the face of Mongol menace. But his ultimate fate was a cruel one: having entered into hostilities with 'Ala ad-Din Kayqubad, the Seljuq Sultan of Asia Minor, he was defeated and died at the hands of Kurdish bandits.

But the death of Jalal ad-Din was not the end of the long history of his fellow Khorezmian warriors, who had to leave their motherland and seek fortune in a foreign land. One part of Jalal ad-Din's battered army joined the colours of the Seljuq sultans of Asia Minor, with some emirs settling in principalities in Anatolia such as the principality of Sarukhan on the Aegean coast. Others emirs settled in Syria and Palestine, where they fought the Crusaders and helped recapture the cities of the Levant. Scattered as they were across the Middle East, however, they were soon forgotten. It would take the work of Buniyatov to put these historical actors back on the world stage.

The publication in 1986 of Buniyatov's *A History of the Khorezmian State under the Anushteginids, 1097-1231*<sup>\*</sup> was a remarkable event not only in academic, but also in wider public circles in the Soviet Union on the eve of Gorbachev's "Perestroika". Despite the political constraints and residual ideological controls that characterized official public discourse during this period, Soviet scholars by the 1980s enjoyed comparative freedom to work in various areas of research, including ancient and medieval history, which were no longer deemed to be ideologically sensitive. The existence of a well-educated and highly literate population furthermore ensured that there was a wide and receptive readership for any work which captured the public imagination. Buniyatov's *The Anushteginid State of Khorezmshahs* was one such book. The work of a distinguished war hero upon whom had been conferred the highest honours of the Soviet state, it was at the same time a work remarkable for its independence of vision and judgement. The very decision to write on the history of the Khorezmshahs was a bold one: prior to Buniyatov, the Khorezmshahs had been studied in detail only once, and much earlier, in V.V. Bartold's magisterial *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*<sup>\*\*</sup>. In the years since Bartold's publication, the history of Khorezmshahs had effectively ceased to be a subject of research: at a stroke, Buniyatov changed this state of affairs entirely.

The book found a particularly warm welcome among scholars and readers in Central Asia. In revealing just how highly developed was the medieval state of the Khorezmshahs, Buniyatov challenged much of the dominant Soviet historical discourse according to which Central

<sup>\*</sup> Z.M. Buniyatov. *Gosudarstvo Khorezmshakhov-Anushteginidov: 1097-1231*. Moscow: Nauka, 1986

<sup>\*\*</sup> V.Bartold. *Turkestan v epokhu mongol'skogo nashestiya*. Ch. I. Teksti. Sankt-Petersburg, 1898; Ch. II. Issledovaniye. Sankt-Petersburg, 1900

Asia, as the last region to be incorporated into the Russian Empire, continued even after the 1917 revolutions to be on a lower developmental level than the rest of the Soviet Union. By highlighting the glittering achievements of a Khorezmian polity that had flourished at a time when Russia itself was little more than a cluster of impoverished fiefdoms, Buniyatov's book represented a bold move towards reconfiguring the constellation of power and prestige within the lands under Soviet rule. Such boldness was a hallmark of Buniyatov's work throughout his career. As the historian A. Ahmedov has recently observed, Buniyatov, in dedicating his 1973 edition of An-Nasawi to the memory of the Uzbek World War II commander Sabir Rahimov, was directly challenging an ordinance issued that year in Moscow against 'the idealization of the past',<sup>\*</sup> as a consequence of which the book was placed alongside such works as A. Urunbaev's facsimile edition of Sharaf ad-Din 'Ali Yazdi's *Zafar-namah* and R. Nabyev's *History of the Kokand Khanate* on a list of scholarly works forbidden for open sale. Through his remarkable intellectual bravery, Buniyatov found himself here in distinguished company.

Overseeing the publication in English of Buniyatov's *The Anushteginid State of Khorezmshahs* has been for me a labour of love, and one that leaves me with a greater appreciation than ever both for the book and for the fine moral character of its remarkable author. While finalizing the manuscript of the translated text, I had the privilege, thanks to Zemfira Qurbanova, administrator of the Buniyatov Room in the Institute of Oriental studies at the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, to look at some of the letters that Buniyatov received from admiring readers from all over the former Soviet Union. It is moving to see what an impact on readers an academic monograph on a little-known period of Central Asian history might have. One of Buniyatov's Uzbek correspondents describes how, when reading of Jalal ad-Din Manguberdi's death, he wept tears, and suggests that Buniyatov, in his retelling of events, attains the same literary greatness as Navoi, Biruni, Ulugh-Bek and Nizami; another reader, an ethnic Russian from the Crimea, suggests that Buniyatov's account of Khorezmian history is more elegant a piece of work than any of the countless works about the emperors of ancient Rome. These, admittedly, are the judgments of lay readers rather than professional historians: but to have elicited such admiration from a lay readership is itself a testimony to the clarity and wit of Buniyatov's writing, and a reminder to Central Asian historians working today that it is by their readers that their works attain immortality.

As we draw this introduction to a close, it is of course worth acknowledging some of the shortcomings of the book. Readers will observe that Buniyatov takes a highly literalistic approach towards his sources, mining them for information without subjecting them to much in the way of critical analysis; in taking at face value often highly inflated claims about the populations of individual cities or the size of armies, for instance, Buniyatov might occasionally be accused of a failure to discriminate the true from the not. But such a tendency can equally be seen as a consequence of Buniyatov's close engagement with his texts, setting aside theoretic-

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<sup>\*</sup> A. Ahmedov, 'Ziya Buniyatov – ucheniy-vostokoved', in *Silneye smerti. Ziya Buniyatov v vospominaniyakh sovremennikov*. Baku: Elm, 2002, p. 449-450

cal preconceptions – of a kind which often mar the work of Soviet scholars all too concerned about keeping their arguments within pre-determined ideological framework– in favour of a disciplined empiricism according to which it is the text which matters, and the text which must be heard most clearly.

It is hoped that the publication in English of Buniyatov's *The Anushteginid State of Khorezmshahs* will make familiar to a new readership of western readers one of the most important studies of pre-Mongol Central Asia, both as a study of a still little-known period of history and as a distinguished exemplar of late-Soviet orientalism.

In preparing the work for publication in English, my colleagues and I have generally opted to reproduce Buniyatov's text as faithfully as possible, just occasionally rewording passages so as better to conform to English idiom. By minimising editorial intrusions, we hope to give English-language readers a sense of the texture of Buniyatov's prose, and of the practices of late-Soviet orientalist writing. As a result, the structure and form of the book may occasionally strike readers as unusual, or eccentric: I should suggest that this is salutary, however, reminding readers of the unstated literary conventions that shape the practice of writing not only in alien academic environments but also in our own. Similarly, we have opted to retain Buniyatov's bibliographical references exactly as they are: while much significant work on the Khorezmshahs has appeared in the thirty years since Buniyatov's book was first published, we have chosen not to incorporate this material in the apparatus, preferring instead to evoke for the English-language reader Buniyatov's own diverse, if perhaps not omniscient, domain of reference. By reading *A History of the Khorezmian State under the Anushteginids, 1097-1231* in the light of the circumstances of its production, we begin to grasp what is so remarkable about the work, and what makes it so deserving of a wider English-language audience.

**Shahin Mustafayev**



**Z.M. Buniyatov**

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## AUTHOR'S NOTE

The historical fortunes of Khorezm have frequently been the subject of attention by historians. Ancient crop-producing cultures have been discovered and explored in the lower reaches of the Amu Darya and adjacent territories. By the mid-second millennium BC, there already existed in the region a developed irrigation system, which by the mid-first millennium BC had become highly sophisticated. Khorezm subsequently became one of the major economic and cultural centres of Central Asia and the wider Persianate world. There existed a dynastic tradition of Khorezmian rulers entitled Khorezmshahs from the very first centuries of the current era, and the tradition persisted in Kath province even after Arabs conquered Khorezm in 712.

As a part of the Caliphate, Khorezm retained its significance as an ancient cultural centre: this continuity of cultural traditions helps explain the fact that Khorezm was birthplace to various prominent scholars including Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khorezmi and Abu Rayhan Muhammad al-Biruni. As natives of Khorezm, many outstanding literati and scholars had the *nisba* 'al-Khorezmi'. This offers eloquent testimony to the existence of an outstanding cultural environment with diverse interests. Khorezm was at the pinnacle of its academic fame in the late 10<sup>th</sup> – early 11<sup>th</sup> centuries, during the time of al-Biruni and Avicenna. However, in 1017 following the conquest by Mahmud Ghaznavi, Khorezm's status as one of the main political power centers in Central Asia entered a century-long period of decline. Khorezm became a part of the Ghaznavid possessions until the 1040s, and later was a part of the Seljuq state.

Our research starts from that point and covers a 140-years reign of Khorezmshahs of the fourth and, in the words of the famous Russian orientalist V.V. Bartold, "most brilliant dynasty" – the Anushteginids (1097-1231).

The book deals not with the history of Khorezm as a historical region but rather with origin, development and collapse of the state with Khorezm as its center and Gurganj (Jurjaniya) as its capital. Initially a vassal state within the Seljuq Empire, it succeeded in gaining independence and turning into the most powerful state in Central Asia and Northern Iran to include territories of Mawarannahr, Khurasan, Mazandaran, Kerman, Persian Iraq, Azerbaijan, Sijistan, Ghazna, etc. in the last decades of its existence.

In the late 12<sup>th</sup> and early 13<sup>th</sup> centuries, the realm of Khorezmshahs stood out as the greatest and the most powerful kingdom in the Muslim Orient.

Historians and other scholars concerned were expressing their interest in this dynasty primarily because it was the first to bear the brunt of the Mongol invasion westwards. Despite outnumbering the Mongolian army, the dynasty failed to organize defence both on the borderlands and in the core parts of the kingdom. At the same time, the population of some towns in Central Asia (the capital included) and many troops put up fierce resistance to the invaders, causing great damage. Through his legendary campaigns against the in-

vading forces, the last Khorezmshah Jalal ad-Din Mankburni earned immortal fame as the staunchest and most active foe of the Mongols.

There are several research works, handbooks and basic monographs on Central Asia which deal with the history of the Khorezmshah dynasty. Detailed information about the blossoming forth of Khorezmshahs and their subsequent fate is provided in V.V. Bartold's book *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion* and in a popular work by S.P. Tolstov *Tracing the civilization of ancient Khorezm*. As for the historical belles-lettres, readers draw information about the history of struggle of Central Asian peoples against Mongol invaders from a remarkable historical novel of V. Jan entitled *Chinghis Khan*. However, more than eight decades have passed from the time of Bartold's classic work and since then the volume of historical sources on the subject has increasingly widened. Although Bartold used primary sources on the history of the Khorezmshah dynasty, including works by Ibn al-Athir, an-Nasawi, Juwayni, Rashid ad-Din, official documents, and some works of the authors of later period (Mirkhwand and etc.) he had no access to the works of Arab and Persian authors discovered in manuscripts after the publication of his book. Specifically this concerns the works of Ibn al-Fuwati, Ibn as-Sa'i, Ibn ad-Dubaysi, al-Yazdi, an-Nishapuri, al-Husayni, etc. Besides, Bartold showed no interest in some works, for they had no direct relation to the subject of his research. Subsequently it has been proved that "A Vocabulary of Literary Men" by Yaqut al-Hamawi, a biography of Shafi'ites (*Tabaqat* – "Ratings") by as-Subki, and the works by as-Suyuti provide some evidence that matter in re-establishing the history of the Khorezmshah dynasty. The aforementioned work by S.P. Tolstov (1948) was written by an archaeologist, so the facts of political and social history of Khorezmshahs were not the main subjects of his research which focused more on the key historical role of Khorezm (ad maiorem Chorasmiæ gloriam – "for the greater glory of Khorezm", as it was put by another scholar V.F. Minorsky).

On the topic, *The History of the State of Khorezmshahs* by Turkish historian Ibrahim Kafesoğlu (Ankara, 1956) is notable for which it deals with the political and military history of the kingdom. A PhD thesis by professor of the University of Baghdad Nafi'a Taufiq al-Ubud, which was published in 1978, studies the origins of the dynasty and its domain, its relations with other Muslim kingdoms and dynasties, its military and administrative structure. Also, several works came off the press which retrace the history of Khorezmshahs' vassal states. There are works by Erdoghan Merchil, professor at Istanbul University, on the history of the Salgurid atabeks of Fars and on the atabeks of Kerman.

The idea to research the history of the dynasty of Khorezmshahs first came during my work on a monograph entitled *The Atabek State of Azerbaijan (1136-1225)*. Both states existed during the same historical period; their rulers, especially Atabek Jahan-Pahlawan (1175-1186) and Khorezmshah Tekish (1172-1200) maintained friendly relations. Research on the subject was preceded by intensive source-study efforts, including the preparation of a critical text edition and an annotated translation of a work by Shihab al-Din Muhammad an-Nasawi, private secretary (munshi) to the last Khorezmshah, entitled "The Biography



of Sultan Jalal ad-Din Mankburni”; a thorough study into other written sources, especially documents – decrees of Khorezmshahs, including sources of the latest period, including those which are available in manuscripts only.

It should be noted that the information provided by manuscript sources is often of a controversial nature, and not concerned with the established date and chronology. The published research is intended for the general reader, so there is no need to provide different interpretations of sources and giving proof of each one.

In the work I have made no attempt to draw upon archaeological or ethnographic sources related to the region, which would entail a very different project altogether. A great acknowledgement is made to the professors V.M.Beilis and E.A.Davidovich for their contribution to the research.

Z.M. Bunyatov

Baku, 1982-1984

## THE ORIGINS OF THE DYNASTY

Anush-Tegin, eponymous ancestor of the Khorezmshahid dynasty, spent his youth as a slave (*mamluk*) in the region of Gharchistan.<sup>1</sup> Rashid ad-Din and Hafiz-i Abru report on the Turkic origin of Anush-Tegin and his belonging to the Oghuz tribe of Bekdili.<sup>2</sup> As a young man Anush-Tegin was acquired as a slave by the distinguished Seljuq emir *isfahsalar* ‘Izz ad-Din Onar Bilge-Tegin (d. 1098). Later on he started to get promoted quickly, joined a sultan’s retinue and was appointed a custodian of the sultan’s washing and bath accessories (*tashtdar*) of Malik-shah I (1071-1092).<sup>3</sup>

Soon after Anush-Tegin became a confidant of the sultan, as a position of *tashtdar* considered as one of the major court offices. All the expenses relating to this position were covered by the tax revenues from the province of Khorezm. Therefore Anush-Tegin was appointed as a *mutasarrif* of Khorezm and received the title of the *shihna* of said province.<sup>4</sup> However, he did not enjoy absolute power in Khorezm, because it was a *mamluk* of Malik-shah’s son (future great Sultan Sanjar) who was in charge of the province as a governor (*wali*). This *mamluk*’s name was Ekinchi ibn Qochqar, and after Malik-shah’s death, he played an important role for several years in the politics of Central Asia.

During the reign of Sultan Berkiyaruq (1094-1104), power over much of the eastern regions was in the hands of Dadbek Habashi ibn Altun-Tash, amir of Khurasan. Using the internecine struggle of the Seljuqs he seceded from the central authority in 1097.<sup>5</sup> The same year Anush-Tegin died, and Amir Dadbek Habashi substituted Ekinchi ibn Qochqar, appointed Qutb ad-Din Muhammad,<sup>6</sup> Anush-Tegin’s son, as the *wali* of Khorezm. At the same time he became *muqta*’ of Khorezm and received the title (*laqab*)’of Khorezmshah. Hence, it was Qutb ad-Din Muhammad who started the history of the dynasty.

When in 1100 Sultan Berkiyaruq and his brother Sanjar cracked down on the uprising led by amir Dadbek Habashi,<sup>8</sup> Sanjar seized Khurasan and reaffirmed Qutb ad-Din Muhammad as ruler of Khorezm.

During the lifetime of his father, Qutb ad-Din Muhammad received an excellent education in Merv, capital of Khurasan, mastered *adab* and religious sciences. As a ruler of Khorezm, he proved to be a talented administrator and a patron of scholars and religious figures. “He was a thoroughly gifted man; we read, worshipped by the men of science and religion, and he was close to them. He was a fair ruler with respect to his subjects who glorified him”.<sup>9</sup>

Qutb ad-Din made great efforts to consolidate his power in Khorezm. He served sultan Sanjar faithfully, and the latter gave credence to him, protecting from the malicious attacks of his courtiers.<sup>10</sup> Once, when Qutb ad-Din Muhammad was absent in Khorezm, a son of the former governor Toghrul-Tegin Muhammad ibn Ekinchi invaded Khorezm leading Turkic nomads. Qutb ad-Din appealed to Sanjar, and while

the sultan was engaged in mustering the army, Qutb ad-Din defeated the enemy by himself alone. This greatly helped to boost his prestige in the eyes of the sultan.<sup>11</sup>

Khorezmshah Qutb ad-Din Muhammad played an active part in the feudal struggle for supreme power in the clan of Seljuqs. At the battle of Sawa, on 2 Jumada 513 AH (11 August 1119), he aligned himself with Sanjar, the Seljuq Great Sultan, and helped defeat Sanjar's nephew and rival Mahmud ibn Muhammad. On another occasion, Qutb ad-Din intervened as Sanjar was preparing to lead a campaign against Muhammad Arslan-khan, Qarakhanid ruler of Samarqand (1102-1130). At the Qarakhanid ruler's entreaties, Qutb ad-Din was able to use his power and influence to dissuade Sanjar from going to war.

The authority that Qutb ad-Din enjoyed can be seen from his titlature: *Padishah Qutb ad-Dunya wa-d-Din Abu-l-Fath Mu'in Amir al-Mu'minin* ("Padishah, the Pole of this World and the Faith, Father of a Victory, Assistant to the Amir of Believers", i.e. Caliph). The last *laqab* is a proof of the direct connections between Qutb ad-Din and the government of Caliphate that perhaps were carried out bypassing Sanjar.<sup>13</sup>

Khorezmshah Qutb ad-Din Muhammad reigned over Khorezm for 30 years and was a loyal vassal to the sultan Sanjar till his death (522/1127-28). He delivered tributes to the sultan's treasury in person or occasionally via his son Atsiz. In doing so, he emphasized Sanjar's supremacy as a ruler. So, when Qutb ad-Din Muhammad died, Sanjar immediately decreed to enthrone his son al-Malik Abu Muzaffar 'Ala ad-Din Jalal ad-Din Atsiz as Khorezmshah.<sup>14</sup>

When Atsiz came to power, he was 29 years old. Like his father, he was brought up in Merv, Sanjar's capital. In addition to patronizing faith and theologians, he became famous as connoisseur of art and science, wrote *qasida* and *rubaiyat* in Persian, and was well versed in contemporary literature.<sup>15</sup> Atsiz was reputed to be a fair and caring ruler;<sup>16</sup> he was loved by his subjects who "enjoyed prosperity and total safety during his reign".<sup>17</sup>

Atsiz was famed for his courage and was lucky in battle; he scored numerous victories,<sup>18</sup> and thus earned goodwill of his suzerain. Greatly contributing to the confidence and the affection of Great Sultan was an incident following which Atsiz saved his sovereign's life. In 524/1130, Sanjar went to Mawarannahr to quell a mutiny of his vassal – Arslan-khan Muhammad ibn Sulayman, ruler of Samarqand<sup>19</sup>. When Sanjar reached Bukhara, his *ghulams* and servants hatched a plot to kill him during the hunt. Atsiz did not go to the hunt and stayed, but he woke up at night and went to rescue Sanjar. In the meanwhile, Sanjar was surrounded by plotters and was desperate for help. Atsiz pounced on plotters and rescued Sanjar. When the great sultan inquired how Atsiz learnt about the plot, the latter replied: "I dreamt that an accident had befallen the Sultan in the hunting grounds, and I at once hastened to this side".<sup>20</sup>

Sanjar was constantly accompanied by Atsiz in his campaigns. The sultan appointed Atsiz a commander of the left flank of his army during a war with his nephew Mas'ud ibn Muhammad Tapar (1133-1152). The battle between Sanjar and Mas'ud took place on 8 Rajab in 526 AH (26 May 1132) in a locality Day-Marj, near Hamadan, and

resulted in Sanjar's victory.<sup>21</sup>

During the reign of caliph al-Mustarshid (1118-1135) relations between the Caliphate and Khorezmshahs grew stronger. Drawn into a war with Seljuqs with the aim to restore his political clout, al-Mustarshid was keenly interested in stronger ties with the wilful Atsiz. Seeing the Khorezmshah as a potential ally, in 528/1133 the caliph sent him robes of honour.<sup>22</sup>

In so doing, the Caliph seems to have been trying to support Atsiz in his struggle against sultan Sanjar. By that time Atsiz had become very influential and his authority became a great source of envy for the Great Sultan's retinue.<sup>23</sup> Even Atsiz felt Sanjar's change in attitude towards him. This became apparent during Sanjar's campaign against the rebellious Ghaznavid Bahram-shah [Dhu-l-qa'da 529 AH (July-August 1135) – 530 AH (July 1136)].

When Sanjar arrived in Balkh, Khorezmshah Atsiz, acting as *kutwal* (commandant) of the town in charge of food and forage, asked Sultan to let him return home to Khorezm, Sanjar allowed him to leave. When Atsiz left, Sanjar told his retinue that he would never see him again. Then his people asked: "If Your Majesty is certain of this, why then did he obtain leave to return home to Khorezm?". Sanjar replied: "The services he has rendered us have placed us under a great obligation to him: to harm him would be contrary to our tenets of generosity and clemency".<sup>24</sup>

For ten years (1128-1138) Atsiz had been devoted to his suzerain, the Great Seljuq Sultan Sanjar, never having an inclination to go against him. However, over this same period Atsiz consolidated his position and gained strength enough to assert his independence from the sultan. When he announced to his courtiers and amirs that he "refused to serve Sanjar (*imtana'a alayhi*)", his people supported him, and Khorezmshah started to act.<sup>25</sup>

Like other vassals of Sanjar whose territories bordered the lands of "infidel" Turkic nomads, Khorezmshah Atsiz was supposed to raid his neighbours only when instructed by his suzerain. No wilfulness was tolerated. However, Atsiz violated the order and seized the lands of Seljuq-subordinated Turks downstream of the river Syr Darya, including the town of Jand, and advanced northwards, annexing the territory of Manghyshlaq.<sup>26</sup> That was essentially the first independent action of Atsiz in respect to his suzerain Sanjar.

When Sultan Sanjar learned about the wilfulness of Khorezmshah Atsiz, he decided to teach his vassal a lesson, and in the month of Muharram in 533 AH (October 1138) he set out to Khorezm.<sup>27</sup> Apparently Sanjar thought that letting Atsiz get away with his actions would provoke his other vassals - Qarakhanids and Ghaznavids - into disobedience.

In the battle of Hazarasp Atsiz was routed, for "he had insufficient strength to overpower the sultan, and fled. Numerous warriors (10,000) lost their lives, including his son Atlyk. The father mourned about his death, and pined much for him".<sup>28</sup>

Having gained a victory over Atsiz, Sanjar, as was the custom, sent a triumphal letter (*fath-nama*) to the *maliks* explaining reasons of punitive expedition against

the obstinate Khorezmshah. Sanjar charged Atsiz with “disobedience and shedding blood of Muslims in Jand and Manghyshlaq, whose residents are faithful defenders of the Islamic land and fighters against infidels (*kuffar*)”.<sup>29</sup>

In laying claims against Khorezmshah Atsiz, Sultan Sanjar contradicted himself: in his letter in 526/1132 to Anushirvan ibn Khalid, the vizier of caliph al-Mustarshid in Baghdad, he pointed out that the campaigns of Atsiz and his conquest of Jand and Manghyshlaq proved to be marches to the glory of Islam and its proliferation. As is seen, the sultan Sanjar assessed one and the same actions differently, according to political expediency.<sup>30</sup>

Further, the letter accused the Khorezmshah of imprisoning, and then executing one of Sanjar’s top Khorezmian representatives, arresting all of his senior officials (*wukala-i khass wa marufan-i hadrat*) and confiscating their property. It also accused him of blocking the roads to Khurasan for travellers, and of sending taxes levied for crossing Jayhun and other rivers not all at once but in instalments (*parakanda*). The letter additionally accused Khorezmian officials in charge of these river-crossings of stealing from travellers and encroaching on their harems.<sup>31</sup>

After the seizure of Khorezm, Sanjar granted it as *iqta’* to his nephew Sulayman-shah, appointed there a vizier, an atabek and a hajib, and defined principles of governance by a new governor.<sup>32</sup> However, Sulayman-shah failed to establish himself in these possessions. As soon as Sanjar returned to Merv in February 1139, Khorezmshah Atsiz came back to Khorezm and, with the assistance of its residents, ousted Sulayman-shah and re-established his power in the region.<sup>33</sup>

However, Atsiz was concerned that Sanjar would again send his troops to Khorezm. So, he decided to forestall the sultan, and expressed his obedience to Sanjar. The latter took him on trust and forgave Sulayman-shah’s banishment from Khorezm.

Atsiz’s reconciliation with Sanjar was a prime instance of his political skills. The reconciliation gave him an opportunity to repair his military forces, allowing him once again to resume his raids on neighbouring lands. First, he waged an attack on Jurjan, and in 1139 captured a district of Kabud-Jama, taking *ispahbad* ‘Ala ad-Dawla ‘Ali ibn Shahriyar as his prisoner. *The ispahbad* was released only after his son Shah-Ghazi Rustam arrived personally to the Khorezmshah and persuaded him to let his father free. Since then, *ispahbads* of Kabud-Jama became vassals of the Khorezmshahs.<sup>34</sup>

After a few months Atsiz started a new campaign against Sanjar’s domain. In 534/1139, Khorezmshah attacked and captured Bukhara, executed Sanjar’s *wali* (amir Zangi ibn ‘Ali) and destroyed the citadel and the walls of the town. The citadel lay in ruins for about two years.<sup>35</sup>

Supposedly the Bukhara campaign came as a result of Sanjar’s march to Khorezm and the assassination of Atliq. Apparently, Sanjar accepted this quid pro quo and took no punitive steps against Atsiz. Also, Sanjar’s indifference towards his obstinate vassal could be explained with the advance of a new threatening force in Mawarannahr. The tribes of the Qara-Khitay (*al-khita*) started a systematic advancement from Xinjiang west- and north-westwards. In his turn, Atsiz, apprehensive for his possessions,

decided to express his obedience to the sultan and sent him in Shawwal 535 AH (9 May 1141) a faithful charter (*sawgand-nama*) in which he assured the sultan that he, Khorezmshah, would never campaign against him. The text of the *sawgand-nama* reads as follows:

"Almighty Allah says, and he is the most veracious of speakers: "You shall fulfill your pledges; surely you shall be held accountable for your pledges"\* and "Fulfill the covenant of Allah when you have pledged to do so, and do not break your oaths after you have sworn them; for swearing in His name you have made Allah your surety".\*\* As for me, Atsiz, son of Muhammad, I appeal to mighty and great Allah, and I resort to his mercy. As I owe my oath to Allah, likewise I consider myself obliged to obey the sovereign of this world (*khudawand-i 'alam*), the Sultan of Islam. Allah welcomes those on the pious path. I am, Atsiz, son of Khorezmshah Muhammad, promised mighty and great Allah and his Messenger Muhammad, Allah be with Him, that I shall obey Sanjar ibn Malik-shah, so prolong Allah his life, and follow his orders. Never shall I disobey him. I shall be no friend to the Turks or the Tajiks, friends or enemies, women and men, infidels (*kuffar*) or Muslims who want to harm the state. I shall not support them, nor will I oppose [Sanjar's] state. I shall be friend to his friends, and enemy to his enemies. Should an enemy of his write a message against the state or conspire, I would inform High Authority (*ra'y-i a'la*) about it. To the best of my abilities, I shall suppress all those plotting against the authorities. I shall yield to no cunning or ruses, and I shall not doubt. Following my worship and subordination to Creator, I consider it my duty to fulfil orders of the happy padishah. At the same time, I shall be loyal to all as mentioned in this charter. In the name of mighty and great, merciful and gracious, supreme, the sole one, all-cognizing, all-shattering and perpetual Allah, I assure in my devotion to everything containing in the charter. I swear by Allah, by Allah, by Allah!

"I swear by the name of Allah, Creator of the Heavens and the Earth, I shall never oppose the sultan. Should I make a blunder contrary to the charter, let Allah's anger befall me, and I shall lose his protection. Should I oppose the sultan, I would make ten successive pilgrimages to Mecca by foot and fast for ten years; I shall distribute my property and possessions to the poor in Mecca and Medina. Should I violate a single of my oaths, let Allah bring His ire upon me. Should I be a remiss slave of the great sultan, I would be accursed by mighty Allah, His Messenger and other Prophets.

"This charter has been drawn up of my own will in mid-Shawwal 535 (May 1141)".<sup>36</sup>

However, while sending the charter to sultan Sanjar, Khorezmshah Atsiz realized that Sanjar was no longer displaying firmness and seriously resisting his actions. In other words, Atsiz came to believe in his impunity and started to pursue his independent political line. To make certain that his line was correct, he sent his man to Baghdad in 1141 to deliver a message to caliph al-Muqtafi (1136-1160). In his message Atsiz expressed his absolute loyalty to the caliph, reported on a sacred war (*jihad*) of his

\* Koran XVII, 34/36.

\*\* Koran XVI, 91/93.

father Muhammad ibn Anush-Tegin against Seljuqs, and that sultan Sanjar incited him to rise against the caliph. Atsiz asked the caliph to issue a decree on his appointment as a sovereign of Khorezmian vilayat, from its eastern borders to the western lands to be conquered by him, as well as countries and regions to join it, if any.<sup>37</sup>

In a short while, Khorezmshah Atsiz received robes garments and gifts from Baghdad, as well as a decree on approving him as a full sovereign of his lands with the title of sultan. Starting from 1141, therefore, Atsiz began minting golden coins with his name engraved.<sup>38</sup>

In taking this step, the caliph al-Muqtafi aimed to get an ally in his struggle against the Seljuqs in revenge of the murder of his predecessors – caliph al-Mustarshid (1118-1135) and ar-Rashid (1135-1136). The Seljuqs and, first of all, sultan Sanjar, were thought of being guilty in their deaths.<sup>39</sup>

While certifying his loyalty to sultan Sanjar, Atsiz was far from the thought of becoming an obedient vassal. As a far-sighted politician, he was well informed about the situation in Central Asia, and could foresee casting off Sanjar's yoke very soon. His expectations proved to be right with sultan Sanjar facing strong adversaries in Central Asia. First there were the Qara-Khitay<sup>40</sup> and later the Oghuz. Ibn al-Athir reports that "Khorezmshah appealed to the Khitay [in Mawarannahr], inciting them to assault the kingdom of sultan Sanjar".<sup>41</sup>

The first skirmish with the Qara-Khitay took place in 522/1128 when they invaded Kashghar from the east. The offensive was beaten off by Sanjar's vassal, Ahmad-khan ibn al-Hasan of Kashghar.<sup>42</sup> But having consolidated themselves on the lands neighbouring Mawarannahr and subjugating Qirghizs and Uighurs, the Qara-Khitay grew stronger and invaded Mawarannahr in 531/1137. Their opponent, the Samarqand khan Mahmud ibn Arslan-shah was defeated near Khujand and fled to Samarqand. "Afterwards, - a historian notes, - the people suffered misfortunes, fear and sorrow intensified, and trouble set in".<sup>43</sup>

The Samarqand khan appealed to sultan Sanjar who immediately made ready for the war with the Qara-Khitay and especially with the Qarluqs – instigators of the Qara-Khitay invasion in Mawarannahr. Being the vassals of the Samarqand khan, they rebelled against him and asked the Qara-Khitay for military aid. That was a pretext for the Qara-Khitay to invade.

Reassured by Atsiz's oath, Sultan Sanjar felt secure for his left flank and was preparing for the war during the next six months. Nearly all the vassals of Sanjar were involved in preparations, including rulers of Sijistan, Ghur, Ghazna and Mazandaran. According to the historical sources the Sanjar's army numbered 100,000 men.<sup>44</sup>

In Dhu-l-Hijja 535 (July 1141), Sanjar went with his troops to Mawarannahr. In the first turn, he meant to punish the Qarluqs, but they outstripped Sanjar's pursuit and went under the auspices of the Gur-khan<sup>45</sup> of the Qara-Khitay – Yeh-lu Ta-shih (1124-1143).<sup>46</sup>

The Gur-khan sent a letter to Sanjar asking him to leave Qarluqs in peace and to forgive them. In response, enraged Sanjar rudely demanded from the Gur-khan to adopt Islam. Otherwise, Sanjar warned that Gur-khan will have to face the sultan's



army. Boasting, Sanjar mentioned the number, fighting efficiency, armament, high professionalism of his soldiers. Sanjar even wrote that "his soldiers could split a hair into two parts with an arrow".<sup>47</sup> Despite objections of vizier Nasir ad-Din Tahir, grandson of the famous Nizam al-Mulk, the letter was sent to the Gur-khan.

Having read the letter, the Gur-khan ordered to shave off an envoy's beard, gave him a needle, commanded to pierce a hair out of his beard. However, the envoy failed to do that, so the Gur-khan asked: "Now can others cut a hair by an arrow if you cannot pierce it through by the needle?"<sup>48</sup>

According to Chinese sources, the Gur-khan commanded a 100,000-strong force of Turks, Chinese and Khitans.<sup>49</sup> The battle took place near Samarqand, in the desert of Qatawan, on 5 Safar 536 AH (9 September 1141). The Qarluqs waged a relentless fight against Sanjar. Sanjar's army was defeated utterly, and he had to escape with six horsemen only. His army lost 10,000 men in the gorge of Dargham alone.<sup>50</sup>

The defeat of the army of the Great Sultan ruined the Seljuqids' prestige in the Middle East,<sup>51</sup> and Khorezmshah Atsiz took advantage of the moment to expand his possessions. A month after the Sanjar's defeat Atsiz invaded Khurasan and in early Rabi' I 536 AH (early October 1141) he seized Sarakhs. The imam Abu Muhammad az-Ziyadi welcomed Khorezmshah on behalf of the townsfolk, and Atsiz did him an honour.<sup>52</sup> On 17 Rabi' I 536 AH (21 October 1141), "Khorezmshah 'Ala ad-Din Atsiz ibn Muhammad ibn Anush-Tegin captured Merv, while [Sanjar] was preoccupied elsewhere, and killed the representatives of the local elite. He mounted on Sanjar's throne, sealed up the sultan's treasury with *tughra*, then took the coffers with him".<sup>53</sup>

"Thus relates Sadr ad-Din al-Husayni: and his report could be confirmed and supplemented with other sources".

When Atsiz approached Merv with his army, he was greeted by the imam Ahmad al-Bakharzi; Khorezmshah camped outside the town and agreed to guarantee security (*aman*) for the residents of Merv, provided they would comply with his demands and raise no difficulties to his representatives in the city. However, when Atsiz demanded some noblemen of Merv to be taken as hostages, including the well-known Hanafi faqih Abu-l-Fadl al-Kermani,<sup>54</sup> the townsfolk (*'amma*) rose, killed several of Atsiz's people, and ousted others out of the city and locked the gates in defiance of Atsiz. Infuriated, Atsiz burst into the city and devastated it utterly. Among the executed there were prominent figures of Merv, including the Shafi'i faqih Ibrahim al-Marwazi; a polymath scholar 'Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Arslan, Sharif 'Ali ibn Ishaq al-Musawi who headed the Merv uprising, etc. Also, Abu-l-Fadl al-Kermani, Abu Mansur al-Abbadi, the qadi al-Husayn ibn Muhammad al-Arsabandi, the philosopher Abu Muhammad al-Kharaki and other scholars were abducted to Khorezm.<sup>55</sup> The last initiative testified to Khorezmshah Atsiz's aspiration to raise his capital's reputation as centre of sciences.

After his conquest of Merv, Atsiz moved towards Nishapur in Shawwal of the same year (May 1142). He was welcomed by religious figures of the city who asked Atsiz to be merciful to Nishapur residents and abstain from Merv-like devastations. Atsiz gave his consent and appealed to the townspeople from the village of Ab-i Baryek as saying:



“Wonderful stories about us are yet to reach that degree thus to be beyond the understanding for a living creature when I displayed sincerity before the Lord and brought on a haft [of a sword] of my valour and goodwill the reins of world’s government and the protection for all people. Because of the heaven’s revolution and divine predestination each day is bringing blessings to our life. To return this kindness, we are seeking to eliminate the darkness of violence on earth and grant the world a place in the shade of our infinite benevolence. Credit goes to us for removing a gain [for] the rulers from the paths of eternity and exterminated the enemies, transformed our feasts and battles into a source of generosity and miracles for the people. Some people enjoy our endearment, others remains scared and groan. Today, people read characters of fortunate heavenly presage on the pages of our success and see manifestation of celestial mysteries in our actions. If anyone has doubts about what has been said then he should think over delusive destiny and inconstancy of the cause of Sanjar, world’s padishah. While his thoughts were in unison with ours, a banner of his happy kingdom was hoisted on the highest sphere. When the consent changed for the dissention, and he, influenced by his effeminate and cowardly advisers, turned his face away from us, ruined our ancient rights and property, the heavens came down, and now we do not know why should he be remorseful, for his kingdom had no other faithful protector and friend, like me. Our supremacy is not a secret for anyone.

"Today, our banners reached happily Ab-i Baryek, and from there they would set off to Nishapur’s environs. There are well aware of what is happening in Khurasan to those unwilling to obey. We are positive about residents, shaykhs, nobility and the people of Nishapur. If they want to stay in their abodes, avoid destructions, and to remain as the sovereigns of their land, then they have to apply some efforts. We sent khoja ra’is to inform about the order, and to call the shaykhs and the noblemen to us to make an agreement. As soon as you read the message, you should announce my name in *khutba* and start minting coins with my name. If there are people poised to revolt like other khans, “we shall arrive with the army which would overwhelm them, and they will be abased, and would remain as such”<sup>56\*</sup>.

According to this message, Sultan Sanjar was defeated because he ignored the support of Atsiz, and while he did enjoy this support, his empire flourished. At any rate, Atsiz realized that Sanjar’s defeat in the battle with the Qara-Khitay in the desert of Qatawan was the beginning of the end of Seljuq domination in Central Asia and Khurasan. While marching on Merv, Nishapur and other cities of Khurasan, Atsiz behaved like a conqueror, insisting on all formalities arising from his recognition as a sultan. Having captured Nishapur, Atsiz demanded to cease mentioning the sultan Sanjar’s name in the *khutba* and replaced it with his own name.

No massacres were carried out in Nishapur, but Atsiz ordered to confiscate property owned by Sanjar’s people. On Friday 2 Dhu-l-Qa’da 536 AH (29 May 1142) Atsiz made his people to announce the *khutba* with his name. However, when *khatibs* announced the *khutba*, the population opposed and attacked them. The episode almost led to

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\*Koran XVI, 91/93.

an uprising but circumspect citizens (*dhu-r-ra'y wa-l-'aql* – “people of wisdom and reason”) warned the other inhabitants of possible grim consequences, so the discord abated.

The *khutba* in Nishapur was issued in the name of Khorezmshah Atsiz for just two months, before in Muharram 537 AH (July 1142), it was restored in the name of Sultan Sanjar.<sup>57</sup>

From Nishapur Atsiz dispatched an army under the command of his brother Yinal-Tegin who sacked Bayhaq, Faryumaz and other towns and other towns and districts.<sup>58</sup>

Having returned to his capital Merv after his defeat at the hands of the Qara-Khitay, Sultan Sanjar was in no position to take any measures against the Khorezmshah. The Qara-Khitay were still in Mawarannahr and neighbouring lands, and the Khorezmshah availed himself of the situation.

Following a raid on Khurasan Atsiz returned to Khorezm and, mindful of the Qara-Khitay nearby, concluded an agreement with them and undertook to pay 30,000 golden dinars annually in cash or in cattle.<sup>59</sup>

According to various sources, Khorezmshah Atsiz came out of Sanjar's subordination completely.<sup>60</sup> A court poet and the *munshi* of Khorezmshah Rashid ad-Din Watwat wrote a *qasida* dedicated to Atsiz which began as follows:

King Atsiz ascended the throne of the kingdom:  
the luck of Seljuq and his family came to an end.<sup>61</sup>

Following Sanjar's rout in the desert of Qatawan, the *gur-khan* occupied nearly the whole of Mawarannahr. Once he reached agreement with Atsiz, the *gur-khan* granted Bukhara to Atma-Tegin ibn Bayabani, Atsiz's nephew. The *gur-khan* “entrusted him to the patronage of Khoja Imam Taj al-Islam Ahmad ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, who was the imam of Bukhara from the clan of Burhan.”<sup>62</sup> He ordered the *khoja* to keep his eye open for [Atma-Tegin] and control all his endeavours and to make sure the new ruler did not stray a step without his permission”.<sup>63</sup>

However, soon afterwards the Khorezmshah's nephew began behaving disgracefully in Bukhara and confiscating the residents' property. The townsfolk complained about him to the *gur-khan*, who let him off, however, with just a caution: “Atma-Tegin should be aware that despite a great distance between us, our endorsement and displeasure are close to him. Everything that Atma-Tegin does is subject to [the imam] Ahmad, while what Ahmad does is subject to the order of [Prophet] Muhammad”.<sup>64</sup> In letting the malefactor off so lightly, the *gur-khan* evidently regarded his anti-Sanjar alliance with Atsiz to be greatly more important than the misbehaviour of a rogue administrator in Bukhara.

Sultan Sanjar could not forgive Atsiz for the daring march against his possessions and seizing his treasury, and nurtured plans of revenge. Upon his return to Merv “he distributed three million dinars to his *ghazi*, on top of the dispensed garments and bonuses (*tashrifat*), mustered the troops and marched against Khorezmshah”.<sup>65</sup>

In 538/1143-44, Sultan Sanjar took to the field once against the Khorezmshah Atsiz. His troops laid siege to Gurganj, strongly fortified capital of Khorezm. Atsiz did not dare to leave the fortress as his forces could not withstand Sanjar's army. But Sanjar's attempts to capture the city were in vain, despite some breakthroughs into the fortress. The aggressors were repelled; however, Atsiz was in no position to resist for too long, so Sanjar could gain a victory, should he try harder.

Atsiz decided to forestall the enemy and, having presented Sultan's amirs with lavish gifts, avoided the rout after the courtiers persuaded Sanjar to stop the siege. Especially, as Atsiz begged the sultan's pardon and asked for *aman*. The sultan was satisfied with Atsiz's appeal and agreed to make peace with him.<sup>66</sup> "Afterwards Atsiz returned [to Sanjar] the seized trunks with jewellery and Sanjar's seal. [Then] Khorezmshah rode out and stopped in front of sultan Sanjar on the right bank of Jayhun, got off, kissed the ground and accepted his conditions".<sup>67</sup>

However, as soon as Sanjar returned to Merv he realized that Atsiz was not going to be idle: all his actions testified to the fact that he did not intend to give up. Therefore Sanjar dispatched his envoy - the prominent poet of the time Adib Sabir - to Khorezm, to keep Sanjar informed of the situation in the capital.

One day Adib Sabir learned that Atsiz sent two Isma'ilites to Merv to assassinate Sanjar, and he immediately informed the sultan about it. The two Isma'ilite *fida'i* were seized in Merv and executed. When Atsiz got to know that his plan failed through the fault of Adib Sabir, he ordered to catch the poet and drown him in Amu Darya river.<sup>68</sup>

Sultan Sanjar sent a menacing letter to Atsiz; however, Atsiz gave the following famous answer:

If a steed of the master is quick as wind,  
My chestnut is not a limp.  
You will come here, I shall go over there!  
The Universe is spacious for its ruler!<sup>69</sup>

In September 1145, Atsiz went "over there" where he was planning to for a long time. He moved to conquer Jand and other lands along the banks of the Syr Darya river. He put on a spurt from Gurganj through the desert, besieged Jand and seized the fortress, with almost with bloodshed. On the occasion of the victory over "infidels" and the capture of Jand, Atsiz issued a triumphal charter (*fath-nama*) that said as follows:

"...One of the most wonderful creations and lavish gifts of Almighty Allah is that we are informed of the happy aid, of the triumph by be gained by our near relations and friends in the matters that deal with religion and management, state and people. All these are being done to ensure the safe beginning and the glorious end of the action.

"Jand is an important part of the world and a great border of Islam: Almighty liberated it for us and made it obedient to us. Another question of paramount importance for our power was that a group of rioters incessantly interfered with the region's matters and bossed there. They believed that the violence would be legitimized and their wishes

would be realized. This went on until Almighty Allah instructed us to enter the path of truth and in Rabi' II 540 (October 1145) we came out of Khorezm, this centre of grandeur and the abode of our happiness, to reach the province of Jand.

"Under the accompaniment of successful destiny and fortunate star, we decided to move. Our domain is powerful, our victory was expected to be great, and the destiny obeyed us. With the help of Allah and the support of the heavens, we crossed the desert of Jand, known to be awful and menacing, within a week and on 8 of that month (27 October) we put up at the coast, in a place called Jenag-dara, 20 farsakhs (120-140 km) away from Jand.

"As soon as the pack animals of the triumphal army had a rest, we came up to Jand at night, and on Friday morning, on 9 (28 October) reached the gates of Jand. We started fighting, announced our victory and raised the banner of the state; it was arrival of our blessed suite that led to the escape of unconcerned ignoramus and recalcitrant rebel who titled himself as khan. At once we sent a detachment to seize and cut him to pieces. Other amirs, commanders and respected people hurried to voice their obedience to us and received their share from our mercy and generosity. According to our customs and nature, we refrained from punishing them and forgave their sins and blunders. The province of Jand and its further-flung surroundings was liberated by us, and we did not have to use swords and shed blood in action. Our name started to be mentioned in *khutba*, and our *laqabs* rose.

"When we had the luck unseen by other sovereigns of the universe, we desired qadi, imams, ra'is, the nobility and the landlords being our subjects to gain benefit from our joy and that a news of this great victory would reach them soon.

"This victorious message (*fath-nama*) was drawn up on Friday, the Victory Day, and this wonderful news was sent together with amir Asad al-Mulk Ahri-bek, so help him Allah. As soon as he reaches the destination, he should be greeted cordially and bestowed with all confidence.

"This wonderful news should be proclaimed everywhere; an appropriate ceremony and reception have to be arranged after this blessed message will be received. Following this message and a final conquest of Jand when a reliable and authorized person will be entrusted to govern the province, we shall make our way to the capital of the kingdom, to the abode of our happiness in order that everyone could live safely and think of Khorezm and Jand as the united kingdom, and to send envoys and letters blessing our power until our banners arrive, for all these gifts and happiness are fruits of their prosperity. And the peace be upon it!"<sup>70</sup>

Such an action of vassal in respect to his suzerain caused a new punitive expedition, for that it was an apparent blow at the Great Sultan's prestige. In Jumada I 542 AH (November 1147) Sanjar took to the field for the third time against Khorezmshah Atsiz.<sup>71</sup>

This time, Atsiz decided to take shelter in the fortress of Hazarasp.<sup>72</sup> The army of the sultan besieged the fortress and began catapulting it. The siege lasted for two months, and finally Sanjar succeeded to capture it.<sup>73</sup> A court poet of Sanjar, Awhad ad-Din Muhammad ibn 'Ali 'Anwari (d. 1168) who took part in the siege of Hazarasp,

wrote the following verse:

O king (Sanjar), all the empire of the earth is accounted thine;  
 By fortune and good luck the world is thy acquisition:  
 Take Hazarasp today with a single assault,  
 And tomorrow Khorezm and hundred of thousand horses (hazar asp) shall bethine!

Having tied the verse to an arrow, he released it to the besieged. While under siege at Hazarasp, Rashid ad-Din Watwat wrote an answer and sent it back with an arrow too:<sup>74</sup>

If thine enemy, o king (Atsiz), were the hero Rustam himself,  
 He could not carry forth a single ass from thy thousand horses (hazar asp)!

The enraged Sanjar looked for Watwat, but he came to see him when the sultan's anger waned, and the latter pardoned him.

Having captured Hazarasp, Sultan Sanjar besieged Gurganj, the capital of Atsiz. Finding himself unable to resist Sanjar, Atsiz sought to make peace with the sultan. An ascetic called Ahu-Push ("clothed in deer-skin") acted as a go-between and he was received by the sultan with great honour. Ahu-Push succeeded in securing Sanjar's mercy toward the residents of the city. Besides Ahu-Push, Atsiz sent to the sultan a group of envoys with valuable gifts and asked for *aman*. And Sultan Sanjar pardoned Atsiz for the third time.<sup>75</sup>

By convention, Atsiz was to express his obedience to Sanjar and kiss earth beneath his feet. On 12 Muharram 542 AH (2 June 1148), therefore, Atsiz presented himself before Sultan Sanjar to offer homage. In fact, he did not act quite as he was expected to. He failed to dismount from his horse, and he greeted Sanjar with the curtest of nods. Even worse, he then left Sanjar's presence without permission. The sultan was angry at Atsiz's impudence, but had to curtail his indignation in view of the fact that he had just pardoned the Khorezmshah and could not change his decision. Showing no outward displeasure, Sultan Sanjar returned to Merv.<sup>76</sup>

Owing to the armistice, Atsiz sent the following penitent letter to the sultan, in order to assuage.

"Let the Supreme Ruler, the Sovereign of Humans, the Sultan of the East and the West, the Governor of the Universe live for thousand years! Let the world develop at his discretion, the heavens serve him, and destiny and empire together lie subject to his will. The most resigned slave of him is ready to kiss the earth on the Sovereign's doorstep. His reign and supreme status – So Allah may extend his life! – are the *qibla* for rulers of land and sea, *Ka'ba* for the sultans of the East and the West, reached the acme so that no imagination is capable of to conceive it, and *qalam* – to describe it! I set all my hopes on perfect generosity of omnipotent Allah, so that he could demonstrate his mercy and enable the slave to kiss the ground on the doorsteps and provide the opportunity to stay at the palace together with my Sovereign and enjoy his mercy.

"The slave of the slaves incessantly, day and night thanks for his mercy... After people saw and witnessed the justice of the ruler of the Universe, heard and watched the brilliance of his charity, they blessed his powerful empire and entreated Allah to prolong his existence. From now on, his lowest slave will serve and obey the Supreme Majlis, and he will bequeath this to his offspring and spread this custom among them".<sup>77</sup>

However, Sanjar was well-aware of the situation which was developing in Khurasan and Central Asia, so Atsiz's behavior did not seem to him defiant. He still kept in his mind the consequences of the battle of Qatawan battle; even worse, the Qara-Khitay were close, and the Khorezmshah continued to pay an annual tribute. Aware of the fact that the obstinate Khorezmshah was unlikely to be quelled, he decided not to provoke Atsiz once more into rebellion. Upon his return to Merv, he sent ceremonial garments and gifts to the Khorezmshah. In return, Atsiz received Sanjar's envoys with respect, and sent them back to Merv heavily laden with gifts.<sup>78</sup>

Thus a powerful new kingdom – the domain of the Khorezmshahs – came into existence and was consolidated on the political arena. And even Sultan Sanjar had to reckon with this kingdom. Though Sanjar succeeded, nevertheless, in diverting Khorezmshah from Khurasan, so Atsiz "went on several campaigns against the infidels and gained the victory over them".<sup>79</sup>

In Muharram 547 AH (April 1152), Khorezmshah Atsiz once again took the field against "the major place in the world and the greatest outskirts of Islam" (*ummahat-i buq'a-i dunya wa mu'azzamat-i sughur-i Islam*) – Jand that was taken away from him during the invasion of Qara-Khitay. Kamal ad-Din ibn Arslan-khan Mahmud was the Qara-Khitay governor here, with whom Atsiz had so far maintained friendly relations.

The Khorezmshah resorted to cunning in order to get his hands on Jand and the surrounding region. He suggested that Kamal ad-Din wage a joint campaign against Sighnaq, the capital of the "infidel" Qipchaqs. Kamal ad-Din agreed but when a well-equipped Khorezmian army approached the walls of Jand, Kamal ad-Din realized the true purpose of the march and fled from Jand together with his troops. Atsiz sent his retinue to follow him, and assured Kamal ad-Din that nothing threatened his safety. When Kamal ad-Din returned to Jand, he was immediately seized and put into chains. Atsiz promptly purged Jand of Kamal ad-Din's people and appointed his elder son Abu-l-Fath Il-Arslan to act as *wali* there.<sup>80</sup>

No response or protest regarding the capture of Jand and the arrest of Kamal ad-Din came from Sultan Sanjar; even better, he remained on good terms with the Khorezmshah even despite the latter's attempts to oppose Seljuq domination in the East.

Another blow at Sultan Sanjar's prestige came from his former vassals, the Ghurids, who in 1152 smashed the sultan's army under the command of Amir Qumach and captured Balkh.<sup>81</sup> Afterwards, the fledgling Ghurid kingdom seized territory former belonging to the Ghaznavids, who were also vassals of Sanjar.<sup>82</sup> Soon after the occupation of Ghazna in 545/1150-51, the head of the Ghurid dynasty 'Ala ad-Din al-Husayn (d. 1161) proclaimed his independence, ceased sending annual tribute to Sanjar's treasury, assumed the title (*'unwan*) of sultan and demonstrated his neglect to Sanjar.<sup>83</sup>



It was the abovementioned circumstances, as well as the treachery of Seljuq governor in Herat ‘Ali Chetry which transferred the power to the Ghurids, that made Sultan Sanjar take the field. On 17 Rabi’ I 547 AH (24 June 1152), Sanjar crushed the army of ‘Ala ad-Din al-Husayn near the vicinity of Marabad to the east of Herat. ‘Ala ad-Din was captured but later released with great honours.<sup>84</sup> More than 30,000 Ghurids and their Oghuz Turk allies lost their lives in the battle. During the skirmish 6,000 Oghuz Turks defected to the Seljuq army, thus deciding the battle in Sanjar’s favour.<sup>85</sup> Sultan Sanjar returned the trophies to ‘Ala ad-Din al-Husayn and even presented him (according to one historian) with his treasury, and a great quantity of cattle as saying:

“‘Ala ad-Din! You are like a brother to me! Take it all<sup>86</sup> and go back to Ghur. With Allah’s help, take these Oghuz Turks with you, and if we succeed, return all these to me when necessary. But should the situation change and I am defeated, and my Empire collapses, then this treasury should be yours instead of being captured by Oghuz Turks”.<sup>87</sup>

The third adversary of Sultan Sanjar in the last decades of his long reign was his vassal and the ruler of Sijistan Taj ad-Din Abu-l-Fadl Nasr (r. 1087-1163), a man of extraordinary courage, Sanjar’s favourite, and the sultan’s fellow-champion in all his campaigns (he saved the sultan in the battle of Qatawan).<sup>88</sup>

When Sanjar took the field against the Ghurids, he insistently asked Taj ad-Din to help him with his troops, and waited long for his arrival. However, Taj ad-Din, despite gratifying promises and suasions, yielded to no persuasion, feigned illness and declined from helping the sultan in his campaign against the Ghurids.

And finally, the most dangerous were the Qara-Khitay on the north-eastern border of Sanjar’s domain. It was the Sanjar’s fear of the Qara-Khitay that gave him no chance to rout Khorezmshah Atsiz.<sup>89</sup>

Once a menacing ruler to all his neighbours and vassals, a ruthless oppressor of recalcitrant and rebellious governors, Sanjar had now turned into a passive observer of the ongoing events, which were far from his favour. His former vassals deserted him and turned into his open enemies. The historian Ibn al-Ibri was right in maintaining that “the very nature of the sultans is based on cruelty, and their disposition is made of unconcern and idleness, so they have no mercy, just brute force, and, hence, it is very dangerous to deceive them. Also, it is baneful to be sincere with them”.<sup>90</sup>

In general, it was the Qara-Khitay and Khorezmshah Atsiz, as well as rising Oghuz tribes that were at loggerheads with Sultan Sanjar and Seljuqs as a whole. Greatly contributing to the degradation of the sultan’s power were also court intrigues that involved viziers, atabeks and Sultan’s wives. According to one historian, “servants (*al-hasham*) of the Great Sultan Mu‘izz ad-Din Sanjar displayed avidity and animosity to each other. All of them demanded from the sultan to provide them with positions already filled by others”.<sup>91</sup>

The historian ‘Imad ad-Din al-Isfahani offered the following explanation for the decline of Sanjar’s fiefdom as being due to the followings:

“As the sultan kept on ruling, amirs took over him and encroached on his property.

Juniors began to despise their seniors, who often had to give up their positions to these arrogant younger men. The revered was treated scornfully and the flippant with respect; the strong gave its place to the weak; the envy ruled over amirs; hatred filled their hearts; aid and trust to each other ceased. There were dignitaries in this state, including Sunqur al-‘Azizi, Mu‘ayyid ibn Yuryun-Qush Khiriwa, Qizil et al.; the highest among them were Qumach and ‘Ali Chetri. Views of each group contradicted with each other; each adhered to its own preferences...”<sup>92</sup>

Delivering a crushing blow to the empire of Sultan Sanjar was the famous “Oghuz mutiny”, which took place in 548/1153. Oghuz tribes came to resettle on territories subordinated to Seljuqs under Sultan Malik-shah.<sup>93</sup> Under Sultan Sanjar, Oghuz Turks (Turkmens) roamed across the Khurasan lands.<sup>94</sup> They settled down in the district of Balkh, had semi-nomadic way of life, and supplied the sultan with 24,000 sheep every year for the right to use the pasture.<sup>95</sup> Amir-*sipahsalar* ‘Imad ad-Din Qumach was *muqta‘* of Balkh.

The reason for the discontent among Oghuz amirs’ was the insult made by a tax collector (*muhassil*); the latter was later killed for his fault by enraged nomads.<sup>96</sup> Taking advantage of the situation Amir Qumach persuaded Sultan Sanjar to appoint him *shihna* of the district of Balkh. In exchange, he promised to levy 30,000 sheep from the Oghuz Turks. Qumach demanded that the Oghuz Turks pay blood money for the murdered *muhassil* (*rasm-i jinayat*), their chiefs refused saying they were subjects of the sultan (*khass ra‘iyyat*) and were not answerable to anybody else. In an attempt to oust Oghuz Turks from the area, Qumach headed a 10,000-strong cavalry but was defeated and fled to Merv where Sanjar camped.<sup>97</sup>

Amir Qumach and his supporters succeeded in persuading Sanjar to attack the Oghuz Turks. Apprehensive of the sultan’s forces (100,000 horsemen)\*, the Oghuz Turks offered 50,000 horses and camels, 200,000 dinars, 200,000 sheep and the annual kharaj as a farming. The sultan was about to accept this proposal, however, amirs impeded an armistice.

When the sultan’s army came up to the pastures of the Oghuz tribes, the latter again appealed to the sultan and raised the amount of tribute. Under pressure from the amirs, however, Sanjar turned their request down. In the battle in Muharram 548 AH (April 1153), the army of Sanjar was defeated completely, Qumach and some other amirs were killed.<sup>98</sup>

Having taken Sanjar as a prisoner, the Oghuz Turks treated him like a sultan, but the kingdom of Sanjar ceased to exist.<sup>99</sup>

After Sanjar’s defeat, Atsiz proved to be the most active although not the strongest of the sultan’s former vassals, who included the Qarakhanids, the Ghurids, the Bawandids of Tabaristan and the Saffarids of Sistan. Atsiz sought to seize the power through the entire domain of Sanjar. Assuming the total destruction of Sanjar’s army Atsiz moved upstream the Amu Darya river, aiming to capture the strategically important fortress Amul (Amuya). However, he failed in his endeavour, since a governor (*kutwal*) of the fortress appointed by Sanjar refused to surrender it to Atsiz. In the meanwhile,

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\* These figures are doubtful and only reflect the general picture.



the latter considered himself to succeed to all the lands and possessions formerly subordinate to Sanjar.<sup>100</sup> After the refusal to surrender by the governor of Amul, Atsiz appealed to the imprisoned Sultan Sanjar with a request to yield the fortress to him. The experienced and old sultan retorted to Atsiz: “We begrudge thee not the castle, but first send Il-Arslan with an army to our assistance, and then we shall grant thee the castle of Amuya and the double thereof”.<sup>101</sup>

Although the issue of the rescue aid to Sanjar was under discussion for a while and parties were exchanging the missions, Atsiz eventually refused to help, and decided to proceed with the campaigns against Qipchaqs; with that end in view he returned the troops to Khorezm.<sup>102</sup> However, to demonstrate his might he detached a part of his troops under the command of his brother Yinal-Tegin towards Bayhaq. From later December 1153 to May 1154 the troops were besieging Bayhaq, plundering the vicinity so fiercely that famine set in to the region for the next two years.<sup>103</sup>

Mindful of his principal purpose to overthrow Seljuq domination, Khorezmshah Atsiz realized that the reign of the Oghuz Turks in entire Khurasan posed a threat not only to him but to other neighbouring kingdoms as well. Atsiz sent letters to Taj ad-Din Abu-l-Fadl, the ruler of Sijistan (Nimruz),<sup>104</sup> ‘Ala ad-Din al-Husayn, the padishah of Ghur,<sup>105</sup> and the malik of Mazandaran, Abu-l-Fath Rustam (Shah Ghazi),<sup>106</sup> calling then to apply efforts and end the mess and anarchy in Khurasan, restore order and rally to rescue sultan Sanjar and his country from “bad interference and vicious reign” (*ta’arrudat-i batil va tahakkumat-i fasid*) of the Oghuz oppressors. Indeed, Atsiz intended to create anti-Oghuz alliance under his leadership. However, Sanjar’s nephew, Qarakhanid Rukn ad-Din Mahmud-khan ascended to the throne of the Eastern Seljuq Empire, so Atsiz re-evaluated his priorities and immediately sent him a letter of congratulation that stressed his willingness to help the new sultan as a “loyal subject” of Seljuqs.<sup>107</sup>

Mahmud-khan sent his envoys to Khorezm requesting Atsiz to assist him militarily “in order to extinguish the fire of the Oghuz Turks”. Atsiz left his younger son Khitaykhan in Khorezm and together with his elder son Il-Arslan moved to Khurasan in Safar 551 AH (April 1156), and in Rabi‘ II (end of May 1156) his army halted at Shahrستان.<sup>108</sup>

Now it was a time to implement an idea of alliance with the rulers of Sijistan, Ghur and Mazandaran to oppose the Oghuz Turks. Atsiz repeatedly appealed to the rulers, calling them to unite. He asked them to arrive together with their troops. Thus, in a message to the ruler of Sijistan Taj ad-Din Abu-l-Fadl, Atsiz wrote:<sup>109</sup>

“This letter is addressed to malik of Nimruz Taj ad-Din Abu-l-Fadl Nasr ibn Khalaf and calls him to lend a helping hand to the Great Sultan... A letter of greetings was sent by us from vilayat Khorezm, authorized persons dispatched, and informed about our march towards Khurasan. In late Safar [551] when we reached Shahrستان, the messengers of the Noble Assembly (of Taj ad-Din) arrived and ... an excellent message came to express care and sincere friendship. All that the Noble Assembly reported on disasters that took place and spread in Khurasan; about the seizure of power [by the Oghuzes], violence, the spread of vice and discord, hardships and bloodshed, murder

of scholars, destruction of madrasa and mosques, martyrdom of great and revered people – all these are true; it is essential for the people of Islam to eradicate these evils.

“At present, there is no ruler excellent in all the parts of the East and the West... than is the Noble Assembly. Mercy and blessings from the master of the world (Sanjar) are welcomed by the inhabitants of the world... The tribe of Oghuz is unruly and full of animosity and they are [still] in their chambers... Until they are slaughtered there would be no harmony in the world and its inhabitant would still be in danger.

"With that end in view, this friend [Atsiz] came to Khurasan, set to quell the violence and reached Shahrstan. We are cordially welcomed by the Noble Assembly of the greatest khaqan [Mahmud-khan]. Within several days he [Mahmud-khan] sent messengers and trustees, displayed his love and pure intentions. His subjects and truly devoted to the mighty power come from everywhere to put things in order...

"The magnificent letter added that if Atsiz sets out, shall Mahmud do the same. Now the friend arrived in Khurasan and set to work. It is his good management and wisdom that would help to be through with disorder and the evil of the violence abandons this world..."<sup>110</sup>

An identical letter was sent by Atsiz to malik Rustam, ruler of Mazandaran.<sup>111</sup>

However, in Ramadan 551 HA (October 1156), Sultan Sanjar broke out of Oghuz captivity, so Atsiz hurriedly had to change his tactics. He immediately sent a letter to Sanjar that congratulated the sultan with the release from prison, reaffirmed his loyalty to him and willingness to serve him faithfully. He stressed that his army was ready to set out: return to Khorezm or stay in Khurasan at the sultan's discretion.<sup>112</sup> At the same time, Atsiz circulated letters among neighbouring rulers, calling them to maintain unity in the struggle against the Oghuz Turks.<sup>113</sup>

Sultan Sanjar's escape took the Oghuz Turks unawares and made them cease predatory raids on towns and villages of Khurasan. Warning letters from Atsiz addressed to the Oghuz chiefs were not the least of the factors influencing this outcome. One of these letters was addressed to the Oghuz amir Nasir ad-Din Abu Shuja' Tuti-bek, head of the *Uch-Oq* Oghuz tribe. The letter of the Khorezmshah, described by V.V.Bartold as a "brilliant example of the eastern diplomacy"<sup>114</sup> is cited below:

"This letter is addressed to the blessed amir, glorious and great commander Nasir ad-Din Shuja' Tuti-bek.

"Inhabitants of the world are aware of the merits of the God-guarded amir and his glorious forefathers, of their rights to patronage and assistance of this party [Khorezmshahs].\* Every time a tribe subordinated to the God-guarded party, or other generations of Oghuz troops suffered a disaster in Khurasan and Mawarannahr, they used to arrive in the vilayat of Khurasan, confident in care and mercy. They were not denied assistance in raising their number and subsistence.

"In the present period, no aversion or dislike was manifested in the relations between the two parties. Instead, manifestations of friendship became increasingly apparent...

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\* The Oghuz Turks used pastures of Khorezm.

"These words are aimed on this: ... master of the world [Sanjar] is now in the city of Tirmidh; everybody came to his court and expressed their submissiveness. This party [the Khorezmshah] also arrived in Khurasan. Slaves of the powerful empire, formerly scattered around, have gathered anew, and the ruler of Nimruz and the ruler of Ghur will arrive with their countless troops to join the enterprise.

"Now it is important for the God-guarded party to inform about intentions of the Oghuz army...

"The Oghuz army should now present its apologies and express its submissiveness to the mighty power. The Noble Assembly of great khaqan Mahmud-khan, ruler of Nimruz, ruler of Ghur and this party [the Khorezmshah] will intercede for the sovereign of the world to forgive them and grant them a place (*yurtgah*) and a remuneration (*nanpara*) to live the rest of their lives in safety and prosperity, abstaining from an arrogance. May the God-guarded party consider these words as the manifestation of unselfishness and as a benefit for the faith and the life for himself and the entire Oghuz army..."<sup>115</sup>

It is difficult to say whether Atsiz was actually in a position to put his threats against the Oghuz Turks into practice. During his stay in Khabushan he was paralyzed, and on 9 Jumada II 551 AH (30 July 1156) Khorezmshah Ghazi 'Ala ad-Din Baha ad-Din Abu-l-Muzaffar Husam Amir al-Mu'minin Atsiz died at the age of 61.<sup>116</sup>

According to chroniclers of the 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> centuries, Khorezmshah Atsiz "was one of the pillars of the Seljuq state",<sup>117</sup> was just to his subjects, did not encroach upon their property, took care of them, and "his subjects had always been close to him in joy and sorrow".<sup>118</sup> Of his 29 years in power, Atsiz ruled almost independently for 16 years and upheld his sovereignty in the struggle against the Seljuqs. As V.V. Bartold put it, despite "being a vassal of the Seljuq sultan", Atsiz was a founder of the Khorezmian dynasty. Having conquered nomads and reinforced his army through the use of Turkic mercenaries, he "laid down the foundation of a strong and de-facto independent dynasty".<sup>119</sup> But he failed to gain universal and complete independence: he kept on paying *kharaj* (tribute) to the Qara-Khitays.

Nine months after the death of Khorezmshah Atsiz, the great Seljuq sultan Sanjar died on 26 Rabi' I 552 AH (9 May 1157). This death put an end to the nominal domination of Seljuqs in Mawarannahr.<sup>120</sup>

The domain established by Khorezmshah Atsiz expanded during the reign of his successors. The policy of Atsiz aimed to consolidate his rule in Khorezm. His successors sought to expand the lands of the kingdom and strengthen their authority at the international arena.

During his lengthy reign Khorezmshah Atsiz was eager to consolidate relations with the Caliphate. His aspiration to gain Baghdad's support in the struggle against Sanjar became apparent from his five extant messages to Caliph al-Muqtafi (1136-1160), compiled by his *katib al-insha'* Rashid ad-Din Watwat. These messages are legal documents testifying to the Caliphate's recognition of the Khorezmshah dynasty. Atsiz appeals to caliph as follows: "Our sovereign, amir of believers, imam of Muslims,

deputy of the Lord of the two worlds, al-Muqtafi li-amrillah (*sayyiduna va mawlana Amir al-Mu'minin wa Imam al-Muslimin wa khalifat rabb al-'alamin al-Muqtafi li-amrillah*)".<sup>121</sup>

In one of his messages Khorezmshah Atsiz draws Caliph al-Muqtafi's attention to the significance of his kingdom "which is still fledgling" and kindly asks the caliph to patronize him in securing Khurasan and Khorezm against the aliens, the Oghuz Turks.<sup>122</sup> Atsiz aspired to enlist the caliph's support against a common Seljuq enemy, whom he accused of inciting Isma'ilis to murder the caliphs al-Mustarshid and al-Rashid.<sup>123</sup> Atsiz made no secret of his intention to profit from the caliph's hostile attitude to Seljuqs and to Sanjar, in particular. He noted: "There is nothing good to expect from him and there is nothing to be gained from being on friendly terms with him or in becoming closer to him".<sup>124</sup> In the end of his message Atsiz tries to persuade the caliph to issue a decree on legal recognition of his dynasty: "This decree should be signed (*tawqi'*), so that the envious people should burst with fury, and the grace of the decree suppresses evil and depravity of the enemy... So raise Allah high the effect of this decree to thus prolong days of the amir of believers!".<sup>125</sup>

Atsiz then sent a second message, assuring Caliph al-Muqtafi of his loyalty: Atsiz informed the caliph that the *khutba* had been issued in the caliph's name in Khorezm: "All the imams, the '*ulama*' and their *katibs* in Khorezm are calling to follow a sacred path".<sup>126</sup>

In his third message to Caliph al-Muqtafi Atsiz again assured him of his loyalty and kindly asked caliph to pardon him for not arriving personally to caliph's court for expression of his obedience, for he was busy with combating infidels (*kuffar*). Atsiz insists that "he is the most devoted of his slaves with good intentions and the sincerest of his loyal rulers".<sup>127</sup>

Of the same nature is the Khorezmshah's fourth message to the caliph.<sup>128</sup> In his fifth message Atsiz informed al-Muqtafi of his indignation with the fact that Sultan Muhammad ibn Mahmud (1153-54) who succeeded to Sanjar as the head of the Seljuq dynasty got out of the caliph's obedience and that he, Atsiz, detested Sultan Muhammad for ignoring the caliph's name, and again Atsiz assured the caliph of his loyalty and obedience.<sup>129</sup>

## THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KHOREZMSHAH KINGDOM

### The Rule of Khorezmshah Il-Arslan

The advent of Il-Arslan to power in Khorezm was accompanied by a long internecine struggle. To consolidate his power, Il-Arslan sought to get rid of possible rivals. After the death of his father, Khorezmshah Atsiz, Il-Arslan enlisted the support of various amirs and army commanders and immediately set out from Khurasan to Khorezm where major political developments were taking place.

Upon his arrival in Gurganj, Il-Arslan jailed his younger brother, and executed his *atabek* Oghul-bek together with various members of the nobility who had tried to elevate Sulayman-shah onto the Khorezmshahid throne.<sup>1</sup> Then he executed his uncle Yusuf and blinded his brother who died (or, according to another version, committed suicide) within three days.<sup>2</sup>

On 3 Rajab 551 AH (22 August 1156) Il-Arslan ascended to the Khorezmshahid throne. He immediately issued a decree ordering a raise in military salaries and in the size of *iqta'* allotments.

Il-Arslan had other concerns in addition to the possible usurpation of the throne by his rivals. One further reason which spurred him to leave Khurasan was the seizure of Jand and Manghyshlaq by the "infidel" nomadic Turks, who had thereby taken advantage of the death of Atsiz and the resultant internecine struggle in Khorezm.<sup>3</sup> Having recaptured both Jand and Manghyshlaq, Il-Arslan opted to continue the policy of his father by intervening in Khurasani internal affairs. Towards this end, he sent a message to Sultan Sanjar that expressed obedience and loyalty to him and in Ramadan 551 AH (October 1156) Sanjar sent him a decree (*manshur*) that declared him Khorezmshah, together with a ceremonial robe of honour.<sup>4</sup> Mahmud-khan similarly congratulated Il-Arslan on the occasion of his enthronement as Khorezmshah and sent condolences upon the death of his father.<sup>5</sup>

V.V.Bartold noted the essential changes in the correspondence between Khorezmshah and Seljuqs; instead of describing himself as a *banda* ("slave"), as Atsiz had done, Il-Arslan titled himself as *mukhlis* ("sincere friend").<sup>6</sup>

The Khorezmshah kept a close watch developments not only in Khurasan but in all the territories of the wider Middle East which were subject to Seljuq rule. As is well known, Sultan Sanjar appointed no heir to the throne. Consequently, the ruler of the Iraqi Seljuq Sultanate Sultan Ghiyath ad-Din Muhammad ibn Mahmud recognized Sanjar's authority as supreme sultan, but disputed the authority of his nephew Mahmud-khan. Besides, several of Sanjar's influential amirs who headed large armies also denied Mahmud-khan's power; Caliph al-Muqtafi was contributing to this process and after Sanjar's death gave orders that his name should be omitted from the Baghdad *khutba*.

The struggle for power within the Seljuq family was skilfully stirred up by the caliph. He stopped reckoning with Seljuq princes and incited them to the internecine rivalry after Sanjar's death. When Ghiyath ad-Din Muhammad demanded that the *khutba* be issued in his name, the caliph denied his request<sup>7</sup> and ordered that it be issued instead in the name of his uncle Sulayman-shah. The caliph received Sulayman-shah in Baghdad, dressed him up in the sultan's garment and transferred him the command over 3,000-strong cavalry to fight with other pretenders to the leadership among Seljuqs.<sup>8</sup>

Caliph al-Muqtafi sent envoys to Khorezmshah Il-Arslan in order to determine his intentions and readiness for invasion into Khurasan. In his letter of response, Il-Arslan tried to draw the caliph's attention to various disorders which had broken out in the Muslim world after Sanjar's death. He suggested that Ghiyath ad-Din was the only person now capable of bringing peace and calm to the region.<sup>9</sup>

Ghiyath ad-Din Muhammad died in 1159. In 1160, the *khutba* was issued across the Iraqi Sultanate in the name of Arslan-shah (1161-1176). However, the sultanate had since been ruled by the atabeks Shams ad-Din Ildeniz and his sons Jahan-Pahlawan and Qizil-Arslan.<sup>10</sup> Just in case, Khorezmshah Il-Arslan sent a deferential letter to the new Iraqi Sultan Arslan-shah.<sup>11</sup>

Despite officially being ruled by Sanjar's nephew Mahmud-khan, Khurasan was beset with anarchy and lawlessness caused by some amirs after the death of Sanjar. The most influential amirs among those were Aybek, Sunqur al-'Azizi, Ay-Tegin and particularly Mu'ayyid Ay-Aba.<sup>12</sup> The Oghuz tribes occupied lands of Eastern Khurasan and exercised military influence over the political life of the entire region. Il-Arslan had at his disposal a strong army and enjoyed incontestable authority among numerous alignments. In the course of the internecine struggle these amirs alternately resorted to the Khorezmshah's patronage.<sup>13</sup> Thus, in Jurjan and Dihistan, Aybek's possessions, the *khutba* was issued in Il-Arslan's name, thereby signalling recognition of Khorezmshahid suzerainty.<sup>14</sup>

The most influential and powerful among these amirs was Mu'ayyid Ay-Aba who captured Nishapur, blinded Mahmud-khan and his son Jalal ad-Din in 557/1162 who tried to protect the town, eliminated their names from *khutba* and ordered that this be issued in the names instead of Caliph al-Mustanjid (1160-1170) and himself.<sup>15</sup> Soon after, Ay-Aba annexed Tus, Abivard, Shahristan, Bistam and Damghan.<sup>16</sup> In 558/1163, Ay-Aba seized Qumis and its environs.<sup>17</sup> In the meantime, we read, "Sultan Arslan-shah ibn Toghrul sent him a garment of honour, entrusted him to sort out the disturbances in his newly acquired domain and requested him to have the *khutba* issued in the sultan's name wherever he held authority. The domain of Arslan-shah was ruled by Atabek Shams ad-Din Ildeniz, while Arslan-shah had just a title (of a sultan), and friendly relations were maintained between Ildeniz and Mu'ayyid. When Mu'ayyid submitted to Sultan Arslan-shah, the *khutba* was proclaimed in the sultan's name across the country, including Qumis, Nishapur, Tus, in all districts of Nishapur, from Nasa to Tabas Qangly".<sup>18</sup>

As soon as Il-Arslan learned about these developments, he decided to initiate a



campaign against the increasingly ambitious Mu'ayyid Ay-Aba, and to conquer his possessions. Leading a strong army he moved to Nishapur and put the city to siege. However, the siege did not prove to be successful, and shortly after the parties had to conclude an armistice, following which Il-Arslan returned to Khorezm.<sup>19</sup> Taking advantage of this situation, Mu'ayyid Ay-Aba attempted to expand his possessions at the expense of the towns of Khurasan that were seized by the Oghuz tribes. Early in 560 AH, the army of Mu'ayyid besieged Nasa. The siege lasted till Jumada I (March, 1165). However, the Il-Arslan stopped it at once, as Nasa bordered onto his own possessions. As soon as his army came up to Nasa, Mu'ayyid Ay-Aba raised the siege and returned to Nishapur. Il-Arslan followed him to Nishapur, but in the face of Mu'ayyid army's operational readiness, turned back to Nasa, held since 553/1158 as an *iqta'* by 'Umar ibn Hamza an-Nasawi.<sup>20</sup> The latter obeyed Il-Arslan, and thereafter the *khutba* was issued in Nasa in the name of the Khorezmshah.<sup>21</sup>

Il-Arslan's army then took Dihistan. Amir Aybek took refuge in the domain of Mu'ayyid Ay-Aba, and Dihistan became a part of the Khorezmshah's possessions, administered by a governor (*wali*) from Khorezm.<sup>22</sup>

Mu'ayyid Ay-Aba's consent to the vassalage by Iraqi Sultanate aroused Il-Arslan's suspicions, especially as Mu'ayyid, backed by Atabek Ildeniz, actual ruler of the sultanate, was behaving in Khurasan as his own master. Il-Arslan felt the menace, and when Iraqi Sultan Arslan-shah and Atabek Ildeniz sent garment of honour, banners and gifts to Mu'ayyid and appointed him a governor of Iraqi Sultanate in the east,<sup>23</sup> Khorezmshah Il-Arslan moved with his troops against Ay-Aba.

Apprehensive of the consequences of the Khorezmshah's invasion in the dependent lands, in 562/1166 Mu'ayyid Ay-Aba travelled from Nishapur to Hamadan, where he informed Atabek Ildeniz that Il-Arslan was planning to take Nishapur from him. He warned Ildeniz that this would not be then end of the Khorezmshah's ambitions, and that after capturing Nishapur he would move westwards into the possessions of Sultan Arslan-shah. Ay-Aba told atabek: "If you fail to oppose him, you will faced with a deluge which you will never overcome".<sup>24</sup>

Atabek Ildeniz sent an envoy to Il-Arslan, with the following message: "Truly, this Mu'ayyid Ay-Aba is *mamluk* of the Sultan, and Khurasan is a country of the Sultan, possession of his fathers and grandfathers. Likewise, Khorezm where you are staying is his possession! If you march against Nishapur, my reply will be a march against you and a war between us. You are not thinking about yourself!"<sup>25</sup>

According to the source, the message of Ildeniz "made Khorezmshah Il-Arslan so angry that his army set out in 562 AH to Nishapur and put up there".<sup>26</sup> In the meanwhile, Atabek Ildeniz came up to Bistam, and the first battle between the Khorezmshah's army and that of Iraqi Sultanate broke out. None of the parties managed to gain a victory. However, Il-Arslan sent a part of his troops from Bistam to capture Mu'ayyid-owned towns of Bayhaq and Sabzavar. In May 1167, these towns were captured by the Khorezmshah, and in June that year, having made Ay-Aba to escape, Il-Arslan seized Nishapur where *khutba* mentioned a name of Taj ad-Dunya wa-d-Din Malik at-Turk wa-l-'Ajam Il-Arslan.<sup>27</sup>

Realizing that the army of the Iraqi Sultanate gained no victory against the Khorezmshah, Mu'ayyid Ay-Aba decided to submit to Il-Arslan. He sent *qadi* Fakhr ad-Din al-Kufi as an envoy to the Khorezmshah with the following message: "You have spent much and awarded lavishly, so it does not befit you to return to Khorezm without getting anything for your pains. Now that you have returned, I am your *mamluk*, and I pledge on my word that I shall obey you. I shall mention your name in the *khutba*, and I shall mint coins – dinars and dirhams on your behalf. I will rule the country according to your order and prohibition".<sup>28</sup>

A source says that Il-Arslan rejoiced at Ay-Aba's appeal and immediately concluded an armistice with him. He presented Fakhr ad-Din with a robe of honour and gifts and sent him together with his envoy to Nishapur with the presents for Ay-Aba, including "thoroughbred horses with golden and silver harnesses, shawls and various precious rarities from his treasure-house".<sup>29</sup>

When Atabek Ildeniz learned that his vassal Ay-Aba agreed with his dependence upon Khorezmshah, he had to withdraw with his army from Bistam to Ray.<sup>30</sup>

The capture of Nishapur resulted in a complete rupture between the Khorezmshah and the Seljuqs. From this point on, Il-Arslan began freely interfering with the internal affairs of Persian Iraq. Local rulers of the region who were fighting for their independence against Seljuqs and atabeks henceforth relied on Il-Arslan as their ally in this confrontation. One of the opponents of Sultan Arslan-shah and Atabek Ildeniz was Inanch, ruler of Ray, who paid annual tribute to the Seljuq treasury. Once, when Atabek Ildeniz sent his people for to collection the tribute, Inanch refused to pay.<sup>31</sup> The atabek decided to teach the unruly vassal a lesson, and sent troops to punish him. Learning of this news, Inanch fled from Ray to Bistam where he wrote to Il-Arslan asking for his help. If Il-Arslan were to help him, he suggested, then he could capture Persian Iraq and make it a part of Khorezmshahid possessions. Il-Arslan graciously acceded to his request. He instructed the *wali* of Dihistan to hand Inanch 30,000 dinars in compensation for his losses, and to grant him asylum. He ordered Inanch to stay in Dihistan until his problem was settled.<sup>32</sup>

In the meanwhile, Atabek Ildeniz received a letter that reported on Inanch's collusion with Khorezmshah and transfer of Ray and related district to Il-Arslan's possession. Il-Arslan provided Inanch with a great army in the hope of advancing westwards after Ray's annexation. He appointed the Qarluq amir Shams al-Mulk ibn Husayn 'Ayyar-bek as commander of this army and ordered him to set out to Iraq.

Learning about the advance of these troops, Atabek Ildeniz decided to forestall his opponent. The troops of the Khorezmshah passed Ray to reach the town of Sawa where in 563 AH/1167 they ran into an army led by Sultan Arslan-shah and Jahan-Pahlawan ibn Ildeniz. Despite fierce resistance, the Iraqi troops failed to withstand the Khorezmian onslaught, and retreated. Inanch besieged the fortress of Tabrak, but was unable to prevail, so the Khorezmshahid army advanced westwards.

Having invaded Azerbaijan, the Khorezmians captured the towns of Abhar, Zanjan and Qazvin, destroyed and ravaged these areas. They took away 2,000 thoroughbred camels



from Qazvin and returned to Khorezm, leaving Inanch to rule over his possessions.<sup>33</sup>

In 564 AH/1168, Atabek Ildeniz managed to suborn Inanch's vizier Sa'd ad-Din al-Ashall, and the latter, assisted by three *ghulams*, murdered Inanch. The vizier went over to Ildeniz, while *ghulams*, having received no reward, went to Khorezmshah Il-Arslan. However, Il-Arslan gave orders for their execution as punishment for betraying their master.<sup>34</sup> Having failed to seize the lands of Iraqi Sultanate, Il-Arslan now decided to intervene instead in the affairs of Mawarannahr.

As was noted above, the Qarluqs played a key role in the battle of Qatawan. With Mawarannahr in their possession, the Qara-Khitay could not forgive the Qarluqs who in the battle of Bukhara 551 AH/1156 had killed the ruler of Samarqand, the Qarakhanid Tamghach-khan Ibrahim III, and left his dead body in the desert.<sup>35</sup> A new Qarakhanid ruler of Samarqand Jalal ad-Din 'Ali Chaghri-khan under the guardianship of the Qara-Khitay defeated the Qarluqs in 553 AH/1158, while their chief Lachin-bek fled to Khorezm. The Khorezmshah offered the Qarluqs a cordial welcome, since he was keen to eliminate the power of the Qara-Khitay, to whom he was still paying an annual tribute.<sup>36</sup> He set his hopes on the strength of Qarluqs to oppose the Qara-Khitay.

In Jumada II 553 AH (July 1158), the Khorezmshah invaded Mawarannahr at the head of a large army. The ruler of Samarqand Jalal ad-Din 'Ali fortified the town and appealed for help to the Turkmen nomads who resided in the area between Qara-Kol and Jand, as well as to his suzerains the Qara-Khitay.

In the resulting battle which took place on both banks of the river Soghd (Zaravshan), the army of the Qara-Khitay led by Ilig-Turkman failed to resist the onslaught of the Khorezmshah's troops. Apprehensive of complete defeat, Ilig-Turkman had to request a truce, and it was reached thanks to the '*ulama*' and the imams of Samarqand. By the terms of the armistice, the Khorezmshah sent the Qarluqs back to the places where they had previously lived, and returned to Khorezm.<sup>37</sup>

When the Khorezmshah was advancing towards Samarqand, he passed by Bukhara, following which a source reported: "The Khorezmshah, having encouraged the people of Bukhara with promises, set out from thence for Samarqand".<sup>38</sup>

In 559 AH/1163, the Qara-Khitay took measures against "overbearing and recalcitrant Qarluqs".<sup>39</sup> According to Ibn al-Athir, a Qara-Khitay khan ordered his vassal, the Qarakhanid ruler of Samarqand Qilich-Tamghach-khan, "to expel the Qarluqs from the districts of Bukhara and Samarqand all the way to Kashghar, and to disarm them and compel them to engage in agriculture and other matters".<sup>40</sup> However, the Qarluqs declined to comply with this order and moved to Bukhara. Qilich-Tamghach-khan now appealed to Muhammad ibn 'Umar, the ruler of Bukhara, with a letter that asked him to assist in ousting the Qarluqs. He then launched an offensive against the Qarluqs, killed scores of them, and banished the survivors from Bukhara.<sup>41</sup> One party of fugitive Qarluqs headed by Shams ad-Din ibn Husayn 'Ayyar-bek was sheltered by the Khorezmshah.

Later on, the Qara-Khitay tried to deal shortly with Qarluqs but for this they had to fight on the area controlled by Il-Arslan. Finally, in 567/1171 the Qara-Khitay crossed the Amu Darya and attacked Khorezm. As soon as Il-Arslan learnt about this, he gave

orders to open the dykes and inundate the tracks leading to the capital. Il-Arslan then retreated to Amul and put forward troops under the command of Amir ‘Ayyar-bek to oppose the Qara-Khitay advance. Il-Arslan was ill at the moment, stayed in Amul and could not take part in the fighting. The Qara-Khitay crushed the army of Khorezmshah, Amir ‘Ayyar-bek was taken prisoner and carried away to Samarqand. The Khorezmshah returned to Gurganj, where he died on 19 Rajab 567 AH (18 March 1172).<sup>42</sup>

Like his father Atsiz, Khorezmshah Il-Arslan maintained close correspondence with the caliph. He asked the caliph to confer legal recognition upon his kingdom. When Caliph al-Muqtafi died, Il-Arslan sent a message to his successor Caliph al-Mustanjid expressing the condolences of the Khorezmian populace at the late caliph’s death, and added that a three-day period of mourning had been announced in Khorezm. The letter presented apologies for not arriving in Baghdad to attend al-Muqtafi’s funeral.<sup>43</sup>

### **The Struggle for the Khorezmshahid throne**

The death of Khorezmshah Il-Arslan marked the beginning of a fierce and long struggle for power between his sons ‘Ala ad-Din Tekish and Sultan-shah Mahmud.<sup>44</sup>

At the time of Il-Arslan’s death, his eldest son Tekish was serving in *wali* of Jand.<sup>45</sup> Il-Arslan declared his youngest son Sultan-shah as the successor to the throne; however, it was Sultan-shah’s mother Terken-khatun who in fact ran the kingdom and dealt with the military affairs.<sup>46</sup>

Tekish was called from Jand to swear allegiance to Sultan-shah; however, he refused to arrive in Gurganj, saying that he did not recognize Sultan-shah as the head of the dynasty.<sup>47</sup> Then Terken-khatun sent troops to Jand in order to bring Tekish forcibly to the capital. Learning about the imminent threat, Tekish left Jand for Chen Tyan, Empress of the Qara-Khitay (1167-1177),<sup>48</sup> to ask for help in the struggle against Sultan-shah and his mother. In return, he promised to pay an annual tribute.

Having enlisted Tekish’s support, the Qara-Khitay fitted out a huge army under the command of Fuma, husband of the Empress,<sup>49</sup> and dispatched it to Khorezm. When Tekish and the Fuma’s army approached Gurganj, Sultan-shah and his mother fled from Khorezm to Khurasan under the protection of Mu’ayyid [ad-Dawla] Ay-Aba, ruler of Nishapur.

On 22 Rabi’ I 568 AH (11 December 1172), Tekish, facing no resistance, and backed by the army and the population, officially ascended to the Khorezmshahid throne.<sup>50</sup> But it would still be a long time until the bloody internecine struggle for power in Khorezm came to an end.

Sultan-shah’s mother lavishly presented Ay-Aba with gifts and promised to grant him a part of the lands of Khorezm for his assistance with the troops. She assured Ay-Aba that the people and the army of Khorezm stood through thick and thin by Sultan-shah.<sup>51</sup>

In the meantime, Mu’ayyid Ay-Aba decided to use the situation to meet his own interests: in supporting Sultan-shah, he could rid himself of the vassalage and expand his possessions at the expense of Khorezm. With this aim in view, he mustered the

troops and together with Sultan-shah and his mother took the field against Khorezm.

Some 20 *farsakhs* from Gurganj, near the town of Supurli (Suburni), the armies of Ay-Aba and Tekish clashed. One of the Khorezmshah's vassals, the *ispahbad* of Mazandaran Ardashir, decided to avoid tempting fate and informed Tekish about the route of the Ay-Aba's army. Tekish took up a position near Supurli, from where he soldiers swiftly attacked the enemy. Mu'ayyid's army was utterly defeated and had to flee limping from the battlefield. Ay-Aba was taken prisoner and brought to Tekish, who gave orders for him to be cut in two. The defeat of Ay-Aba's army occurred on 9 Dhu-l-Hijja 569 AH (11 July 1174).<sup>52</sup>

Terken-khatun and Sultan-shah now went to the town of Dihistan (near the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea). But Tekish laid siege to the town and finally seized it. Sultan-shah managed to escape but his mother was taken prisoner and executed. Sultan-shah hid himself in Nishapur, which following Ay-Aba's death was ruled by his son Toghan-shah Abu Bakr (1174-1185). Afterwards Khorezmshah returned to Gurganj.<sup>53</sup>

Aware that the Khurasanian army had been partly defeated in Khorezm, and partly dispersed, Toghan-shah refused to back Sultan-shah. Sultan-shah instead appealed to the Ghurid sultans Ghiyath ad-Din and Shihab ad-Din, who received him with honours.<sup>54</sup> Though Ghiyath ad-Din al-Ghuri struggled for supreme power in Khurasan and could take an advantage of the arrival of Sultan-shah and interfere with internal affairs of Khorezm, instead he decided to attain his goal through influencing the situation in Mawarannahr. Around this very time, the conflict between Tekish and the Qara-Khitay came to a head.

Once Tekish had consolidated his position in Khorezm, the Qara-Khitay considered him to be their humble vassal, so they began dispatching tribute collectors of various ranks. In their dealings with the Khorezmians, these collectors behaved insolently, arrogantly and imperiously. When these people lost self-control and began scorning the Khorezmshah as sovereign, Tekish "felt hurt for his kingdom and religion".<sup>55</sup> The Khorezmshah killed an envoy – a relative of the Qara-Khitay rulers who had come to request a tribute – and ordered his noblemen to kill the rest of Qara-Khitay envoys.<sup>56</sup>

Unsurprisingly, this episode led to a serious breach in the relationship between the Khorezmshah and the Qara-Khitay. Sultan-shah immediately pounced upon the opportunity thus presented to him, while Ghiyath ad-Din al-Ghuri provided him with all the necessary means.

Upon his arrival in Balasaghun, Sultan-shah stated that he was awaited in Khorezm and that the people and the army of Khorezm supported him, so he asked the Empress to help him to combat against his brother.<sup>57</sup> And again, the Qara-Khitay army led by the same Fuma advanced toward Khorezm but this time they were bringing Sultan-shah to fight against Tekish. The latter made necessary preparations to beat off an assault of the Qara-Khitay. In the first turn, he opened the locks on Amu Darya river and the water flooded all the roads and approaches to strongly fortified Gurganj.

Fuma realized that the assault against Khorezmshah would be disastrous for his army and that the population of Khorezm was not nearly as sympathetic to Sultan-

shah as the latter had tried to assure the Qara-Khitay. Fuma thus ordered his army to leave Khorezm.<sup>58</sup> Seeing that it would be impossible to seize power in Khorezm, Sultan-shah asked Fuma to provide him with some soldiers to thus win back towns in Khurasan. With several thousands of Qara-Khitay soldiers from Fuma,<sup>59</sup> Sultan-shah turned to the south and assaulted Sarakhs, owned by the Oghuz tribes. Having captured Sarakhs in 576/1180, Sultan-shah directed his army to Merv, seized the city and made it his residence. Soon after, the Qara-Khitay army returned home. Later on, Sultan-shah captured Tus, Zam, Nasa and Abivard.<sup>60</sup>

In the struggle for the lands of Khurasan Sultan-shah was opposed by Toghan-shah Abu Bakr, the afore-mentioned ruler of Nishapur and various other nearby cities. In a battle on 26 Dhu-l-Hijja 576 AH (13 May 1181) the army of Toghan-shah was defeated, and Sultan-shah seized all his property and treasury. A historian noted: "The star of his (Sultan-shah's) fortune rose again after setting, for unlike Toghan-shah, he was a man of war and battle, not a lover of cumbal and harp".<sup>61</sup>

For several years, Sultan-shah wearied Toghan-shah out with his raids and, in the end, undermined his authority in Khurasan and, even better, won over to his side most of the amirs. Toghan-shah appealed to Khorezmshah Tekish and ruler of Ghur Ghiyath ad-Din but failed to get support from them, since the two rulers preferred to wait for denouement.

On 12 Muharram 581 AH (15 April 1185), Toghan-shah died. His son Sanjar-shah (1185-1198) succeeded him in Nishapur. However, his lands were actually ruled by Atabek Mengli-Tegin.<sup>62</sup> This ruler was cruel and imperious. His policies of extortion, requisition, oppression and execution led many of his amirs to flee to Sultan-shah.<sup>63</sup>

As soon as Khorezmshah Tekish learned about Sultan-shah's consolidation and Mengli-Tegin's neglect of his vassal duty to Khorezm, he decided to intervene. When the Tekish's army took the field, Sultan-shah, taking an advantage of the situation, tried to capture Khorezm. However, he learned that Tekish suddenly turned his army to his capital Merv. With his soldiers stationed in Amul, Sultan-shah broke through the enemy's position and fortified himself in Merv.

Right away, Tekish left Merv and rushed towards Nishapur, and in Rabi' I 582 AH (May 1186) he laid siege to the city.<sup>64</sup> Following a two-month siege, Mengli-Tegin and Sanjar-shah had to accept Khorezmshah's tribute conditions. Several of Tekish's envoys stayed in Nishapur to draw up terms and conditions of the armistice: these included great *hajib* Shihab ad-Din Mas'ud, *khansalar* Sayf ad-Din Mardan-Shir and *munshi* Baha ad-Din Muhammad al-Baghdadi. As soon as Tekish left Nishapur, Mengli-Tegin captured took these envoys prisoner and sent them to Sultan-shah.<sup>65</sup> He also arrested a prominent Khorezmian religious figure *qadi* and *shaykh al-islam* Burhan ad-Din 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Fakhr ad-Din 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Kufi, and gave orders for his execution.<sup>66</sup>

Tekish considered all the repression above as a challenge to his authority, and on 14 Muharram 583 AH (27 March 1187) he laid siege to Nishapur and gave orders for the town to be bombarded.

Following a 40-day siege, Atabek Mengli-Tegin, "was finally compelled to appoint

*imams* and *shaykhs* as mediators sending them to Tekish and laying his hand upon the skirt of supplication”.<sup>67</sup> The town fell, and Mengli-Tegin was brought to Tekish, who on 17 Rabi’ I 583 AH (27 May 1187) entered Nishapur and “cleared the town of evil spirits, hatred and violence”.<sup>68</sup> Mengli-Tegin’s misappropriations were returned to their legitimate owners. Mengli-Tegin was delivered up to imams who passed a decision (*fatwa*) on his extradition to *qadi* Fakhr ad-Din, father of the executed Burhan ad-Din, who sentenced Mengli-Tegin to death.<sup>69</sup>

Therefore Nishapur and its district became a part of Khorezmshah Tekish’s possessions. He appointed his elder son Nasir ad-Din Malik-shah as *wali* of Nishapur. Nasir ad-Din had earlier been a governor in Jand, and in September 1187 returned to Gurganj. Also, Khorezmshah took Sanjar-shah with him to Gurganj as well. Quite soon Sanjar-shah started to transfer money secretly to Nishapur hoping to come back over there but was exposed and thereafter blinded and held prisoner in Khorezm until his death in 1198.<sup>70</sup>

In spite of the fact that a greater portion of Khurasan joined Tekish’s possessions, Sultan-shah continued to exercise authority over Merv and Sabzavar. As soon as Tekish had withdrawn his troops from Nishapur, Sultan-shah immediately assaulted the city. Following fierce fighting, he managed to destroy a greater part of the city walls. However, Tekish’s son Malik-shah succeeded in upholding the city. Having learnt that the troops of Tekish were approaching, Sultan-shah retreated to Merv. Tekish ordered to restore the destroyed walls of Nishapur and then led his troops to Mazandaran.<sup>71</sup>

In spring 1188, through the mediation of Khurasan’s nobility and amirs, a truce was concluded between Khorezmshah Tekish and his brother Sultan-shah. By this point, Tekish’s power and authority were such that Sultan-shah was compelled to accept Tekish’s terms without reserve. Besides, Sultan-shah had a very few troops left, for all Khurasan amirs and commanders deserted to Tekish who enjoyed great authority thanks to his political and military successes.<sup>72</sup> Under the truce, Sultan-shah obtained Jam, Bakharz and Zir-Pul; in return, Sultan-shah released the three Khorezmian high officials whom he had previously taken prisoner.

Thus, the Khorezmshah declared himself a fully-fledged sovereign, and on 18 Jumada I 585 AH (4 July 1189) there occurred in Radikan a formal coronation ceremony. In this connection many poets dedicated panegyrics to Tekish. Thus, the poet ‘Imadi Zawzani addressed the following *qasida* to Tekish:

Praise be to God, from East to West hath the world  
 been confided to the sword of the World-Monarch.  
 The supreme commander, the Emperor of the Universe,  
 The Giver of signets to kings, the Lord of the Earth,  
 Tekish-khan, son of Il-Arslan, son of Atsiz – kings,  
 father and son, from the time of Adam.  
 He hath stridden up to the throne of vicrorious fortune  
 as the sun strides up to the throne of the turquoise canopy!<sup>73</sup>

Following magnificent festivities, Tekish returned to Gurganj in autumn 1189.<sup>74</sup> “From the exceeding malignancy of his nature and violence of his temper”,<sup>75</sup> however, Sultan-shah was not going to obey his brother Tekish. He imagined himself to be strong and powerful enough to draw the rulers of Ghur on his side. The Ghurids realized that Tekish’s enhanced might and authority posed a threat to their possessions, so they were favourably disposed to Sultan-shah and made concessions to him in the hope of weakening Tekish’s power. In consolidating Sultan-shah’s positions, even to the detriment of their possessions, the Ghurids distracted Tekish’s attention from their own lands. However, Sultan-shah considered that Ghurids were afraid of him, so he demanded that they grant him Herat, Bushenj, Badghis and the surrounding region. Sultan Ghiyath ad-Din al-Ghuri at first nearly convinced his brother Shihab ad-Din to sign an agreement on the transfer of the aforementioned towns and lands to Sultan-shah. However, the ‘*alid* Majd ad-Din al-‘Alawi al-Haravi, highest spiritual authority, and Ghiyath ad-Din’s nephew Alp-Ghazi now intervened.

Majd ad-Din spoke as follows to Sultan-shah’s envoy: “Please, tell Sultan-shah that the armistice with you has been concluded on behalf of Shihab ad-Din. And I, ‘Alawi, tell you: “Your opponents are me and Alp-Ghazi, and a sword is between us and you!”. Then al-‘Alawi turned to Ghiyath ad-Din, saying: “He (Sultan-shah) is the one who has been ousted by his native brother. Why are you giving him what you won back from the Oghuz Turks and the amirs of Sanjar. Should his brother (Tekish) learn about our deed, he would take away India and all that is in your hands!”.<sup>76</sup>

In the end, Sultan-shah’s envoy returned without success, so Sultan-shah decided to resort to force. However, he was defeated utterly in the battle of Merv in 586 AH/1190; a greater part of his army was captured, while he returned to Merv with just 1,600 men.<sup>77</sup> Without army and manpower, Sultan-shah decided to yield to the Qara-Khitay. However, Tekish learned about his brother’s defeat and blocked his eastward retreat. At the same time, he sent troops to the south and, after the capture of the fortress of Sarakhs, immediately destroyed it.<sup>78</sup>

With Tekish in hot pursuit, Sultan-shah now deserted to the Ghurids, who welcomed him heartily. Tekish sent a message to Sultan Ghiyath ad-Din al-Ghuri that reminded him of the destruction caused by Sultan-shah in the country and of his campaigns against Khorezm, and demanded Sultan-shah’s extradition. But Ghiyath ad-Din refused this demand, and gave Tekish’s envoy the following instructions: “Convey to ‘Ala ad-Din Tekish the following: “As for your words that Sultan-shah devastated the country and meant to seize power, I can swear, that he is a sovereign and son of the sovereign and he has lofty intentions, and if he is soliciting power, then he is worthy of it. He sought shelter with me, and I cannot send him away. You must leave his possessions and provide him with his share he succeeded to from his father”. Then Ghiyath ad-Din added: “I vow you both my love and friendship, and you will issue the *khutba* in my name in Khorezm and marry your sister to my brother Shihab ad-Din”.<sup>79</sup>

Naturally, Tekish was indignant with the response of Ghiyath ad-Din al-Ghuri and sent him a wrathful message announcing war. In response, Ghiyath ad-Din fitted up



an army under the command of his nephew Alp-Ghazi and ruler of Sijistan Taj ad-Din Hasan, placed these forces at Sultan-shah's disposal who made for Khorezm. Tekish set out to fight him; however, Sultan-shah did not dare to join battle. Meanwhile, Tekish came back to Gurganj, where he began to assemble an army in readiness for Sultan-shah's possible invasion.<sup>80</sup>

In 588 AH/1192 Tekish started combat operations in Persian Iraq and reached Ray. However, it was unfavourable climatic conditions that led to losses in his army, so he had to return to Khorezm. On the way back he was informed that Sultan-shah, taking opportunity in his absence, invaded Khorezm and laid a siege to Gurganj, but on learning about Tekish's return, raised the siege and left for Merv.<sup>81</sup>

In spring 589 AH (March-April 1193) Tekish moved his forces against Sultan-shah in an effort to put an end to his resistance. When his troops reached Abivard, mediators tried to settle a dispute between the brothers. The talks dragged, but, a treachery of *mustahfiz* (commandant) of Sarakhs fortress Badr ad-Din Chaqir and his going over to Khorezmshah put an end to years-long confrontation between the brothers.

As soon as Tekish learned about the commandant's going over to his side, he, with a swift thrust, came up to the fortress where Chaqir gave him the keys to the fortress together with Sultan-shah's treasury. In the meantime, Sultan-shah realized that all his hopes to seize the throne and dispose of independent possessions proved to be futile. The surrender of Sarakhs was a fatal blow, and just days later, on the last day of Ramadan 589 AH (19 September 1193) Jalal ad-Din Sultan-shah Mahmud died.<sup>82</sup>

Thus ended a 20 years struggle between the sons of Il-Arslan. The death of Sultan-shah put an end to Tekish's apprehension for the fate of the Khorezmshah's throne and untied his hands in expanding his possessions. Tekish took control over entire Khurasan up to the line Talaqan-Merverud-Herat. In Dhu-l-Hijja 589 AH (December 1193), Tekish entrusted Merv and environs to the authority of his elder son Nasir ad-Din Malik-shah, while his other son Qutb ad-Din Muhammad was appointed *wali* of Nishapur.<sup>83</sup>

### **The Rise of the Khorezmshah Kingdom**

The year of 589/1193 saw the beginning of gradual rise and strengthening of the Khorezmshah kingdom. The consolidation of a new empire in the east of the Muslim world became possible thanks to the strict organization of the administrative apparatus and the army. Soon after the kingdom became the most powerful in Central Asia and Iran.

In the course of a long struggle with his brother, Khorezmshah Tekish closely watched the political developments in the areas to the east of his domain. As has been noted above, the rupture of relations with the Qara-Khitay put an end to Khorezm's dependence upon them. Furthermore, during the struggle against the "unfaithful" Qara-Khitay Tekish did not confront with any serious immediate actions on their part, any longer. However, the Qara-Khitay rulers continued inciting nomadic Qipchaq tribes to invade the Khorezmshahid lands from the east and, primarily, the territory

of Jand and its environs.

In his crown prince years, Tekish acted as *wali* of Jand,<sup>84</sup> and after he ascended to the throne, he appointed his favourite son Nasir ad-Din Malik-shah as *wali* of the same Jand. Head of *divan al-insha'* of Khorezmshah Tekish Baha ad-Din Muhammad al-Baghdadi issued a decree that emphasized the importance of Jand for the Khorezmshahid kingdom. In holding that Jand "is a major part of Islamic lands and one of the largest regions of the kingdom" and "the basis and beginning of our triumphal kingdom", Tekish declared that this area was as important to the kingdom's fortunes as was Khorezm itself.<sup>85</sup> The decree stressed a particular role of Jand residents as the defenders of the borders of "Islamic Sultanate", and instructed to use the best and experienced warriors to repel any attack of "infidels".

Another reason for Jand's importance was that it was located on one of the main trade routes which crossed the area from the east to Khorezm. Therefore the decree prescribed to treat merchants fairly, including Turks and foreigners, to avoid impeding commercial deals, ensure security on the roads, to protect commodities and lives of merchants against possible encroachments, etc.

Decrees of this sort were intended for Jand only, as the Khorezmshahs paid special attention to economic conditions of the region and its provision with manpower. It was Khorezmshah Tekish who made a great contribution to Jand's welfare.

Another important outpost on the right bank of the Sayhun river was Barjinligh-kend, so Tekish did his best to join it to his possessions. We still have the text of Tekish's decree on appointment of his son Taj ad-Din 'Ali-shah as *wali* of Barjinligh-kend.<sup>86</sup> The decree says that Barjinligh-kend and another community of the region Ribat Toghan became a part of Khorezm. Also, the decree stipulates that spies should be sent from that point far eastwards to forestall the enemy sallies.

Tekish declared the struggle against "infidels" and their conversion into Islam as his honourable prime objective. His ideas clearly manifested themselves in a letter dated Ramadan 576 AH (January 1181) and addressed to the ruler Ghur. The letter said that the troops of Khorezm would reach the Qipchaq lands bordering onto his and that a goal set before them would be attained.<sup>87</sup> Another letter dated Muharram 577 AH (May 1181) and informed the Ghurid ruler about a joint campaign of Khorezmian and Qipchaq armies against the Qara-Khitay.<sup>88</sup>

As it is seen from the letter, a countless number of Qipchaqs headed by the chief of the Turkic tribe Uran<sup>89</sup> Alp-Qara came up to the borders of Jand and expressed their desire to serve the Khorezmshah. Alp-Qara sent his elder son Qiran to Gurganj together with a detached force of "children of the beks of Ughur tribe" and informed Tekish that he was ready to head out in whichever direction the Khorezmshah liked.

Tekish welcomed the envoys, awarded them robes of honour, and dispatched to Jand a Qipchaq force with ten commanders at the disposal of his son Nasir ad-Din Malik-shah. He instructed his son to take the army of Jand under his command and together with Alp-Qara's soldiers start conquering lands of "these damned Qara-Khitay and banish these infidels from the lands they occupied, or exterminate them".



In Jumada II 577 AH (October 1181) Khorezmshah Tekish sent a letter to the ruler of Iraq and Azerbaijan Atabek Jahan-Pahlawan, informing him that his troops had reached Taraz and there was a certain Qiran among commanders, a relative of Jahan-Pahlawan.<sup>90</sup>

In his third letter addressed to Ghiyath ad-Din al-Ghuri, in which he lists the towns which were assisting him in the siege of the fortress at Sarakhs, Tekish refers to Kand (Shahr (i)-kend).<sup>91</sup> Perhaps this town was a part of his domain.<sup>92</sup>

Starting in 1180, it seems, Khorezmshahid army advanced not only to the environs of Balasaghun, capital of the Qara-Khitay, but, together with the troops of malik of Sighnaq), even further into the lands of the Qara-Khitay.<sup>93</sup>

At the same time, Tekish set out on campaign to Mawarannahr and captured Bukhara on 12 Jumada II 578 AH (14 October 1182).<sup>94</sup> His struggle for the town is referred to in his triumphal letter (*fath-nama*).<sup>95</sup> The conquest of Bukhara is described here as “a great *jihad*” (*jihad-i a’zam*). The letter tells that the army of Khorezm, “frightful as a fire and fast as a wind”, crossed the Jayhun with lightning speed and invaded the Bukharan lands. The *khutba* and *sikka* were issued in Tekish’s name.<sup>96</sup> Tekish issued here two *farmans* that thanked one of the *sayyids* who helped in the seizure of Bukhara. The *sayyid* was appointed to replace the *khatib* and *mufti* of Bukhara Badr ad-Din. The latter was instructed to make *khutba* public where a name of caliph was followed by a name of Tekish.

Tekish faced difficulties while seizing Bukhara. The population of the city refused to surrender, and mocked Tekish. They took a one-eyed dog (Tekish was blind in one eye), dressed it in a kaftan and a *qalansuwa*, and placed it on the fortress wall, crying: “Here’s your Khorezmshah!”. Then they catapulted it shouting: “Here’s your Sultan!” The Khorezmians responded saying: “That’s the realm of heathen (*ya ajnad al-kufr*)! You have swerved from the true course of Islam and keep on persisting in your delusion!” Nevertheless after seizing Bukhara Tekish did not punish its citizen for their impertinence.<sup>97</sup>

During his struggle with Sultan-shah, Tekish tried to maintain good relations with rulers of neighbouring states. Official documents attached by the head of the *diwan al-insha’* Baha ad-Din al-Baghdadi to the collected works *at-Tawassul ila-t-tarassul* allow us to reconstruct Tekish’s diplomatic activities during the period in question.

In his dealings with Khurasan, Tekish found himself in violent competition with the Ghurid ruler Sultan Ghiyath ad-Din al-Ghuri. While struggling with his brother, however, Tekish tried to maintain normal relations with Ghiyath ad-Din, and each of them titled another as “brother” (*baradar*). The Khorezmshah’s earliest letter is dated Ramadan 576 AH (January 1181). A month previously Ghiyath ad-Din had dispatched to Khorezm an embassy under Amir Humam ad-Din, which had concluded with a warm mutual understanding. Tekish now sent Humam ad-Din back to the Ghurid court, accompanied by his own envoy, *sayyid al-umara wa-n-nuwwab* Fakhr ad-Din.<sup>98</sup>

The letter delivered by Fakhr ad-Din touched upon Sultan-shah and his encroachment upon lands of Toghan-shah, vassal of Khorezmshah and ruler of Nishapur. Fighting

with his brother, Tekish strove to ensure Ghiyath ad-Din al-Ghuri's neutrality. Once he secured this goal, "Tekish warned his dearest brother Sultan-shah" against any attempts to infringe upon Toghan-shah's possessions. Those were declared *khass* lands belonging to the Khorezmshah. The fact that Ghiyath ad-Din did not try to impede Tekish testifies to his growing authority.<sup>99</sup>

Still, the Khorezmshah remained dissatisfied with the situation in Khurasan, as Sultan-shah's perpetual threats tied up Tekish's hands who aspired to complete the seizure of Khurasan lands.

Having blunted Ghiyath ad-Din's vigilance, Tekish annulled the truce with Sultan-shah and led his forces towards Sarakhs. On this occasion, his forces consisted of troops from Jand, Barjinligh-kend and Manghyshlaq. Troops from Jurjan, Dihistan, Abivard, Nasa and Nishapur were to join later.

In Muharram 578 AH (May 1182), Tekish wrote a letter to Ghiyath ad-Din, informing him about his expedition against Sarakhs. The letter started with good wishes, then Khorezmshah reminded Ghiyath ad-Din of the agreement between them and invited the Ghurid ruler to participate in the campaign. He made a reservation as saying that if Ghiyath ad-Din had no opportunity to take the field, he could send troops from bordering regions. Tekish repeated his request to Ghiyath ad-Din and again asked him to send troops in time.<sup>100</sup>

Thus, the Khorezmshahid forces operated in two directions: on the right bank of the Syr Darya jointly with Qipchaqs under the command of Qiran, son of Alp-Qara, and in Khurasan. Following the capture of Sarakhs, Tekish intended to invade Mawarannahr.

Having received no military aid, Khorezmshah postponed his siege of Sarakhs for a year. Meanwhile, the situation in Khurasan went from bad to worse; various amirs together with Sultan-shah started their forays not only on Khorezmian lands but on Ghurid possessions as well. Ghiyath ad-Din thus launched an offensive, and his army invaded regions of Sarakhs and Khabaran. Ghiyath ad-Din defeated commandants of neighbouring fortresses and informed Khorezmshah about his success.

Tekish was about to move his 10,000-strong vanguard to Khurasan but having received a report from Ghiyath ad-Din's agents that order in Khurasan had been restored, withdrew his army back, especially as severe winter and lack of forage could damage the troops heavily.

As spring set in, the Khorezmshah began preparations for a new march against Sarakhs. Towards this end, he again appealed to Ghiyath ad-Din.<sup>101</sup> A letter from the Khorezmshah dated Ramadan 578 AH (January 1183) says that on this occasion Sarakhs was not besieged, and that the army of Khorezmshah did not even approach its environs.<sup>102</sup> Tekish now changed his mind and took to Mawarannahr and, seized Bukhara, as he considered this operation to be more advantageous for him. He informed Ghiyath ad-Din that he coped with his task and returned to Khorezm, not Khurasan, since his horses were tired and winter came together with incessant and cold rains.

This time Khorezmshah decided to focus on the Qara-Khitay and Mawarannahr. As for Khurasan, meanwhile, he decided to adopt a wait-and-see policy until such

time as his authority in Mawarannahr was fully consolidated. Notwithstanding his eloquent assertions of friendship and collaboration in correspondence with Ghiyath ad-Din al-Ghuri, Tekish remained firm and unshakeable with regard to his political aims on eastern and southern borders of Khorezm. But meddling with internal affairs of Khurasan, then Persian Iraq and, finally, the struggle with Seljuqs was the maximum Khorezmshah desired for that moment. Meanwhile, he concentrated on Mawarannahr only.

A letter of Ghiyath ad-Din al-Ghuri dated Rabi' II 579 AH (August 1183), sent from Abivard, stressed that one of the Khorezmshah's purposes was to defend possessions "of Toghan-shah's son patronized by him long since". Khorezmshah possessed 50,000 Turkic-archers who, from the date of their arrival in Khurasan, were successful in smashing up those encroaching upon his vassal.<sup>103</sup>

In April 1185 Toghan-shah died, and his son Sanjar-shah succeeded to the throne as ruler of Nishapur (under actual ruler, Atabek Mengli-Tegin). The situation in Khurasan thus changed to the extent that Tekish eventually managed to annex these territories.

During this period, Tekish maintained generally good relations with *ispahbad* Husam ad-Dawla Ardashir (1171-1205), ruler of Mazandaran and Gilan. Both sovereigns exchanged embassies and offerings. Their friendly relations greatly improved after the Khorezmshah married his daughter Shah-khatun to Ardashir.<sup>104</sup> When Tekish was engaged in routing Mengli-Tegin, *ispahbad* Ardashir helped him with sending a 2,000-strong detachment. Khorezmshah in his letter referred to Ardashir as to his vassal (*ispahbad mu'azzam farzand*) who sent troops to the Khorezmshah at a moment's notice.<sup>105</sup>

Tekish also obtained assistance from the ruler (*malik*) of Nasa 'Imad ad-Din Muhammad ibn 'Umar.<sup>106</sup>

A very different picture was playing out, meanwhile, between the Khorezmshah and the Iraqi Seljuqs – or, to be more precise, with the atabeks of Azerbaijan who actually held control over Persian Iraq. Following the accession of Muhammad Jahan-Pahlawan (1175-1186) as atabek of Azerbaijan, relations with Tekish were warm. The Khorezmshah dispatched to the atabek a letter offering "assurance about his friendship and sincerity. During the atabek's lifetime, he and Khorezmshah maintained relations of friendship and harmony".<sup>107</sup>

Four letters of Khorezmshah have been preserved to this day in the collected documents compiled by Baha ad-Din Muhammad al-Baghdadi and addressed to "great Atabek Shams ad-Dawla wa-d-Din, Pahlawan of Iraq". All four letters are written in a friendly style and show Tekish's interest in maintaining peaceful relations with the atabek, whom Khorezmshah identifies as "noble brother" (*baradar-i humayun*).

A letter dated Muharram 557 AH (May 1181) stresses the importance of exchanging embassies and explained reasons urging Khorezmshah to invade Khurasan in 1181. Tekish apologizes to the atabek, noting that "there will be no repetition of the events which led to disputes and discontent".<sup>108</sup>

Another letter dated Rabi' II 577 AH (August 1181) was sent by Khorezmshah with

Rashid ad-Din, envoy of atabek, mentions the delivery of atabek's letter to him, and tells about the impression left by the message under which he remained for a while. Khorezmshah informed that a gyrfalcon he promised was sent with Rashid ad-Din. Tekish regretted that the number of the embassies of "noble gentleman" (*janab-i humayun*) declined and expressed his concern about the break "in exchange of messages" (*mukhatabat-i buzurgwari*). He expressed his wish about at least, one more meeting between him and atabek.<sup>109</sup>

In a third letter dated Jumada II 577 AH (October 1181) the Khorezmshah laments that Khorezm's remoteness from the capital of Atabek Jahan Pahlawan made it impossible to maintain a regular exchange of messages. Tekish does emphasize, however, that he has been kept informed about the developments going on in *majlis-i sami* as saying that borders between the kingdoms were kept peaceful and tensions in the atabek state were eased. He thanked the atabek for unity between them and for his message delivered by noble Amir Salah ad-Din, whom Tekish had kept at his court for so long because of his expressive and wise speech. The envoy's personality is indicative that the atabek was a friend of him. Salah ad-Din saw with his own eyes an arrival of huge army of Qipchaqs who moved to the borders of Jand to serve the Khorezmshah. Then they, jointly with soldiers from Barjinligh-kend, Shahri-kend, Rabatat and other places, would get down "to exterminating disbelief in the regions neighbouring Khorezm". Tekish expressed his desire that he and the atabek should inform each other beforehand about developments in their neighbourhoods.<sup>110</sup>

In his fourth letter to the atabek dated Rajab 578 AH (November 1182), Tekish again apologizes for his rare letters and missions to the atabek, and assures him that their friendship will not suffer; instead, it will only grow stronger. He asks the atabek to accept gifts, for they are presented from the bottom of his heart. He expresses his hope that "paths of joy will always be open to them and paths of mistrust be closed for ever". And he informs the atabek that Khurasan and adjacent lands had submitted to him completely and he is in command of countless Qipchaq detachments from all parts of Turkestan.<sup>110</sup>

On 20 Rabi' II 587 AH (August 23 1182) Tekish sent a letter to the Shirvanshah Minuchihr III (1160-1197) and expressed his hope on a meeting to take place soon and sincere aspirations to strengthen friendly relations. He took pleasure, as he put it, in talking with the envoy of Shirvanshah, Amir Farid ad-Din; he reported that he would set out with 10,000-strong army toward Khurasan to liberate the local population from oppressions. He noted that he would send his own envoy Jamal ad-Din back to Shirvan with Farid ad-Din, to convey his best regards and to update the Shirvanshah about recent developments in Khorezm; he added that ruler of Sighnaq together with his troops agreed to serve him and that he was instructed to exterminate all "infidels" on borders of his possessions.<sup>111</sup>

Tekish maintained good relations also with Atabek Qizil-Arslan (1186-1191), Jahan-Pahlawan's successor.

However, after Qizil-Arslan's murder the Azeri atabek state was divided between

four sons of Atabek Jahan-Pahlawan. Hamadan and neighbouring regions of Persian Iraq were captured by sons of atabek from a daughter of Inanch, Ray's ruler – Inanch-Khatun; namely by Qutlugh-Inanch and Amir Amiran Mahmud. In the meantime, Inanch-Khatun preferred to stay in Ray.<sup>112</sup>

Thus, the Atabek kingdom of Azerbaijan fell apart, though the process was not complete, and a new internecine war remained possible, especially as in Rabi' II 588 AH (April-May 1192) the last Seljuq Sultan Toghrul III, previously arrested by Qizil-Arslan, was released.<sup>113</sup>

Sultan Toghrul III quickly mustered an army, and on 15 Jumada II 588 AH (June 22 1192) he defeated the army of Qutlugh-Inanch in the vicinity of Qazvin. Qutlugh-Inanch had to flee, and a greater part of his army deserted to Toghrul III.<sup>114</sup> Following this victory, Toghrul III entered Hamadan to take the sultanal throne. Qutlugh-Inanch took shelter with his mother in Ray, from where he sent envoys to Khorezmshah Tekish reporting that Toghrul III had seized Persian Iraq, and requesting Tekish's help against the Seljuq forces. Seizing the opportunity thus presented to him, Tekish decided to intervene in the conflict, and in early 589 AH (January 1193) he sent his troops to the region in order to seize possession of Persian Iraq.<sup>115</sup>

The Khorezmshahid army captured Ray and the fortress of Tabrak, took booty and began exercising control over the country. Apprehensive of Khorezmshah, Qutlugh-Inanch and his mother hid themselves in the fortress of Sarjahan. Availing himself of the situation, Sultan Toghrul III sent luxury gifts to Tekish and tried to solicit his patronage and aid to fight against Qutlugh-Inanch. Toghrul III married his daughter to Tekish's son Yunus-khan and promised to issue the *khutba* and *sikka* throughout the Iraqi Sultanate in Tekish's name,<sup>116</sup> thereby effectively acknowledging Khorezmshahid suzerainty. By the terms of an agreement concluded between Toghrul III and Khorezmshah Tekish, Ray now came under Khorezmshahid rule.

At this very juncture, Tekish received news that his brother Sultan-shah army had invaded Khorezm. Having collected *kharaḡ* from the occupied lands and retaining garrisons headed by Amir Tamghach in Ray and Tabrak, Tekish hurriedly returned to Khorezm.<sup>117</sup>

Taking advantage of the Khorezmshah's departure, Sultan Toghrul III decided to breach the terms of his agreement, and in spring 589 AH (March-April 1193) he attacked and destroyed the various Khorezmshahid garrisons in the region. He seized Ray and Tabrak, and he dispatched off to Khorezm the decapitated head of Amir Tamghach.<sup>118</sup> Qutlugh-Inanch fled to Zanjan, from where he sent a message to the Khorezmshah requesting help against Sultan Toghrul III.

Simultaneously the 'Abbasid caliph an-Nasir (1180-1225) sent an appeal to Tekish, complaining that Sultan Toghrul III had invaded various territories which were subject to caliphal rule. Together with this message, the caliph sent a decree (*manshur*) stating that he had granted to Tekish as an *iqta'* of all the territories presently ruled by Sultan Toghrul III.

In realizing benefits from the internecine struggle in Iraqi Sultanate, Khorezmshah set out with his army from Khorezm (590/1193). While at Semnan, his army was

reinforced by Qutlugh-Inanch with his supporters and Iraqi amirs that abandoned Sultan Toghrul III.<sup>119</sup>

In front of the Khorezmshah's throne, Qutlugh-Inanch "kissed the very ground beneath him, informed him about the current situation and hardships he suffered. Khorezmshah 'Ala ad-Din Tekish accepted him favourably, showed mercy and promised to help. He ordered to present Inanch and his companions with splendid garments of honour".<sup>120</sup>

On learning that Tekish was now marching against him, Toghrul III hastily moved towards Ray. Before the battle, Toghrul III received a message from Shihab ad-Din Mas'ud, senior *hajib* to the Khorezmshah, that induced the sultan to conclude a peace treaty with Tekish and accede to his demands. The senior *hajib* wrote: "Though I am a *mamluk* of Sultan 'Ala ad-Din Tekish, and am the merest plaything in his hands, I nevertheless have the right to give you good advice. I advise you to leave Ray and go to Sawa, where you should stay put and conclude a peace with Sultan 'Ala ad-Din Tekish. We shall mediate between you and him. Your departure from Ray is his prime demand. His purpose is to keep people informed about his prestige and authority in the eyes of infidel sovereigns (*muluk al-kuffar*). They are aware that Ray lies under his authority, but his people are presently banished from the town, and someone else is currently in control there. He has no other desire but this, and if you do as he asks and yield control of Ray, he will leave his son there and go back to Khorezm. In this case, his son will fall under your power, obey your orders and observe your prohibitions. It turns out the sultan has returned wilfully, without bloodshed, and everything will remain as it was".<sup>121</sup>

Having received the letter, Sultan Toghrul III talked things over with his amirs, and Amir Nur ad-Din Qara told him:

"That is right; we should go to Sawa and remain there until our troops from Isfahan and Zanjan arrive. Should Khorezmshah 'Ala ad-Din Tekish follow us, we would be able to block a narrow passage between Sawa and Mushkuya and impede him. If we fail, we can go to Isfahan, and if he attacks us in Isfahan, we may return to Hamadan. He will not be able to leave the country, nor follow us, and then we shall be able to conclude a truce with them for the welfare of Muslims".<sup>122</sup>

But Sultan Toghrul III turned these proposals down. He spoke as follows: "That's a good idea! But the people of Ray would think of me as a coward who abandoned them. The Khorezmians will sway over there, oppress them, and wound their feelings, while the people voiced their love and loyalty to me. So I shall not do that!".<sup>123</sup>

Before the arrival of his main forces, Sultan Toghrul III decided to attack the Khorezmian forces, and on 9 Rabi' I 590 AH (March 4 1194) his army assaulted the Khorezmshah's advance guard headed by Qutlugh-Inanch. Reinforced by 60 *ghulams*, Sultan Toghrul III threw himself upon the advance guard, but was wounded by an arrow in his eye and fell from his horse. At the moment, Qutlugh-Inanch came up to him, and Toghrul III appealed to him as saying: "Oh, Mahmud, lift me and take me away from here. That will be better both for you and me!". Instead, however, Qutlugh-Inanch chopped off Sultan Toghrul's head and took it to the Khorezmshah. But Tekish



disapproved of Qutlugh-Inanch's actions, telling him: "It would have been better if you had brought him alive. Alas! His fate proved to be deplorable!". The Khorezmshah sent Toghrul's head to Baghdad where it was exhibited for several days at the Nubi gate. The sultan's body was then hanged at Ray bazaar.

"With the death of Sultan Toghrul III, the last Seljuq sovereign, all that is left from the Seljuq clan is ashes, and even these were dispersed by the wind!" – wrote the historian Sadr ad-Din al-Husayni.<sup>124</sup>

Following the death of Toghrul III, Tekish occupied Hamadan and a greater part of Persian Iraq on 4 Rajab 590 AH (June 25 1194) and then distributed these lands among his amirs. He granted Isfahan to Qutlugh-Inanch; Hamadan to Amir Qaragoz; and Ray to his son Yunus-khan, under the guardianship of the *atabek* Amir Mayachuq.<sup>125</sup> He humbled the Iraqi amirs and forced them to desist from combat operations, and seized all treasures of Persian Iraq. He disbanded the bureaucratic apparatus, appointed new persons to take office in divans and took away *iqta'* from previous owners and gave them to his people. Following magnificent festivities in Hamadan, the Khorezmshah returned to Gurganj.

Caliph an-Nasir assumed that Khorezmshah Tekish, while at Persian Iraq, would grant him a part of lands of Toghrul III, for his troops led by vizier Ibn al-Qassab took part in combat operations against Sultan. But the caliph was disappointed. The Khorezmshah did not offer him any territory at all. In an effort to emphasize his own importance, the caliph instructed his vizier to hand a deed to Tekish on transfer of the lands of Sultan Toghrul III to Khorezmshah's ownership and to robe him in sultan's garment. When sending vizier Ibn al-Qassab with the deed and gifts, the caliph added 10,000-strong army composed of Kurds and Arab Bedouins.

Having arrived to the Asadabad pass, the vizier communicated to the Khorezmshah the following message: "The honour and the diploma of Sultanship have been bestowed by the Supreme Divan, and the surety for the affairs of the realm, that is the vizier, has come hither on that errand. The obligation under which he is placed by that boon requires the Sultan to advance to meet the vizier with a small following and great humility and to proceed on foot in front of the vizier's horse!".<sup>126</sup> But the Khorezmshah suspected something wrong in this request and gave orders to attack the vizier's camp. The vizier managed to escape; however, Tekish's soldiers chased him up to Dinavar and seized numerous trophies.

Following this conflict, relations between the Khorezmshah and the caliph took a turn for the worse.<sup>127</sup> The enmity between the two sovereigns greatly increased after Tekish "demanded from caliph to recognize his power and re-establish the sultan palace in Baghdad as was under the Seljuqs".<sup>128</sup> Caliph an-Nasir turned this demand down, whereafter the Khorezmshah dynasty and the caliphal house became enemies. This enmity ceased only after the Mongolian invasion and the fall of the Khorezmshah kingdom.

First of all, Caliph an-Nasir could not agree with the capture of lands of Persian Iraq. As soon as Tekish returned to Khorezm, an internecine war broke out in the country

at the caliph's incitement. The ruler of Isfahan Qutlugh-Inanch deserted to the caliph, and against the terms of his alliance obligations launched an open war against Tekish's son Yunus-khan and his atabek Mayachuq. In the battle under Zanjan Qutlugh-Inanch was routed by Mayachuq and with remains of his army fled to the headquarters of vizier Ibn al-Qassab near Hulvan passage.<sup>129</sup> Vizier awarded Qutlugh-Inanch with a garment of honour and granted him the command over all the cavalry he had. The army under the command of Qutlugh-Inanch moved via Kermanshah to Hamadan. Following a brief battle Yunus-khan and Mayachuq were thrown out of Hamadan in Shawwal 591 AH (September 1195). After the capture of the lands around Hamadan, Qutlugh-Inanch and Ibn al-Qassab approached Ray. And again, Khorezmian troops were smashed and had to retreat to Bistam and Jurjan. Shortly after, the entire Persian Iraq was freed from the Khorezmian troops.<sup>130</sup>

However, several months later, Qutlugh-Inanch and Iraqi amirs sensed that vizier Ibn al-Qassab was acting in the interests of the caliphate alone, and that his principal objective was to sack the country. When Qutlugh-Inanch objected to the actions of Ibn al-Qassab, the latter assaulted him and compelled him to flee. The vizier overtook him near the town of Karaj, where Qutlugh-Inanch was completely defeated and had to seek shelter.<sup>131</sup>

After that, vizier Ibn al-Qassab returned to Hamadan. After several months, the envoy of Khorezmshah Tekish arrived to express his discontent with actions of caliph's troops, and demanded to withdraw them from Persian Iraq. However, the vizier declined this request, so Khorezmshah sent his troops towards Hamadan. Tekish could not approach Ibn al-Qassab, for the latter died in Shawwal 592 AH (July 1196). Vizier's troops sank into disorder, and Khorezmshah using the situation crushed the caliph's army, seized trophies and captured Hamadan. He ordered to take the body of Ibn al-Qassab out of the grave and burn it.<sup>132</sup>

Following these developments, Mayachuq and some other amirs of Khorezmshah started peace talks with Qutlugh-Inanch and asked his permission to arrive at his headquarters. However, this was a trick devised by a daughter of the late Sultan Toghrul III who had been killed by Qutlugh-Inanch. She married Yunus-khan and decided to take vengeance for her father. Mayachuq and his accomplices managed to decoy Qutlugh-Inanch into an ambush and kill him.<sup>133</sup>

Taking advantage of Tekish's absence, Caliph an-Nasir, at the request of Isfahan Shafi'it leader Sadr ad-Din al-Khujandi, sent an army led by Sayf ad-Din Toghrul to seize the town. The Khorezmian garrison failed to stand its ground, surrendered the town and went to Khurasan. Isfahan was recaptured by Caliph an-Nasir in 591/1195.<sup>134</sup>

When Khorezmshah was departing from Persian Iraq, he decided to leave the country under the command of Abu Bakr, another son of Atabek Jahan-Pahlawan. Tekish wrote to him:

"We are greeting our son Abu Bakr and are solicitous for his health. We have important matters to deal with in Khorezm. We consider it necessary to hand Hamadan over to the administration of our son". However, Atabek Abu Bakr pleaded being busy



on the border with Georgians and declined from coming to see Khorezmshah. He sent his brother Atabek Uzbek to replace him.<sup>135</sup>

Urbek arrived in Hamadan where Khorezmshah Tekish received him solemnly and entrusted him the rule over Persian Iraq. Jamal ad-Din Ay-Aba who took control over the all administrative affairs, became a trustee (*mudabbir*) of Uzbek.<sup>136</sup>

In 591/1195, after the Khorezmshah's departure to Khorezm, the *mamluks* of Atabek Jahan-Pahlawan, acting in collusion with some amirs of Iraq, started to fight against the Khorezmshah. This group was headed by the *mamluk* Amir 'Izz ad-Din Gokcha. His supporters captured Ray and its districts and moved towards Isfahan to oust the Khorezmisan garrison. When they approached the city, they learnt that the Khorezmians had already been banished from there by Caliph an-Nasir's army under the command of Sayf ad-Din Toghrul. Having agreed on joint actions, Gokcha and Toghrul set off in pursuit of the Khorezmians, and soon after conquered the whole of Persian Iraq. Gokcha took possession of Ray and the surrounding area together with Sawa, Qum and Kashan, while Caliph an-Nasir received Isfahan, Hamadan, Zanjan and Qazvin. The caliph sent *manshur* to Gokcha that secured lands he seized, provided that these regions would be formally subordinated to Gokcha, and taxes go to the caliph's treasury.<sup>137</sup>

In 592/1196 there occurred a fierce battle between the armies of the Khorezmshah and the caliph. The battle resulted in the abject defeat of the caliphal army, and the Khorezmshah retook control over Hamadan, Ray and Isfahan. When the Khorezmian army encircled Hamadan, Amir Mayachuq warned the townsfolk and the caliph's garrison not to resist the Khorezmian troops, otherwise the town and its districts would be destroyed. The residents of Hamadan declared that they would not yield the city until they saw Khorezmshah. Mayachuq encircled the town, confiscated the cattle and reported to Tekish. On 19 Sha'ban 592 AH (18 July 1196) the Khorezmshah arrived in Hamadan and declared that he was ready to receive visitors. He sent an envoy to the city to make the following announcement:

"If you do not believe me, send your agents, let them see me and surrender the town. Otherwise, I shall seize it by force and turn it upside down!" No one dared to respond to the offer until some authorities, mainly local residents, made certain that it was indeed Khorezmshah Tekish. They kissed his hands and explained that they had not surrendered the town, fully confident that Mayachuq betrayed the Khorezmshah. Tekish told Hamadan envoys: "Nobody owes to anybody. And if anyone from our army commits a vile act, we shall allow him to be put to death". As a result, the town was surrendered and the caliphal garrison was captured. The Khorezmshah rewarded the caliphal amirs with garments of honour and said: "We are also the slaves of Amir of believers! If you wish, stay here, if not, then leave". At the same time, however, he gave orders that any Arab soldier who donned a Khorezmian headdress should be decapitated. This was because certain Arabs troops were pillaging the Hamadan population in the guise of invading Khorezmians.<sup>138</sup>

As soon as Caliph an-Nasir learned of the failure of his attempt to capture Persian

Iraq, he changed tactics in his struggle with Khorezmshah. When Tekish stayed in Hamadan, the caliphal envoy Mujir ad-Din Mahmud al-Baghdadi arrived from Baghdad. On the way to the palace the envoy set his feet on a strip of satin and brocade covered with heaps of golden coins. In welcoming the envoy, the Khorezmshah even half-rose on the throne!

Mujir ad-Din said: "The Amir of believers is interested in your health!". When the envoy pronounced the caliph's name, Tekish stood up and thus demonstrated his respect to the caliph. Mujir ad-Din said: "The Amir of the faithful puts it: "Your father and your grandfather got means of subsistence from us. Now we are giving it to you: use it, then, with frugality and avoid mean actions. Otherwise, I shall muster troops against you, and the blood will be shed!"

The Khorezmshah replied: "Power belongs to the Amir of the faithful, and I am just one of his *shihnas*. I have a lot of enemies, but I am stronger than they are. However, I cannot do without troops. The head of the army divan told me that we have a 170,000-strong cavalry, but this figure is unsustainable on terms set forth by the caliph. Should the caliph do the kindness of granting me control over Khuzistan, our needs would be satisfied".<sup>139</sup>

Mujir ad-Din went to his premises after the discussion, and the next day died suddenly in his chamber. The Khorezmshah sent the caliph's embassy back to Baghdad, accompanied by his own envoy hajib Shibab ad-Din Mas'ud al-Khorezmi.

As the historian Rawandi noted: "The Amir of believers damaged his own interests when ordered to take these measures!"<sup>140</sup> The Khorezmshah was well aware of the political situation, and knew that Caliph an-Nasir was in a vulnerable position. Through his envoy he demanded to read out *khutba* with his name in the capital of Caliphate and the reconstruction of the palace of Seljuq sultans in Baghdad. The Caliph refused to answer this demand, so Tekish envoy's returned with no results.<sup>141</sup>

In the meanwhile, Caliph an-Nasir aspired to parry Khorezmshah's threats. He decided to win over to his side Mayachuq, Tekish's governor in Persian Iraq, to his side. The Caliph sent an amiable message to Mayachuq: "Sultan Khorezmshah is your sovereign, however, Shams ad-Din Mayachuq is a true and real lord of the world, Pahlawan of the universe, a second Rustam, victorious conqueror, guard of state's borders (*kir-isfahsalar*) and governor (*na'ib*) of the Amir of believers!"<sup>142</sup>

Mayachuq was inclined to accept the caliph's proposal and even sent his army toward Hamadan, whose residents yielded to his entreaties and were ready to surrender the city. However, on 20 Rajab 594 AH (8 June 1197), Khorezmshah Tekish's envoy arrived in Hamadan and read out a decree that said: "The fair sovereign, victorious conqueror, great *hajib*, malik of amirs of the East and the West Shams ad-Din, *ulugh-hajib*, fighter (*ghazi*), *kir-isfahsalar* Mayachuq, assistant to the Amir of believers, is our slave and his justice is well-known to us. We decided to appoint him as our governor (*na'ib*) in the whole of Iraq, and to entrust him to fulfil all our decrees. He is a shelter for the *ra'is*, the *qadi* and other senior officials".

Having received this decree from Tekish, who stayed far in Khorezm, Mayachuq

imagined himself free in his actions and got down to pillaging the country. His troops committed outrages everywhere in Persian Iraq, from Hamadan to Ahbar and Zanjan. "They killed even hens or cocks that dared to crow; took bulls away from farmers, mocked people reading such verses: \*

If you have nothing, then learn something,  
For he who has nothing is worthless.  
Rich is the one, who has a brave and generous heart,  
That's why you should collect money, think of it only!  
All what a man has, has to be eaten up!  
After my hand is depleted, soul of mine suffers torments",<sup>143</sup>

The insolent Mayachuq distributed *iqta'* everywhere and even thought of declaring himself a sultan, especially as the whole of Iraq was under his control. Rawandi noted that "his people had no mercy to Muslims, and they shed human blood everywhere like water. They burst into madrasahs and mosques, plundered them, imposed fines on madrasah, mosques and scholars".<sup>144</sup>

Having learnt about Mayachuq's disgraceful practices, Khorezmshah Tekish decided to do away with him. He set his troops toward Persian Iraq, and Mayachuq, in the fear of being punished for his crimes, tried to escape from Khorezmshah. Finally, Tekish caught Mayachuq at the fortress of Ardahn, near Ray. Without his army, the helpless Mayachuq went out of the fortress and was seized. All his associates were detained and executed. Upon his return to Khorezm, Tekish executed his vizier who patronized Mayachuq, while the latter was hanged to his head down.<sup>145</sup>

Failing to counteract Tekish with the help of Mayachuq, Caliph an-Nasir decided to enlist the support of a new ally. He sent a message to the ruler of Ghur Ghiyath ad-Din and instigated him to assault Khorezm and thus avoid Tekish's capture of Persian Iraq. This time, Ghiyath ad-Din sent a menacing letter to Khorezmshah that demanded from him to stop interfering with Iraqi affairs; otherwise, he warned, his army would immediately invade Khorezm.

Sensing danger, Khorezmshah appealed to the Qara-Khitay for military aid, and simultaneously advanced toward Herat via Tus, and laid siege to the town, in Jumada II 594 AH (April 1198) a huge Qara-Khitay army invaded Khurasan and ruined the country utterly. However, Ghiyath ad-Din al-Ghuri succeeded to rout the Qara-Khitay and throw them into Amu Darya.

When the sovereign of the Qara-Khitay learned about the defeat of his army, he demanded from Khorezmshah to pay him 10,000 dinars per each of the 12,000 Qara-Khitay killed. Tekish refused, and had to appeal to Ghiyath ad-Din for advice. The latter agreed to pay this amount, provided that the Khorezmshah refrains from hostile operations against Caliph an-Nasir, obey him and ensure that the Qara-Khitay return all Muslim lands under occupation.<sup>146</sup>

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\* Ferdowsi, 1427

Khorezmshah agreed with these conditions, and his relations with Caliph an-Nasir became normal. Caliph sent a garment of honour to Tekish and his son Qutb ad-Din Muhammad, as well as *manshur* authorising the Khorezmshah as sultan of Khurasan, Turkestan and Persian Iraq.<sup>147</sup> The caliph thus confirmed Khorezmshah's suzerain power in these countries.

Relations between Tekish and the caliph consolidated after the arrival in Baghdad of an embassy headed by Tekish's nephew Amir Sayf ad-Din in Muharram 595 AH (November 1198). Acting on behalf of Tekish, Sayf ad-Din expressed obedience to the caliph and apologized for the Khorezmshah's insistence that the *khutba* be issued in his name in the capital of the Caliphate. The caliph robed Sayf ad-Din in a garment of honour and expressed his satisfaction with the arrival of the envoy. Having presented the envoy with dulcimer and a banner, the caliph allowed him to return home.<sup>148</sup>

Around this time, Tekish found his attention drawn by events taking place in Kerman. Following the death of Kerman's ruler Dinar, the situation in the country deteriorated under his son Farrukh-shah. Thus, residents of the fortress of Burdeshir banished representatives of central power and appealed to the Khorezmshah with a request to send troops to ease tensions. They started issuing the *khutba* and *sikka* in Tekish's name. Residents of the fortress of Kubnat appealed to the Khorezmshah for assistance.

In response to these appeals, Tekish dispatched to Kerman a military force under the leadership of Amir Nusrat ad-Din 'Umar, who entered Burdeshir and formed a government here under the leadership of the spiritual leader Rukn ad-Din. However, *hajib* Husam ad-Din 'Umar who came to manage Kerman proved to be an untalented and cruel ruler, and shortly after power in Kerman devolved to the representative of the Shabankar clan.<sup>149</sup>

Tekish devoted much of the last years of his life to the struggle against the Isma'ilis. Following a 4-month siege, his troops captured the fortress of Qahira (Arslan-gushay), the second most important Isma'ili base after Alamut; by the terms of the surrender, it was agreed that the inhabitants of the fortress would not be harmed. Tekish then turned his attention to the siege of Alamut itself. Soon afterwards, however, he raised the siege, despite the fact that the fortress garrison of "heretics" had already been greatly weakened. He appointed his son Taj ad-Din 'Ali-shah as his governor of Iraq, and on 10 Jumada II 596 AH (29 March 1200) returned to Gurganj.<sup>150</sup>

The Isma'ilis believed that it was the vizier Nizam al-Mulk Mas'ud ibn 'Ali who had set Sultan Tekish against them, so the same month they assassinated the vizier. Tekish was enraged and dispatched a punitive expedition against them under the command of his son Qutb ad-Din Muhammad. Qutb ad-Din laid siege to the fortress of Turshiz. Following a 4-month siege, the Isma'ilis were compelled to ask for peace, and having obtained 100,000 dinars from them, Qutb ad-Din Muhammad signed a truce and drew off his troops (perhaps, he was informed about his father's disease).<sup>151</sup>

Following his triumph over the Isma'ilis, Tekish raised a new army and made his way to Khurasan in an attempt eventually to attack Baghdad. His relations with

Caliph an-Nasir deteriorated again, so he passed a decision to capture Arab Iraq and the capital of Caliphate. However, he fell ill during the march and on 19 Ramadan 596 AH (3 July 1200) he died halfway between Khorezm and Nishapur, in Shahrstan. The body of Sultan ‘Ala ad-Din Tekish was brought to Gurganj and buried in a sepulchre under a *madrasa* of his own construction.<sup>152</sup>

The poet Zahir ad-Din al-Faryabi wrote as follows about Tekish’s campaign towards Baghdad:

Oh, shah! As soon as Persian Iraq would be conquered on your order,  
 Send your troops and capture the town where ashes of Prophet lie!  
 Then destroy Ka’aba, burn its veil and disperse like dust, this holy place!  
 Why is veil for Ka’aba (*mahmal*)?  
 Let it stay in the treasury, and send two-three beddings to the temple.  
 Burn the faithful down, and raise men of science up to mountain peaks!  
 When you turn into non-believer (*kafir*),  
 Go to Balch, and send a caliph’s head to the Qara-Khitay!<sup>153</sup>

According to medieval authors, Khorezmshah Tekish behaved justly towards his subjects, possessed remarkable intelligence, and was a prominent diplomat and skilful commander. Drawing upon his military might and his political expertise, Tekish succeeded in annexing Mazandaran and Persian Iraq.<sup>154</sup> He was known for his love of music, and was unsurpassed in particular playing the oud. The chronicler Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzi writes as follows: “The Isma‘ilis were said to send a man to kill the Khorezmshah. At the moment he was playing the oud and singing a couplet “I recognized you, save yourself!”. The Isma‘ili was startled and tried to escape, but was caught, brought to the Khorezmshah and put to death”.<sup>155</sup>

Tekish was renowned for his wit. A certain person wrote to him: “As a Muslim, I am your brother! Give me a part of your treasure!”. Tekish ordered that he should be given ten golden dinars. Upon receiving the money, the man wrote another letter to Tekish: “I am your brother. If your treasure really amounts to just ten dinars, I’m satisfied!” Tekish replied: “If the rest of my brothers demand their share each, you’d not get these though!”<sup>156</sup>

In order to enter into an alliance with Qipchaqs, Tekish contracted a marriage with Terken-khatun, a daughter of the Qipchaq khan Jankishi. Terken-khatun was descended from the Bayat tribe,<sup>157</sup> and she brought with her to Khorezm representatives of several Turkic tribes (sources refer to tribes of Uran, Qarluq, Ughrak, Khalaj), to whom she subsequently became a powerful patroness. Enjoying their support, Terken-khatun accumulated for herself great power, and during the reign of her son ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad she was successful in promoting her protégées to positions of high rank. Subsequently, this led to the formation of a separate military-feudal Turkic elite that later ruined the kingdom of Khorezmshahs.

Terken-khatun was imperious, vindictive and jealous. The chronicler Juzjani

recounts that Terken-khatun became furious at the way in which her husband Sultan Tekish whiled away his time in a bathhouse with female slaves. One day she locked the door to the pool, leaving Tekish to start suffocate from the heat: only the timely intervention of a slave contrived to save Khorezmshah from death.<sup>158</sup>

As a result of the political activity of ‘Ala ad-Din Tekish, the kingdom of the Khorezmshahs was placed on a firm footing. But Tekish’s establishment of unchallenged authority came at a heavy price: for twenty years he waged a long and bloody campaign against his brother Sultan-shah, who was his rival for the throne.

From year to year Tekish was successful in expanding borders of his possessions and, finally, he created a huge empire which extended right over to the territories of Caliph an-Nasir. According to one source, residents of his possessions were satisfied with his methods of administration.<sup>159</sup> To all appearances, the centralization of power under Tekish conduced to improve living conditions of tax payers. The administrative apparatus was notable for severe discipline and order. The army of the kingdom was composed of select detachments of Turkic soldiers from Qangli, Qipchaq, Uran and other tribes and distinguished themselves in action.<sup>160</sup> Tekish personally commanded his troops. He used to say: “If a sovereign does not command his army personally, he is unfit to manage a country, for he is bearing resemblance to a woman!”<sup>161</sup>

On his deathbed, Tekish was pleased to yield the power to his son Qutb ad-Din Muhammad whose mission was to manage a unified, strong and properly organized kingdom with efficient army.

On 20 Shawwal 596 AH (3 August 1200) in the concourse of Gurganj residents and the presence of nobility and amirs, son of Tekish and Terken-khatun Qutb ad-Din Muhammad ascended the throne of the Khorezmshah kingdom. He assumed the *laqab* of his father, ‘Ala ad-Din, and later acquired the additional penname of Sanjar the Second.<sup>162</sup>

## CHAPTER 3

### THE HEYDAY OF THE KHOREZMSHAH KINGDOM

In the initial period of his rule, Khorezmshah ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad faced serious difficulties arising from claims of some dynasty members to the throne, as well as from Ghurid incursions into the lands under Khorezmian rule. At the same time, the ruler of Mazandaran *ispahbad* Husam ad-Din Ardashir, taking advantage of domestic squabbling in Khorezm, seized Khorezmian fortresses and land as far as Astrabad and ousted Khorezmian garrisons from Persian Iraq.

In the meanwhile, Khorezmshah was in Gurgan, the capital of the kingdom, and in an effort to strengthen administrative control over his possessions decided to replace governors from their domains. ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad called his brother – Taj ad-Din ‘Ali-shah from Isfahan and sent him to Nishapur as his governor of Khurasan.

Following the departure of Taj ad-Din, the rulers of Iraq intensified their struggle for independence. After receiving the caliph’s *manshur* ‘Izz ad-Din became obdurate and wilful towards the atabek of Iraq Abu Bakr saying: “I do not know any atabek”. Gokcha was determined and courageous, and was in possession of his own army, so the atabeks Abu Bakr and Uzbek did not dare constrain the ambitions of their father’s mamluk. One day Gokcha said: “Toghrul and Sanjar, the representatives of the Seljuq clan, no longer have power and authority, so fate has placed the Khorezmshah on earth. But if the Ildeniz clan fails to preserve its power, it is not surprising if they leave me with what I have conquered by my sword, it’d be fine, I would need nothing more! If not, I’ll cause great troubles!”.<sup>2</sup>

In 600/1203-04, another mamluk of Atabek Jahan-Pahlawan called Shams ad-Din Aytoghmish came out against Gokcha. In the course of fighting between them, Gokcha was killed, and Aytoghmish captured Ray, Hamadan and all of Persian Iraq.<sup>3</sup>

Khorezmshah ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad had every reason to worry about the future of his kingdom. His nephew Hindu-khan ibn Nasir ad-Din Malik-shah, who had been appointed *wali* of Nishapur during the reign of Sultan Tekish, was removed by Khorezmshah for his wilfulness. However, he did not come to the court, as he was apprehensive about his security and meant to hide himself behind the walls of Nishapur. However, Taj ad-Din ‘Ali-shah was already there, so Hindu-khan made for Merv where he started mustering troops. Sultan ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad sent an army against him under the command of amir Chaqir at-Turki. As soon as Chaqir came closer to Merv, Hindu-khan tried to escape from the town. Chaqir captured the mother and children of Hindu-khan in Merv, and sent them to the sultan in Gurganj.<sup>4</sup> Meanwhile, Hindu-khan went to Ghur where he appealed to Sultan Ghiyath ad-Din al-Ghuri, old rival and the strongest opponent of Khorezmshahs. Ghiyath ad-Din displayed much kindness to Hindu-khan, allotting him an *iqta’* and decided to take advantage of the dissension in Khorezm. He ordered Muhammad Jarbek, the ruler of Talaqan, to set out and capture Merv. Having captured Marvarrud and Panjdih,



Muhammad Jarbek came up to Merv and delivered an ultimatum to Amir Chaqir to restore the *khutba* in Merv and mint coins with a name of Sultan Ghiyath ad-Din al-Ghuri, or to leave Merv. Chaqir agreed to give up Merv provided he was granted safe passage, and promised to serve Ghurids. This would have enabled Ghiyath ad-Din to expand his possessions in Khurasan, especially as Khorezmshah had no enough troops to rebuff onslaught of Ghurids.<sup>5</sup>

Having mustered a huge army together with troops from Sijistan and other regions, with 90 fighting elephants, Ghiyath ad-Din al-Ghuri moved to Talaqan on Jumada I 597 AH (February 1201). However, when his army approached Merv, Amir Chaqir who had earlier agreed to serve Ghurids, put up strong resistance in collaboration with the townsfolk. Fearful of the elephants, Merv residents asked for *aman* (mercy). When Sultan Ghiyath ad-Din arrived in the town he pardoned Amir Chaqir and sent him to Herat. Ghiyath ad-Din granted Merv to Hindu-khan and made the townsfolk promise to obey the new ruler.<sup>6</sup>

After that, Ghurid captured Sarakhs, Nasa and Abivard and granted them as *iqta'* to Amir Zangi ibn Mas'ud, cousin of Sultan. The city of Tus kept on resisting the Ghurids army for three days but had to surrender. Soon after, the major centre of Khurasan - Nishapur was surrounded by the troops of Ghurids. Ghiyath ad-Din sent a letter to Taj ad-Din 'Ali-shah, Khorezmshah's governor demanding to abandon Nishapur. However, with great army at his disposal, 'Ali-shah turned down the demand and fortified himself in Nishapur. To create additional obstacles to the enemy, 'Ali-shah destroyed facilities around the town and felled all the trees.

In the early Rajab 597 AH (April 1201) Ghurids surrounded Nishapur. The defenders were unable to resist for long, and the city had to give up. Ghurid soldiers began plundering the city but Ghiyath ad-Din prohibited pillages and thus caused sympathy of Nishapur residents who seized Khorezmians and extradited them to Ghurids. When Taj ad-Din 'Ali-shah was brought to Ghiyath ad-Din al-Ghuri, the Sultan took 'Ali-shah's hand and seated him close to his throne. Then he sent 'Ali-shah and noble Khorezmians to Herat<sup>7</sup> and appointed his officials to rule captured regions and towns of Khurasan, returned to Ghazna together with his army.

By this time Khorezmshah 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad managed to consolidate his power in Khorezm, outfitted his army and decided to march against Ghurids. On the eve of his campaign, Khorezmshah wrote the following letter to Ghiyath ad-Din: "I hoped that you will be my father and help me fight against Qara-Khitay and banish them from my country. Though you refused to help me, don't impede me at least by seizing my lands. I expect you to return all you have conquered from me. Otherwise I'll root you out with the help of Qara-Khitay and other Turks, since you are too old to capture my country. I was busy with the death of my parent and resolving problems in my country, so I could not resist you. But I am not weak now and I shall capture your country and other regions!"<sup>8</sup>

Indeed, Ghiyath ad-Din al-Ghuri was old and ill. He did not rush to respond pending the arrival of his brother Shihab ad-Din from India.

The Khorezmshah did not wait and attacked his enemy. In Dhu-l-Qa'da 597 AH

(August 1201) his troops laid siege to Herat. However, Sultan Ghiyath ad-Din made necessary preparations to defend his position and put against Khorezmshah an army under the command of his nephew Alp-Ghazi and called his brother Shihab ad-Din with his army from India. The army of Alp-Ghazi tried to resist Khorezmshah while the other Ghurid amir Muhammad Jarbek began pursuing the Khorezmshah's soldiers who went for the foodstuffs. The Khorezmian army besieged Herat for forty days, but the city withstood all the assaults, so the Khorezmshah took the ransom and withdrew with his army. However, on the bank of the river Marvarrud he clashed with the army of Shihab ad-Din al-Ghuri. During the battle both parties suffered great losses. Observing Ghurid attempts to break through into Khorezm, 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad destroyed bridges across the river and went to Merv.<sup>9</sup>

He wrote a letter to Diya ad-Din al-Ghuri, Ghurids' governor in Khurasan, demanding him to leave Nishapur, since "its population is sympathetic towards the Khorezmians". Having received no reply, Ala ad-Din Muhammad moved his army on Dhu-l-Hijja 597 AH (September 1201) against Nishapur. As soon as his detachments reached Nasa and Abivard, Hindu-khan, his own nephew fled Merv to Firuzkuh to Ghiyath ad-Din. Ala ad-Din Muhammad seized Merv and laid siege to Nishapur on 17 Dhu-l-Hijja (18 September).<sup>10</sup>

The siege lasted for two months, and following fierce fighting Diya ad-Din al-Ghuri gave Nishapur up on honourable conditions: the garrison had an opportunity to leave the city. Ala ad-Din Muhammad demanded from Diya ad-Din to mediate in concluding armistice between him and Sultan Ghiyath ad-Din; Diya ad-Din agreed and left for Herat but did not fulfil his promise.<sup>11</sup>

After that, Ala ad-Din Muhammad made his way to Sarakhs where Amir Zangi acted as *wali* of the town serving the Ghurids. The siege lasted for 40 days, and the residents were dying of hunger. Then Zangi resorted to cunning; he informed Ala ad-Din Muhammad that he would withdraw his army from the town if Khorezmshah withdraw his soldiers from the fortress. The Khorezmshah did as suggested; however, the soldiers of Amir Zangi allegedly left the fortress, provided themselves with foodstuffs, returned to the fortress and locked themselves there. Ala ad-Din Muhammad had to withdraw his army to Khorezm, and Amir Zangi took his soldiers to Marvarrud where he joined the army of Muhammad Jarbek. A 3,000-strong detachment of Khorezmshah was routed, and Khorezmian transport carts were captured by the Ghurids.<sup>12</sup> However, Sarakhs was eventually taken by the Khorezmshah's army.<sup>13</sup>

When 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad reached Sarakhs, envoys of Ghiyath ad-Din al-Ghuri came up to see him and demanded that the Khorezmshah give up a part of Khurasan and compensate for the damage inflicted by his army. Ala ad-Din Muhammad turned these demands down and returned to Khorezm. The army of Ghurids pursued him but could reach Tus only. There began a patch of severe cold weather, and the cavalry of Ghurids was in desperate need of forage. Ghurids began robbing residents of Tus, confiscating forage and foodstuffs from them.

As spring set in, Shihab ad-Din al-Ghuri decided to go northwards, to Khorezm, however, on Jumada I 599 AH (January 1203) Sultan Ghiyath ad-Din died, so Shihab

ad-Din left Amir Jarbek in Tus and went to Herat.<sup>14</sup>

As soon as rumours about the death of Ghiyath ad-Din and the struggle for throne in Herat reached Khorezmshah, he immediately ordered his army to move to Khurasan. Advanced Khorezmian detachments reached Merv and at a distance of ten *farsakhs* from the city they clashed with the big army of Ghurids under the command of Amir Jarbek. Ghurids were routed, and amir managed to hide himself in Merv with a small number of soldiers. For 15 days Khorezmians had been besieging the city; and it was finally captured only after its fortified walls had been destroyed. Survived Ghurids were taken prisoners, Amir Jarbek was beheaded, and his head was sent to Khorezm.<sup>15</sup>

This success inspired 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad, and at the end of Jumada I 600 HA (January 1204) his large and well equipped army set out against Herat. The siege started on Rajab (March). For a month the Khorezmians were engaged in catapulting Herat, its fortifications and buildings. Days passed, and the number of victims and destructions in Herat rose. Meanwhile, Shihab ad-Din al-Ghuri was busy suppressing uprisings against Ghurids in Lahor, and his governor in Herat Alp-Ghazi had to accept terms of capitulation: he had to appear before Khorezmshah, pay contribution, decline from invasions in the lands of Khorezmshah and act as mediator in the peace talks between Ala ad-Din Muhammad and Shihab ad-Din al-Ghuri.<sup>16</sup> Herat was captured; however Khorezmshah did not collect the indemnity at the request of the townsfolk.<sup>17</sup>

Then Khorezmshah invaded the district of Badghis, seized great spoils of war and moved towards Merv. At this moment, Alp-Ghazi died. The capitulation of Herat, a sudden death of Alp-Ghazi and reprisal with the most prominent amir of Ghurids – Jarbek enraged Sultan Shihab ad-Din. He decided to defeat the Khorezmians and marched off to Khorezm. Having learned about this, Ala ad-Din Muhammad sent a later to sultan of Ghurids as saying: "I ask you very much not to begin the war, otherwise I'll go to Herat and from there will capture your capital – Ghazna".<sup>18</sup> Shihab ad-Din replied Khorezmshah and threatened to rout him. 'Ala ad-Din decided to retreat and destroyed all stocks of forage. Upon his return to Khorezm, Ala ad-Din Muhammad mobilized the population to build fortifications and opened sluices and closed all approaches to the capital. The water flooded a vast territory, so Ghurids had to halt their advancement. Ghurids waited for more than a month and when the ground dried up, the opponents met near Amu Darya's canal Qara-Su. A bloody battle resulted in great losses for both parties. Khorezmshah suffered defeat, scores of his soldiers were taken prisoners, and Shihab ad-Din al-Ghuri ordered to kill all of them.<sup>19</sup>

Finally, the army of Shihab ad-Din surrounded Gurganj. Facing death and the destruction of the capital, the townspeople decided to protect their city at any cost. The resistance was led by head of Shafi'ites of Khorezm - Shihab ad-Din al-Khivaqi, whose prayers rallied the townspeople. Imam al-Khivaqi donated all his property for the defence, and the townsfolk followed his example: they provided soldiers with weapons, money and food.<sup>20</sup> Ala ad-Din Muhammad sent his envoys to all the parts of the country to muster infantrymen and cavalry. His mother, Terken-khatun, played an instrumental role in organizing the capital's defence. She issued a decree on arming the townspeople,

and soon after Gurganj put forward 70,000 soldiers.<sup>21</sup>

At the same time, the Khorezmshah made an appeal to the *gur-khan*, ruler of the Qara-Khitay: and when Shihab ad-Din tried to cross the canal and start assaulting Gurganj, the Qara-Khitay army now appeared. The army was headed by the Qarakhanid Taj ad-Din Bilge-khan, ruler of Otrar, his cousin and ruler of Samarqand from the dynasty of Qarakhanids – sultan of sultans ‘Uthman ibn Ibrahim, as well as Tayangu, Qara-Khitay ruler of Taraz, “who together with their army unexpectedly attacked Shihab ad-Din al-Ghuri in Andkhud”.<sup>22</sup>

The battle between the enemies took place in early Safar 601 AH (October 1204), and the army of Shihab ad-Din al-Ghuri left the battlefield with an ignominious defeat. Most amirs of Shihab ad-Din and numerous soldiers were taken prisoner, while the rest dispersed across the desert. Four fighting elephants were killed, and two more were taken prisoner by the Qara-Khitay. Laden with the spoils of war, Ala ad-Din Muhammad returned to Gurganj. The Qara-Khitay pursued the Ghurid army and killed 20,000 soldiers over the two days. With a small number of soldiers, Shihab ad-Din al-Ghuri hid in a fortress Andkhud but was encircled. However, it was ‘Uthman, ruler of Samarqand, who saved him. ‘Uthman believed that the Muslim ruler could not be taken prisoner by the “infidel” Qara-Khitay, so he succeeded in concluding armistice. The treasures of Ghurids, their property and transport facilities were given to Qara-Khitay and this helped Sultan Shihab ad-Din al-Ghuri to save his life.<sup>23</sup>

Upon returning home, Sultan Shihab ad-Din al-Ghuri faced disorders and chaos, since rumours about his death were abounding. The treasury was plundered, and rulers of vassal countries and regions proclaimed independence. It took Shihab ad-Din great efforts and time to restore order in the kingdom. This is why he accepted the Khorezmshah’s offer of armistice. The truth was that ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad also needed a respite to restore his forces and feed up his army. On Jumada I 601 AH (January 1205) the truce was signed, and Shihab ad-Din al-Ghuri took the obligation, at Ala ad-Din Muhammad’s request, to help him with armies.<sup>24</sup> Under the same agreement, a part of Khurasan, including Marvarrud, was returned to the Khorezmshah.

However, hardly 2 months passed before the Khorezmshah had to fight the amirs of Ghur. On Sha‘ban 601 AH (April 1205) Ghurid detachments headed by Amir Taj ad-Din Zangi assaulted Marvarrud, killed one of Ala ad-Din Muhammad’s local *amils* of Khorezmshah, and began plundering the population. Khorezmshah sent his *wali* in Sarakhs – Amir Chaqir, and his brother Taj ad-Din ‘Ali-shah from Abivard to repel the enemy. The troops of Amir Zangi were routed; he and ten commanders were taken prisoners. They were executed, and their heads had been exhibited for several days in Merv.<sup>25</sup>

At this moment, a report came from Ghazna that on the first night of Sha‘ban 602 AH (13 March 1206) Sultan Shihab ad-Din al-Ghuri was killed.<sup>26</sup> According to historian Juwayni, the death of sultan of Ghur made Khorezmshah ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad very happy.<sup>27</sup> The Ghurid kingdom collapsed: amir Qutb ad-Din Aybek became ruler of Delhi; Nasir ad-Din Qubacha – in Multan; Taj ad-Din Yildiz – in Zabulistan and Ghazna; and

Mahmud, son of Sultan Ghiyath ad-Din – in Herat and Firuzkuh.<sup>28</sup>

When in Ramadan 602 AH (April 1206) Mahmud proclaimed himself sultan and the *khutba* was read out in his name in Firuzkuh, he sent a message to the Ghurid governor in Herat ‘Izz ad-Din Husayn ibn Khurmil. However, the latter, prior to Mahmud letter’s arrival, sent envoys to the Khorezmshah with instruction about his intention to submit to him and asked Khorezmshah to send troops to seize Herat. Ala al-Din Muhammad demanded that ‘Izz ad-Din Husayn send his son as a hostage. Sultan Mahmud could not withstand the assault, and shortly after the Khorezmshah’s troops occupied Herat. Under Khorezmshah’s decree, ‘Izz ad-Din Husayn was appointed as a governor of Herat, and a part of the Khorezmshah’s troops went over to his command.<sup>29</sup>

The next concern for Khorezmshah Ala ad-Din Muhammad was to solve problems arising from the domination of the neighbouring Qara-Khitay. He was anxious about the fate of Balkh and its environs that bordering on Qara-Khitay territory. With the weakening of Ghurid power, the Qara-Khitay could easily seize the region. Consequently, upon completing his mission in Herat the Khorezmshah set out against Balkh. On the way to Balkh he captured all the fortresses of Ghurids, largely due to the Herati ruler’s voluntary defection to the Khorezmian side. However, amir of Balkh ‘Imad ad-Din ‘Umar resisted the Khorezmshah’s advance troops headed by Ala al-Din Muhammad’s brother Taj ad-Din ‘Ali-shah. ‘Imad ad-Din succeeded in repulsing the Khorezmian army’s attempt to seize Balkh and hid behind the walls of the fortress pending the arrival of reinforcement from Bamyan.<sup>30</sup>

‘Umar’s resistance encouraged the amirs of Herat not to submit to the Khorezmshah, so they appealed to Sultan Mahmud for help. However, ‘Izz ad-Din Husayn notified the Khorezmshah about it. Ala al-Din Muhammad’s people arrested instigators of the conspiracy – faqih Ibn Ziyad and qadi Sa‘id. The first was blinded, the second ousted from Herat.

*Wali* of Balkh, ‘Imad ad-Din ‘Umar waited for reinforcement in vain, and was compelled to surrender the fortress to Khorezmshah. A *khutba* was announced in Balkh, and a coinage was issued in the name of ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad. Shortly after, amir ‘Imad ad-Din, formerly pardoned by Khorezmshah, betrayed him, was arrested and sent to Gurganj. Meanwhile, Balkh and its district were given to amir Chaqir.<sup>31</sup>

Thus, Khorezmshah ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad defeated the once-powerful Ghurids: although the Ghurid state would survive for a while longer, Khurasan and the cities of Herat, Balkh and elsewhere were annexed to the kingdom of Khorezmshahs.

According to Juwayni, the populations of Herat and Balkh welcomed the army of the Khorezmshah. The nobility of these cities voiced their loyalty to ‘Ala ad-Din, and the latter was solemnly welcomed in all the places mentioned above.<sup>32</sup>

Following the seizure of Balkh, Khorezmian forces came up to Tirmidh ruled by Bahram-shah, son of ‘Imad ad-Din.<sup>33</sup>

Bahram-shah intended to resist the Khorezmian army, but when he learned about the fate of his father and the Ghurids’ defeat, he asked for *aman* (mercy) and came out of the fortress. The Khorezmshah granted Tirmidh to the sultan of Samarqand

‘Uthman.<sup>34</sup> The population of Tirmidh was indignant that their town was granted to a protégé of the Qara-Khitay, though ‘Uthman was “first among equals” of the Qarakhanids, and furthermore a Muslim. The townsfolk openly demonstrated their dissatisfaction, giving short shrift to ‘Uthman’s soldiers that dropped behind main forces.<sup>35</sup>

The capture of Tirmidh was followed by the defeat of amir Sevinj, ruler of Talaqan, so Talaqan, Mayhana and Andkhud with their contiguous districts joined Khorezmshah’s possessions.<sup>36</sup> At the same time, the Khorezmshah sent his envoy Allama al-Kermani to sultan of Ghur – Mahmud with a request to recognize the Khorezmshah’s supreme power.

Mahmud obeyed the request and began reading the *khutba* and issuing a coinage in the name of ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad. Mahmud preferred to stay in Firuzkuh as vice-sultan (*na’ib*) and sent a white elephant to the Khorezmshah and valuables from the Ghurids treasure.<sup>37</sup>

In Safar 603 AH (September 1206), the Khorezmian governor of Herat ‘Izz ad-Din Husayn ibn Khurmil laid siege to the fortress of Isfizar, which had to surrender after a month under the threat of total massacre.<sup>38</sup> Ala ad-Din Muhammad rendered due homage to ‘Izz ad-Din and granted him an *iqta’* to the value of 250,000 dinars.<sup>39</sup> Then the ruler of Sijistan Taj ad-Din Harb ibn Muhammad also bent to the Khorezmshah together with a traditional *khutba* and coinage.<sup>40</sup>

The same year the Khorezmshah conquered Mazandaran and had the same *khutba* and coinage. The Khorezmshah’s brother Taj ad-Din ‘Ali-shah was appointed as *wali* of Mazandaran.<sup>41</sup>

In 604 AH (1207), Ala al-Din Muhammad embarked on a campaign aimed at annexing Mawarannahr. Prior to his march on the right bank of Amu Darya, he decided to strengthen his positions in Khurasan and on the lands captured from Ghurids. He appointed amir Kezlik-khan as governor of Nishapur with a part of the sultan army as reinforcement. He also appointed amir ‘Izz ad-Din Jildak to rule the town of Jam; and amir Amin ad-Din Abu Bakr to the town of Zawzan. Khorezmian garrisons were also billeted in such cities as Merv and Sarakhs, etc.<sup>42</sup>

However, those amirs simultaneously decided to disown Khorezmshah. The *wali* of Herat ‘Izz ad-Din Husayn ibn Khurmil was the first to defy the Khorezmshah, arresting numerous Khorezmian soldiers for cruelty to locals and for encroaching upon townspeople’s property. Husayn ibn Khurmil tried to convince the Khorezmshah of his good motives, but Ala al-Din Muhammad had grown cold toward his protégé and demanded from him to send the detainees back to Khorezm, and ordered amir Jildak to seize Husayn ibn Khurmil and bring him to Gurganj.<sup>43</sup>

According to another version of events, Husayn ibn Khurmil decided to take advantage of the Khorezmshah being busy with preparations for a campaign against Mawarannahr, and thus separate from Khorezmshah by declaring his independence in agreement with Ghurids. Ibn Khurmil informed Ghurid Sultan Mahmud about his plans, arrested people loyal to Khorezmshah, and banned the issue of the *khutba*



and coinage in the Khorezmshah's name. Instead, he ordered to announce a *khutba* and mint coins in the name of Sultan Mahmud. However, soon after he learnt that Ala al-Din Muhammad returned to Gurganj, he sent a penitential letter, begging for the Khorezmshah forgiveness and beseeching him to temper justice with mercy. This demarche set the Ghurids against him, and they sought for ways to eliminate Herat's governor. Husayn ibn Khurmil asked Khorezmshah to help him, and with the assistance of Khorezmians repulsed the Ghurids' invasion.<sup>44</sup>

The actions of Husayn ibn Khurmil seemed to be suspicious, so Ala ad-Din Muhammad and his people ceased to confide in Herat's governor. The Khorezmshah's retinue told him that Husayn ibn Khurmil was double faced and advised to get rid of him. It was no mere coincidence that Khorezmshah ordered to kill Husayn ibn Khurmil.

The task was entrusted to Amir Jildak, who went to Herat with 2,000 horsemen. Sa'd ad-Din Rindi (khoja as-sahib), vizier of Husayn ibn Khurmil, advised him not to go out of the fortress to meet amir Jildak. However, Husayn ibn Khurmil did not follow this advice, went out, and was captured by Jildak's soldiers and delivered to the fortress of Salumid. In several days the head of Husayn ibn Khurmil was brought to Gurganj from Salumid.<sup>45</sup>

Meanwhile, having learned about Ibn Khurmil's capture, vizier Sa'd ad-Din Rindi locked himself up in Herat and refused to surrender it to Jildak, saying: "I shall yield the fortress neither to you, nor to the traitor Ibn Humil. It is owned by the Ghurids only!". Then Jildak sent a message to Ala al-Din Muhammad, and the latter ordered the *wali* of Nishapur Kezlik-khan and the *wali* of Zawzan Amin ad-Din Abu Bakr to lay siege to Herat. With a 10,000-strong army, amirs started besieging the city. They offered the vizier to surrender and give up the fortress, however, the vizier refused saying: "There is no reason to surrender a city like Herat. However, if the Khorezmshah arrives in person, I'll give it to him".<sup>46</sup>

An attempt to seize the fortress ended up with a failure: previously Husayn ibn Khurmil erected four rows of strong walls around the city and surrounded it with a deep moat which he filled with water. Ala al-Din Muhammad was informed about the situation in Herat; however, no answer came from him: developments in Mawarannahr threatened the very existence of the kingdom of Khorezmshahs.

The issue was that in 1207 the ruler of Samarqand and Bukhara sultan of sultans (khan of khans) 'Uthman and other noblemen of Mawarannahr appealed to the Khorezmshah asking him to assist in combating the Qara-Khitay. The Qara-Khitay had their governors in every town of Mawarannahr who, together with their associates, committed outrages and robbed locals, and sent the plunder to Uzkend, Balasaghun and Kashghar.

'Uthman wrote to Ala al-Din Muhammad: "The Most High sanctioned everything he granted to you as a sovereign. He reinforced your army, so that you could vacate Muslims and their country from infidels, and get them rid of those encroaching upon their property and them proper. We shall be your ally in the struggle against the Qara-Khitay, and give you everything that have formerly were giving to them. We shall mention your name in *khutba* and on the coins!".<sup>47</sup>

Ala al-Din Muhammad promptly responded to the summons of 'Uthman and



sent troops to Mawarannahr. But before acting against the Qara-Khitay he had to put down a mutiny in Bukhara. Despite the presence of Qara-Khitay governor in the town, representatives of the Burhan family were sole masters of Bukhara who held posts of imams, khatibs and raised under the title of *Sadr-i jahan*.<sup>48</sup> The Qara-Khitay in every possible way advocated spiritual and administrative authority of Burhanids and compelled their own representatives in Bukhara to consider their opinions.<sup>49</sup>

By the beginning of Ala al-Din Muhammad's campaign against Mawarannahr, power in Bukhara was seized by the insurgent population headed by a certain Sanjar, son of a buckler trader (*majan-furush*). Sanjar persecuted "respected people" (*ashab-i hurmat*), ousted *sadr* and his retinue from Bukhara and confiscated all their property. The leader of the insurgents called himself a *malik*.<sup>50</sup>

A certain poet wrote:

The kingdom is a jewel

However, son of a grain trader got it for nothing

The kingdom and the throne befit no person

Whose father used to sell shields!<sup>51</sup>

The attempts of the Burhanids to suppress the rebellion with the help of Qara-Khitay fell through: Burhanids complained the leader of Qara-Khitay, and the latter issued several orders addressed to Malik Sanjar; however, he ignored them. Then the *sadres* appealed to Ala al-Din Muhammad who in spring of 1207 set off against Bukhara. Through the assistance of the town's nobility, Khorezmshah seized Bukhara. The uprising was defeated; Malik Sanjar was arrested and sent to Gurganj where among other 27 captured rebel leaders he took part in the first performance of *nauba Dhu-l-Qarnayn* in honour of Khorezmshah Muhammad.<sup>52</sup>

The capture of Bukhara<sup>53</sup> consolidated the influence of Khorezmshah 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad in Mawarannahr, and local rulers started to desert to his side. Qarakhanid ruler of Samarqand, sultan of sultans 'Uthman welcomed with honours the Khorezmian envoy, amir Dort-Aba, and they agreed on a joint campaign against the Qara-Khitay.<sup>54</sup>

However, the loss of Samarqand did not trouble the Qara-Khitay. They prepared for war against Ala al-Din Muhammad much more seriously than the latter assumed they would. Besides, the *gur-khan* managed to bribe and set against Khorezmshah *ispahbad* Rukn ad-Din Kabud-Jama (at one time Ala ad-Din Muhammad ordered to execute his uncle Nusrat ad-Din),<sup>55</sup> as well as amir Dort-Aba, *shihna* of Samarqand.<sup>56</sup> The parties agreed that in case of Khorezmshah's defeat, the *gur-khan* would transfer Khurasan to *ispahbad* Kabud-Jama, and Khorezm – to amir Dort-Aba.<sup>57</sup>

When the battle between the Khorezmshah and the Qara-Khitay started, *ispahbad* and Dort-Aba betrayed Khorezmshah and left the battlefield together with their soldiers. Despite a fierce resistance, the Khorezmian army was utterly defeated; many soldiers were killed, while others were taken prisoners. Khorezmshah was also captured, and together with him – one of the prominent amirs Fulan ibn Shihab ad-Din Mas'ud.<sup>58</sup>

Remnants of the Khorezmian army returned to Khorezm, but no information about the fate of the Khorezmshah himself was available. Rumours said that Ala al-Din Muhammad was missing, wounded or even killed. In the meanwhile, *wali* of Nishapur, amir Kezlik-khan and *wali* of Zawzan, amir Amin ad-Din Abu-Bakr who besieged Herat, were waiting for an answer from Khorezmshah regarding the fate of the city.

A sister of Kezlik-khan told him that Ala al-Din Muhammad was missing during the battle with the Qara-Khitay, and Kezlik-khan immediately withdrew his army from Herat to Nishapur that was strongly fortified and had huge reserves of weapons and foodstuffs in case of war. Kezlik-khan was engaged in devising plans of Khurasan's seizure and gaining of independence.<sup>59</sup>

Rumours about the disappearance of the Khorezmshah reached the ears of his brother Taj ad-Din 'Ali-Shah who was in Tabaristan. He proclaimed himself a sultan and stopped issuing the *khutba* in the name of 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad.<sup>60</sup>

However, the Khorezmshah managed to escape capture. According to Juwayni, Ala al-Din Muhammad had a habit to put on cloth of an enemy soldier, therefore when he was taken prisoner, nobody recognized him and he contrived to flee.<sup>61</sup> Ibn al-Athir described the escape of Ala al-Din Muhammad's escape as follows: "While in captivity, Ibn Mas'ud suggested that Ala al-Din Muhammad pretended to be his servant, and the latter agreed and began serving Ibn Mas'ud. In particular, he served him food, washed his clothes and did respects to him. A certain Qara-Khitay who captured Khorezmshah and amir watched the situation and asked Ibn Mas'ud: "I see that this man glorifies you. Who are you?" Ibn Mas'ud replied: "I am such-and-such, and this is my *ghulam*!". After this Qara-Khitay treated Ibn Mas'ud with great respect and even told him: "If your servant is exalting you, I'll never let you free!". Several days passed, and the same Qara-Khitay man came again. Ibn Mas'ud told him: "I'm afraid that when surviving soldiers return to Khorezm and my relatives fail to see me among them, they will think that I'm lost and they will be bemoaning me. Then they distribute my property and money between themselves, and I'll lose everything. But I want to have a part of money to give it to you!". They agreed about a sum of ransom, and Ibn Mas'ud said "I want to entrust a clever man with giving my letter to my family and informing them that I'm alive and sound. So he will get money from them and bring it to you". Then he added: "The question is that your friends are not familiar with my family, while this *ghulam* knows my family, and my family will trust him". The Qara-Khitay permitted Ala al-Din Muhammad to go under the escort of one horseman. They set out, and Ala al-Din Muhammad reached Khorezm where the townsfolk heartily and cordially welcomed their sovereign. Khorezmshah was informed about actions of Kezlik-khan in Nishapur and Taj ad-Din in Tabaristan.<sup>62</sup>

Beyond any doubts, the traitors were to be properly punished, especially as Kezlik-khan betrayed Khorezmshah and misappropriated the sultan treasury and confiscated property of the members of state *diwan*. Infuriated Ala al-Din Muhammad set off army against Kezlik-khan. The latter had to escape to Iraq with the treasury of Nishapur. In the end, Kezlik-khan and his son were seized and decapitated even despite Terken-khatun's intercession.<sup>63</sup>

As for Taj ad-Din 'Ali-shah, apprehensive of his brother's revenge, he fled to Firuzkuh, to the court of Ghurid Sultan Mahmud who welcomed him with great honours and let him reside in his capital.<sup>64</sup>

Having purged Nishapur of all Kezlik-khan's supporters, Ala al-Din Muhammad moved to Herat that was still besieged by his army. He tried to negotiate with vizier of Herat Sa'd ad-Din Rindi and reminded him about his promise to surrender the town to him only. However, vizier refused him as saying that he would surrender the town to Sultan Mahmud only. Angered, Ala ad-Din Muhammad gave orders to attack the fortress but failed to capture it. As Herat had been besieged for more than a year, famine and epidemic started, so the townspeople agreed to surrender it to the Khorezmshah. They destroyed two towers and let the Khorezmshah's army into Herat. The town was captured in Sha'ban 605 AH (July 1208). The vizier was captured and executed. Ala ad-Din Muhammad's maternal uncle Amir-Malik was appointed *wali* and *muqta'* of Herat. This person held his posts till the collapse of the kingdom of Khorezmshahs.<sup>65</sup>

After the conquest of Khurasan and seizure of Herat, the Khorezmshah left for Gurganj and ordered Amir-Malik to campaign against Ghurids, seize their capital Firuzkuh and capture Sultan Mahmud and Taj ad-Din 'Ali-shah. Having learnt about this, Sultan Mahmud informed Amir-Malik about his obedience to the Khorezmshah. Amir-Malik arrested Mahmud and Taj ad-Din 'Ali-shah and sent them to Khorezm where they were executed. The domain of Ghurids ceased to exist.<sup>66</sup>

Thus, in 605/1208, all of Khurasan was subordinated to the Khorezmshah. From now on 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad had the opportunity to resume actions against the Qara-Khitay. Khorezmshah could no longer endure the misbehaviour of the Qara-Khitay *gur-khan*'s representatives who arrived to collect money that Khorezmshahs annually paid to Qara-Khitay as far back since the rule of Atsiz.<sup>67</sup>

When in 605/1209 a representative of the *gur-khan* Tushi arrived in Gurganj and, ignoring etiquette, sat down near Khorezmshah on the sultan throne, Ala al-Din Muhammad gave orders for Tushi to be cut pieces, and his retinue to be killed and their corpses thrown into the Jayhun.<sup>68</sup> While the *gur-khan* was engaged in taking retaliation against the disobedient Ala ad-Din Muhammad, the latter set out against the Qara-Khitay. Residents of towns and villages of Mawarannahr, stirred up by the agents of Samarqand khan 'Uthman and Ala ad-Din Muhammad's spies, came out against the infidel Qara-Khitay and welcomed the army of 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad as their liberators.

In the meantime, the troops of Khorezmshah crossed Syr Darya and met with the army of Qara-Khitay in Ilamish steppe headed by experienced commander Tayangu. Following the results of cruel battle in Rabi' I 607 AH (September 1210) the Qara-Khitay were utterly defeated. A great number of the Qara-Khitay, including Tayangu, were captured.<sup>69</sup> Governors and *shihna* of Khorezmshah were appointed to rule all the towns and populated localities of Mawarannahr, as far as Uzkend. Ala al-Din Muhammad married his daughter Khan-Sultan to Samarqand Sultan 'Uthman and let the latter to rule Samarqand with amir Dort Aba as his *shihna*. Taj ad-Din Bilge-khan, cousin of Uthman and the ruler of Otrar was exiled to Nasa where he was killed

after two years on Ala al-Din Muhammad's order.<sup>70</sup>

Rumours about the defeat of Qara-Khitay quickly spread across the region. While retreating, the Qara-Khitay destroyed and robbed everything on their way. When the Qara-Khitay approached their capital Balasaghun on the river Chu, residents of the town, believing the Khorezmian army would come there soon, locked the town's gates and refused to open them. However, Ala al-Din Muhammad did not intend to besiege Balasaghun and returned to Gurganj. Within 15 days the Qara-Khitay army had been besieging their own capital and when, finally, they penetrated inside they massacred the townspeople for three days. As a source reported 47000 noble and respected citizens were killed.<sup>71</sup>

Though it would be another two years until the final destruction of the Qara-Khitay realm, 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad's victory over the Qara-Khitay army was appreciated by contemporaries as a triumph of Islam over "godlessness". This victory proved to be the principal foreign political success of the kingdom of Khorezmshahs. Countless riches and valuables came into the treasury, the army captured a great booty. However, the most important thing was that Ala al-Din Muhammad succeeded in gaining full independence: none of the rulers of the region could encroach upon suzerainty of Khorezm; the time came when the Khorezmshah was henceforth an arbiter of destinies of other domains and peoples.

When 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad returned to Gurganj, envoys were dispatched to different parts of the Muslim world with communiqués of Khorezmshah, all the towns and villages were decorated, festive homilies were read at mosques that glorified the name of "the greatest Sultan" 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad. During these festivities the captured commander of the Qara-Khitay – Tayangu was drowned in Amu Darya.

'Ala ad-Din Muhammad changed palace ceremonies and imparted them with greater solemnity. After the victory over the Qara-Khitay the Khorezmshah received a title – *laqab Iskandar-i Thani* ("Second Alexander the Great") and introduced *nauba Dhu-l-Qarnayn* ("Two-horned", i.e. Alexander the Great) and selected captured rulers to perform this *nauba*. The *nauba* was performed in 27 golden kettledrums with sticks decorated by different precious stones during the sunrise and sundown.

However, the Khorezmshah considered it insufficient to be titled as Iskandar-i Thani even despite the fact that poets began glorifying him under this title. He remembered about long-term rule of the great Seljuq Sultan Sanjar, so he came to be titled as "Sultan Sanjar". With that end in view he ordered to prepare a *tughra* for signing a text *zill Allah fi-l-ard* ("A shade of Allah on Earth").<sup>72</sup> A new name of Khorezmshah found its reflection in the titles of his son: heir to the throne of Khorezmshahs Qutb ad-Din Ozlagh-shah was titled "sultan Abu-l-Muzaffar Ozlagh-shah, son of Sultan Sanjar, aide to Amir of believers".<sup>73</sup> Sultan Jalal ad-Din Mankburni signed his letters to caliph as follows: "Of his (caliphs) obedient servant Mankburni, son of Sultan Sanjar".<sup>74</sup>

The Khorezmshah's son-in-law, ruler of Samarqand and khan of khans 'Uthman arrived in Gurganj and stayed there for a month. He tried to return to Samarqand, however, mother of Khorezmshah Terken-Khatun kept him with reference to Turkic

customs, under which a young son in law could return home upon the end of a year.<sup>75</sup>

In the meanwhile Muhammad ibn Tekish was planning a new campaign against the Qara-Khitay. As soon as Samarqand residents learned that khan of khans 'Uthman was absent in the suite of Khorezmshah they started to suspected that something was wrong. So they demonstrated enmity to Khorezmshah and his retinue. The situation in the great city was rather strained, and the Khorezmshah sent envoys to Gurganj who brought 'Uthman and his wife Khan-Sultan to Samarqand.

However, the return of the khan to Samarqand did the Khorezmshah little good. In the absence of 'Uthman *shihna* of Khorezmshah amir Dort-Aba and his people behaved insolently and mocked at the townspeople. When 'Uthman came back to the town, he ordered to exterminate all Khorezmians; hatred of Samarqand residents was so great that they broke corpses of Khorezmians into pieces and hang them on hooks in the streets and bazaars.<sup>76</sup> 'Uthman personally killed Khorezmians who arrived with him and his wife, and compelled his Khorezmian wife to serve another wife – daughter of Qara-Khitay *gur-khan*. However, Khan-Sultan locked herself in a citadel of Samarqand and waited there until the army of Khorezmshah came.<sup>77</sup> To all appearances, the retinue of Khan-Sultan and, perhaps, some Samarqand residents remained loyal to the daughter of Khorezmshah.

Having finished off with Khorezmians, the khan of khans 'Uthman broke off with the Khorezmshah and sent envoys to *gur-khan* saying he was ready to surrender Samarqand to the Qara-Khitay.

'Ala ad-Din Muhammad was infuriated as soon as he learned about 'Uthman's actions in Samarqand, so he ordered to immediately kill all foreigners visiting Gurganj. However, dissuaded him from this impulsive step as saying that he would be disgraced and condemned in the Muslim world.<sup>78</sup> Having mustered a great army, 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad set out to Samarqand. Despite a desperate resistance, the city was captured by Khorezmians who for a period of three days then set about killing the Samarqandi residents. According to Juwayni, about 10,000 were killed<sup>79</sup>. Khan of khans 'Uthman was captured, and 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad meant to pardon him, however, Khan-Sultan insisted on his punishment, so in 609/1212 he was executed. All his relatives and associates, as well as the family of Samarqand khans and other representatives of the Qarakhanid dynasty were killed as well.<sup>80</sup>

In order to suppress attempts by the Qara-Khitay to penetrate into Mawarannahr, Khorezmshah dispatched a 10,000-strong force to Isfijab.<sup>81</sup>

The Qara-Khitay realm was on the brink of collapse. In an attempt to escape from Ghingiz-khan, the Nayman ruler Kushlu-khan took shelter at the court of the Qara-Khitay *gur-khan*, and even married his daughter. Having mustered Naymans, Kushlu-khan made raids on the lands of Qara-Khitay, as most of their army was routed by the Khorezmshah. Soon after the events in the Ilamish steppe and a siege of Balasaghun Kushlu-khan managed to occupy nearly all the possessions of *gur-khan*. Formally *gur-khan* was on the throne; however Kushlu-khan was actual ruler as advisor to Qara-Khitay ruler.

‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad demanded that Kushlu-khan extradite the *gur-khan* and confiscate his treasure, however, Kushlu-khan refused and suggested Sultan to distribute lands owned by the Qara-Khitay among them. After the death of the *gur-khan* Kushlu-khan began ruling lands owned by Qara-Khitay and remained in this capacity until Mongols invaded in 612/1215.

The defeat of the Qara-Khitay realm enabled ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad to expand his possessions in the east. Having captured lands of Mawarannahr, he gave orders to destroy many towns of this land, including Shash and northern Farghana, justifying this devastation by the threat of the Mongol invasion.<sup>82</sup> However, some medieval historians believe that ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad’s destruction of the Qara-Khitay domain by Khorezmshah ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad was the greatest mistake, for the Qara-Khitay served as a barrier between the countries of Islam and “infidel” Mongols. Deplorable results of this thoughtless step of Khorezmshah became apparent very soon when the way to the west for the Mongols was open.<sup>83</sup>

After the destruction of the Qara-Khitay kingdom, ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad was confident in the security of his eastern lands, so he shifted his attention to the west, to the lands bordered by Khurasan.

As has been mentioned already, in 600/1203 the power in Persian Iraq was seized by Shams ad-Din Aytoghmish, mamluk of Azerbaijan’s atabek Jahan-Pahlawan, who, in the words of Rawandi, “restored the justice in the country and was concerned in restoring the order in the country”.<sup>84</sup>

In 602/1205 ruler of Maragha Korpa-Arslan revolted against the atabek of Azerbaijan Abu Bakr. The atabek appealed for help to Aytoghmish who entered in Azerbaijan at the head of his army. Some Khorezmian amirs used the situation as a pretext for invasion and 10,000 strong horsemen of Khorezmians together with their families and property attacked the territory of Persian Iraq. Khorezmians who reached Zanjan, however, were caught by Aytoghmish who routed them and captured their families and property.<sup>85</sup>

The power of Aytoghmish on the territory of Persian Iraq consolidated, and Caliph an-Nasir conferred Aytoghmish with pompous nicknames like “great khaqan”, Greatest Padishah, Sun of state and belief, Support of Islam and Muslims, Sovereign of Sovereigns of the East and the West”.<sup>86</sup>

In 607/1210-11, the atabek of Azerbaijan Abu Bakr died, and his brother Atabek Uzbek began ruling his lands, including Persian Iraq. In the meantime, the situation in Persian Iraq changed: a group of his former fellow fighters headed by the mamluk Nasir ad-Din Mengli came out against Aytoghmish. In the battle that took place in Sha’ban 608 AH (January 1212) Aytoghmish was defeated and fled to Baghdad. After seizing Hamadan, Isfahan, Ray and neighbouring regions, Mengli proclaimed the *khutba* and began minting coins in his name.<sup>87</sup>

Aytoghmish made his way from Baghdad to the Turkmen tribe of Iva’i. But in Muharram 610 AH (June 1213) he was killed by the agents of Mengli. Meanwhile, Mengli wrote a threatening letter to caliph that informed about the murder of Aytoghmish and demanded from caliph to cease interfering with affairs of Persian Iraq. In doing



so, Mengli behaved as independent ruler, and even “the sovereign of Azerbaijan Uzbek, despite being his formal master, was afraid of him”.<sup>88</sup>

During this same period, an internecine struggle broke out in Mazandaran, into which Mengli was also drawn. The last ruler of Mazandaran from the family of Bavandids Shah-Ghazi Rustam ibn Shahriyar became a puppet in the hands of his *sarhang* Abu Riza Husayn. Abu Riza married to Shah-Ghazi's sister and after assassinating him in 606 AH declared himself as a sovereign of Mazandaran. However, his wife took revenge over her brother's death, and Abu Riza Husayn was executed.<sup>89</sup>

When Mengli learned about this, he decided to seize the Bavandid throne and treasury, so he proposed that Shah-Ghazi's sister become his wife. However, she rejected the claims of Mengli and sent a letter to Ala ad-Din Muhammad offering him to marry her and granting Mazandaran as a dowry. Khorezmshah sent his people for matchmaking, and soon after the sister of Shah-Ghazi Rustam was brought to Gurganj. However, Khorezmshah married her to one of his amirs, and Mazandaran became a part of the sultan's possessions without any combat operations.<sup>90</sup>

As for Mengli, he was opposed by a coalition of Azerbaijan's atabek Uzbek, Caliph an-Nasir and ruler of the Isma'ilites of Alamut Jalal ad-Din Hasan, whose possessions Mengli tried to seize. Caliph an-Nasir promised to divide Persian Iraq owned by Mengli into three parts, one of them being of his, and the others owned by Uzbek and Isma'ilis.

In Jumada I 612 AH (September 1215) Mengli was routed, seized and decapitated. The lands of Persian Iraq were divided, as had been planned. Mamluk Sayf ad-Din Oghlimish who proved his worth in the struggle against Mengli was appointed as a governor of the lands that went over to Atabek Uzbek.<sup>91</sup>

Long before these events Sayf ad-Din Oghlimish used to be in service of Khorezmshah 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad and now, having received consent of Atabek Uzbek, he started issuing the *khutba* in the Khorezmshah's name. Historian an-Nasawi referred to Sayf ad-Din Oghlimish as “na'ib of Khorezmshah in Iraq”.<sup>92</sup>

In 612/1215<sup>93</sup> Kerman passed under Khorezmian control. This was done with the help of the Khorezmian governor of Zawzan Amin ad-Din Abu Bakr. During the period in question, Kerman was governed by Harb ibn Muhammad ibn Abu-l-Fadl who failed to resist troops sent by Khorezmshah to reinforce Amin ad-Din Abu Bakr.<sup>94</sup>

Having captured Kerman, Khorezmshah's army turned to the east and seized Beluchistan and Makran. Then the army came down to the coast of the Hormuz Strait, and defeated Makik, the ruler of Hormuz, who began issuing the *khutba* with a name of Khorezmshah and paying tribute. According to Ibn al-Athir, a *khutba* with the name of 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad was read even in Oman.<sup>95</sup> When Sayf ad-Din Oghlimish announced a *khutba* with the name of Khorezmshah in Persian Iraq, neither Caliph an-Nasir, nor Atabek Uzbek expressed their protest. However, caliph perceived this as encroachment on his prerogatives, so he took measures to assassinate Sayf ad-Din, the official representative of Khorezmshah in Persian Iraq. Entering into talks with the head of Isma'ilites Jalal ad-Din Hasan, the caliph sent a *fida'i* to Oghlimish who killed him during a meeting with pilgrims that came from Mecca.<sup>96</sup>



Following the murder of Sayf ad-Din Oghlimish, people in Persian Iraq had stopped issuing the *khutba* in the Khorezmshah's name. In this connection, Ala al-Din Muhammad decided to restore his rule in Persian Iraq.<sup>97</sup> One more reason for this step was that the ruler of Azerbaijan Atabek Uzbek and his vassal, ruler of Fars Atabek Sa'd ibn Zangi (each separately) decided to take advantage of the death of Sayf ad-Din Oghlimish. They sent their troops to Persian Iraq, and Uzbek seized Isfahan and reached Hamadan while Sa'd ibn Zangi captured Ray, Qazvin, Khuvar and Semnan and their districts.<sup>98</sup>

An-Nasawi recounts that both Atabeks decided to use their chance: "There was no one to protect Iraq. They knew that the Sultan was far away from there, entered deep into the country of Turks and rose high and was engaged in removing godlessness".<sup>99</sup>

The Sultan learned about the advance of Uzbek and Sa'd ibn Zangi when he was visiting Samarqand. He immediately "selected the most courageous warriors and the bravest heroes numbering 100,000 horsemen and reinforced his main forces with noble amirs and good fellows from Mawarannahr and Turks from bordering regions".<sup>100</sup> While at Qumis, the Khorezmshah inspected his troops for the second time and, having picked out 12,000 strong light cavalry, reached a locality Khayl-i Buzurg near Ray. At this time, there approached the forces of Sa'd ibn Zangi, Atabek of Fars. Thinking that it was the army of Uzbek, Sa'd decided to take the offensive. In the height of the battle he suddenly noticed a marquee of Khorezmshah and realized that he lost the fight. He ceased the battle, his army scattered; "he dismounted from his horse and prostrated himself on the ground". Sa'd was taken prisoner and brought to Khorezmshah who, first, wanted to execute him but later changed his mind and ordered for him to be taken to Hamadan.<sup>101</sup>

While at Isfahan, Atabek Uzbek learned about the defeat and capture of Sa'd; he was taken aback and did not know what to do else: move eastwards and conquer new lands or retreat in the face of the formidable Khorezmshah. Uzbek's vizier Rabib ad-Din Dandan suggested him to fortify his position in an unassailable fortress Farrazin, however, Uzbek refused. He instructed his vassal and ruler of Ahar Nusrat ad-Din Pish-Tegin to retreat to Tabriz together with his army and stores, and he, jointly with 200 loyal ghulams hid himself in impregnable mountains of Azerbaijan. However, the Khorezmshah's army caught Nusrat ad-Din at Mayanij, defeated him completely, captured all treasures of Uzbek, and took Nusrat ad-Din and vizier Dandan as prisoners.<sup>102</sup>

Ala al-Din Muhammad sent his envoy Nasir ad-Din Dawlatyar to fugitive Atabek Uzbek. The envoy, on behalf of Khorezmshah, demanded that the atabek acknowledge himself as a vassal, and to mint coins and read the *khutba* in the Khorezmshah's name 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad. Uzbek fulfilled this demand: "In the honour of the Sultan, they declared *khutba* from the towers of Arran and Azerbaijan to Darband and Shirvan". Besides, expressing his obedience to Khorezmshahs, Uzbek surrendered the fortress Farrazin. Taking into account that the Uzbek's treasury was appropriated by Khorezmshah, the latter exempted Uzbek from the tribute.<sup>103</sup>

After that, Atabek Uzbek complained to the Khorezmshah about Georgians' invasion into his lands, so Ala al-Din Muhammad sent an envoy to the Georgian king and

“warned him against assaulting his (Uzbek’s) country saying that this country was his own possession (*khass*), that his name was read from all towers and coins issued”. At the same time, ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad allocated 50,000 horsemen to take the field to Georgia. However, owing to the preparations for the march to Baghdad, no cavalry was sent against Georgians. In the meantime, the envoy returned from Georgia with a king’s delegation that “brought exotic gifts to Khorezmshah”.<sup>104</sup>

‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad decided to pardon Atabek Sa’d ibn Zangi, the ruler of Fars. This was because he was in a hurry: he was now preparing for a march against the capital of Caliphate. Therefore Sa’d was set free. Instead, he surrendered two impregnable fortresses in Fars to Khorezmshah: Istakhr and Ashkanavan. Besides, ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad also contracted Sa’d bin Zangi in marriage to a member of his own family, and obliged him “to annually invest into the Sultan’s treasury one third of *kharadj* of his country”.<sup>105</sup>

Thus, by 614/1217, Ala al-Din Muhammad had fully conquered not just Persian Iraq but also Mazandaran, Arran, Azerbaijan, Shirvan, Fars, Kerman, Mekran, Manghyshlaq, Kesh, Sijistan, Ghur, Ghazna, Bamyan and reached borders of India.

The chronicler reports that Ala al-Din Muhammad “captured these countries without any efforts, struggle, violence and destructions. He seized lands of the Qara-Khitay and other Turkic rulers and noblemen of Mawarannahr: he killed some of them, while others had to seek refuge in the remote parts of China. Total number of towns he annexed was four hundred. Anyone else could have hardly attained this achievement”.<sup>106</sup>

Khorezmshah ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad fancied himself as the greatest sovereign of the universe, for after conquering Azerbaijan, Shirvan and Arran and preparing a 50,000 strong army to take the field to Georgia, he intended to move toward Anatolia and Syria and conquer Egypt. He failed to implement his plans, though rumours about possible campaign caused anxiety among rulers of Syria and Asia Minor.<sup>107</sup>

As a ruler of the vast empire that stretched from Iraq in the west to India in the east and from the Aral sea and Manghyshlaq in the north to the seaboard of the Indian ocean in the south, Ala al-Din Muhammad intended to make Caliph an-Nasir recognize him as a secular leader of the Muslim world, and read a *khutba* in Baghdad, capital of the Caliphate.

Not a single conflicts saddened relations between the Khorezmshah and caliph in the first decade of ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad’s rule when the latter faced numerous disorders inside his kingdom and tried to expand its borders. Both sovereigns exchanged messages typical for relations between local rulers and the government of caliph – the “Supreme diwan”.

One of Ala al-Din Muhammad envoys who repeatedly visited Baghdad was vizier and *munshi* Ibn as-Siba’i (died in 600/1204), famed for his erudition and literary activity. “He was received in Baghdad with honours and respects, and he was awarded by caliph”.<sup>108</sup> In his turn, Caliph an-Nasir sent to Gurganj in Muharram 601 HA (September 1204) his envoy Fakhr ad-Din ibn as-Sheykh Majd ad-Din Yahya ibn ar-Rabi’a, mudarris of Baghdad madrasah an-Nizamiya. In 603/1206, caliph sent to Khorezm his second envoy Nasr ibn As’ad al-Khirafi, renowned under the name Ibn al-Asil, head of army diwan of the Caliphate.<sup>109</sup>

In Ramadan 602 AH (April 1206), the Khorezmian envoy Nizam ad-Din Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim as-Sam'ani arrived in Baghdad. When he dismounted from his horse, he according to the ceremonial should have kissed the highest threshold. However, as-Sam'ani "with his high status<sup>110</sup> and nearest advisor to 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad", arrogantly declined from fulfilling the ritual. Nevertheless, he was compelled to go through ritual and then read a sermon that glorified caliph.<sup>111</sup>

In 605/1208, Caliph an-Nasir sent an envoy to Khorezm, poet 'Imad ad-Din Jabra'il ibn Sarim ibn Ahmad as-Sa'di al-Misri. Al-Misri's mission to Khorezm remained unknown. On 19 Rabi' II 605 AH (1 October 1208) he returned to Baghdad.<sup>112</sup>

The same year, another Khorezmian envoy arrived in Baghdad and was solemnly welcomed by caliph's escort. On 2 Jumada I (12 October 1208), the envoy was received by caliph's vizier Fakhr ad-Din Muhammad. On 10 Jumada I (22 October), the envoy received garments of honour from caliph, and he was allowed to return to Khorezm.<sup>113</sup> None of sources provide information about missions of Khorezmshah's envoys to Baghdad, and an-Nasawi alone touches the hidden motives behind these journeys: "When the authority of the Sultan rose..., he sought supremacy and power in Baghdad, as did the Seljuq family. He had repeatedly sent envoys with the mission, however, failed to attain his goal. In the meanwhile, he kept on persisting in his intention in the hope that sooner or later he would achieve long-awaited purpose".<sup>114</sup>

Ala ad-Din Muhammad was determined to succeed where his father had failed, namely to compel the caliph to recognize him as a Sultan of Islam and of the Muslims. He considered his demand to be legitimate and found no grounds for objections.<sup>115</sup> After the Qara-Khitay were routed, the Khorezmshah sent a message to Caliph an-Nasir saying: "I want our relations to develop, as it were between your predecessors and the Seljuq Sultans Alp-Arslan, Malik-shah and Sultan Sanjar. I shall be responsible for Baghdad and Iraqi affairs while you'll have nothing but *khutba*!".<sup>116</sup>

However, Caliph an-Nasir angrily rejected this demand. Therefore, the latter strived to use other methods of removing caliph or ruining his power at all.

The first open demarche of 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad against the caliph took place in 601/1204 when Caliph an-Nasir ordered to remove from *khutba* a name of the heir to the throne, his son Abu Nasr Muhammad because of his inability to state activity.<sup>117</sup> The name of the heir to the throne was excluded from *khutba* in all Muslim countries, and it was only the Khorezmshah who declined and even sent troops to Persian Iraq for compulsory restoration of the heir's name in *khutba*.<sup>118</sup>

Another fact was further complicating relations between Khorezmshah and caliph. The caliph was angry at the independent behaviour of Mecca's sharif, an offspring of 'Ali ibn Abu Talib, and sent assassins (Isma'ilites) to deal shortly with the sharif. However, the killers mistakenly assassinated one of the sharif's brother. Seizing this opportunity, Ala ad-Din Muhammad appealed to the imams. He declared that this crime of caliph was a good cause to dethrone him, especially as the family of 'Abbasids usurped the rights to caliphate from descendants of 'Ali ibn Abu Talib. He demanded from imams to declare holy war (*jihad*) against Caliph an-Nasir, in particular, and

‘Abbasids, in general.<sup>119</sup>

Qadi Mujir ad-Din ‘Umar ibn Sa’d al-Khorezmi who had repeatedly visited the Caliphate with instructions from Khorezmshah was the last envoy of ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad. His last visit to Baghdad aimed to demand from the “Supreme diwan” on recognizing “the supremacy and power of the Sultan in Baghdad”. However, the envoy was told that no consent for *khutba* would ever be given to Khorezmshah: he has got enough lands and had nothing to do in Baghdad.<sup>120</sup>

When Mujir ad-Din ‘Umar was returning to Khorezm, a head of Baghdad Sufis, Shaykh of Shaykhs, Shihab ad-Din as-Suhrawardi (1145-1234) joined him as “an advisor to the Khorezmshah to dissuade him from fulfilling his intention”.<sup>121</sup> Ala ad-Din Muhammad welcomed Shihab ad-Din but when Shaykh of Shaykhs told Sultan a *hadith* that warned him against doing harm to ‘Abbasids, Ala ad-Din Muhammad replied: “Though I’m a Turk and not well-versed in Arabic, I’ve understood your *hadith*. But I’ve never done harm to any descendants of al-‘Abbas. However, as far as I know, scores of people languish in captivity of the Amir of believers, some multiply and procreate there. And it would have been much more useful and appropriate if Shaykh could have repeated this *hadith* in the presence of the Amir of believers!”<sup>122</sup>

Shihab ad-Din as-Suhrawardi tried to justify caliph’s actions, however, all his efforts failed, so the envoy returned to Baghdad, and the “animosity between the two rulers ran its course”.<sup>123</sup> After Ala al-Din Muhammad learned that pilgrims heading for Mecca from his possessions were treated worse than Isma‘ilites, his patience wore thin, and he ordered to remove the caliph’s name from the *khutba* and coins. Then, in 609/1212, he convened *‘ulamas* and imams of Khorezm and received their *fatwa* to dethrone the ‘Abbasids and appoint as caliph ‘Ala al-Mulk at-Tirmidhi, a descendant of ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib as a caliph.<sup>124</sup>

The final deciding factor which provoked the Khorezmshah’s decision to campaign against Baghdad was the discovery during the capture of Ghazna of Ghurid archives which revealed that Caliph an-Nasir had set the Ghurid sultans against the kingdom of Khorezmshahs.<sup>125</sup> Also, letters of caliph to the Qara-Khitay amirs were identified.<sup>126</sup>

When Caliph an-Nasir learned that Ala al-Din Muhammad’s army reached Hamadan, he tried to stop the march by talks, and he sent Shaykh Shihab ad-Din as-Suhrawardi to Khorezmshah. This time Ala ad-Din Muhammad did not pay compliments to the shaykh. As-Suhrawardi confessed: “I was invited to visit a huge shed (*khayma*) with a gallery (*dihliz*), unexampled in the world, decorated with satin and brocade. Sovereigns (*muluk*) of ‘Ajam were standing in the *dihliz*; these included rulers of Hamadan, Isfahan, Ray and others. Then I went to the third silk lean-to where the rulers of Khurasan, Merv, Nishapur, Balkh, etc. were standing in the *dihliz*. Then we came before the Khorezmshah who was in a huge gilded marquee (*khargah min dhahab*). Above him there was a curtain (*sijab*) trimmed with precious stones. The Khorezmshah was young, bearded, sitting on a plain throne. He had a Bukhara caftan (*qaba’ bukhari*) on, costing five dirhams; a fur-cap costing one dirham. I greeted him but he did not reply, nor order me to sit down. I mumbled a story of the glorious

‘Abbasid family and defined caliph as abstemious, devout, righteous and pious man, and his aide interpreted my words. When I finished, he told his aide: “Tell him that a person in question is not in Baghdad. When I reach over there, that person will be on the spot!”<sup>127</sup>

Thus, both visits of Shihab ad-Din as-Suhrawardi, this trustee of caliph and Sufi respected in the Muslim world were a failure. In late autumn 1217, ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad’s army made its way to Baghdad. “His army overcrowded steppes and deserts, but even they failed to hold his army!”<sup>128</sup> Medieval authors estimate the strength of his army differently. Thus, Sibṭ ibn al-Jawzī writes that he had 400,000 or even 600,000 soldiers;<sup>129</sup> an-Nasawī insists on 400,000 horsemen,<sup>130</sup> including 70,000 Qara-Khitay;<sup>131</sup> later authors note 300,000.<sup>132</sup>

Ala al-Din Muhammad was absolutely confident that his army would conquer Baghdad and dethrone the caliph. With that end in view, he divided beforehand a territory subject to caliph as secular ruler into separate estates (*iqtaʿ*) and signed appropriate decrees (*tawqīʿ*) on their distribution.<sup>133</sup> Ala al-Din Muhammad pushed forward a 15,000 strong cavalry headed by an amir (who owned Hulvan as *iqtaʿ*), and soon after the horsemen reached this district. He then ordered forward another amir (who owned a district as *iqtaʿ* even closer to Baghdad), and after that took the field himself.<sup>134</sup>

However, when the Khorezmian army reached the Asadabad pass, near Hulvan, it snowed heavily and was freezing. “Tents and marquees were covered with snow... it snowed three days nonstop. A snow-white land grew black; a great number of soldiers died. Camels fell; some soldiers lost their arms, others – their legs. This calamity made Sultan to retreat, and he gave himself up to despair”.<sup>135</sup> Many of Khorezmians were slaughtered by a nomadic tribe of Parcham and by the Kurds from a tribe Hakkar.<sup>136</sup>

The above-mentioned envoy of Caliph an-Nasir, Shaykh Shihab ad-Din as-Suhrawardi, who was detained by Khorezmshah to certify a fact of Baghdad’s triumphal seizure, witnessed the defeat of ‘Ala al-Din Muhammad. After this defeat, Khorezmshah released Shihab ad-Din and let him go to Baghdad. An-Nasawī noted: “Sultan was remorseful of what he had done, when he lost all sense of shame and justice, obligatory for any man of excellent judgment and belief”.<sup>137</sup>

On the way home Khorezmshah, defeated and disgraced, kept on humiliating name and authority of caliph. Upon arrival in Nishapur in Dhu-l-Qaʿda 614 AH (February 1218), he ordered a khatib of the town to exclude a caliph’s name out of *khutba* first in Merv, then in Balkh, Bukhara and Sarakhs. However, he failed to attain his goal in Samarqand, Herat and, strange though it may be in Khorezm.<sup>138</sup>

Following his unfortunate march to Baghdad, Ala al-Din Muhammad returned not to Gurganj where Terken-Khatun now held sway but to Samarqand that became his residence and capital, especially as rumours about imminent danger from the east intensified.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE KHOREZMSHAH KINGDOM

From the very start of their struggle for independence from the Seljuqs all the way up to their downfall, one major concern of the Khorezmshahs remained to ensure the supply and reinforcement of their regular army. The Khorezmshahid army was heavily armed and well equipped, and its commanders displayed bravery and experience during combat operations.

The Khorezmshahs started to form their army during the earliest days of the dynasty. From the outset, they staffed the army predominantly with soldiers of Turkic descent, with military units arranged on a tribal basis.<sup>1</sup> Even when the dynasty was at its strongest, at a time when the army contained numerous tribes and peoples within its ranks, Turks continued to comprise its major part, and constituted the prime source of shock troops.

To judge by historical reports, the Khorezmshahs adopted a system of universal military conscription for the population.

Dhakariya al-Qazwini writes as follows about Gurganj, the capital of the kingdom: “This is a huge city with a large population. All of its residents serve as soldiers, regardless of whether they are greengrocers, butchers, bakers or weavers. They say that Sultan Muhammad ibn Tekish hid himself in the city when the Qara-Khitay defeated his army. The sultan escaped with a small number of soldiers. He entered the city at night so that nobody could see he had just a few soldiers with him. When morning came, he already had 30,000 horsemen under his command to withstand the enemy”.<sup>2</sup>

Another author, meanwhile, writes that the citizens of Hazarasp, one of the strongest citadels of Khorezm, “were born under the banner of battle, and were breastfed by spears and swords”.<sup>3</sup>

The numerical strength of the army varied according to the scale of the military campaign. Thus, in 1195 the registers (*dafatir*) of the army diwan (*diwan al-‘ard*) of Khorezmshah Tekish notes the existence of 170,000 horsemen.<sup>4</sup> Early on in his reign, Khorezmshah ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad was able with just a few days’ notice to deploy a cavalry force 70,000-strong.<sup>5</sup> When campaigning against the atabeks Uzbek and Sa’d, Persian rulers of Azerbaijan and Fars who invaded Iraq in 1214, ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad was able to “select 100,000 horsemen who together constituted the very bravest soldiers and most courageous heroes”.<sup>6</sup> When Atabek Uzbek subsequently acknowledged the suzerainty of ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad, he requested his assistance in resisting the Georgians, with the result that the Khorezmshah “ordered 50,000 select horsemen to attack the Georgians forces”.<sup>7</sup>

During the reign of ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad, the army is described as having been similar in number to “grains of sand, in that no one knew where it began and where it ended”.<sup>8</sup> When in autumn 1217 the Khorezmshah decided to embark on a



campaign against Baghdad, “he brought forth troops of such number that they filled steppe and desert, and indeed could not be confined within even such vast areas”.<sup>9</sup> In 615 AH/1218, meanwhile, the Khorezmshah inspected his army “numbering 150,000 horsemen and 100,000 foot soldiers”.<sup>10</sup>

Such figures as found in our sources might appear to reflect the fantasies of chroniclers. But they correspond with the reports of officials whose mission was to produce truthful information. Thus, Gok-Bori (1190-1233), envoy of Irbil’s ruler Atabek Muzaffar ad-Din, reported upon returning from Khorezm that “350,000 soldiers are directly subordinate to the Khorezmshah”.<sup>11</sup> During a war with the Qara-Khitay in 1211 and 1212, ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad dispatched cavalry forces amounting to 400,000 troops.<sup>12</sup> This is confirmed by the registers of ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad’s army diwan, which refer to 400,000-strong cavalry on horses and camels.<sup>13</sup>

On the eve of the Mongol invasion of Central Asia, the dimensions of the Khorezmshahid army reached 400,000 horsemen in Turkestan and Mavarannahr, with 20,000 in Otrar, 10,000 in the province of Benaket and 110,000 in Samarqand. Large numbers of troops were additionally deployed in Balkh, Sijistan, Jand, Khuttalan, Qunduz and Yarkend.<sup>14</sup> Even during the decline of the dynasty, Jalal ad-Din Mankburni had 90,000 horsemen in India,<sup>15</sup> while during his Caucasus campaign the army reached 200,000 horsemen;<sup>16</sup> and more than 100,000 horsemen and foot soldiers took part in the battle against the Mongols near Isfahan in 1227.<sup>17</sup>

The army was evidently composed of a wide variety of military units. These included heavy and light, horse and camel cavalry, infantry and militia, plus strong auxiliary detachments which were responsible for equipping the army with ammunition, foodstuffs, money and forage. Besides regular troops, the Khorezmshahs possessed a personal guard (*haras*) that consisted of *mamluks* (slave-soldiers). It was Khorezmshah Tekish who had first instituted this guard.<sup>18</sup> ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad’s guard numbered approximately 100,000.<sup>19</sup> Besides guarding purposes, the *haras* was also used for punitive expeditions and to escort the trading caravans.<sup>20</sup>

With the start of combat operations the authorities mobilized the population into militia though the latter received no salaries in the course of campaigns and lived at the expense of robbery and forays.<sup>21</sup>

The supreme command body of the army was the *diwan al-‘ard* (or *diwan al-jaysh*); the head of this body was the *sahib diwan al-‘ard* (or *sahib diwan al-jaysh*, or *‘arid al-jaysh*).<sup>22</sup> A source also refers to the *diwan-i ‘ard dar jumla-yi mamalik* as the main body of command of army.<sup>23</sup>

The *diwan al-‘ard* was in charge of military enfeoffments (*iqta’*), plus salaries and payments for the soldiers of all military ranks, as well as the control and registration of the army and its armament. The *diwan al-‘ard* distributed salaries (*mawajib*, *arzak*) to all soldiers (*mutajannida*), supplied them with requisites (*huquq*) and supervised the payments by the senior commanders to their subordinates.<sup>24</sup>

In major regions the management of the army was entrusted in turn to local agencies.

The second important rank was that of army superintendent (*nazir al-jaysh*),<sup>25</sup>



who operated under the control of the head of the army diwan.<sup>26</sup>

A commander of the army of the Khorezmshahs held the title of *qa'id* or *muqaddam*; usually, the most talented amirs were nominated to this position. Thus, Khorezmshah Il-Arslan “appointed Shams al-Mulk ibn Husayn ‘Ayyar-bek, a Qarluq amir, as a commander of the army (*al-muqaddam ‘ala-l-‘asakir*). He married his sister to ‘Ayyar-bek and made him a commander of his army (*qa'id jayshihi*)”.<sup>27</sup> During the reign of ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad I, his son Abu-l-Fath Yusuf was appointed governor to the province of Ray and a commander of the troops.<sup>28</sup> The commanders of the troops of provinces were also titled as *sahib al-jaysh*.<sup>29</sup>

When conquering new provinces or areas, the Khorezmshahs distributed the lands which they captured among amirs as *iqta'*, and appointed leading amirs as seniors over local office-holders with the title *amir al-umara* (“amir of the amirs”).<sup>30</sup>

Commanders of 10,000 strong cavalry held the rank of *malik*. In rare cases, this rank was conferred to individuals from lower classes. Thus, under the Khorezmshah ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad his *tashtdar* Ayaz “rose to the rank of *malik*”. The same was true of commoner Mu'ayyid al-Mulk Qawam ad-Din, “quite an achievement”, as an-Nasawi put it.<sup>31</sup>

The title of *khan* might also be conferred to *maliks* who distinguished themselves in a battle.<sup>32</sup>

A batman in the army of the Khorezmshahs had the rank of “*chawush*”; there was also a rank of senior *chawush* (*muqaddam chawushiya*).<sup>33</sup> Additionally there was also a special unit of scouts/informants (*jasusiya*)<sup>34</sup> who were in charge of collecting information on the “situation in the ranks of the enemy, as a matter of utmost importance”.<sup>35</sup>

The Khorezmian army had its own spiritual leader, who was the army judge (*qadi-yi hasham wa lashkar-i hadrat* or *qadi al-‘asakir*).<sup>36</sup>

In addition to the traditional armament – swords, spears, bows and arrows,<sup>37</sup> the army of the Khorezmshahs had catapults (*manjaniq*), mangonels (*dabbabat*), “tortoises”, i.e. mobile towers (*mataris*), battering rams (*jamalukat*) and scaling ladders (*salalim*).<sup>38</sup>

The Khorezmshahs paid particular attention to the construction and reinforcement of citadels and fortresses. According to an-Nasawi, these included the fortresses of Istakhr and Ashkanavan, whose “impregnability became proverbial”;<sup>39</sup> the citadel of Ilal, supposedly “one of the most impregnable fortresses”;<sup>40</sup> Khurandiz, known as “one of the best fortresses, like an eagle in the sky, no access is available”;<sup>41</sup> Qahira: “watch fires looked like stars or, rather, fireflies”;<sup>42</sup> Ustunavand, “a strong fortress: impregnable it needs no walls”;<sup>43</sup> Ardahan, “one of the most impregnable fortresses in the world”;<sup>44</sup> and Farrazin, “one of the most famous fortresses in the world famed for its impregnability”.<sup>45</sup> The fortress garrisons were each commanded by a *mustahfiz*.

Policing and punitive functions in the kingdom of the Khorezmshahs were performed by *shihn*as with their troops. Usually, the position of *shihna* was entrusted to Turkic commander-amirs.<sup>46</sup> A *shihna* had a right to interfere in all the affairs that posed a

threat to the dynasty, and kept watch over any individuals who might set the population against the authorities.<sup>47</sup>

The Khorezmshahs appointed *shihnas* in all conquered regions, cities and townships. When in 1165 the army of Khorezmshah Il-Arslan seized Dihistan, he immediately appointed his own *shihna* there.<sup>48</sup> In 1193, Khorezmshah Tekish learned about his brother and rival Sultan-shah's death, captured the cities Sarakhs and Merv and appointed his *shihnas* there.<sup>49</sup> Sultan Jalal ad-Din Mankburni, meanwhile appointed Amir Quli-khan and then amir Yighan Sunqur as *shihna* of Khurasan, Nusrat ad-Din Muhammad as *shihna* of Isfahan, Amir Badr ad-Din Tutak as *shihna* of Azerbaijan, and Amir Sarir-Malik as *shihna* of Hamadan.<sup>50</sup>

During combat operations the attack and defence formations were as follows: advance guard – right wing – centre – left wing – rearguard and ambush troops (*muqaddama* or *yazak* – *maymana* – *qalb* – *maysara* – *mu'akhkhara* and *khafiya*).

Each of the 10,000-strong detachments was accompanied by the soldiers' families; armed women were frequently involved in the fighting.<sup>51</sup>

Prior to military campaigns or the declaration of war, the Khorezmshah would convene a war council to discuss forthcoming operations. This council was attended by the renowned commanders, *'ulama*, *faqih*s and astrologers.<sup>52</sup> However, the ultimate power of decision in these war councils always lay with the Khorezmshah himself.

## MAIN PUBLIC AND PALACE OFFICES

The central state apparatus (*al-majlis al-‘ali al-fakhri at-taji*) of the Khorezmshahid kingdom was headed by a chief official with the title of vizier. The vizier was a senior advisor of the ruler of the kingdom and reported to him only. He represented the sovereign at official ceremonies, inter-state relations, and talks with vassals,<sup>1</sup> mediated between the subjects and the sovereign,<sup>2</sup> and monitored universal order.<sup>3</sup> High officials including governors and commanders<sup>4</sup> reported directly to the vizier. The vizier headed a diwan (*ashab ad-dawawin*) of bureaucrats, appointed and dismissed officials, awarded pensions (*arzak*) and upkeep (*mawajib*), and supervised fiscal administration and treasury.<sup>5</sup> The vizier accompanied his sovereign, traveled with him on marches, and had the right to dispatch or command troops.<sup>6</sup>

The position of a vizier enjoyed widespread respect, as is demonstrated by a fragment of a letter from Sultan Sanjar: “By the terms of a decree, we have established a vizierate to run our community. As a result, prosperity and justice are reigning in the country. It is now our turn to dominate in the world, provide the state with responsible, sage and talented viziers (*dastur*); respectable, experienced person to put the people on the right track; to inform our subjects about the situation in the country, report on Muslim affairs...”<sup>7</sup>

The viziers had the titles of *sadr*, *dastur*, *khoja-yi buzurg*; their official symbols were an inkpot (*dawat*) and a turban of special cloth (*dastar*).<sup>8</sup> When travelling, the vizier was escorted by people carrying four spears supplemented by gilded shafts.<sup>9</sup>

As a rule, the Khorezmshah’s viziers belonged to the Arab-Persian service class: no Turkic names appear in our lists of office-holders. In the selection of viziers, emphasis was laid on a candidate’s proficiency in the Arab and Persian languages, administrative abilities, and his awareness of court etiquette; his ancestral background, by contrast, was of little significance.

During receptions, the Khorezmshah invited the vizier to sit by him on his right hand side. While at diwan, the vizier sat in a black armchair (*dast*); one vizier with the *laqab* “Nizam al-Mulk” famously failed ever to get out of his chair to greet incomers, even if these were heirs to the throne.<sup>10</sup>

The position of vizier was first established in the Khorezmshahid kingdom during the reign of Sultan Atsiz. The names of his four viziers have survived down to this day:

1. Shams ad-Din Abu-l-Fath Muhammad ibn ‘Ali ibn Musa. In 550 AH/1155, he died the death of a martyr for the faith (*shahid*) The court poet Fakhr al-Afadil Abu Hafs ‘Umar ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Umar al-Khorezmi al-Kuda’i bemoaned his death in verses as follows:

The sun grew dark when you, Shams ad-Din, died – but your grave shone.  
Your memory is still fresh and will survive you.

While the five daily prayers will be issued above your body.  
 We feel sad about your death, so will do jinns and humans.  
 Both in the East and the West will Arabs, Turks and Persians be proud of his deeds.  
 Time itself will be amazed at his accomplishments, and the lions of Earth will try to comprehend your thoughts.<sup>11</sup>

2. Abu-l-Muzaffar Sa'id ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abdallah al-Falaki an-Nishapuri. "He was a vizier of the ruler of Khorezm but later, fearing him, he left Khorezm in 533 AH/1138. He died in Damascus in Shawwal 560 AH (August, 1165)".<sup>12</sup>

3. Baha ad-Din al-Isfahani, the uncle of the famous 'Imad ad-Din al-Isfahani.<sup>13</sup>

4. Imam Majd ad-Din Abu Muhammad Sahib ibn Muhammad al-Bukhari.<sup>14</sup>

The viziers of Khorezmshah Il-Arslan were Qawam ad-Din Abu-n-Najm Suhayl ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn 'Abd al-Ghani al-Khorezmi;<sup>15</sup> Abu-l-Muzaffar Sa'id ibn Sahl al-Amki an-Nishapuri who died in 560/1165.<sup>16</sup> Another vizier was referred to by Rashid ad-Din Watwat. One of his messages was addressed to "*mawlana*", this "mighty sovereign of the world, triumphant, auspicious *sadr* of the Universe, lord of viziers of the East and the West".<sup>17</sup> However, no reports are available as to the name either the vizier in question or of the Khorezmshah – probably Atsiz or Il-Arslan – to whom he was subject.

Nizam al-Mulk Shams ad-Din Mas'ud ibn 'Ali al-Haravi was an early vizier to Khorezmshah Tekish. According to historical sources, this individual was an outstanding statesman, who left a variety of monuments to his life and activities. Thus, he built an excellent mosque in Merv for Shafi'ites, and in Gurganj he built a large *madrasa*, another mosque and a repository for manuscripts. The vizier fell victim to Isma'ilis in Jumada II 596 AH.<sup>18</sup>

After Nizam al-Mulk's death, Tekish appointed the late vizier's young son to act with all concomitant rights as his successor, though the boy opposed this intention. However, Tekish surrounded him with the aides to help him until coming of age. He had to perform his duties, so his entourage was satisfied with the young vizier. However, shortly before Tekish's death, the youth died suddenly.<sup>19</sup>

Among the viziers to Khorezmshah Tekish were also 'Imad al-Mulk as-Sawi<sup>20</sup> and Qawam al-Mulk al-Amid Abu-l-Fath 'Ali ibn 'Abd al-Malik al-Balkhi (*Mu'ayyid al-Mulk Qawam ad-Dawla wa-d-Din Taj al-Islam wa-l-muslimin iftikhar akabir Khorezm wa Khurasan*).<sup>21</sup>

Nizam al-Mulk Muhammad ibn Nizam al-Mulk Baha ad-Din Mas'ud al-Haravi was a vizier to Khorezmshah 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad. But the Khorezmshah then dismissed him,<sup>22</sup> and on his mother's advice appointed as vizier in his place Nizam al-Mulk Nasir ad-Din Muhammad ibn Salih, a man who soon proved to have few talents other than soliciting bribes. Cowed by his mother and her various kinsmen who held key positions in the administration, 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad had to tolerate this vizier for seven years. In the end, however, he dismissed him, because "there was nothing in him but haughtiness and infinite wastefulness".<sup>23</sup> But the former vizier continued to enjoy the support of 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad's mother, and so carried on behaving as badly as before. The Khorezmshah was determined to put an end to this matter, but

did not dare to have him executed. Instead, therefore, he sent the disgraced ex-vizier to Gurganj, saying: "Go to Gurganj and see your benefactor!" Terken-khatun ordered that the residents of the capital city should join together and organise a welcome committee for the dismissed office-holder. She appointed him as her own vizier, and he began managing her business, property and possessions.<sup>24</sup> The orders of Nasir ad-Din thus continued to hold sway in all those territories in Khorezm, Khurasan and Mazandaran which were subject to Terken-khatun's rule. If under Khorezmshah there were four spears before Nasir ad-Din, now in Gurganj there were eight spears before him upon order of Terken-khatun.

An-Nasawi noted: "The Conqueror-Sultan who subdued mighty rulers and belittled people from the family of Khusraw failed to turn his anger on one of his servants".<sup>25</sup>

The Khorezmshah 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad also had one further vizier. This was 'Ala al-Mulk al-'Alawi, a man renowned for his erudition and prudence who wrote verses in Arabic and Persian. When the Khorezmshah, defeated by the Mongols, fled the country, 'Ala al-Mulk al-'Alawi went to Chingiz-khan, "who paid him compliments and welcomed him into his own entourage".<sup>26</sup>

On the eve of the Mongolian invasion, 'Ala al-Din Muhammad renounced the services of the vizier, and abolished the vizierate. In its place, he "ordered six plenipotentiaries (*wakildar*) to run the affairs of state which had previously been under the jurisdiction of the vizierate".<sup>27</sup> He thereby created a state council, the members of which were expected to act in unison when considering any business in front of them. The council's plenipotentiary members were initially to include *katib al-insha'* Nizam ad-Din, Mujir al-Mulk Taj ad-Din Abu-l-Qasim 'Umar al-Bistami, Amir Diya ad-Din al-Bayabanki, Shams ad-Din al-Kalabadi, Taj a-Din ibn Karim ash-Sharq an-Nishapuri and ash-Sharif Majd ad-Din Muhammad an-Nasawi.<sup>28</sup> As it transpired, however, the Khorezmshah's initiative suffered a setback, and the council of *wakildars* failed ever to make any decision.

In addition to the position of chief vizier, the administrative structure of the Khorezmshahid kingdom also contained a number of regional and district viziers, who similarly enjoyed extensive authority over the territories to which they were appointed. The office of provincial vizier was something of an administrative novelty, unknown anywhere outside the kingdom of the Khorezmshahs. The appointment of authoritative and high-ranking persons to these positions suggests that viziers either managed personal lands of Khorezmshahs or were entrusted by the sultans with solving major political issues as the officials with special authorities.

Thus, under Khorezmshah Atsiz a certain Majd ad-Din Sharaf al-Islam was responsible for Mazandaran.<sup>29</sup> The vizier to Sultan 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad in Nasa was Zahir ad-Din Mas'ud ibn al-Munawwar ash-Shashi, who was responsible for the town fortifications.<sup>30</sup> A vizier to the sultan in Dihistan and Mazandaran was a certain Amin ad-Din ad-Dihistani, who was in charge of the situation on the borders with Isma'ilis.<sup>31</sup> Safi ad-Din al-Aqra' served as vizier to the sultan in the country of Turks – Otrar where he supervised the developments on the eastern borders of the kingdom.<sup>32</sup>

The sultanal vazirs in Jand were Najib ad-Din al-Shahrazuri, his son Baha al-Mulk Hajji, and Fakhr ad-Din ‘Ali ibn Abu-l-Qasim al-Jandi (future vizier of Sultan Jalal ad-Din Mankburni).<sup>33</sup>

‘Imad al-Mulk Muhammad ibn ash-Shadid as-Sawi enjoyed reputed as an influential and sage politician during the reign of Sultan ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad. Also, at one time he acted as vizier in Jarbarakan, in the vicinity of Isma‘ili territory.<sup>34</sup> Prior to the Mongol invasion, the sultan appointed ‘Imad al-Mulk a vizier to his son Rukn ad-Din Ghursanjti, ruler of Persian Iraq.<sup>35</sup>

The sultan’s vaziers in Nishapur were Khoja Sharaf al-Mulk and Mujir al-Mulk Kafi ad-Din ‘Umar ar-Ruhhi.<sup>36</sup>

When Sultan ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad delegated his son Jalal ad-Din Mankburni with the right to rule Ghazna, Bamyan, Ghur, Bust, Takinabad, Zamindavar and other regions on the Indian frontier, it was Shams al-Mulk Shihab ad-Din Alp al-Haravi who acted a vizier, for “he had all the necessary qualities needed for a sovereign, and he was incredibly generous, modest and gentle”.<sup>37</sup> The vizier was killed during Jalal ad-Din’s retreat to India.

One of six *wakildars* of the sultan, Taj ad-Din [ibn] Karim ash-Sharq an-Nishapuri, was appointed a vizier to Ghiyath ad-Din Pir-shah when the sultan granted him Kerman, Kesh and Mekran. Ghiyath ad-Din Pir-shah sent this vizier to the court of Caliph az-Zahir (1225-1226) with a request that the caliph should recognize him as ruler of lands of Persian Iraq. In continuation of the political line of his predecessor an-Nasir, the caliph gave Ghiyath ad-Din 30,000 dinars with which to fund activities against his brother Jalal ad-Din Mankburni.<sup>38</sup>

When Ghiyath ad-Din Pir-shah invaded Azerbaijan in 1224 and captured the possessions of Atabek Uzbek, including Nakhichevan, he granted vizieral authority over this important border region to his hajib Sadr al-Milla wa-d-Din Abu-l-Barakat al-‘Uthmani. The following decree by Ghiyath ad-Din on Abu-l-Barakat’s appointment as vizier has survived until the present day:

“Recently we have granted a vizierate of Nakhichevan to Sadr al-Milla wa-d-Din Abu-l-Barakat al-‘Uthmani who comes from the family of Caliph ‘Uthman ibn Afwan, so he could compensate for losses incurred to us because of the rule of infidels, restore justice and improve the lot of the Muslims and polytheists (*mushrik*), rewarded everyone according to his merit, levy the traditional taxes only: *kharaj* from Muslims and *jizya* from the Dhimmi population.

If a resident of the fortress (*ahl-i qal’a*) comes under the protection of a Muslim and renounces his disbelief, the vizier cannot claim unpaid *jizya* from him. Nor can the vizier impede the Christians from building and repairing churches, nor from meeting together. He shall, however, restrict them in introducing essential novelties. Besides, he shall take measures to settle Christians, high- or low-ranking, separately from Muslims; and he shall ensure that they do not ride horses, nor carry arms.

Sadr ad-Din shall protect roads and ensure that none of the Dhimmi population (*ahl-i dhimma*) abandons the land of Islam and flees to the infidel. No merchant can



enter the land of infidels with arms, slaves or cattle. Those willing to enter the land of Islam (*dar al-Islam*) shall be welcomed and respected: but Sadr ad-Din shall ensure that the number of settlers does not exceed reasonable limits...”<sup>39</sup>

Following the murder of vizier Shams al-Mulk Shihab ad-Din Alp al-Haravi in India, Sultan Jalal ad-Din Mankburni appointed Fakhr ad-Din ‘Ali ibn Abu-l-Qasim al-Jandi to act as the head of the vizierate. An-Nasawi points out that “good fortune helped him to retain his power and to tower above the nobles who occupied high positions in society. Only those few who earned fame and respect of the outstanding people of Khurasan and Iraq have been honoured to this extent”.<sup>40</sup>

However, this vizier “could not draft documents, was not courteous enough, nor proficient in accounting”.<sup>41</sup> In the end, he betrayed his sultan, and Jalal ad-Din gave orders for his execution.<sup>42</sup>

During the reign of Jalal ad-Din, “each town had its own vizier who ran municipal affairs”.<sup>43</sup> Thus, Isfahan was under the administration of vizier Nizam ad-Din<sup>44</sup>; Nasa was under the vizieral authority of Diya al-Mulk ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad ibn Mawdud an-Nasawi;<sup>45</sup> and Shirvan, Sheki and Qabala were governed first by Safi ad-Din Muhammad at-Tughra’i<sup>46</sup> and then, after this latter’s dismissal, by vizier Taj ad-Din Muhammad al-Balkhi.<sup>47</sup> The sultan’s vizier in Tabriz was Shams ad-Din at-Tughra’i, who “managed not only the property of Tabriz townsfolk but also their lives”.<sup>48</sup> Following at-Tughra’i’s dismissal, he was replaced in Tabriz by a Turk called Baha ad-Din Muhammad ibn Bashir Yarbek.<sup>49</sup> Finally, the vizier to Sultan Jalal ad-Din in Nasa was his private secretary Shihab ad-Din Muhammad ibn Ahmad an-Nasawi, author of “The Biography of Sultan Jalal ad-Din Mankburni”.

Another high position in the Khorezmshahid state was the rank of senior or great *hajib*.<sup>50</sup> As a rule, the position of *hajib* was the prerogative of members of the Turkic nobility. The *hajib* reported to the Khorezmshah on matters pertaining to the sovereign’s own person, and he oversaw court ceremonial. The Khorezmshah could have several *hajibs* in charge of major missions of the sovereign, escorting him wherever he went. Shihab ad-Din Mas‘ud ibn al-Husayn, for instance, was a senior *hajib* (*hajib al-kabir*) of Sultan ‘Ala ad-Din Tekish, who secretly dispatched him to the last Seljuq Sultan Toghrul III with a message that recommended him to leave Ray to avoid bloodshed.<sup>51</sup>

Erboz ibn Sa’d ad-Din Sahm al-Hasham was *hajib* to Sultan ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad. The Khorezmshah sent him on an official visit to suppress abuses of the vizier Nizam al-Mulk. The *hajib* was instructed to check “registers (*dafatir*) of vizierate’s diwan, its inventory (*jara’id*), archives (*makhzan*), [acts] of the secretaries (*kuttab*) and the officials in charge of finances (*mutasarriif*)”.<sup>52</sup>

Acting as a *hajib* (*hajib al-khass*) to Sultan Jalal ad-Din Mankburni was Khanberdi Saru-khan, who later went to Konya to serve ‘Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I, sultan of Rum.<sup>53</sup> Together with an-Nasawi, *hajib al-khass* Khanberdy Saru-khan conducted negotiations on behalf of the sultan with Bandar, chief of the mutineers in Ganja.<sup>54</sup> Acting on behalf of Sultan Jalal ad-Din, *hajib al-khass* Badr ad-Din Tutak ibn Inanch similarly conducted talks with the Isma‘ilis.<sup>55</sup> Among Badr ad-Din Tutak’s other



responsibilities were to receive the submission to Khorezmshahid authority in 1225 of Rukn ad-Din Jahan-shah ibn Toghrul-shah, ruler of Arzan ar-Rum,<sup>56</sup> and to receive an embassy from Caliph al-Mustansir to the Khorezmshahid court.<sup>57</sup>

Our sources provide detailed information about a number of other court positions.

*Ustadhdar* – a courtier who was in charge of household services at Khorezmshahs' palaces, including stables, kitchens, bakeries, wine cellars; maintenance of the palace servants. The *ustadhdar* was the first to arrive at the sultan's disposal, and his orders were not subjects for discussion. He was also in charge of the court expenses.<sup>58</sup>

In 1253, when Sultan Jalal ad-Din Mankburni appointed Jamal ad-Din az-Zarrad as his *ustadhdar*, he conferred upon him the *laqab Ikhtiyar ad-Din*.<sup>59</sup> An-Nasawi describes the duties of the *ustadhdar* as follows: "His responsibilities obtained from the Khorezmshahs included administering part of the income of the treasury and the riches of the country. He expended sums for bakeries, kitchens, stables, palace servants, money allowances, etc. in exchange for sealed receipts. Thus, he accepted receipts certified by viziers, *mustawfi*, *mushrif*, *nazir* and their deputies (*nuwwab*). There were twelve seals of senior officials and their deputies".<sup>60</sup>

*Ustadhdar* Jamal ad-Din az-Zarrad started to receive money for necessary expenditures after the sultan captured Iraq in 1224. On this occasion the *ustadhdar* was not required to submit reports, for this was the time of troubles, and Jalal ad-Din Mankburni was constantly on the move from one place to another. Availing himself of this state of affairs, Jamal ad-Din az-Zarrad began misusing his position and squandered huge sums of money. When the sultan finally demanded a report from him, Zarrad had a deficit of 150,000 dinars. The sultan gave orders for the *ustadhdar*'s arrest, with instructions that the missing sum of money should be recovered. But Jamal ad-Din az-Zarrad had no money at his disposal, so the sultan simply dismissed him from his position. He was replaced as *ustadhdar* by Shihab ad-Din Mas'ud ibn Nizam al-Mulk Muhammad ibn Salih, a son of Khorezmshah 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad's vizier.<sup>61</sup> In his capacity as *ustadhdar*, this new appointee actively fought against corrupt officials, "yielding to no temptation and showing no ostentatious generosity. He assumed office in 624 AH/1227 and discontinued his duties up to the downfall of the state in mid-August 1231".<sup>62</sup>

The *amir-akhur* was an equerry in charge of the sultan's saddle-horses.<sup>63</sup> Amir Ikhtiyar ad-Din Kushlu is known to have been Sultan 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad's senior *amir-akhur*,<sup>64</sup> with responsibility for "about 30,000 horses";<sup>65</sup> another *amir-akhur* to Sultan 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad was a certain Kochidek.<sup>66</sup> Odek-khan, one of "the most cunning courtiers" was *amir-akhur* of Jalal ad-Din Mankburni; he accompanied the sultan everywhere, and took part in all his battles.<sup>67</sup>

The *amir-shikar* was chief of the sultan's hunting staff.<sup>68</sup> A certain Sayf ad-Din Dort-Aba<sup>69</sup> was *amir-shikar* to Sultan Jalal ad-Din.

The *tashtdar* was custodian of the sultan's washing-sets, with authority over several ghulams.<sup>70</sup> *Tashtdars* maintained close relations with sultans, who often shared with them their innermost secrets and intimacies. *Tashtdar* to Sultan 'Ala ad-

Din Muhammad was a certain Ayaz, whom “the Khorezmshah raised to the rank of *malik* and put at the head of 10,000 horsemen”. Ayaz “was entrusted with chopping off heads and annihilating souls”.<sup>71</sup> Sultan Jalal ad-Din appointed as his *tashtdar* a certain Jamal ad-Din Farrukh, upon whom he also conferred the title of *malik* with responsibilities as his personal envoy.<sup>72</sup>

The *sharabdar* was a cup-bearer, head of a sultan’s storeroom (*sharab-khana*) where various drinks were stored. Also, a sugar necessary for making drinks, and precious tableware was stored there. Acting as *sharabdar* was an amir who gave orders to specially trained ghulams.<sup>73</sup> Amir Sa’d ad-Din ‘Ali<sup>74</sup> served as *sharabdar* to Sultan Jalal ad-Din.

The *qissadar* was a courtier whose responsibility was to accept complaints and claims addressed to the sultan, to submit these to the sultan for consideration, usually on Thursday nights, and to inform applicants and plaintiffs as to the sultan’s response.<sup>75</sup> This was regarded as one of the most honourable positions in the kingdom of Khorezmshahs. The *qissadar* to Sultan ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad was Najib ad-Din ash-Shahrazuri, who “accompanied and served the sultan in the times when he was in command of army (*sahib al-jaysh*) in Khurasan. This position carries with it high status together with other regular benefits”.<sup>76</sup>

The *jashnigir* was a courtier who tasted meals and drinks served to the sultan to avoid the risk of poisoning.<sup>77</sup> Sayf ad-Din Toghrul served as *jashnigir* to Sultan Jalal ad-Din.<sup>78</sup>

The *dawatdar* was the sultan’s secretary.<sup>79</sup> Sayf ad-Din Sunqurja was *dawatdar* to Jalal ad-Din.<sup>80</sup>

*Farrash* was a Gentleman of the Bedchamber and head of storeroom (*farrash-khana*) where bedding of specially trained ghulams (*farrash*) was stored: they accompanied the sultan everywhere.<sup>81</sup> Gentleman of the Bedchamber to the sultans ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad and Jalal ad-Din was Muqarrab ad-Din Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Pahlawan al-Khorezmi.<sup>82</sup> He was one of “the noblest amirs of the state and enjoyed great authority under Sultan Jalal ad-Din Mankburni”.<sup>83</sup>

The *amir al-‘alam* (*‘alamdar*) was a sultan’s standard-bearer.<sup>84</sup> Shams ad-Din was *‘alamdar* to Sultan ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad.<sup>85</sup>

## CHAPTER 6

## TOWNS AND VILLAGES OF THE KHOREZMSHAH KINGDOM

The history and historical topography of some cities in the Khorezmshah kingdom, including the likes of Bukhara, Samarqand, Merv and Nasa, has been the subject of extensive study on the basis of comparative analysis of written sources and archaeological and ethnographic materials. Archaeologists have successfully excavated various handicraft workshops, town blocks, free-standing buildings, walls, etc, and have thus substantially expanded the range of material sources relating to urban and artisan history.

It is impossible to summarise all this material in a single chapter. In referring readers to the special literature on the subject, the author has instead set himself another task: to identify and systematize information about some towns of the Khorezmshah kingdom drawn from Persian and Arab sources of the XIII and XIV centuries (an-Nasawi; Juwayni, Ibn al-Athir et al).


In describing a typical town of the period under discussion, Dhakariya al-Qazwini relates that “it consists of two parts, one of which is placed in the middle of another (*ihdahuma fi wasat al-ukhra*). The minor town (*al-madina as-sughra*) is called the *shahrستان*, and is enclosed by walls and a number of gates (*abwab*). The major town (*al-madina al-kubra*) encircles the minor one, and has walls and gates as well. In turn, the major town is encircled on all sides by vineyards and gardens which themselves are surrounded by pastures”.<sup>1</sup>

In explaining the term *kahandaz* (*kuhandiz*), Yaqut al-Hamawi writes: “This term is primarily used by the populations of Khurasan and Mawarannahr to denote a citadel in the middle of the town; most narrators instead render the term as *kuhunduz*. This means “ancient fortress” where *kuhun* - “ancient” and *daz* (*daz*) is “a fortress”. Later on, this term denoted an interior urban citadel, as opposed to the larger fortress within which it was enclosed. Notable instances of the *kuhundiz* are those of Samarqand, Bukhara, Balkh, Merv, etc.”.<sup>2</sup> According to as-Sam‘ani, the *kuhundiz* (*kuhandiz*) stood in the centre of the minor (internal) town, i.e. *shahrستان*, or *madina*.<sup>3</sup>

The principal city of the Khorezmshahid kingdom was Gurganj. Dhakariya al-Qazwini reports that Gurganj was “an enormous city on the bank of the Jayhun, with a great population”.<sup>4</sup>

Yaqut al-Hamawi, who visited Gurganj in 616 AH/1219, on the eve of the Mongol invasion and the collapse of the city, wrote: “I have never seen a city so splendid, so rich and geographically advantageous as Gurganj”.<sup>5</sup> Al-Qazwini echoed this sentiment, saying that Gurganj was a very beautiful town “adorned by the care of angels, who represent the town in paradise like a bride at a bridegroom’s home”.<sup>6</sup>

The growth of the city as the capital of the Khorezmshahs was attributable to the rise of the kingdom. Gurganj developed rapidly during reign of the sultans Tekish and ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad.<sup>7</sup> The Khorezmshahs paid great attention to the first capital of



their kingdom. ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad is reported to have said: “It is now our right and responsibility to care for the people of Khorezm, as our forefathers did in former times.”<sup>8</sup>

All types of handicrafts were spread in the capital in the period under discussion. One 13<sup>th</sup>-century chronicler refers to 50 main specialties of artisans in medieval towns.<sup>9</sup> Dhakariya al-Qazwini notes that the population of Gurganj included a large number of skilful craftsmen, particularly blacksmiths, carpenters, and the like, who each attained perfection

in their chosen trade.<sup>10</sup> The woodcarvers of the city were renowned for their products made of ivory and ebony. The womenfolk, meanwhile, were famed for their remarkable embroideries.<sup>11</sup> There were workshops in the town to manufacture natural silk.<sup>12</sup> Willow was widely used in constructions. Buildings made of this wood were light and withstood strong earthquakes, unlike stone buildings which were prone to collapse.<sup>13</sup>

The country had a well-organized system for protecting road and caravan routes, which helped the development of internal and external trade networks. Thus, robbers were severely punished. The following, for instance, is the testimony of a travelling merchant as reported by Dhakariya al-Qazwini: “We left Gurganj in a large caravan. Once we were a long way from the city, our *mamluks* – who were far greater in number than us merchants ourselves – became rebellious. They conspired between themselves and began shooting arrows at us. We asked: “What are you doing?” They replied: “We want to kill you all and capture these goods. Having sold them, we shall buy horses and arms and go to serve Sultan ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad”. Then the merchants told them: “You won’t sell these red calicos properly. Leave it to us, and we shall buy horses and arms for you. One of you will become amir to serve the Sultan”. We managed to outwit them, so one of us went to Gurganj and informed the *shihna* about the incident. In several days *shihna* came to us and arrested the *mamluks*. The caravan returned to Gurganj where the *mamluks* were crucified”.<sup>14</sup>

Gurganji merchants transported their wares to Baghdad and beyond, all the way to distant al-Andalus. We know this from a single document which has survived until the present day. The document is an appeal from Rashid ad-Din Watwat to the Khorezmshahid governor of Iraq, asking this latter to take care of the merchant ‘Uthman ibn Isma‘il al-Khorezmi.<sup>15</sup> One of the merchants, a certain resident of Samarqand called Abu-l-Fath Nasr ibn al-Hasan al-Shashi, “had repeatedly visited al-Andalus for commercial purposes.”<sup>16</sup>

Located across both banks of the Amu Darya, Gurganj was separated from the river by a dyke. At the time of the conquest, the Mongols destroyed this dyke, thus flooding

the entire city;<sup>17</sup> even before being flooded, however, the city had been in ruins as a result of the Mongols' protracted siege.<sup>18</sup> Sources report that the only buildings which survived this destruction were the sepulchres of Shaykh Najm ad-Din al-Kubra, Sultan Tekish and the daughters of Sultan 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad, as well as the Kushk-i Akhjuk palace and part of a bazaar.<sup>19</sup>

Prior to its defeat by the Mongols, Gurganj was very densely built. A source says that "Gurganj is crowded and bustling due to the multitude of people".<sup>20</sup> We are aware of names of two residential districts (*mahalla*) of Gurganj, Tanura<sup>21</sup> and Maydan,<sup>22</sup> as well as the name of one gate – Qabilan.<sup>23</sup>

The city had a lot of markets (*bazaars*). The supervisor of bazaars had the title of *muhtasib*. He supervised the quality of goods, the cleanness of utensils and the freshness of foodstuffs; he also kept order, and suppressed fraud and trickery. As a rule, the *muhtasib* was a literate and educated person. Frequently the *muhtasib* also had the title of *imam*.<sup>24</sup> The last *muhtasib* of Gurganj and all Khorezm was Abu 'Ali 'Ala ad-Din Sadid ibn Muhammad ibn Abu Sadiq Tahir al-Khayyati al-Khorezmi, whom Sultan 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad "respected for his perfection in theory and in practice".<sup>25</sup>

The names of several districts (*nahiya*) of Khorezm vilayat are known as well: Tahiriya,<sup>26</sup> Kardar<sup>27</sup> and Maragard.<sup>28</sup>

Our sources provide more information about the towns of Khorezm vilayat. These towns included the following:

Ardahushmisan (or Hushmisan): a large town "with beautified bazaars and prosperous inhabitants". Yaqut al-Hamawi made a winter visit to this town in Shawwal 616 AH (December 1219–January 1220), i.e. a year before the Mongols' invasion of Khorezm, when a boat carrying Yaqut on board found itself ice-bound of the Jayhun.<sup>29</sup>

Khivaq (or Khiva): a fortress-town located 15 *farsakhs* from Gurganj. Khivaq was unusual, in that its residents were Shafi'is, unlike the rest of the population of Khorezm who followed the Hanafi school of law.<sup>30</sup>

Darghan: a town located on the hill next to the desert. Yaqut al-Hamawi visited Darghan in Ramadan 616 AH (November 1219), when he was on his way from Merv to Gurganj.<sup>31</sup>

Savakan: a small town located between Hazarasp and Hushmisan; it had a large bazaar and a cathedral mosque. Yaqut al-Hamawi visited Savakan in 617 AH (1220).<sup>32</sup>

Gavshfinj: a beautiful, densely populated town, 20 *farsakhs* from Gurganj. Yaqut al-Hamawi visited the town in 616 AH (1219).<sup>33</sup>

Kath: a large town, 20 *farsakhs* from Gurganj.<sup>34</sup>

Nuzkath (Nuzkat): a small town near Gurganj.<sup>35</sup>

Hazarasp: "an impregnable fortress and a beautiful town with numerous bazaars and trade shops. Yaqut al-Hamawi visited the town in 616 AH (1219).<sup>36</sup>

Besides, Yaqut al-Hamawi refers to the towns Suburna,<sup>37</sup> Sarakusta,<sup>38</sup> and Manghyshlaq.<sup>39</sup>

According to various sources, rural districts of the Khorezmshah kingdom (especially during the reign of the last two Khorezmshahs) "were very well cultivated lands".<sup>40</sup>

Cotton, fruit trees and melons and gourds were cultivated there.<sup>41</sup> When visiting Khorezm on the eve of the Mongolian invasion, Yaqt al-Hamawi wrote that he “had never seen a land more prosperous than Khorezm”.<sup>42</sup>

Located in the lower reaches of Amu Darya, Khorezm *vilayat* was an oasis surrounded by deserts, and therefore every available plot of land was carefully cultivated there. Despite a significant content of ground waters in the soil (water came up at the depth of “two cubits”),<sup>43</sup> all the lands along the banks of Amu Darya constituted a “continuously cultivated strip with villages close to each other”.<sup>44</sup>

Practically all the villages of the oasis had bazaars; in case of flood, the villages were separated from the river by dykes made of trunks of trees and shrubs. These dykes were renovated annually, and villagers jointly restored parts of the dykes destroyed by the flood.

Large areas were irrigated by water from the canal Gavkhara channelled off from the Amu Darya. This canal was navigable.<sup>45</sup>

Unfortunately, information about the villages of the Khorezm vilayat is scanty. Yaqt al-Hamawi mentions some of their names: Harur,<sup>46</sup> Gazniz,<sup>47</sup> Mubarak,<sup>48</sup> Nawbagh,<sup>49</sup> Farnifasan,<sup>50</sup> Baf,<sup>51</sup> Zamakhshar (famous Abu-l-Qasim Mahmud ibn ‘Umar Jar-Allah az-Zamakhshari came from this village)<sup>52</sup>, Ishsh.<sup>53</sup>

Bukhara is referred to in the sources as “the greatest, and the most enormous, beautiful and famous city”.<sup>54</sup> Like other towns in the period under discussion, Bukhara was surrounded by a wall; reinforced walls were erected around *madina* (*shahristan*). The *kuhandiz* of Bukhara was located outside of *madina* on a high hill. An external wall of Bukhara built in the middle of the 9<sup>th</sup> century had repeatedly been renovated and repaired. Following the capture of Bukhara Muhammad ibn Tekish gave order for the walls of the city to be repaired.<sup>55</sup>

Bukhara was one of the most heavily populated cities of the Khorezmshah kingdom.

Sources note the names of several district of Bukhara, including Sikkat al-Bayan, Sikkat al-Jadid, Fariza, Bab Farij, Kalabad, Ushmiyun (Ushmivan), Riyva and Makh.<sup>56</sup>

Bukhara was the centre of highly developed handicrafts, especially weaving. Famous fabric *zarbaft* (woven with golden or silver threads), *zandanichi* (padded coloured cotton fabric), *karbas* (plain white cotton fabric)<sup>57</sup> and exported to the remotest countries.

According to the sources, the Bukhara vilayat included districts (*nahiya*) Bamijkat and Tavavis (the town of Tavavis had its own *kuhandiz* and was walled)<sup>58</sup>, the city (*baldat*) Baykand (Paykend), that had strong walls and a cathedral mosque,<sup>59</sup> as well as Firabr,<sup>60</sup> Karminiya<sup>61</sup> and Maymurgh.<sup>62</sup> The vilayat included a great quantity of villages, including Agharun,\* Aghzun, Afsavan, Amdiza, Ambarduvan, Anjufarin, Andas, Anisun, Bab, Babish, Baba, Badan, Bardiza, Banab, Badanir, Bazikhun, Babakat, Barakat, Barran (Fawran), Barsukhan, Bavvaran, Barfakhsh, Basbat, Bashkashr, Baydara, Bayramis, Tadan, Tadiza, Taraha, Tazun, Turnavaz, Jubanna, Jirakhasht, Khujab, Khudabaz, Kharajar, Kharadin, Kharakhara, Khurmisan (Kharmaysan), Khardavan, Khazvan, Khashaghir, Khakanja, Khumhisar (Khumkhaysar), Khunamat, Khunbun, Dakhfandun, Diymas, Zar’ayna, Zibadvan, Zimun, Ramush, Ramin, Ramisan, Riyghazmun, Razmanah,

\* The names of villages are given according in Arabic alphabetical order



Riyvad, Rivarsun, Zamin, Zabaghduvan, Zarahsh, Zimlik, Zandarmisan, Zanda, Zush, Sirakun, Subazmun (Sabazyun), Sibara, Subazgun, Sutifaghna, Sutikan, Suniyan, Sarbara (Sirbara), Sarbar, Surmari, Sughdan, Sufradan, Sakbiyan, Sikajkat, Sutikhan, Sayara, Suyaj, Shavakan, Shar'a, Sharafdan, Shargh, Shakan, Shiya, Shiyar, Shirvan, Tarab, Tus, Tusan, Ayshan, Ghudashfard, Ghaghama, Ghashid, Fashun, Famyar, Farabr, Farakhsha, Fashna, Faghdar, Faghandiza, Fighisht, Faghiytusan, Fagva, Fuyadsun (Fiyadasun), Kakhushuvan, Kashakan, Kakin, Kayshakan, Katta, Kamari, Kandasarvan, Kamarat, Mastin, Majdast, Majdun, Madyankat, Muzyankat, Murzin, Marghabun, Mazrin, Maghkan, Miyigh, Nakhl, Nakbun, Naujabad, Naufar, Vardana, Varzan, Varkan, Varkat, Vanandun, Vanufagh, Yuhasun and etc.<sup>63</sup>

The vilayat of Soghd (Sughd) was famed for its fertile lands and densely populated areas. Samarqand's Soghd is referred to in the sources as "the fourth earthly paradise" (the other three being Guta of Damascus, Shi'b Bavvana of Fars and Ubulla of Basra).<sup>64</sup> All towns and villages of Soghd had *kuhandizes*.

Samarqand was an administrative centre of Soghd. Medieval authors were unanimous in their opinion that there was no city in the world more beautiful and richer than Samarqand.<sup>65</sup> Between an external wall and *madina* wall there was a great number of villages and estates. Four gates led to the *madina*. It had a lead-made water pipeline.<sup>66</sup> The city was surrounded with gardens, and none of the city buildings was seen even from the height of *kuhandiz*.

Various sources mention names of several gates of Samarqand, including Bab Dastan,<sup>67</sup> Bab Kuhak,<sup>68</sup> Bab Tak,<sup>69</sup> Namazgah,<sup>70</sup> as well as names of Samarqand districts Ushtabazida (Ushtabiyzak),<sup>71</sup> Banjahin,<sup>72</sup> Jakardiza,<sup>73</sup> Za'rimash,<sup>74</sup> Sanjadiza,<sup>75</sup> Ghadavad,<sup>76</sup> Farzamisan,<sup>77</sup> Fagandara,<sup>78</sup> Kanvan,<sup>79</sup> Labbad,<sup>80</sup> Varsanin,<sup>81</sup> etc.

Samarqand was renowned for products of its artisans, especially paper (*al-kaghidh as-samarqandi*), comparable only to Chinese paper in its superb quality.<sup>82</sup>

The Chinese traveler Yeh-lu Chu-Tsay, who visited Samarqandi in 1218, described the city as follows:

When they uncork its jugs, they taste excellent wine.  
When they cast nets, fresh fish is caught.  
Wine-makers do not pay taxes, nor do farmers.  
In case of war they dig ditches  
and high dykes to prevent water streams...<sup>83</sup>

According to the sources, Soghd vilayat included the following villages: Arakhs (Urukhs), Isbiskat, Ista, Isnan, Isfarij, Asmand (Amand), Ismisan, Ishtikhan, Andaq, Izuj, Barkat, Butanin, Bursan, Banuj, Bandimash, Binkat, Burnamaz, Bavaranmand, Tahsanjkat, Turban, Tashkibaza, Tuz, Tuskat, Tiymak, Jahzana (Juhzan), Hudfaran, Hudimankan, Hudand, Hargun, Harshikat, Harkan, Humiysan, Daziva, Zahirava (Zahiynav), Zam, Razmaz, Raghna, Razman, Rastaghrif, Rustaghfan, Rakund, Rivdad, Ruvdakaghat, Riyhashan, Zarkaran, Zarman, Zaruvdizak, Zarudiza, Zakan,



Samijan, Sankadizak, Sanjafin, Sankabat, Shajabi, Shabajna, Shazavan, Shamidizak, Shikistan, Ghushdan, Ghurashk, Ghunjir, Faran, Fagh, Faghfad, Farfara, Farankad, Fayy, Kuzghund, Karzan, Kabuz, Kadan, Karazm, Kasadun, Kamarja, Kandukin, Kundikyat, Kunda, Majram, Majarm Majandan, Maziya, Muzn, Mighan, Nafahsh, Nau, Naukand, Naukazak, Naurid, Nujanaykat, Vazar, Vazd, Varaghsar, Varakud, Varsanan, Vazaghir, Yasirkat, Yughank.

Sources also provide information about other towns of the Khorezmshah kingdom.

Kash (Kesh, Shakhribabz) – was a fortified town near Samarqand, comprising a *kuhandiz* and *rabad*; the second town with a *madina* and its own *kuhandiz* was adjacent to it.<sup>84</sup>

Shash (Chach, Tashkent) – was a town and a region beyond the Sayhun river. The town was destroyed by ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad Khorezmshah during his struggle against the Qara-Khitay. Local rulers were killed by the Khorezmshah, and the city’s residents were banished from their lands for disobedience. In the years until the Mongol invasion, the region remained neglected and sparsely populated.<sup>85</sup>

Taraz (Tiraz, Talas) – was “a town bordering on the region of Shash. It is the further outpost of Islamic territory, for if one leaves the place, you find yourself in the territory of the Qarluq”.<sup>86</sup>

Khujand (Khojand) was “a well-known town on the bank of the Sayhun”. It was famous for its fruits, and for the beauty of its residents.<sup>87</sup> Under the leadership Jalal ad-Din Mankburni’s associate Damir Malik, the town stoutly resisted the Mongols.<sup>88</sup>

Tirmidh was one of central towns located on the east bank of the Jayhun. It had a *kuhandiz* and *rabad*, surrounded by strong brickwork.<sup>89</sup>

Akhsikat was a town in the region of Fergana. It had a *kuhandiz* and *rabad*, with the territory of three *farsakhs*. The *rabad* had its own walls. Four gates led to the *madina*.<sup>90</sup>

Isfijab was a “large town”. The town was destroyed and its residents banished when ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad Khorezmshah conquered the lands of the Qara-Khitay in 1212.<sup>91</sup>

Uzjand (Uzkend) was a town in the region of Farghana. It had walls, a *kuhandiz* and several gates.<sup>92</sup>

Ush (Osh) was a large town in the region of Farghana and was walled, with four gates and a *kuhandiz*.<sup>93</sup>

Nasaf (Nakhshab) was a large, densely populated town between the Amu Darya and Samarqand on the bank of the Qashqa Darya river. It had a *kuhandiz*, a *rabad* and four gates.<sup>94</sup> A name of one district of Nasaf is known – Juvik.<sup>95</sup> Nasaf district contained the following villages: Afuran, Anbadi, Anshamisan, Buthazan, Budyana, Bazda – “strong fortress”, Biran, Tuban, Tadyana, Dujakan, Diriza, Zandiya, Zaykun, Sakabdiyaz, Sanjan, Suvadiza, Sunanj, Shavakran, Kasni, Kabanda, Shirakat, Kajar, Kasam, Misnan, Varsin, Vanj, Varajan, Vanag, Yagna, etc.

Banakit (Banaket) was a large town in Mawarannahr.<sup>96</sup>

Nasa was “a wonderful town with numerous rivers and villages”.<sup>97</sup>

It is worth mentioning Merv among the cities ruled by the Khorezmshahs for a

long period of time. It was once a capital of the great Seljuq Sultan Sanjar. It was a huge fortified city with a great population.<sup>98</sup> Merv was destroyed by the Mongols, and its residents were slain.

Besides the towns and regions listed above, there were Balkh, Vakhsh, Jandarud, Jand, Qunduz, Khuttalan, etc. that formed a part of the Khorezmshah kingdom. During the height of the kingdom it included territories of Khurasan, Mazandaran, Ghazna, Ghur, Bust, Takinabad, Zamindavar, Kerman, Sind, Kesh and Mekran with all the towns, fortresses and villages as parts of this empire.

## COINAGE AND MONETARY CIRCULATION IN THE KHOREZMSHAH KINGDOM, 12<sup>TH</sup> AND EARLY 13<sup>TH</sup> CENTURIES

The military and political successes of the Khorezmshahs - and particularly those of the sultans Tekish and 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad - rested upon the economic might of the kingdom. Analysis of Khorezm's economic fortunes is impossible without our taking special account of the kingdom's monetary economy, the distinctive features of a coinage and money circulation in the Khorezmshah kingdom and the domains of their vassals.

By means of a careful reading of sources from the period, we can reconstruct the location of the Khorezmian kingdom's minting centres.

According to one official document, it was Atsiz Khorezmshah who was the first Khorezmshah to mint coins on his behalf. In Shawwal 536 AH (May 1142) after the defeat of Merv, Atsiz set out to seize Nishapur. When he arrived in the town's environs, Nishapur's representatives met him, and promised to yield the city if the shah undertook not to engage in massacre and looting. Atsiz agreed to these conditions and addressed the townsfolk with a message that said: "As soon as this document is made public, a *khutba* should be announced in Nishapur, coins minted and a *tiraz* woven with my name on".<sup>1</sup> No information is available as regards the type of the coins, namely whether they were gold, silver or copper.

The occasion of Atsiz minting coins on his behalf without mentioning the name of his sovereign, the great Seljuq Sultan Sanjar, was due to the fact that Sanjar's army had been routed by the Qara-Khitay in the Qatawan desert on 5 Safar 536 AH (8 September 1141), and he was in no position to take measures against his high-handed vassal. A *khutba* with a name of Khorezmshah Atsiz being mentioned in Nishapur just for few weeks, but within this period of time the name of the suzerain ceased to be mentioned.<sup>2</sup>

Following the capture of Nishapur by Il-Arslan Khorezmshah in May 1167, golden dinars and silver dirhams with his name were minted all over the domain of his vassal Mu'ayyid Ay-Aba.<sup>3</sup>

In many countries and regions which found themselves under Khorezmshahid suzerainty, the *khutba* and the *sikka* were issued in the Khorezmshah's name. In 591 AH/1195, for instance, in the city of Kerman, which had recently become a Khorezmshahid possession, the *khutba* and the *sikka* were issued in the name of Tekish Khorezmshah.<sup>4</sup>

In 603 AH/1206, meanwhile the ruler of Balkh 'Imad ad-Din accepted the suzerainty of 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad Khorezmshah and committed himself to issue the *khutba* and the *sikka* in the Khorezmshah's name.<sup>5</sup> Similar undertakings were made around this time by the ruler of Bamiyan 'Ala ad-Din<sup>6</sup> and the ruler of Herat Ghiyath ad-Din Mahmud al-Ghuri.<sup>7</sup>

In 606 AH/1209, a ruler of Mazandaran became a vassal of ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad Khorezmshah and “minted coins and read the *khutba* in the Khorezmshah’s name”,<sup>8</sup> and in that same year the ruler of Samarqand ‘Uthman ibn Ibrahim became a vassal of the Khorezmshah, and similarly started minting coins in the name of ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad.<sup>9</sup>

In 614 AH/1217, ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad Khorezmshah defeated the atabeks of Fars and Azerbaijan Sa’d ibn Zangi and Uzbek. Following his victory, we read, ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad Khorezmshah ordered Uzbek “to give instructions for the *khutba* and *sikka* to be issued in his name across the country, and to make an agreed annual contribution to the sultan’s treasury. Uzbek undertook to fulfil the sultan’s demands, and thus satisfied everybody. In honour of the sultan, a *khutba* was proclaimed from the minbars of Arran and Azerbaijan, all the way as far as Darband and Shirvan”.<sup>10</sup>

Pursued by the Mongols in 619 AH/1222, Jalal ad-Din Mankburni Khorezmshah retreated to India. There, he seized territories belonging to the local rulers Nasir ad-Din Qubacha (1205-1227) and Shams ad-Din Il-Tutmish al-Mu’izzi (1211-1236), as well as various rajputs and khakkars. He thereupon began minting his own silver and copper coins across the territories now in his possession.<sup>11</sup>

Manuscript sources underscore political aspects of coinage as evidence of the establishment of the supreme power of Khorezmshahs. It was natural that authors of historical chronicles did not mention all the towns and the regions where coins were minted on behalf of the Khorezmshahs but only those which were major political centres. Coins with names and titles of the Khorezmshahs were indicative of an enlarged list of mint-places. These included Samarqand,<sup>12</sup> Bukhara,<sup>13</sup> Barab (Otrar),<sup>14</sup> Uzjand,<sup>15</sup> Tirmidh,<sup>16</sup> Chaghaniyan<sup>17</sup> and Vakhsh<sup>18</sup> in Mavarannahr; Balkh,<sup>19</sup> Bamyān,<sup>20</sup> Ghazna,<sup>21</sup> Ghur,<sup>22</sup> Jurzuvar,<sup>23</sup> Zamindavar,<sup>24</sup> Yamur,<sup>25</sup> Qunduz,<sup>26</sup> Merv,<sup>27</sup> Nasa,<sup>28</sup> Nishapur,<sup>29</sup> Peshavar,<sup>30</sup> Talaqan,<sup>31</sup> Farvan,<sup>32</sup> Shafurkan,<sup>33</sup> etc, in the former Seljuq and Ghurid possessions, including non-localized and unread names. The total number of mint-places in the Khorezmshah kingdom reached approx. 30; and the greatest expansion took place during the reign of Muhammad ibn Tekish.

After capturing Tiflis and Eastern Georgia in 623 AH/1226, Sultan Jalal ad-Din began minting coins throughout the western Transcaucasus. He made use of Georgian copper coins, which he re-minted in his own name. The coins in question were generally those which had previously been issued during the reigns of the emperor Georgi Lasha, and the emperesses Tamara and Rusudan.<sup>34</sup>

Special distinctions of a coinage and money circulation, both in Khorezm and the entire territory of the Khorezmshah kingdom, were accounted for by three related factors: the so-called silver monetary crisis in the Middle East; traditions; and the Khorezmshahs’ own monetary policy.

Signs of the silver monetary crisis became apparent in the end of the 10<sup>th</sup> century; later silver dirhams of the Samanids were of low grade. No one, however, could have predicted in the 10<sup>th</sup> century that the debased coinage was anything other than a temporary phenomenon, or that the silver shortage would embrace the entire Middle

East, and that every country in the region would have to revise its monetary economy and political line with respect to coinage and organization of money circulation for the course of the next two centuries.

The silver monetary crisis which occurred across this vast territory displayed certain common features, though these varied by region according to the framework of different state formations. Two features stand out, however, as commonly characterising coinage and currency circulation throughout the period in question. The first of these was the primacy of gold as a mean of exchange, and the second was the disappearance of high-quality silver currency, with the increased circulation in their place of various low-grade silver – and sometimes copper – coins.

The causes of the crisis and its progressive worsening have been the subject of discussion and debate for more than a century. The problem is yet to be conclusively solved, but there has clearly been some limited progress in our understanding of the matter. One of the causes was evidently a substantial reduction of silver stock in the Middle East during the course of the 9-10<sup>th</sup> centuries. This reduction was due to the nature of the region's trade relations with its northern neighbours. As is known, from the end of the 8<sup>th</sup> century silver coins were exported to Europe from the Caliphate; in the 10<sup>th</sup> century, meanwhile, Samanid coins were similarly traded northwards. Silver mines were exploited very intensively in the period under discussion. Resources may well have come under pressure during this period, with a depletion of silver mines leading to a shortage of precious-metal reserves. Our materials indicate that there occurred a steep rise in the price of silver throughout the Middle East. For example, the ratio of gold to silver in Bukhara, 1128, was 1:7,5;<sup>35</sup> a figure stood at 1:8,5<sup>36</sup> in Egypt, Baghdad and some other places. However, E.A. Davidovich points out that the reduction of silver stock and the rise in the price for this metal, taken separately, fail to explain the changes that took place in the minting of dirhams. She cites a number of examples when a high-grade coinage continued under identical conditions, or where (in case of cheap silver) silver coins were debased by various alloys. Hence, the situation around silver stock in the Middle East in the late 10<sup>th</sup> and early 11<sup>th</sup> centuries was due to objective prerequisites that favoured minting high-grade coins. If for any other reason the silver was debased, it was a real state of the silver stocks that accelerated this debase and made the process irreversible for a long period of time.<sup>37</sup>

Another reason seems to have been intensive urban development, and a growth in trades and handicrafts which in turn required increased money circulation.<sup>38</sup> Taken separately, this reason could have led to a greater reliance on silver coinage, given the favourable state of silver stocks. However, under the real conditions of the late 10<sup>th</sup> and early 11<sup>th</sup> centuries when the silver stocks considerably dropped, it became difficult to meet the demand for high-grade silver coins. The authorities realized the necessity of substituting high-grade coins. On the one hand, this resulted in the increased usage of gold, even in those areas of the trade where gold had not previously played an important role; on the other, it led to the issue of low-grade

silver coins and even copper substitutes for silver.

Besides these general reasons and factors, there were local distinctions in each country, reflecting local traditions of coinage and money circulation with which governments had to reckon. Peculiarities of the silver monetary crisis in different regions and countries obviously manifested themselves in the rates and methods of debasement of silver coins, in the selection of silver “substitutes”, and in the political line towards gold coinage. To our thinking, an identical historical study into all aspects of the silver monetary crisis would make it possible to identify its prerequisites and reasons. In the meanwhile, no specific regional versions of this phenomenon have so far been studied.

Khorezm is among the least well studied areas in this respect. It was a territorial centre of the Khorezmshahid’s Empire. Numerous numismatic catalogues and academic articles provide information about coins minted in Khorezm during the silver monetary crisis. A number of coin hoards have also been discovered in the territory of Khorezm. But the discovery of such materials still leaves much work to be done before we can make conclusions about the circulation of currency. No one has yet embarked upon this work, whether numismatists or specialist medieval historians. Consequently, we can here only offer some broad observations regarding the coin stock in Khorezm during the 12<sup>th</sup> early 13<sup>th</sup> centuries.

First of all, the local origin of minting golden dinars has to be taken into account. Quite often, minting-places were named by region, not town. We are aware of Khorezmian golden dinars of Atsiz, Il-Arslan, Tekish, Muhammad.<sup>39</sup> Dinars of Muhammad ibn Tekish were particularly numerous. It should be noted that not only local dinars did circulate on the territory of Khorezm. For instance, a treasure of golden coins discovered in Kunya-Urgench region contained Nisabur dinars of Seljuq Sanjar and dinars of Khorezmshah Atsiz (with reference to Seljuqs as suzerains), his son Il-Arslan and grandson Tekish.<sup>40</sup>

Copper coins were also minted in Khorezm. Large copper coins (25-26 mm on average)<sup>41</sup> of Muhammad ibn Tekish on both sides of which there were names of mint-place (“Khorezm”) and date of coinage (602/1205-06; 603/1206-07 and 610/1213-14) were well-known. Smaller copper coins with no references to name and date of issue were minted in Khorezm and other places. Analysis of the topography and content of large-scale coin finds allows us to identify the origin of copper coins. Thus, the composition of a copper coin treasure from Kunya-Urgench indicates that smaller copper coins (19-20 mm on the average) were issued in Khorezm under Muhammad ibn Tekish.

It follows from the above that golden and copper coins formed the monetary bulk on the territory of Khorezm proper in the 12<sup>th</sup> - earlier 13<sup>th</sup> centuries. The former was used for large-scale commercial operations on the territory of Khorezm province, as well as for trade relations with other regions of the state. The latter served as means of circulation in the petty and retail trade. Golden and copper coins filled up an area of money circulation and trade that had earlier traditionally fallen upon silver.

The situation around the silver monetary crisis was different in the states of Qarakhanids, Ghaznavids, Great Seljuqs and Ghurids. The analysis of monetary circulation and of coins' chemical composition provides the evidence for this. These conditions should be briefly characterized to understand the policy of Khorezmshahs regarding coinage and money circulation on the conquered territories.

Unlike the case with Khorezm, the circulation of coinage in the Qarakhanid kingdom has been the subject of extensive study. This case was mostly predetermined by the tradition going back to the 9<sup>th</sup> - 10<sup>th</sup> centuries.<sup>42</sup> At first sight, the country faced a typical crisis: debasement of coinage. This debasement developed intensively and resulted in the issue of various low-grade coins made of silver and copper alloys (in the second quarter of the 11<sup>th</sup> century the content of copper reached 70%) or of the so-called clad coins (silver external and copper internal). The populace normally was aware of the standards applicable to the coins of this type. Some low-grade coins had their own names, for example, low-grade dirhams of Ibrahim Arslan-khaqan, of 1040-50s, were called *mu'ayyadi*. In the mid-11<sup>th</sup> century the Eastern Qarakhanids issued dirhams from copper and lead alloy but these coins had not been circulated for long. In the second half of the 12<sup>th</sup> and earlier 13<sup>th</sup> centuries, instead of low-grade silver dirhams, the authorities began issuing copper coins with a thin silver plating. These coins were used by Muhammad ibn Tekish when he annihilated the dynasty of the Western Qarakhanids and annexed a greater part of their possessions to his domain.

Both low grade silver dirhams and silver-plated copper dirhams were intended for traditional silver circulation. Silver dirham rates depended upon silver content to comply with pure gold indices; copper, silver-plated dirham rates were established forcibly by the government. But these coins did not entirely substitute for the circulation of silver, nor did they enjoy the confidence of the populace. The Qarakhanid kingdom inherited dirham-*ghitri*fi from the 9<sup>th</sup> – 10<sup>th</sup> centuries: these were bronze coins depicting a crowned king's head and a flaming altar attended by guardsmen. *Ghitri*fi was minted after the template of coins going back to a Sassanid king of the 5<sup>th</sup> century, with schematized depictions. The purchasing power of the *ghitri*fi from the 9<sup>th</sup> to the 12<sup>th</sup> centuries was comparable to that of pure silver coins, and sometimes indeed surpassed them.

Until the middle of the 12<sup>th</sup> century, the Qarakhanid kingdom felt no need for gold to ensure silver commerce, for this kind of trade was reliably backed by bronze dirham-*ghitri*fi and low-grade silver Qarakhanid coins. This was why no golden coins had been minted in Mawarannahr till the middle of the 12<sup>th</sup> century. It was a time-tested tradition that helped the region to cope with difficulties that arose from shortage of and rise in prices for silver. The traditions underwent radical changes in the second half of the 12<sup>th</sup> century when bronze dirham-*ghitri*fi and low-grade silver coins were replaced by copper, silver-plated Qarakhanid dirhams with a fixed fiat value (the circulation of these coins was accompanied by frequent crises), a regular mintage of golden dinars (Samarqand, Bukhara) started, and copper fils were issued for petty commerce. That was the situation in Mawarannahr prior to the conquest by



Muhammad ibn Tekish.

The Ghaznavid kingdom offers a third, different example of the consequences of the silver monetary crisis (different from the Qarakhanid version).<sup>43</sup> From the very outset of the silver monetary crisis in the Ghaznavid kingdom, the situation here was characterized by a combination of intensive minting of golden dinars and slow debasement of silver dirhams. For instance, dirhams of Mas'ud Ghaznavi (1030-1041) had above 70% of silver in the second quarter of the 11<sup>th</sup> century while high-grade dirhams with 95% of silver had still been in circulation. Nevertheless, functions of golden dinars broadened; they supplanted silver to function as an independent means of circulation. There were cases when prices had been fixed in silver dirhams, and real calculations were carried out in golden dinars, i.e. illustrative example of restructuring under new conditions. The dinars in the Ghaznavid kingdom had different standards; the highest were Nisabur ones. Different standards came as a result of different politics, for golden dinars of different standards were used to serve various levels of trade.

The development of objective prerequisites and an appropriate political line in the domains of Great Seljuqs and Ghurids led to the formation of the new specific types of monetary systems and money circulation, similar but not identical to the Ghaznavi variant.

The Great Seljuqs were among those dynasties that minted golden dinars. These golden dinars were of different standards, as was with Ghaznavi ones. Dinars of different standards had their own names. Under the Seljuqs, high-grade golden coins were issued in Nishapur (92-98% pure gold). Other mint-places of Seljuqs also issued high-grade dinars.<sup>44</sup> These coins co-existed with various low-grade golden dinars<sup>45</sup> and it was sign of the time, with gold-plated dinars of high-grade and then low-grade silver (with a touch of copper).<sup>46</sup>

At first, dirhams were composed of silver with a light copper alloy; later on, they consisted of copper only. The "worst" coins (gold-plated dinars of low-grade silver and copper dirhams) were typical for the second half of the reign of Sultan Sanjar.<sup>47</sup>

The monetary system and money circulation in the Ghurid kingdom have not yet been the subject of monographic study. The publication of materials on Ghurid coins provides information about the monetary stock under the last Ghurids when Muhammad ibn Tekish invaded the country. The Ghurids minted high-grade golden dinars; later Ghurid dinars comprised 98-99% pure gold. An-Nasawi writes that the so-called *ghiyathi ghuri* (named after the laqab "Ghiyath ad-Din" borne by both Muhammad ibn Sam (1163-1203) and his son Mahmud) was the highest-grade among *rukni* dinars.<sup>48</sup>

The gold mintage of the Ghurids went with the issue of silver, billon and copper coins.<sup>49</sup>

In considering the aforementioned types of monetary stock in several regions and kingdoms, one can get an idea of the political line of the Khorezmshahs in respect of money circulation and coinage. This question requires separate study, with a due

consideration of place and date of coinage, kinds of metal, standard, weight, size, inscriptions, iconography, etc. At any rate, it may be inferred that the Khorezmshahs paid particular attention to the political aspect of coinage; as for monetary stock and the organization of money circulation, they followed the local traditions.

An eloquent testimony to this is the politics pursued by Muhammad Tekish in Mawarannahr after his conquest of this region.<sup>50</sup> As has been noted above, Muhammad ibn Tekish borrowed from the Qarakhanids the monetary stock as follows: golden dinars, copper silver-plated dirhams and fils. The first apparent sign of “Qarakhanid version” of the silver monetary crisis in the second half of the 12<sup>th</sup> century was the domination of copper, silver-plated dirhams in the silver circulation, with a forced rate. The situation remained invariable under Muhammad ibn Tekish.

Since 610/1213-14, the authorities of Samarqand issued copper, silver-plated dirhams with the name of Muhammad ibn Tekish. These were large and heavy coins (above 40 mm) whose issue reached its height in 610/1213-14 and 614/1217-18. Bukharan authorities also minted copper, silver-plated dirhams with a name of the conqueror in 610 and 612 AH. These were smaller and lighter coins with their face value lower than Samarqand coins. Under the Qarakhanids, the population was accustomed to use copper, silver-plated dirhams of two face values. In this regard, the political line of Tekish followed earlier established traditions. This could be clearly illustrated by the mintage in Tirmidh in 616 AH/1219-20 and 617 AH/1220, and Chaghaniyan in 615 AH/1218-19 and 616 AH/1219-20: each of the two mint-places issued copper, silver-plated dirhams of two face values that differed in their types and sizes.

Muhammad ibn Tekish availed himself of the Qarakhanid-developed system of deriving additional profits from coinage of this sort. The point is that their issue made it possible to derive immediate profits thanks to the forced nature of their exchange rate. There was a great temptation to mint coins as many as possible. However, medieval economists were already aware of an objective and extremely important principle: it was inadmissible to issue arbitrary, unceasing quantity of coins of this sort. As soon as their quantity exceeded a required number, immediately inflation started, and then came a money circulation crisis. To avoid these tendencies those Qarakhanid economists resorted to cunning: they replaced one monetary stock with another; withdrew the stock from circulation by means of prohibition and exchange (profitable for the treasury) and issued another stock instead. That was done by Muhammad ibn Tekish in Mawarannahr who drew up his earnings in a traditional manner.

Another sign of the “Qarakhanid version” of the silver monetary crisis was a regular minting of golden dinars from the second half of the 12<sup>th</sup> century. This tradition had continued to the reign of Muhammad ibn Tekish: dinars with his name were issued in Samarqand, Bukhara and Tirmidh.

When comparing the coins of Tekish with those of the Ghurids, one observes that the former did not violate traditions but rather borrowed them. Golden dinars, silver and billon dirhams and copper fils were issued in the former Ghurid possessions on

behalf of Muhammad ibn Tekish. In other words, he succeeded in preserving “Ghurid version” of monetary system of the silver crisis period on the conquered territory of the Ghurid kingdom. Muhammad ibn Tekish repeated even the very iconographic type of Ghurid coins, particularly, depiction of a horseman.

The two examples cited above (preservation of “Qarakhanid” and “Ghurid versions”) give weight to the statement that there was no unified organization of coinage and money circulation in the huge Khorezmshahid empire, comprising as it did the former territories of various other kingdoms. In each constitutive region of the empire, monetary practices were influenced by local traditions dating from before the Khorezmshahs’ conquest. The silver monetary crisis within the bounds of the Khorezmshah Empire had not been overcome, and this led to the consolidation of local versions of monetary economics and greater economic isolation.

Still, there was a unifying factor – the production and circulation of gold coins. As the Empire expanded, the Khorezmshahs expanded the production of golden dinars. Particularly important here was ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad, in whose name gold dinars were issued by many minting centres, including those in Khorezm, Nishapur, Bukhara, Samarqand, Tirmidh, Vakhsh, Ghazna and Qunduz. An essential factor has to be taken into account: Khorezmian gold mintage did not undermine position of golden coins having been minted in the previous period by other dynasties, as it is evidenced by treasure stock of golden coins. Many treasures are of mixed composition: dinars of the Khorezmshahs get on with dinars of Ghurids, Qarakhanids, and Seljuqs.<sup>51</sup> Another essential aspect: different weights of golden coins, especially as there is a great difference in dinar weights issued under ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad. So, it is not surprising that there were discovered scores of debris and scrap-coins among the rest.<sup>52</sup>

A certain quantity of golden coins must have been hidden during the Mongol conquest. Mongols destroyed and burned towns, exterminated and took large numbers of people prisoner. In the present day, gold dinar hoards are occasionally discovered in archaeological excavations, and constitute an invaluable source for the study of economic life in the 12th and early 13th centuries.

A part of golden dinars “broke through” the Mongolian horrors, as is evidenced by treasures of another kind: dinars of pre-Mongolian period found alongside dinars which were minted by the Mongols themselves.

## AN ESSAY ON CULTURAL LIFE IN THE KHOREZMSHAH KINGDOM

The duration of the Khorezmshah dynasty, and particularly the period of rule by sultans Tekish and 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad, was notable for the growth of cultural life. The creative works of eulogists reached its heyday in the period under discussion. All the representatives of the Khorezmian poetic school were court poets of the Khorezmshahs. The most prominent of these was a poet and *belle-lettriste* Rashid ad-Din Muhammad al-'Umari (b.1114-1116; d.1182-83), known also as Rashid ad-Din Watwat ("the bat") on account of his small stature and unattractive bald appearance.

With a brilliant education, first in his mother city of Balkh and then in Khorezm, Watwat became famous as an unsurpassed master of the epistolary genre under the court of the Khorezmshahs Atsiz, Il-Arslan and Tekish, under each of whom he served as *katib al-insha'*. Proficient in all the subtleties of official correspondence in Arabic and Persian, Watwat, despite frequent absence, remained to be the favourite of the sultans.

As a brilliant poet and a master of rhetoric figures and tropes, Imam Rashid ad-Din Watwat<sup>1</sup> lavishly adorned his correspondence with stylistic ornament. He liked to patronize those poets who recognized his supremacy in poetry. His relations with the poet Khaqani, for instance, were benevolent until Khaqani began making fun of Watwat's admiration for the Khorezmshahid court and alleging that the Watwat's creativity was inferior to that of Adib Sabir al-Tirmidhi. Most probably, when Sanjar sent Adib Sabir as an envoy to Atsiz Khorezmshah, it was Watwat who persuaded Atsiz that Adib Sabir had not been an envoy but rather a spy, whose mission was to get information about the Khorezmshah's intention to kill Sultan Sanjar. So, Adib Sabir was drowned in Amu Darya.<sup>2</sup>

Watwat's work "*Hada'iq as-sihr fi daqa'iq al-shi'r*" ("Magical Gardens in Subtleties of Poetry") is dedicated to Atsiz Khorezmshah.<sup>3</sup> Watwat also wrote scores of eulogistic *qasidas* to Nusrat ad-Din Abu-l-Fath Rustam, *ispahbad* of Tabaristan, who in return sent the poet an annual sum of 500 dinars, together with a turban *jubba* and a beautifully adorned horse.<sup>4</sup>

Of great value is Watwat's *al-Rasa'il* ("Epistles"). The work consist of two parts: the first of these comprises messages addressed to caliphs, sovereigns, sultans, viziers, amirs, wali, qadi and muftis, while the second contains communications addressed to scholars, senior officials, noblemen, poets, friends, etc.<sup>5</sup>

Jamal ad-Din Muhammad ibn 'Abd ar-Razzaq Isfahani and his son Kamal ad-Din Isma'il Isfahani were prominent representatives of what was known as the Isfahan school of poetry. Jamal ad-Din came from a poor artisan family; he was a jeweller and a miniaturist painter. Jamal ad-Din took to poetry from his youth and wrote verses that eulogized courtiers, though personally he did not serve at a court. Jamal ad-Din visited Azerbaijan, Ganja – where he met with Nizami Ganjavi –, and

Mazandaran. Upon returning to Isfahan, he remained there till the end of his life in 588/1122. His verses primarily constituted *qasidas* and *ghazals* eulogizing various dignitaries, particularly from Isfahan's Sa'id and Khujandi families. His creative work was influenced by the poetical heritage of the greatest poets of the epoch such as Khaqani, Anwari and Watwat. Jamal ad-Din Isfahani's oeuvre was instrumental in developing the *ghazal* genre.<sup>6</sup>

Jamal ad-Din's son Kamal ad-Din Isma'il (1172-1237) was a well-known eulogist. He wrote verses in Arabic and Persian. Like his father, he was a Shafi'i and a member of the Sufi order. Still, his asceticism did not prevent him from taking an interest in wine and backgammon that he lauded in his verses.

Kamal ad-Din started writing poetry in his boyhood, and at the age of twenty he wrote his famous elegy for his father's death. It was the patronage of the Sa'id family that enabled Kamal ad-Din to gain wide popularity, but shortly after he suffered much from the slander of his foes. With his poetical *laqab Khallaq al-Ma'ani*, Kamal ad-Din dedicated most of his *qasida* to the Khorezmshahs Tekish, 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad, Jalal ad-Din Mankburni and Ghiyath ad-Din Pir-shah, as well as the atabeks of Fars Sa'd ibn Zangi and his son Abu Bakr. Later on, Kamal ad-Din was influenced by the famous mystical shaykh Shihab ad-Din 'Umar ibn Muhammad al-Suhrawardi, who had a great impact on his subsequent poetic work. On 21 December 1227, during the Mongol capture of Isfahan, Kamal ad-Din was killed by a Mongol soldier who was looking for treasures at the poet's home. Kamal ad-Din's last quatrain was written in blood.<sup>7</sup>

Another talented poet was *khoja malik al-qalam* ("master of the word") Zahir ad-Din Tahir ibn Muhammad al-Faryabi (circa 1160-1202), who for a time lived and worked in Nishapur at the court of the local Khorezmshahid vassal-ruler Toghan-shah ibn Mu'ayyid Ay-Aba. Zahir ad-Din then moved to Isfahan, where he found patronage under various Isfahani *sadrs* from the Khujandi family. While at Isfahan, he made friends with the afore-mentioned poets Jamal ad-Din and Kamal ad-Din Isma'il Isfahani. Later on, Zahir ad-Din made his way to the court of Ardashir ibn Hasan in Mazandaran, where he received generous financial support. Shortly thereafter, Zahir ad-Din was invited to the court of the Azerbaijani atabek Qizil-Arslan (1186-1191). While at Tabriz, Zahir ad-Din al-Faryabi became good friends with Khaqani and imitated him in his panegyrics. Zahir ad-Din died in Tabriz, and buried near a grave of Khaqani at the poets' cemetery Surkhab.<sup>8</sup>

Asir ad-Din Abu-l-Fadl Muhammad ibn Tahir Akhsikati (d. 1184?) was a prominent poet in the period under discussion. His nickname was *Sultan al-Fudala'* (the sultan of the nobles) and he came from the town Akhsikat in Farghana. In quest for a patron he moved to Azerbaijan where he wrote *qasidas* eulogizing local rulers. He was an outstanding master of poetry, and wrote in the manner of Khaqani.<sup>9</sup>

Mawlana Sayf ad-Din Isfara'ini, nicknamed *amlah ash-shu'ara' wa malik al-fudala'* ("wittiest of the poets and sovereign of the nobles"), lived and worked in Bukhara during the reign of the Khorezmshahs Il-Arslan and Tekish, producing verses similar

to those of Ahsikati.<sup>10</sup>

Ghiyath ad-Din Abu-l-Majd Muhammad ibn al-Hasan ibn Ibrahim al-Jandi was a prominent poet of the Khorezmshahid epoch. According to Ibn al-Fuwati, “he was one of the best poets alive at the time, and he wrote marvellous verses”. The following is a specimen of his poetry:

“Passion is an ailment typical for everyone who lost his mind.  
Love – its source is sweet. Love – its source is bitter.  
Its origin is anxiety, its completion is interest,  
Its mystery incinerates inward nature its explicitness smears soul.  
If I could endure its loss, for I know how hard its adherents feel.  
I would be cured with its fragrance and take pleasure in its fragrance”.<sup>11</sup>

Fakhr al-Masha'ikh Abu-l-Qasim 'Ali ibn Muhammad ibn 'Ali al-Adibi al-Khorezmi (d. 1165)<sup>12</sup> and Fakhr al-Afadil Abu Hafs 'Umar ibn Muhammad ibn 'Umar al-Khorezmi (d. 1155) were well-known poets and literati in Khorezm.<sup>13</sup> Kamal ad-Din Abu-l-Faraj Yusuf ibn Mahmud ibn Ahmad al-Samarqandi, from a mountain district near Samarqand, was similarly a prominent Khorezmian poet,<sup>14</sup> and Mu'ayyan ad-Din Abu Sa'd Ibrahim ibn Faris ibn Rustam al-Khorezmi was renowned for his beautiful verses.<sup>15</sup>

Sources refer to prominent literati of the Khorezmshahid kingdom who had a profound influence on science and culture, social and political life of the country. Listed below are the most prominent scholars and poets of the Khorezmshahid kingdom.

1) al-Hakim 'Ali ibn Muhammad al-Hijazi al-Qa'ini. “He was a respectable physician; receptacle of medical knowledge proficient in all sciences. He wrote treatises (*rasa'il*) on medicine and medical practice. He wrote *Kitab mafakhir al-atrak* (“Book on the merits of the Turks”) in honour of the greatest Sultan Sanjar. Also, the poet dedicated his *Kitab fi-l-hikma* (“Book of Wisdom”) to the impartial sovereign of the Universe Khorezmshah Atsiz ibn Muhammad. He lived for 90 years and died in 546/1151; he was a disciple of 'Umar al-Khayyami”.<sup>16</sup>

2) The philosopher (*al-faylasuf*) Baha ad-Din Abu Muhammad 'Abd al-Jabbar ibn Muhammad Sabit al-Haraki. “He was a sage of Merv, and wrote treatises on astronomy and logic. The fair sovereign of the Universe, Atsiz Khorezmshah took him to Khorezm in Rabi' I 536/October 1141 to derive benefit from his erudition. Also, he wrote works on history”.<sup>17</sup>

3) Abu-l-Mafakhir Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Abu-l-Jalil al-'Umari al-Katib al-Bukhari al-Khorezmshahi. To judge by his *laqab*, he held the post of *katib* under one of the Khorezmshahs, perhaps Atsiz. “Imam amir the greatest, the weal of state and religion, happiness of Islam and Muslims, holder of merits and praiseworthy qualities, favourite of the sovereigns and the sultans, the most eloquent in all the kingdoms, connoisseur of rhetoric and stylistics... with the grace of Allah he was pre-eminent among the worthy [scholars] of Khorezm and Khurasan”.<sup>18</sup>

4) Al-Amir as-Sayyid al-imam Zayn ad-Din Isma'il ibn al-Hasan al-Husayni



al-Jurjani *at-tabib* ("physician"). "He revived the science of medicine and other sciences by his works. I (al-Bayhaqi) saw him in Sarakhs in 531/1136. He was old. Atsiz Khorezmshah became greatly attached to him. While at Khorezm, he wrote works *at-Tibb al-muluki* ("Royal Medicine"), *Kitab al-aghrad* ("Aspirations"), *Kitab fi-r-radd 'ala-l-falasifa* ("Disproof of Philosophy"), *Kitab tadbir yawm va layla* ("Regulation of Day and Night") *Kitab wasif-nama* ("Book of Youth"), etc. His works are well-known; honest people say that he was affable and well-wishing".<sup>19</sup>

5) Abu Ishaq Shaykh al-Amid Ibrahim ibn Muhammad ibn Ibrahim an-Nasawi was "worthy poet and katib", and died in 1125.<sup>20</sup>

6) Abu-l-Hasan 'Ali ibn Arrak as-Sannari al-Khorezmi (d. 1143, in the village of Mazana, Khorezm province). "He was a grammarian, connoisseur of language and *arud*. He lived long in Bukhara where he studied *fiqh* from the city's shaykhs. Then he moved to Jurjaniya. Author of the book *Shamarih ad-durar fi tafsir al-Qur'an* ("Clusters of Pearls in Commentaries to Koran").<sup>21</sup>

7) Abu-l-Hasan ibn 'Ali ibn Muntajab 'Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Arslan ibn Muhammad al-Khorezmi *al-katib*. A remarkable poet. Killed in Rabi' I 536 AH (October 1141) during a military campaign of Atsiz Khorezmshah against Merv. Author of "The History of Khorezm".<sup>22</sup>

8) Abu-l-Hasan 'Ali ibn Muhammad ibn 'Ali ibn Ahmad ibn Marwan al-Umrani al-Khorezmi, *adib* nicknamed *Hujjat al-afadil sayyid al-udaba' wa fakhr al-masha'ikh*. Died in Khorezm in 560/1164. Abu-l-Hasan taught *adab* to Mahmud ibn 'Umar az-Zamakhshari, and was famed as a poet. Yaqut al-Hamawi refers to his *qasida*.<sup>23</sup>

9) Abu Muhammad Mahmud ibn Muhammad ibn al-'Abbas ibn Arslan al-'Abbasi al-Khorezmi (1099-1172), theologian and historian; author of the books on *fiqh al-Kafi fi-l-fiqh* and the history of Khorezm "*Tarikh Khwarazm*".<sup>24</sup>

10) Al-Hakim Abu Ja'far ibn Muhammad al-Bukhari (d. Ramadan 551 AH/October 1156), a connoisseur of the sciences of ancient sages.<sup>25</sup>

11) Abu-l-Wafa Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn al-Qasim al-Akhsikati. Imam in linguistics and history. Died after 520 AH/1126.

12) Abu Rashid Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn al-Qasim al-Akhsikati, brother of Muhammad al-Akhsikati; *adib* and a poet.<sup>26</sup>

13) Zayn ad-Din Muhammad ibn Abi-l-Qasim al-Baqqali al-Khorezmi (d. 562 AH/1166-67), renowned as *Zayn al-masha'ikh*; author of a vocabulary to the Koran (*Tarajim al-a'ajim*).<sup>27</sup>

14) Abu-l-Karam 'Abd as-Salam ibn Muhammad ibn Abi-l-Hasan 'Ali al-Hijji al-Firdawsi al-Khorezmi al-Andarastani (al-Andarasfani). Andarastan was a village near Gurganj. He compiled a book of selected *hadith* (536/1142) and a biographical vocabulary.<sup>28</sup>

15) Fakhr ad-Din Abu 'Abdallah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Umar ar-Razi compiled an encyclopaedia for Khorezmshah Tekish titled *Jawami' al-'ulum* ("Code of Sciences").<sup>29</sup>

16) Shams ad-Din Muhammad ibn Ashraf ibn al-Husayn al-Samarqandi (d. 1204); author of *Risala fi adab al-bahth*.<sup>30</sup>



17) Muzaffar ad-Din Qutlugh-bek ibn Mas'ud Khalil al-Vakhshi, a poet "who wrote about the poor people".<sup>31</sup>

18) Adib Muzaffar ad-Din Abu Muhammad al-Mubarak ibn 'Ali ibn Ya'qub al-Baykandi (al-Paykandi).<sup>32</sup>

19) Adib Muzaffar ad-Din al-Mubarak ibn Muhammad ibn Surkhab al-Khorezmi al-Kathi.<sup>33</sup>

20) Muzaffar ad-Din Abu-s-Sana Mahmud ibn Arslan al-Khorezmi, a prominent *adib* and historian, author of the history of Khorezm;<sup>34</sup> perhaps to be identified also as to Mahmud ibn Muhammad ibn Arslan al-Khorezmi.

21) Mu'ayyan ad-Din Mahmud ibn 'Umar ibn Khalil ad-Din Muhammad ibn 'Umar as-Samarqandi al-Khorezmi, astronomer, author of the book *al-Mulakhkhas fi-l-hay'a* ("The Crux of Astronomy").<sup>35</sup>

22) Malik al-'ulama' Abu-l-Muzaffar Mas'ud ibn Muhammad ibn Sadid al-Khujandi, prominent *adib* and commander.<sup>36</sup>

23) Muntajib ad-Din Abu Sa'd Muhammad ibn al-Hasan ibn Mahmud an-Nasawi, prominent scholar, connoisseur of history, *adab* and other sciences.<sup>37</sup>

24) Minhaj ad-Din Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Abu Bakr al-Marghinani, prominent scholar and *faqih*.<sup>38</sup>

25) Minhaj ad-Din Abu 'Abdallah Muhammad ibn 'Umar ibn Abu-l-Fath al-Bukhari, *katib*, historian.<sup>39</sup>

26) 'Ala ad-Din Abu-l-Fath Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Hamid al-Husayn al-Asmadi as-Samarqandi, *faqih al-munazir al-'alam*. Descended from Samarqand, prominent *faqih*. Taj al-Islam Abu Sa'id as-Sam'ani wrote: "I met him in Samarqand and spoke to him. But I failed to achieve my goal, for he took to the bottle, and I heard about it earlier. He told me: "Two things in this world soothe: books and wine". He was born in 488/1095, and died in 536/1142. He wrote *Mukhtalif ar-riwaya* and *Intiq'a' hasr al-masa'il wa kasr ad-dala'il*".<sup>40</sup>

27) 'Ala ad-Din Abu Tahir Muhammad ibn Mahmud at-Tarjuman, *faqih* and *adib*. He transmitted all the works by az-Zamakhshari. Died in Jurjaniya, Khorezm on 2 Muharram 645 AH (10 May 1247).<sup>41</sup>

28) Fakhr al-Khwarazm ("Pride of Khorezm") *al-'Allama* ("omniscient") Jar-Allah Abu-l-Qasim Mahmud ibn 'Umar ibn Muhammad al-Khwarazmi az-Zamakhshari was born on 27 Rajab 467 AH (18 March 1075), and died on 9 Dhu-l-Hijja 538 AH (June 13 1144); he was the greatest scholar of Khorezm. Had the *laqabs* an-Nahawi and al-Lughawi. Author of numerous works; the supreme authority of his time on rhetoric, stylistics, astronomy and other sciences.<sup>42</sup>

29) Abu-l-Mu'ayyid al-Muwaffaq ibn Ahmad al-Makki, known as *Akhtab Khwarazm* ("the most eloquent in Khorezm"), the best *mudarris* of Khorezm (d. 568 AH/1172). One of the most talented disciples of al-Zamakhshari, connoisseur of the Arabic language, like his master; author of various works on the history of Islam.<sup>43</sup>

30) Abu Madar ad-Dabbi al-Khorezmi *Mashhur kull fann al-ustadh al-fadil farid al-'asr* ("famed in all sciences, noble *ustadh* (master), unparalleled in his time").<sup>44</sup>

31) Malik Nusrat ad-Din Hamza ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Umar ibn Hamza an-Nasawi, ruler of Nasa, and one of the most highly educated persons of his epoch. He “was perfect in his dignity and a sea of generosity. He knew by heart *Sakt az-zand* by Abu-l-‘Ala al-Ma‘arri, *al-Yamini* by al-‘Utbi, *al-Mulakhkhas* by Fakhr ad-Din ar-Razi and *al-Isharat* by *al-shaykh ar-ra’is* Ibn Sina. He wrote verses in Arabic and Persian, which he collected together in a diwan. He showed his worth in ancient sciences, studying them thoroughly in Khorezm for nineteen years. His astrological prophecies generally came true”.<sup>45</sup>

32) Siraj ad-Din Ya‘qub as-Sakkaki *as-Sadr al-‘allama* (“head of the all-knowing”) from Khorezm was “one of the worthiest men of Khorezm, a pillar of the major arts and connoisseurs of the sciences. They (the people) were confident that this man bewitched some stars and made them to move aside from their orbits, and barred water flows with his breath: that was the people’s view on his abilities. He authorized works in all spheres of knowledge which were considered the signs of art and the miracle of creation, held honourable position under the court of the great sultan ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad and his mother Terken-khatun thanks to his proficiency in astronomy”.<sup>46</sup>

33) The famous ‘Abd al-Karim ibn Muhammad ibn Mansur Abu Sa‘id (or Abu Sa‘d) ibn Abu-l-Muzaffar al-Marvazi as-Sam‘ani (d. 1167), descendant from the well-known family of scholars in Merv, an *adib* who visited many countries. Author of the *Kitab al-ansab*; works “*Zayl Tarikh Baghdad*”, “The History of the city of Merv”, etc.<sup>47</sup>

34) Najib ad-Din as-Samarqandi (13<sup>th</sup> century), author of a popular medical treatise on causes and symptoms of diseases.<sup>48</sup>

35) Shams ad-Din Muhammad ibn Qays ar-Razi, closely connected with the court of ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad, *adib* and scholar, author of the works *al-Mu‘jam fi ma‘a’ir ash‘ar al-‘ajami* and *Tibyan lughat at-turki ‘ala lisan Qangli*.<sup>49</sup>

36) Zayn ad-Din was a well-known eye doctor of Samarqand who came to serve Chingiz-khan after the collapse of the Khorezmshah kingdom. He cured Chingiz-khan from ophthalmia.<sup>50</sup>

37) Abu Ibrahim Isma‘il al-Jurjani dedicated his medical treatise *Kitab al-aghrad at-tibbiya wa-l-mabahith al-‘ala’iya al-kharazmshahiya* to Khorezmshah Atsiz.<sup>51</sup>

According to various sources, “Khorezm has always been an abode of men of science and a stop of the caravans of sages”.<sup>52</sup> And, “Bukhara has always been a place of ‘*ulama*’ meetings, a homeland of nobles and a centre of sciences”.<sup>53</sup>

Scores of scholars that had trainings in the towns of the Khorezmshah kingdom were engaged in teaching in other towns and countries of the Orient”.

38) Zahir ad-Din Muhammad ibn ‘Umar ibn Muhammad al-Bukhari an-Nawjabadi, from the village Nawjabad, Bukhara county, taught in Baghdad. His work *Kashf al-ibham li-daf‘ al-awham* is presently kept at a library of the *al-Mustansiriya* madrasah.<sup>54</sup>

39) Taha ibn Ibrahim ibn Ahmad ibn Ishaq Shaykh Imam Zayn ad-Din Abu Bakr al-Bukhari (d. ca. 1252) wrote approx. 20 volumes of *Kitab fi-l-adabiyat*, the contents of which included short stories, correspondence and verses. He presented his works to this library.<sup>55</sup>

40) Abu Muhammad al-Qasim al-Bukhari (b. 1160).<sup>56</sup> Yaqut cites no date of his death, simply noting at one point that he saw Abu Muhammad when he was very old. Abu Muhammad lived long in Bukhara; he insisted on his commitment to the Hanafi law school of its residents. In doing so, he rejected accusations of his adherence to Mu'tazila, according to Yaqut.<sup>57</sup> Abu Muhammad is an author of many books, including commentaries to *Sakt az-zand* by Abu-l-'Ala al-Ma'arri and to *al-Yamini* by al-'Utbi.<sup>58</sup>

41) Muhammad ibn al-Husayn ibn Muhammad ibn al-Husayn ibn 'Ali ibn Ibrahim ibn 'Abdallah ibn Ya'qub az-Zaghuli (Zaghula is a village of Panjdih) al-Marvazi (d.1163). Author of "numerous works, of which just a single one consisted of 400 volumes".<sup>59</sup>

42) Rukn ad-Din Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn al-Amid al-Hanafi al-Samarqandi, founder of the *al-amidiya* Sufi community and author of many works. Died in Bukhara, in 1218.<sup>60</sup>

43) Majd ad-Din Muhammad an-Nasawi, author of a poetic work in Persian during the reign of Khorezmshah 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad. He dedicated his *Shahanshah-nama* to the victories of his patron. 'Awfi confirms that he met Majd ad-Din in 600/1204 in Nasa.<sup>61</sup> 'Awfi also adds that Sayyid Sadr ad-Din Nishapuri wrote his work *Tarikh Khorezmshahi* in Arabic. He reports that Sadr ad-Din composed wonderful verses in Arabic and sometimes in Persian.<sup>62</sup>

44) Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Abi Nasr ibn Ahmad ibn Mustafi al-Haravi, nicknamed *ar-Radi al-Katib*. By the request of a vizier of Khorezmshah Tekish, he translated into Persian in 596/1199-1200 a work by Ahmad ibn A'sama al-Kufi (d. 926) *Kitab al-futuh* ("The Book of Conquests"). However, he died without finishing the translation. So the work was completed by Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Abu Bakr al-Katibi al-Mabaranabadi.<sup>63</sup>

45) Al-Majd al-Mutarrizi an-Nahawi al-Khorezmi (d. 606/1209)<sup>64</sup>, a well-known connoisseur of grammar of his time.

46) In 1208-09, Muhammad ibn Najib Bakran mapped the globe for the Khorezmshah 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad and wrote an explanatory text to it titled *Jahan-nama* ("The Book of Universe")<sup>65</sup>.

The professors (*mudarris*) and the imams were appointed to teach at educational institutions (*madrassa*) under special decrees of the sultans or their governors. For instance, in 557 AH (August-September 1162) the Khorezmshah Il-Arslan authorised Khaqan Abu-l-Muzaffar Tamghach Boghra-khan Ibrahim ibn Sulayman to appoint *mudarris* in Turkestan.<sup>66</sup> The Khorezmshah Atsiz instructed his governor to appoint a *mudarris*: "A certain person's father had for many years been teaching at the Merv *madrassa*. After his father's death a certain person was invited to attend the *majlis*. Now he has been appointed to teach (*tadris*) at the *madrassa* of his father. The *madrassa's waqf* has been entrusted to him (*tasarruf*). Under founder's instructions, he is committed to expend *waqf* profits for good deeds – erection of houses (*'imarat*) and soil cultivation (*zira'at*). All the theologians, the lawyers and the students of the *madrassa* should respect him and attend his meetings".<sup>67</sup>

Khorezmshah Tekish issued a decree that entrusted Badr ad-Din with the following:

“Highly respected at the court, Badr ad-Din has been appointed to act as *mudarris*, imam and *khatib* in a large *vilayat*. While performing his duties, Badr ad-Din should follow the Koran, *hadith* and Sunna; he should administer Friday and holiday prayers (*namaz*), sermon, praise Allah, the Prophet, the caliphs and the Khorezmshahs, watch over the religious facilities, repair them, set people an example, care for increase of profits, appoint talented deputies”.<sup>68</sup>

Sometimes, a whole village might be granted to an educational institution as *waqf*. Thus, the Khatun Baha *madrassa* in Khorezm was granted with the village Sakan Ahashk as *waqf*. A decree which Khorezmshah Tekish addressed to his vizier Nasir ad-Din says that the former *mutawalli* of this *waqf* proved to be ungifted; following which *waqf* gained no profits and degraded. Nasir ad-Din was instructed to compensate for the losses and appoint a new *mutawalli* to watch training courses (*dars*) of future *mudarris*.<sup>69</sup>

Among the outstanding persons of the Khorezmshah kingdom during the reign of Sultan ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad was Shihab ad-Din Abu Sa’d ibn Imran al-Khivaqi, “a pillar of the Faith and a bulwark of the realm”.<sup>70</sup> Shihab ad-Din was “a well known lawmaker, famous *mufti* of the Shafi’i trend. He reached the summit of his glory under the sultan. This latter sought advice from him, and deferred to his opinion. Shihab ad-Din taught at five *madrasas* in Khorezm. The *hajib*s of the sultan’s had an opportunity to talk to him only after school. He (Shihab ad-Din) built a library in Khorezm under a Shafi’i mosque, the only one of its kind”.<sup>71</sup>

Qutb ad-Din Abu Muhammad ‘Umar ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Umar al-‘Ansari al-Akli al-Bukhari (d. in January 1200) was an outstanding Bukharan *mudarris*. He attended the lectures of such distinguished scholars as Abu Muhammad al-Qasim ibn ‘Ali ibn al-Asakir and Badr ad-Din Abu-l-Khayr Badil ibn al-Mu’ammarr at-Tabrizi. “He was the worthiest shaykh-*mudarris* in his native town”.<sup>72</sup>

The duties of the *mudarris* were highly honoured, so it was no mere coincidence that the position was often held by retired senior officials.<sup>73</sup>

As a rule, prominent religious figures were entrusted with erecting new *madrasas*. For example, a *madrassa* in Khurasan was entrusted to *mufti* Imam ‘Aziz ad-Din ‘Ali al-Balkhi,<sup>74</sup> and one in Nishapur was entrusted to Imam Fakhr ad-Din Abu Sabit ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abd al-Jabbar al-Kufi.<sup>75</sup>

Muqarrab ad-Din Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Pahlawan al-Khorezmi (d.1228) was a prominent scholar during the reign of the last two Khorezmshahs. Sultan Jalal ad-Din instructed him to build a *madrassa* in Isfahan in memory of his father, ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad Khorezmshah. In order to finance this endeavour, the sultan gave him 30,000 dinars. Besides, funds from the tax revenues in Iran were allocated “to finish the construction and provide the *madrassa* with necessary utensils of gold, including candlesticks and jugs. Muqarrab ad-Din made his way to Isfahan and started the construction work. I (an-Nasawi) arrived after four months and noticed that walls of a man’s height had already been erected”.<sup>76</sup>

## THE DEFEAT AND COLLAPSE OF THE KHOREZMSHAH KINGDOM

By the eve of the Mongol invasion, a sort of diarchy had established in the kingdom of the Khorezmshahs: although the Khorezmshah Sultan ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad was ostensibly an absolute sovereign, in practice he was largely subordinated to his mother Terken-khatun, who played an important role in the domestic and foreign policy of the kingdom, and who in certain cases dared openly to oppose her son. Not infrequently, the Sultan’s orders and decrees were cancelled by Terken-khatun and became invalid.

As an-Nasawi observes, “if two different instructions came on one and the same matter, an emphasis was laid on the date only to be valid in all the countries”.<sup>1</sup> In turn, the Khorezmshah had never argued with his mother “neither in minor, nor major issues for two reasons – first, because of her maternal love, and secondly, because most amirs of the kingdom came from his mother’s clan”.<sup>2</sup>

Tellingly, Terken-khatun had the *laqab* (pseudonym) “Mistress of the Universe” (*Khudawand-i jahan*) and her personal tugra for decrees – “Defender of Peace and Faith, Great Terken, Mistress of Women of the Two Worlds” (*‘Ismat ad-Dunya wa-d-Din Ulugh-Terken Malika nisa’ al-‘alamayn*), as well as her own motto: “I seek protection from Allah!” (*‘i’tasamtu bi-llahi*).<sup>3</sup> It was very difficult to forge this motto that she put on the same plane with her son’s one.

Terken-khatun stayed at Gurganj, which effectively became her own capital, while ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad moved to Samarqand. She had her own court and *iqta’* possessions. Her possessions were enormous: as soon as the Khorezmshah seized or annexed new lands, he immediately allotted fertile areas to his mother and her retinue. Terken-khatun did not only have personal power over the sultan, but also managed funds, gave orders to senior amirs and dignitaries.<sup>4</sup> These actions destabilized the political situation in the kingdom on the eve of the Mongol invasion. Terken-khatun and her son quite often killed rulers of various dependent provinces whom they kept as hostages in Gurganj. This did little to add to the stability of the dynasty.<sup>5</sup>

One chronicler observes that Mongols invaded the lands of the Khorezmshah ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad unimpeded, for “the Khorezmshah Muhammad captured various countries and killed their rulers. He consequently now found himself completely isolated, and while he was fleeing, nobody did anything to help him”.<sup>6</sup>

One of the major state functions with which Terken-khatun interfered was the appointment of an heir to the throne. According to an-Nasawi, at his mother’s insistence, ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad instituted Qutb ad-Din Ozlagh-shah as heir to the throne, thus ignoring the claims of his eldest sons Jalal ad-Din Mankburni and Rukn ad-Din Ghursanjti. Ozlagh-shah’s mother came from the same tribe (*‘ashira*) that did Terken-khatun and the hated Ay-Chichek, mother of Jalal ad-Din. When the Ala ad-Din Muhammad put administrative things into order and divided lands between his sons into four huge possessions, heir to the throne Qutb ad-Din Ozlagh-shah got the

right for Khorezm, Khurasan and Mazandaran, i.e. lands under the Terken-khatun's control. A *tughra* was furthermore devised for Qutb ad-Din Ozlagh-shah: "Sultan Abu-l-Muzaffar Ozlagh-shah, son of Sultan Sanjar, Aide to Amir of the Faithful".<sup>7</sup>

Although the Khorezmshah embarked upon an ambitious range of projects, including the creation of a huge army and a highly-developed repressive apparatus, the might of the kingdom proved to be illusory; even worse, 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad showed his feebleness in resolving domestic issues.

Having learnt about the seizure of the *gur-khan* and usurpation of his treasury by Kushlu-khan, Ala ad-Din Muhammad sent a message to Kushlu-khan harshly condemning his actions against the *gur-khan* who, in his words, "became an easy prey for any robber and usurper". Observing that the *gur-khan* had invited him to marry his daughter Tughaj-khatun, 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad now demanded that Kushlu-khan send him the *gur-khan* with his daughter and all treasure. "Otherwise, I'll make short work of you, and neither your sword's edge, nor your might will save you".<sup>8</sup>

Kushlu-khan sent the Khorezmshah "a humble and resigned reply", together with a number of valuable gifts. However, Kushlu-khan declined to extradite the *gur-khan*, especially as the latter entreated Kushlu-khan not to deliver him up to the Khorezmshah for fear of vengeance.<sup>9</sup>

In 610/1213, the *gur-khan* Julhu died, and the Qara-Khitay regarded Kushlu-khan as the only person to save the state from downfall and acknowledged his right to act as *gur-khan*. Kushlu-khan thereafter behaved independently in respect to the Khorezmshah, and after 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad's unfortunate campaign against Baghdad in 1217 he demanded from him the return of those Qara-Khitay lands which had been captured; otherwise, he threatened to take these back by force.<sup>10</sup> Kushlu-khan arrested and clapped in irons the Khorezmshah's envoy Muhammad b. Qara-Qasim an-Nasawi who came to see him by an order of the Sultan.<sup>11</sup>

'Ala ad-Din Muhammad sent several detachments to bring Kushlu-khan to reason. These troops made plundering raids into the lands of the Qara-Khitay, following which Kushlu-khan sent the Khorezmshah an indignant reply, stating that "actions of this sort are typical for brigands and bandits, not a sovereign. If you consider yourself to be a sultan, it is your mission to fight personally, and if you defeat me, then you'll have the right to possess the lands I own".<sup>12</sup>

By this, the position of Kushlu-khan had consolidated, and he set about conquering those lands bordered onto Qara-Khitay territory. Under the influence of his wife (daughter of the *gur-khan*) Kushlu-khan switched over from Christianity to Buddhism. As a consequence, adherents of a different faith were persecuted to adopt Buddhism. Worst affected were the Muslims of Kashghar and Khotan: they were forbidden to offer prayers or to wear Muslim clothes – they were henceforth compelled to wear Qara-Khitay clothes and head-dresses – and all their madrasahs were closed.<sup>13</sup> After that, Kushlu-khan decided to strike one more blow at Islam and convened a meeting of Muslim '*ulama*' to thus "smash up fundamentals of their faith". Above 3,000 prominent Muslim imams, ascetics and *faqih*s attended the meeting. They were ordered to prove



a veracity of the Islamic religion. At first, nobody dared to oppose Kushlu-khan. Then, a well-known imam, Shaykh ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad al-Khotani began fearlessly refuting Kushlu-khan’s arguments. A confrontation began to brew, and Kushlu-khan started defaming Prophet Muhammad. Unable to bear it any longer, the shaykh exclaimed: “Dust be in thy mouth, thou enemy of the faith, thou accursed Kushlu-khan!”<sup>14</sup>

By order of Kushlu-khan, Shaykh ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad al-Khotani was detained, stripped and put in prison where he was held without food and water for many days. Failing to make the shaykh remorseful, Kushlu-khan ordered him to be crucified him in Khotan on the gates of the *madrassa* built by ‘Ala ad-Din al-Khotani.<sup>15</sup>

To the great surprise of historians and other observers, the Khorezmshah ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad – leader of the largest Muslim kingdom opposing the Caliph an-Nasir – did nothing to protect Muslims against persecution. It is also surprising that even Buddhist Mongols headed by Chingiz-khan tried to protect Muslims of Kashghar and Khotan against persecution by the Buddhist Kushlu-khan.<sup>16</sup>

Having completed his Chinese campaign in 1217, Chingiz-khan set about exterminating the Naymans. In the west, the army of Chingiz-khan conquered the lands of the Qarluqs and Uyghurs and came nearer to the lands ruled by Kushlu-khan.<sup>17</sup> An army of Mongols headed by Jebe-noyan set out against Kushlu-khan. In the words of Academician B. Y. Vladimirtsev, “Jebe-noyan availed himself of Kushlu-khan’s anti-Muslim persecution campaigns, and skilfully positioned Chingiz-khan as an ally and saviour of the Muslims”.<sup>18</sup>

After the Mongol army entered the lands ruled by Kushlu-khan, Jebe-noyan announced that nobody would be persecuted for his religious beliefs, and that no damage would be caused to the population. He kept his promises by maintaining strict discipline among his soldiers. It was no mere coincidence that the population of Kashghar and Khotan heartily welcomed the Mongols as their liberators, and all at once went to battle against the tyrant. Though Kushlu-khan tried to resist the Mongol army, he failed. Chased by the Mongols, he fled to the borders of Badakhshan and tried to find shelter in the gorge of Darra-yi Dirazi; however, he was detained by local hunters and given to the Mongols who chopped off his head and took it with them. This occurred in Dhu-l-Qa‘da 614 AH (February 1218).<sup>19</sup>

Having captured Kashghar and Khotan, the Mongol army now approached the lands subject to the Khorezmshah ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad. Direct contacts between the Khorezmshah and the Mongols had been established much earlier. These contacts resulted largely from the Khorezmshah’s plans to start campaigns in the east – Mongolia and China after appending Persian Iraq and Mawarannahr to his domain.

Sultan ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad first conceived this ambition in 611 or 612 AH (1214 or 1215) when he was informed about the vast fortunes of these remote eastern countries. Juzjani relates how the Khorezmshah’s *dabir* ‘Imad al-Mulk Taj ad-Din Jami had told him in 617/1220 in the fortress of Tulak that the Khorezmshah felt an urge to conquer regions of China, so he made inquiries about this country from those who came from there and the countries outside Turkestan. ‘Imad al-Mulk used to



say: “We, his servants and retinue, tried to reason the Khorezmshah out of this plan, pointing to the difficulties of such a long-distance campaign. But the Khorezmshah remained adamant. When he learnt that Chingiz-khan conquered China, he sent an embassy to this country headed by the noble Sayyid Baha ad-Din ar-Razi to investigate these rumours”.<sup>20</sup>

The embassy arrived in Beijing right after the capture of the city by the army of Chingiz-khan in June 1215. Chingiz-khan rendered homage to Baha ad-Din ar-Razi; and even better, Chingiz-khan gave him valuable gifts and rarities for the Khorezmshah, adding the following instruction: “Tell the Khorezmshah: I am the sovereign of the East, and you are sovereign of the West! Long may we live in friendship and peace, and let merchants and caravans of the two parties come and back, and let valuable merchandise and ordinary goods of my land be transported to your one and vice versa”.<sup>21</sup>

To all appearances, Chingiz-khan did not even think about capturing lands subordinated to Khorezmshah ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad. Instead, he was concerned to establish trade relations. Thus, for instance, he gave orders that sentries (*qaraqchi*) should be posted on the main trade routes leading to the west, in order to ensure the safety of caravans.<sup>22</sup>

The gifts and rarities which Chingiz-khan sent the Khorezmshah included a large nugget of gold extracted from goldmines of China. This object had to be transported by a special horse-drawn vehicle. Together with Baha ad-Din ar-Razi, Chingiz-khan dispatched his merchants with a caravan of 500 camels to Khorezm. The caravans were carrying gold, silver, Chinese patterned silk (*khazz-i khitai*), light silk cloth, sables (*sammur*), beavers (*qunduz*) and other rarities and valuable merchandise.<sup>23</sup>

Having received envoys of Chingiz-khan and trade caravans of Mongols, Khorezmshah, in turn, sent, in spring 1218, merchants Ahmad Khujandi, son of Amir Husayn and Ahmad Balchikh to the headquarters of Chingiz-khan with a caravan that brought valuable merchandise, including fabrics *zarbaft*, *zandanichi*, *karbas*, golden ware, expensive clothes.<sup>24</sup>

Thus, the Khorezmshah ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad tried to develop trade relations with the Empire of Chingiz-khan; At the same time, however, it was his initiative also to rupture the established ties.

Shortly after, a delegation of Chingiz-khan, including Mahmud al-Khorezmi, ‘Ali Hajji al-Bukhari and Yusuf Kenka al-Otrari arrived in Khorezm. They handed over to the Khorezmshah further gifts from Chingiz-khan. These included ingots of precious metals, walrus tusk (*nusub al-hutuww*), musk, nephrite, and clothes made of white camel wool tarku (*torgu*) costing 50 or more dinars each.<sup>25</sup> The merchants were also instructed by Chingiz-khan to establish “peace, friendship and good neighbourhood relations” with the Khorezmshah. A personal message from Chingiz-khan was given to the Khorezmshah. The message was as follows: “I am well aware of the grandeur of your achievements. I learned that your possessions are vast and that your commands are obeyed in most countries worldwide. It is one of my duties to maintain peace with you. You are like a dearest son to me. It is not a secret for you that I have conquered

China and neighbouring countries bordered by the Turks. You know it very well that there are innumerable riches in my country, so there is no need to look for them in other countries. It would be good for all of us if you could open routes for merchants of both parties”.<sup>26</sup>

Having read Chingiz-khan's message, the Khorezmshah decided to get detailed information about Chingiz-khan and his empire. One night he summoned Mahmud al-Khorezmi, head of the delegation, and, appealing to him as to a Muslim and Khorezmi native, attempted to learn a little more about who the Mongols were. The Khorezmshah even invited Mahmud to act as his representative to the court of Chingiz-khan. For fear of his life, al-Khorezmi agreed, and the Khorezmshah asked: “Is it true that Chingiz-khan is owner of the town Tamghaj?” Mahmud replied: “Yes, he told the truth. That's not a secret, and the Sultan will be certain of that soon”. The Khorezmshah said: “You're well aware how my possessions are vast and my army is great. Who on earth is he to call me his son? Is his army great?”

Apprehensive of the Khorezmshah's anger and fearful for his own safety, Mahmud al-Khorezmi “brushed any sincerity away” and, in an effort to insinuate himself into Sultan's favour, said that as compared with the Chingiz-khan's army the Khorezmshah's one was just the same as a lonely horseman before the cavalry or haze against the obscurity of night. ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad thereupon agreed to maintain peaceful relations and exchange trade caravans with Chingiz-khan.<sup>27</sup>

One can never know of who informed historian an-Nasawi about this secret nocturnal conversation. As a contemporary and an eye-witness of many of the events in question, however, an-Nasawi was evidently well-informed about the situation around the court of ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad, and he seems to have given an objective appraisal of the Khorezmshah's personality. It would be appropriate to pay tribute to the historian's analytical capability.

Upon Mahmud al-Khorezmi's return to Beijing, Chingiz-khan fitted out a large trade caravan to Khorezm headed by the merchants ‘Umar Khoja al-Otrari, al-Jamal al-Maraghi, Fakhr ad-Din ad-Dizaqi al-Bukhari and Amin ad-Din al-Haravi. The caravan was accompanied by 450 Muslim merchants and 2-3 accompanying persons representing Mongol tribes. Each of them received a gold or silver *balish* (75 dinars), and were instructed “to proceed with this party to the Sultan's territory, engage in commerce there and so acquire strange and precious wares”.<sup>28</sup>

According to one report, these Mongols numbered about 100; together with Chingiz-khan's personal envoy Ukhun they went to the Khorezmshah.<sup>29</sup> The probability remains that these persons were to engage in reconnaissance activity in Khorezmshah's possessions. Further developments gave a weight to these assumptions.

Later in 1218, the first armed conflict broke out between Khorezmshahid armed forces and Mongol troops. The latter fought against a tribe of Merkits who fled to the country of Qipchaqs on the border of the Khorezmshah's possessions.

When the Khorezmshah learned about these events, he decided to use the situation and “kill two birds with one stone”: to attack the disorganized Merkits and ransack

their property.<sup>30</sup> At the head of 60,000-strong army, the Khorezmshah moved from Samarqand via Jand northwards and reached the town of Yughur.<sup>31</sup>

Having crossed the Irgiz river, the Khorezmshah came to the Turghay steppe where he witnessed utter defeat of Merkits. A wounded Merkit soldier told him that the Mongols had just left the battlefield. The Khorezmshahid army went off in pursuit of the Mongols, and soon caught up with them. When son of Chingiz-khan – Jochi, commander of the Mongol troops, watched the Khorezmshah's army embattling, he informed the Khorezmshah that his father banned him to enter into battle with the Khorezmshahid army, and that he intended to defeat the Merkits only and was ready to give Khorezmshah all the spoils of war captured from the Merkits.

However, the Khorezmshah told Jochi: "Even if Chingiz-khan ordered you to avoid fighting against me, it is the Almighty Allah that told me to fight you!"<sup>32</sup>

Jochi had to join the battle, and it was only the tactical talent of Jalal ad-Din Mankburni b. 'Ala ad-Din that helped to avoid utter defeat of the Khorezmshahid army. At any rate, over 3 days of fighting the Khorezmshahid army lost about 20,000 soldiers, with Mongols sustaining far smaller losses.<sup>33</sup> On the fourth night Jochi withdrew his troops, arrived at Chingiz-khan's headquarters and informed his father about the battle and personal bravery of Jalal ad-Din Mankburni.<sup>34</sup>

Chingiz-khan took no retaliatory measures after the first skirmish between his army and Khorezmshah's. As for Ala ad-Din Muhammad, "He fell into fear and arrived at the conclusion that they [Mongols] are brave and fearless and that nobody can vie with them in courage, staunchness before hardships of war, and their skills in piercing with a spear and striking with a sword".<sup>35</sup>

In the meanwhile, the caravan was coming nearer to Otrar. Ukhuna had a message from Chingiz-khan to Ala ad-Din Muhammad that said: "Merchants are the stronghold of the country. They supply their sovereign with rarities and jewellery, and there is no need to prevent our merchants from trading with yours. For my part, I'm not going to hamper your merchants. Both of us should take joint actions for wellbeing of our countries. Therefore we ordered our people to establish peace and ensure security of our merchants beyond our countries. The rich and poor should live in peace and bless Allah".<sup>36</sup>

However, upon arrival at Otrar the caravan, merchants and envoys of Chingiz-khan were detained by the governor of the town, 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad's maternal cousin Amir Ghayir-khan Inal. Ghayir-khan informed 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad that the merchants and envoys were spies, so he ordered to kill them, though Khorezmshah instructed to arrest them, not execute. As a result, Ghayir-khan misappropriated all property and belongings of those killed.<sup>37</sup>

Regardless of how an-Nasawi tried to justify the actions of Ala ad-Din Muhammad and exculpate him for killing the merchants and envoys notwithstanding, it was the fault of the head of the state. As is known, the killing of merchants ran counter to generally accepted standards of inter-state relations. Besides, the carnage embraced the envoys that were protected by the conventional law. Further complicating the case was the fact that the 450 killed merchants were Muslims! It was ironic that the "infidel"

Chingiz-khan, not a sovereign of the huge Muslim Empire and patron of Islam, the Khorezmshah 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad, proved to be advocate of the rights of Muslims.

When Chingiz-khan was informed about the killing of the merchants and envoys in Otrar, he decided to take to the field against his enemy. According to the Mongol historical chronicle, he gathered his retinue and declared: "I shall trigger off the war against the Sartaul people and take vengeance on them for killing my envoys with Ukhuna as their leader. We cannot let them kill our gems and remain unpunished".<sup>38</sup> His sons and other dignitaries urged an immediate campaign to Central Asia, but Chingiz-khan decided to wait a little with the war. He sent an embassy to Khorezm led by Ibn Kafraj Boghra, with the following message for 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad: "You promised to ensure safety for my merchants and avoid attacking them; however, you behaved perfidiously and broke your promise. Such treachery is loathsome, especially coming from a Sultan of Islam. You allege that Inal performed his crime against your will: deliver him up to me, then so that we could punish him for his crime and stop the bloodshed. Otherwise, you will face war and massacre".<sup>39</sup>

But the Khorezmshah failed to comply, and refused to surrender Inal up to Chingiz. This, an-Nasawi claimed, was because 'he was gripped with fear and driven into insanity. The problem was that a greater part of his soldiers and amirs came from Inal's kinsfolk'. These kinsfolk – who were thereby relatives of his mother Terkhen-khatun – were the sole masters of his kingdom. Being dependent on them, the Khorezmshah declared that the merchants and envoys were killed with his knowledge and by his order.<sup>40</sup>

After his talks with envoy Ibn Kafraj Boghra, 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad's son Jalal ad-Din Mankburni advised his father to deliver Inal to Chingiz-khan and thus prevent bloodshed of Muslims residing on a vast expanse, from Syr Darya to Syria. But 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad rejected his son's advice and ordered Ibn Kafraj Boghra to be killed together with his companions.<sup>41</sup> "What a sickening thing to do!" – exclaimed as-Subki – "Each drop of envoy's blood was echoed in the torrent of Muslims' blood!"<sup>42</sup>

When Chingiz-khan learned about the execution of his envoy Ibn Kafraj Boghra, he flew into a rage and prayed for three days and nights in seclusion; appealing to God, he exclaimed: "Oh, Lord of the Universe! I was not the author of this trouble. Grant me strength to exact vengeance!".<sup>43</sup>

Thus, the murder of Ibn Kafraj Boghra proved to fill up the cup of Chingiz-khan. According to the Mongol law, the murder of envoys or truce envoys was reputed to be the worst possible offence that could merit capital punishment.<sup>44</sup>

In his "Description of the Travel to the West" Yeh-lu Chu-tsai who arrived in Khorezm together with Chingiz-khan in 1218 noted that among reasons of Chingiz-khan's campaign against the kingdom of Khorezmshahs was the murder of Mongol envoys and numerous merchants by governor Khua-Tala (Otrar).<sup>45</sup>

Medieval authors suggested that Chingiz-khan's campaign against the Khorezmshah was caused, among other reasons, by the fact that Caliph an-Nasir relied on Mongols in his struggle against 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad, as he had previously relied upon Ghurids, the Qara-Khitay and Naymans. It was no mere coincidence that Ibn al-

Athir hinted at this circumstance: “The invasion of Tatars into the counties of Islam is explained as being due to certain other reasons; however, these reasons cannot be revealed in the pages of this book.”<sup>46</sup> However, another fragment says clearly: “What ‘Ajams (non-Arabs) ascribe to Caliph an-Nasir is this, that he urged Tatars to attack Muslim countries, and with that end in view he sent his people to act as mediators, in this case he committed crime worst of the ones”.<sup>47</sup>

Al-Maqrizi touched upon Caliph an-Nasir’s letters to the Mongols as saying plainly: “During his (an-Nasir’s) reign Tatars ravaged countries of the Orient. They even reached Hamadan. The reason was that he sent messages to them instigating Tatars to invade these countries. The point was that he was apprehensive of Sultan ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad, son of Khorezmshah, when he intended to capture Baghdad and make it a capital of his kingdom, as was under Seljuqs”.<sup>48</sup>

In turn, Ibn Wasil reaffirmed Caliph an-Nasir’s appeal to Chingiz-khan: “When the Khorezmshah moved to Baghdad, the Caliph encouraged him to invade the country of the Khorezmshah”.<sup>49</sup>

Another reason that led to the Mongol campaign against the Khorezmshahid kingdom was ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad’s excessive self-assurance and conviction that he as single sovereign was entitled to hold sway over the universe. Making short work of the former owners of the lands he captured, the Khorezmshah distributed these lands as *iqta’* among his relatives, amirs and functionaries and thus greatly contributed to the disorganization of the state management and the dissatisfaction of commanders and officials formerly subordinated to their previous rulers, as well as the taxpaying population.

It would have been appropriate to leave previous rulers as vassals from political and military-strategic points of view, as the Seljuqs had done. When the invasion started, the local population of captured countries and regions did not back the Khorezmians; indeed, it surrendered Khorezmian garrisons to Mongols and thus managed to save their lives and property.

It has to be kept in mind that Chingiz-khan and his commanders were successful in exploiting the discontent of the peoples conquered by the Khorezmshah. In addition to its limited Mongol contingent, Chingiz-khan’s army included large military units staffed with Muslims, Christians and idolaters to serve as advanced guards and cover.<sup>50</sup> The Qara-Khitay, Khurasanians and Daylamites, formerly exploited by the Khorezmshah, immediately went over to the Mongols after their invasion began. Contributing to Chingiz-khan’s military success was the Khorezmshah’s distrust and hostile attitude to his own amirs and commanders, especially those related by blood to his mother Terken-khatun. Further events demonstrated that at the crucial point ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad showed neither strength of mind nor any kind of tactical ability.

On the eve of the Mongol invasion, a supreme military council was convened by the Khorezmshah to discuss the situation. The prominent Khorezmian statesman Shihab ad-Din Abu Sa’d ibn Imran al-Khivaqi, whose opinions enjoyed influence at court, urged ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad to muster an army of 400,000 (!) strong on the bank of Syr

Darya and from there make a surprise attack on the fatigued Mongols. But ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad rejected this judicious proposal. A second proposal for meeting the Mongol threat was as follows: the Khorezmshah might allow the Mongols into Mawarannahr, where he could use his local knowledge to rout them. This plan was suggested by ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad’s son Jalad-Din Mankburni, who insisted that this would make it possible to protect Khurasan and Iraq on the distant approaches to them.

A third proposed option similarly involved yielding Mawarannahr to the enemy, taking up mountain passages and gorges, and then defeating the Mongols. The proposers of this plan believed that Chingiz-khan’s commanders were not skilful enough to lead the army across an unknown territory and that the Mongols would not find guides to show them the way.<sup>51</sup> However, to disprove this view, suffice it to mention the dozens or even hundreds of Muslim merchants from Khorezm and Mawarannahr in Chingiz-khan’s service, as well as numerous informants of the Mongols operating in all parts of Khorezmshahid territory.

The military council finally considered one further plan, whereby it was proposed that the Khorezmshah might retreat toward Ghazna and arrange resistance there. If failed, it was suggested to move to India and fight the Mongols in this country.<sup>52</sup>

In the end, however, ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad rejected all these proposals, and instead decided to defend Mawarannahr; in so doing, he flinched from decisive battle with the Mongols. In his view, every town was to combat the Mongols independently. Towards this end, he thus gave orders for a tripled *kharaj* levy from the population in 616 AH (March 19, 1219 – March 7, 1220).

An-Nasawi relates that on the eve of the Mongol invasion the Khorezmshah made three fatal mistakes. First, “he decided to build a wall around Samarqand according to the town’s size. The wall was to have twelve *farsakhs* in circumference”. With a view to achieving this, in the year 616 AH he levied from the population a second *kharaj* payment.<sup>53</sup> This tax was levied immediately, but to no avail: the Mongols had already invaded the region and, hence, frustrated this plan. For this reason, funds designed for the construction of the wall and fortifying of Samarqand were not spent. When inspecting a moat around Samarqand, ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad mumbled: “If every soldier in the army which is about to attack us were to throw in his whip, it would be filled up”.<sup>54</sup>

The third *kharaj* for 616 AH was levied to pay for recruitment of archers. “The number of soldiers from each region should correspond to larger or smaller quantity of money collected, and each recruit should have a saddle camel for transportation of arms and provisions. The recruitment was carried out at the earliest possible date”.<sup>55</sup>

Along the way, the recruits learned that ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad had apparently fled and left the country in the lurch. That was the Khorezmshah’s second fatal mistake. The historian pointed out that “if the Khorezmshah had stayed to see the arrival of recruits, he would have had myriads of soldiers”.<sup>56</sup>

‘Ala al-Din Muhammad’s third fatal mistake was his decision to billet his troops in the towns of Mawarannahr and Turkestan. As a consequence, the Mongols dealt shortly with separate garrisons and occupied the whole of Mawarannahr.<sup>57</sup>



In September 1219, the Mongols dealt a first blow at Otrar. This city was ruled by Chingiz-khan's sworn foe Inal-khan. The town's garrison numbered 50,000 under the command of *hajib* Qaraja.<sup>58</sup> The town was strongly fortified, and when Chingiz-khan realized that the siege was expected to last long he left a part of his army headed by his sons Chagatay and Ugedey in the environs of Otrar. After that he divided main forces of his army into three parts: a unit headed by his elder son Jochi went to conquer Jand and Barjinligh-kend to the north from Otrar; another unit headed by Ulaq-noyan and Suketu Cherbi made for seizure of Benaket and Khujand to the south from Otrar; together with his son Toli and famous Jebe and Subetey he invaded Mawarannahr and headed to Bukhara.

Thus, Chingiz-khan did not direct his efforts to the siege of Otrar but made his way to the north, west and south to attack several strong points of the enemy simultaneously. His prime aim was to capture Bukhara and Samarqand, two major centres of Mawarannahr.

According to one source, the siege of Otrar lasted for five months.<sup>59</sup> During the siege both the Mongols and the Otraris sustained casualties. As time passed, the Otrari party became increasingly beleaguered: there were no quarters to expect help from, the number of soldiers thinned out and food supplies ran low. Townsfolk and soldiers were bereft of hope.

At this moment of crisis, *hajib* Qaraja advised Inal-khan to and resistance and yield Otrar to the Mongols. However, Inal-khan rejected this idea as saying that he would fight to the end, for he knew it was his fault and the Mongols would give him no chance. Then Qaraja left the town on his own accord and threw himself upon the mercy of the conqueror together with his troops. Qaraja's treachery enabled the Mongols to enter the town via the gates of Sufi-khan at Otrar. Together with 20,000 soldiers Inal-khan locked himself up in the citadel and resisted the Mongols for a full month. Finally, he was detained and put to death after all his soldiers were killed.

As for *hajib* Qaraja, the sons of Chingiz-khan told him: "You proved to be treacherous in respect of your sovereign (Khorezmshah) even despite the fact that you had in the past been liked by him and enjoyed his benefaction. That's why we cannot count on your devotion".

So Qaraja was executed together with those from the beleaguered town.

After the fall of Otrar in February 1220, the citadel was destroyed, and the survivors, except for craftsmen, were recruited as advanced cover of the Mongol army when besieging other towns of Khorezmshah.<sup>60</sup>

As soon as the sons of Chingiz-khan captured Otrar, 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad's former governor in the city Badr ad-Din al-'Amid (who had defected to the Mongols long before the fall of Otrar), arrived at Chingiz-khan's command. Badr ad-Din's father and many of his relatives belonged to the clergy hateful to Khorezmshah, so it was no mere coincidence that they were executed by 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad straight after the capture of the Otrar possessions.

Badr ad-Din told Chingiz-khan: "The Khan should know that the Sultan, to my

thinking, is the most disgusting creature of Allah, because he killed a good many of my relatives. The Khan should know that Sultan is still powerful, has a large army, and needs no reinforcement. If he would wish, he could muster an army twice as many as he has now. I recommend you to sow distrust between Sultan and his commanders".<sup>61</sup>

Chingiz-khan successfully seized this opportunity. Well-informed about 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad's strained relations with his mother and with the amirs from her family, Chingiz-khan realized that the Khorezmshah was in no position to assemble his troops together, and that, even if he managed to, "in case of victory over the Mongols, this impressive power would immediately bat against Sultan and his dynasty".<sup>62</sup>

It was Badr ad-Din al-'Amid who wrote defamatory letters on behalf of amirs and relatives of Terken-khatun addressed to Chingiz-khan. The letters said: "We, together with our tribes and survivors, came from the country of Turks to serve the Khorezmshah and his mother. We did our utmost to help him conquer rulers of the universe, and he succeeded in conquering sovereigns and their subjects. And now he is behaving insolently and disrespectfully in respect of his mother's rights. That's why she ordered to leave him unprotected. Meanwhile, we are waiting for you to come, and ready to follow your will and desire".<sup>63</sup>

Through the mediation of his agent, Chingiz-khan distributed these letters among the persons concerned. When the Khorezmshah learned the content of the letters, he became desperate, and his resolution weakened, for the information obtained covered those he relied upon". Ala ad-Din Muhammad gave way to Chingiz-khan's provocation and began disuniting his huge military force, thus ruining his kingdom.

In the meanwhile, the Mongol troops headed by Jochi came up to the town of Sighnaq in the lower reaches of Syr Darya.<sup>64</sup> Jochi sent his special agent, the merchant Hasan-hajji, to the townspeople, with instructions to surrender. But the residents of Sighnaq rejected the agent's proposal and shouting "Allah akbar!" killed Hasan-hajji and for seven days held out bravely against the Mongols. But the forces were unequal, and the Mongols seized the town and slaughtered all its residents.<sup>65</sup> After that, Jochi's troops assaulted and captured the towns of Uzkend, Barjinligh-kend<sup>66</sup> and Ashnas.<sup>67</sup>

The wholesale slaughter of the military garrisons and residents of towns that resisted aggressors served to strike terror among the soldiers and populations of neighbouring regions and localities. Indeed, fear of the Mongols was so great that even the well-reinforced and fortified town of Jand was left to the whim of fate by the Khorezmshah's governor and commander of 10,000-strong army, *amir-amiran* Qutlugh-khan who was in charge of defence of Jand, Shahrkend and Yarkend.<sup>68</sup>

Qutlugh-khan defected and left Jand at night together with his soldiers, crossed the Syr Darya and headed to Khorezm.

Learning of this, Jochi sent his commander Chin-Temur to Jand, to issue orders that the residents should obey the Mongols and not impede them. When the residents expressed their indignation at this, Chin-Temur reminded them of the fate of Sighnaq and the murder of Hasan-hajji, and promised to ensure Jand's security.

On 4 Safar 616 AH (21 April 1219), Jand was seized by the Mongols without a fight.

All the residents of the town were banished and kept in the field for nine days, while the Mongols were engaged in pillaging the town. A certain 'Ali-khoja was appointed a deputy of the Mongols to rule Jand and its environs.<sup>69</sup>

A part of the Mongol troops headed by Alaq-noyan, Suketu Cherbi and Taqay operated in the upper reaches of Syr Darya reached to the town Banaket, the garrison of which consisted of the Turks from the tribe Qangli under the command of Iletgu-Malik. For three days the Turks resisted to 5,000 strong Mongol detachments, following which Iletgu-Malik asked the Mongols for *aman* (mercy). A part of garrison's soldiers was executed, the rest sent for siege work. Like other towns, Banaket was sacked by the Mongols.<sup>70</sup>

Doing away with Banaket, the Mongols moved toward Khujand. Their army numbered 20,000 ethnic Mongols and proper and 50,000 local residents (*hashar*) coming from occupied territories.<sup>71</sup> They were classified into detachments by tens, hundreds and thousands of soldiers. In addition to siege operations and delivery of outfit, these soldiers were engaged in covering the advanced forces of the Mongols at the hardest points, or acted in the forefront where largely died from arrows and spears of the enemy or under hoofs of Mongol horses. Those striving to escape were mercilessly dealt with by the Mongols.<sup>72</sup>

The defence of Khujand was led by one of the bravest commanders of the Khorezmshah kingdom, Damir (Temur)-Malik. Realizing that it was hopeless to resist the 70,000-strong Mongol army, Damir-Malik left the town and camped with a detachment of 1000 men on an island in the middle of the Syr Darya. The fortress was out of the range of arrows and catapult shells. In an attempt to seize the fortress at any cost, the Mongols ordered volunteer corps to bring boulders from mountains and throw them down into the river, and thereby to partition it off with a dam. In response, Damir-Malik built 12 barges, and covered them with clay and vinegar-puttied felt, which made these vessels invulnerable to arrows and inflammatory means. Every night Damir-Malik and his soldiers swam up to the dam and destroyed it.

However, Damir-Malik had neither the strength nor the arms to resist the Mongols for a long time. Therefore he took horses, arms and food, went on board of 70 boats and sailed downstream along the Syr Darya.

The Mongols started pursuing Damir-Malik and his associates along the river banks. Despite great losses, Damir-Malik repulsed all the Mongol attacks. His flotilla was thus able to reach Banaket, where the Mongols threw an iron chain across the river. However, Damir-Malik succeeded to break through the chain and went further via Otrar, Sighnaq and Jand. On the way to Barjinligh-kend the flotilla of Damir-Malik was blocked by a pontoon bridge made of boats. Catapults were installed the pontoon bridge with the Mongol units in readiness on both banks of the river.

However, Damir-Malik dodged this dangerous obstacle. He ordered his soldiers to disembark and pass round the trap. According to Juwayni, the famed Rustam was as nothing compared to Damir-Malik, who for many days had been violently struggling against the enemy. In the end, he had to meet three persecutors. He mortally wounded

one of them, and cried to the others: “I have just two arrows. These are enough to kill you both. So you had better turn bridle and save your lives”. The two Mongols turned back, and Damir-Malik arrived safely at Gurganj where he joined the city defenders.<sup>73</sup>

In the meanwhile, a central group of the Mongol army headed by Chingiz-khan, his son Toli, and Jebe-noyan and Subetey-Bahadur was quickly advancing from the banks of Syr Darya via the desert of Qizilqum toward Bukhara. At daybreak, the Mongols came up to the town of Zarnuq. The Mongols sent *hajib* Danishmand, Chingiz-khan’s faithful servant, to Zarnuq, with instructions that the residents should surrender immediately. The *hajib* added that it was Chingiz-khan in the flesh and his huge army that laid a siege to the town, so it was pointless to resist, since failure to comply would result in all the townsfolk being killed. *Hajib* Danishmand informed the residents of Zarnuq that he was instructed to act as Mongol envoy only in compassion for his Muslim coreligionists. Conceding to admonitions of the *Hajib*, the residents of Zarnuq sent men of authority to Chingiz-khan, who duly spared the life of the townsfolk: they were turned out from the town gates; youngsters were selected as *hashar*; the rest released. In doing so, the Mongols destroyed a town citadel.

Chingiz-khan was satisfied with the fact that Zarnuq had been captured without loss, so, to the pleasure of the Mongols, Chingiz-khan renamed the town into Qutlugh-Baliq (“Happy town”).<sup>74</sup>

With several guides from Zarnuq, Chingiz-khan now assumed the offensive against Bukhara, and shortly thereafter the Mongols came up to the township of Nur-i Bukhara. The Mongols again sent an envoy who invited the townsfolk to surrender without a blow. Though a part of the residents was ready to resist, a sense of prudence prevailed, and the townsfolk sent their envoy to Chingiz-khan with expression of submissiveness. The residents suffered no losses; however, 600 youngsters were taken as *hashars*.

Chingiz-khan inflicted no damage on Nur-i Bukhara, instead merely imposing an annual tribute of 1500 dinars. This sum had hitherto been annually to the Khorezmian treasury. Half of the sum was paid in the form of earrings belonging to Nur-i Bukhara’s womenfolk which testifies that the Mongols refrained from sacking Nur.<sup>75</sup>

On 1 Dhu-l-Hijja 616 AH (7 February 1220)<sup>76</sup> the Mongols besieged Bukhara, “the cupola of Islam in the eastern countries and the City of Peace, mother of all towns of Islam”.

‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad assigned 30,000 soldiers headed by Amir Ikhtiyar ad-Din Kushlu and *hajib* Oghul Inanch-khan.<sup>77</sup> Siege fighting near the walls of Bukhara lasted for three days; even so, the Mongols put ahead previously captured residents of Otrar and other towns. “When amir-akhur Kushlu and Sultan’s associates realized that Bukhara was about to fall, they discussed the situation and agreed to fight one and all to avoid the noose and yoke”. According to an-Nasawi, acting in that manner, they had a chance to succeed, should Allah wish that.<sup>78</sup>

The Bukharan army’s sudden attack was so strong that the Mongols were taken aback and took flight. If the Bukharan troops had kept on advancing, they would have routed the Mongols and made them leave Bukhara. However, the Khorezmshah’s amirs, despite having crushed the Mongols in the first offensive, dared not to consolidate

their success. Having defeated the Mongols, Kushlu-khan and other amirs amazed the enemy by straightaway taking flight. The latter recovered from defeat and set off after them in pursuit; they intercepted the retreated and succeeded in slaying nearly all the Bukharan soldiers, except for Kushlu-khan and a small group of fighters. "The Mongols grabbed so many valuables, arms, outfit and slaves that in no time they turned into rich men with a glut of wealth".<sup>79</sup>

When the residents of Bukhara realized that the troops in charge of their protection had shamefully abandoned them and that nearly everyone had been killed, they saw nothing for it but to throw themselves upon the mercy of the conqueror. A delegation of the townsfolk led by Qadi Badr ad-Din Qadi-khan came to see Chingiz-khan, and on 4 Dhu-l-Hijja 616 AH (10 February 1220) the Mongols entered Bukhara.<sup>80</sup> A part of the townsfolk and soldiers (400 men, according to Ibn al-Athir) hid themselves in the citadel and resisted another 12 days.

The Mongols flew into a rage, and following the fall of the citadel they slaughtered all the defenders. When Bukhara's spiritual leaders risked protesting against the destruction of the mosque and massacring the population, Chingiz-khan gave orders for the execution of Imam Rukn ad-Din Imamzada, his son Qadi Sadr ad-Din and other religious figures.<sup>81</sup>

After the townsmen's property and money had been confiscated, they were ordered to leave the town dressed only in their undergarments. The men were engaged to assault Samarqand; the women were distributed among the Mongol soldiers. Bukhara was then burnt to the ground. A city which had until then had been a major trade and cultural centre within not only Central Asia but the entire Muslim world now turned into a heap of ruins. The Bukharan survivors dispersed across those towns and villages that remained unaffected.<sup>82</sup>

Following the capture of Bukhara by the Mongols, 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad lost his determination to resist the Mongol offensive. The once powerful sovereign was now impotent; even the most faithful associates of Khorezmshah left him to the mercy of fate, including his maternal nephews who went over to the Mongol; 'Ala ad-Din, ruler of Qunduz; Amir Mah Ruy, ruler of Balkh, etc.<sup>83</sup>

After the capture of Bukhara, Chingiz-khan moved towards Samarqand, second capital of the kingdom. The Khorezmshah used to devote special attention to this city. The city's garrison consisted of 110,000 soldiers, of which 60,000 fell to the share of Turks, Ghurs, Khalaji and Khurasanians. They were led by Taghay-khan, brother of Terken-khatun, and the amirs Barishmaz-khan, Sarsigh-khan, Ulagh-khan, Alp-Erkhan. Shaykh-khan, Bala-khan, etc. Ghurs were headed by amirs Hurmanj, Hurzur, Husam ad-Din Mas'ud and others. Local Khorezmian troops numbered 50,000. Besides, there were 20 fighting elephants.<sup>84</sup>

During the siege Chingiz-khan resorted to cunning. He sent a small group of soldiers to besiege the city, while his main forces lay in ambush. Amirs of Samarqand fell for the bait and, thinking that the Mongols were not numerous, led a greater part of their soldiers out of the city. The Mongols pretended to retreat, so the Samarqand troops

started pursuing them. However, they were rounded up and destroyed within several hours: the Mongols hacked to death a great quantity of the Samarqand defenders.<sup>85</sup>

The survivors were horrified by cruelty of the Mongols, so their resoluteness to resist was subdued, especially as the Mongols drove together a great quantity of prisoners, formed them in column, hundreds and thousands of them, and supplied them with banners.

The second sortie of the Samarqand defenders when they resorted to the fighting elephants was also unsuccessful.<sup>86</sup> After that the Mongols intensified their pressure catapulting the city and shooting it with arrows. The defenders got panicky, and finally a delegation of the townsfolk headed by the local *qadi*, the shaykh al-islam and other dignitaries was sent to Chingiz-khan. They were hostile to Khorezmshah who exterminated representatives of the local dynasty of Qarakhanid sultans.

The *qadi* and shaykh al-islam told Chingiz-khan that they were ready to open gates of Samarqand and yield the town to the Mongols. The Mongols entered the town and destroyed all the fortification. Over two days they levelled them to the ground, and on the third day they began massacring the city's defenders.

In the first turn, they disarmed and killed Turks, while their wives and property were distributed among the Mongol soldiers. The number of Qangli Turks who were killed totalled 30,000, plus 20 amirs. Chingiz-khan mentioned their names in a *yarliq* addressed to Rukn ad-Din Kart.<sup>87</sup> Except for the *qadi*, shaykh al-islam, their adherents and relatives (above 50,000), a greater portion of the Samarqand's population was driven away to work on siege facilities. Nearly all the artisans of the town (30,000) were taken prisoners. The survivors were permitted to get back provided they would ransom 200,000 dinars for "their souls". Former courtiers of Khorezmshah Siqat al-Mulk and Amir 'Amid Buzurg, as well as a *shihna* of the Mongols in the town Tayfuru were entrusted with a task to levy this sum from the population.<sup>88</sup>

Samarqand fell on 10 Muharram 617 AH (17 March 1220).<sup>89</sup>

Thus within the course of 100 days Chingiz-khan managed to shatter the powerful kingdom of the Khorezmshahs. Its strong fortifications were seized or destroyed; its most populous cities were captured; and the most numerous and well-equipped army of the time was put to flight.

In order to ensure his full victory, Chingiz-khan was to tackle two problems. First, to capture the Khorezmshah 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad and thus disable him to assemble new troops and put up resistance to the Mongols. To this end, Chingiz-khan fitted out 20,000 – strong select army under the command to Jebe and Subetey and ordered them to pursue the Khorezmshah him in front of the Mongol sovereign.<sup>90</sup>

Thus, Chingiz-khan followed the advise of the Khorezmshah's governor in Otrar Badr ad-Din al-'Amid: profiting from rivalry for supreme power in the Khorezmshah kingdom, with the help of planted letters and rumours Chingiz-khan succeeded to disunite the might of the realm. Even better, allegedly on behalf of Terken-khatun, mother of Khorezmshah, dignitaries and amirs were ordered "to leave Sultan helpless".

When the Khorezmshah 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad learned that after Otrar and other



towns and fortresses along the banks of Syr Darya the Mongols moved to Bukhara and then seized it, he left Mawarannahr. His flight was so stampede that he ignored the gold of Kerman numbering 70 load packs brought to him during his passage across Amu Darya. These packs were sunken in the river unopened “together with treasures from the Khorezmshah’s treasury that were of incalculable value”.<sup>91</sup>

In his terror of the Mongols, the Khorezmshah failed to take a sober view of things, and instead blindly followed the advice of his supporters and failed to ensure the safety of his possessions. For example, when Khorezmshah was going to leave the banks of Amu Darya, his vizier ‘Imad al-Mulk Muhammad as-Savi advised him to abandon Khurasan and make for Iraq, where he could allegedly “muster soldiers and recover from wounds”.<sup>92</sup>

Annalist of the last Khorezmshahs, an-Nasawi aptly characterised the vizier’s advice as “false and deceptive”. He reported that the Khorezmshah committed another fatal error by leaving Khurasan.

On the way to Iraq, the Ala ad-Din Muhammad fellow-travellers – relatives of his mother Terken-khatun from the tribe Uran – tried to kill him. However, he was informed of this attempt, and fled to Nishapur with several body-guards.<sup>93</sup> He arrived at Nishapur on 12 Safar 617 AH (18 April 1220).<sup>94</sup> He stayed there “for several hours only, for his heart was seized with fear, and his soul with dread”.<sup>95</sup> Learning of the Mongols’ approach, he was gripped by fear, and left Nishapur and picked his way towards Bistam. While at Bistam, he entrusted his *wakildar*, amir Taj ad-Din ‘Umar al-Bistami, to conceal 10 trunks full of precious stones in the impregnable fortress of Ardahn, high in the mountains between Damavand and Mazandaran. The contents of the two trunks only made up the cost of “*kharaj* of the Universe”. Later on, the trunks were captured by the Mongols and delivered to Chingiz-khan.<sup>96</sup>

The Khorezmshah left Bistam and, pursued by the troops of Jebe and Subetey, rushed from one town to another, from one fortress to the next, but he always got a cold reception. The point was that Chingiz-khan warned rulers of these towns against giving the Khorezmshah a warm welcome. Near the fortress of Farrazin, the Khorezmshah met with his son Rukn ad-Din Ghursanjti who led 30,000-strong army. From here they directed their steps to the fortress Karun (on a mountain with the same name between Ray and Tabaristan) where the Khorezmshah left a part of his harem. Then he reached the fortress of Sar-Jahan in Gilan where he stayed for seven days, and then he made his way to the village Dabuya, near Amul, and finally got to the Caspian Sea.<sup>97</sup>

When the Mongols came up to the Caspian littoral, the Ala al-Din Muhammad boarded a boat and sailed off from the coast. The Mongols threw themselves into the water; however, the boat was far away. The Khorezmshah disembarked on the island Ashur-Ada, not very far from the mouth of the river Gurgan and the port Abaskun.

Soon afterwards, ‘Ala al-Din Muhammad fell ill from hardships he suffered. Complaining of his fate, he is related to have said: “Of all regions of the world we owned, we now longer even possess a single plot of land in which to be buried”.<sup>98</sup> On

his death-bed, ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad cancelled his previous decision to appoint Qutb ad-Din Ozlagh-shah as successor to the throne. When ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad learned that Terken-khatun was taken prisoner, he called his eldest son Jalal ad-Din and two other sons – Ozlagh-shah and Aq-shah and told them the following: “Our power has fallen, foundations of the state weakened and destroyed. Goals of the enemy are clear: his claws and teeth caught hold of the country. It is the mission of my son Mankburni to take vengeance for me. So I appoint him successor to the throne”.<sup>99</sup>

‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad died in Shawwal 617 AH (December 1220) and was buried on the island. Once the greatest sovereign of the world, “he now had no shroud to be wrapped into”.<sup>100</sup>

By the order of Jalal ad-Din Mankburni, ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad’s remains were taken to the fortress Ardahn with the purpose of re-burial in Isfahan later, in a *madrasah* built in his honour of Khorezmshah. When an-Nasawi, *munshi* of Sultan Jalal ad-Din, wrote a deed addressed to Muqarrab ad-Din, ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad former tutor, the former expressed his apprehension in connection with transfer of ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad’s remains from the island. Well aware of the fact that the Mongols traditionally exhumed the dead bodies of the sovereigns of the lands which they conquered, an-Nasawi recommended against transporting ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad’s remains: but nobody took account of his opinion. As a consequence, when the Mongols captured the fortress Ardahn, they removed ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad’s corpse and sent it to Qaan Ogedey, who gave orders for it to be burned.<sup>101</sup>

Thus ingloriously ended the life of “the greatest sovereign of the Universe – the Khorezmshah ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad who owned lands of the Qara-Khitay, Mawarannahr, Khorezm, Isfahan, Mazandaran, Kerman, Mekran, Kesh, Ghazna, Ghur, Bamyan, Otrar, Azerbaijan, Arran, Iraq, Sijistan, Fars, Tabaristan and Jurjan. His possessions reached India, the country of Turks and China. The *khutba* was proclaimed in his name from the towers of Darband and Shirvan, Khurasan, as well as other lands and towns”.<sup>102</sup>

Sources say that ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad had countless riches: the Mongols seized 10 millions of dinars and 1000 packs of satin and other valuable fabric, 30,000 horses and mules, etc.<sup>103</sup>

The second goal of Chingiz-khan was to capture Gurganj, capital of the Khorezmshahid kingdom.<sup>104</sup>

In order to capture Gurganj without any further delay, Chingiz-khan sent a *hajib* Danishmand to ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad’s mother, Terken-khatun, with the following message: “You know that your son behaved dishonourably in respect of your rights. In agreement with some of his amirs, I shall not attack possessions you own. If you agree with me, send me your envoy to acknowledge that I keep my word; in this case you will own Khorezm, Khurasan and neighbouring districts beyond the Jayhun river”.<sup>105</sup>

Terken-khatun was in position to arrange Gurganj’s defence and resist the Mongols as Gurganj was fortified enough to stand a siege. Also, Gurganj residents were brave and militarily proficient: Sultan Shihab ad-Din al-Ghuri knew this from his personal

experience in 1204.

But the arrival in Gurganj of the *hajib* Danishmand, Chingiz-khan's envoy, together with news of the Khorezmshah's stampede to the west, undermined Terken-khatun's steadfastness and resoluteness of. Gathering together the late Khorezmshah's wives and children, together with his treasury and all valuables, she left the city.

In doing so, Terken-khatun ordered to do away with all her prisoners – sultans, possessors and their sons totalling 26. All of them were drowned in the Amu Darya.<sup>106</sup> This disgraceful action averted from her many people in Gurganj, so she had to leave the town with her servants, escorted by the vizier Muhammad ibn Salih and son of Yazir's ruler 'Umar-khan who knew well the roads to escape through.

However, Terken-khatun proved to be ungrateful even with respect to her guide: by her order, he was killed as soon as the caravan reached the fortress of Ilal in Mazandaran.<sup>107</sup>

The Mongols besieged the fortress for four months. They erected walls around the fortress, built gates which were locked by night and thus separated the fortress from outer world. The fortress was impregnable; it had great reserves of arms and allowances, so much time was required to capture it. In laying siege to the fortress, the Mongols found themselves the beneficiaries of freak climatic circumstances. Frequent rains and downpour were usual here. For the duration of the siege, however, not a drop of rain fell: ironically, it began raining heavily only at that very instant when Terken-khatun, parched with thirst, gave instructions to open the gates and surrender to the Mongols. An-Nasawi writes: "Just as she was going out of the fortress, a torrent poured into the gates (of the fortress), and on that day all the water reservoirs overflowed".<sup>108</sup>

Terken-khatun was taken prisoner together with 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad's *haram* and children. The children were killed, the women were given in marriage to Chingiz-khan's retinue,<sup>109</sup> and Terken-khatun was taken to the sovereign's headquarters. Before departing to Qaraqorum, Terken-khatun and 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad's wives were ordered "to come ahead and mourn over the kingdom of the Khorezmshahs while the Mongol troops were marching in front of them".<sup>110</sup>

One of 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad's courtiers, Badr ad-Din Hilal, who managed to escape from Mongol captivity, informed Jalal ad-Din about Terken-khatun: "I told her: let's run away to Jalal ad-Din, son of your son and treasure of your heart. We are often informed about his might and about the magnitude of his country". She said: "Let the devil take him! I cannot let myself go and beg for help from Ay-Chichek's son – mother of Jalal ad-Din – be patronized by him! Even captivity of Chingiz-khan and my present humiliation and disgrace is better for me than your proposal!"<sup>111</sup>

Terken-khatun's conditions in captivity were grim, and she had to eat leftovers from Chingiz-khan's meal. *Khudawand-i jahan* Terken-khatun, whose orders had once been executed unquestioningly, died in poverty in 630/1233.<sup>112</sup>

Abandoned by Terken-khatun, Gurganj was in turmoil, with nobody to assume responsibility for the fate of the capital. Owing to the fact that Terken-khatun left "no one to regulate affairs and manage people",<sup>113</sup> power in Gurganj was seized by the adventurer 'Ali Kuh-i Darughan<sup>114</sup> who brought even greater turmoil in the life of

the city. An internecine war began in Gurganj, property of not only townspeople but members of the city *diwan* was plundered. 'Ali Kuh-i Darughan's cronies levied taxes upon the population and misappropriated much of the city's wealth.

In a while, senior officials returned to Gurganj, including member of the state *diwan* Mushrif 'Imad ad-Din and Sharaf ad-Din Kopek, who compiled forged powers of attorney on behalf of the late Khorezmshah which removed 'Ali Kuh-i Darughan from his post and re-established a semblance of order in the city.<sup>115</sup>

Shortly after, the Khorezmshah Jalal ad-Din Mankburni and his brothers Ozlagh-shah and Aq-Shah arrived in Gurganj. However, supporters of the former appointed heir to the throne Ozlagh-shah did not recognize Jalal ad-Din as head of the kingdom. Amirs and relatives of Terken-khatun, despite counteraction of the whole population of Gurganj that backed Jalal ad-Din, disobeyed the new Khorezmshah and declared that the new sultan was instead Khumar-Tegin, brother of Terken-khatun.<sup>116</sup> Approximately 90,000 soldiers-Turks<sup>117</sup> were led by Khumar-Tegin and amirs *hajib* Oghul, Shaykh-khan, Er-Burga Pahlawan and Qutlugh-khan. These amirs arranged conspiracy against Khorezmshah Jalal ad-Din, however, the latter was warned about it and succeeded to escape. Khorezmshah left Gurganj with 300 soldiers under the command of hero of Khujand defence – Damir-Malik. When Ozlagh-Shah and Aq-Shah learned about the Mongols approaching the city, they left Gurganj.<sup>118</sup>

As soon as 'Ala ad-Din's sons left the city, Mongol advance troops invaded Khorezm. These troops camped far from Gurganj and began preparing for its siege. Soon after detachments under the command of Baychu-noyan arrived, and next came major forces of the Mongol army headed by sons of Chingiz-khan – Ogedey and Chagatay and noyans Tolan-Cherbi, Ustun and Qadan, totaling above 100,000.<sup>119</sup>

When besieging Gurganj, the Mongols applied the most advanced means of the time: catapults (*manjaniq*) "tortoises" (*mataris*) and besieging cars (*dabbabat*). For lack of stones in Khorezm, the Mongols felled adjacent trees, cut logs out of trunks, and put these into water, after which these shells became hard and heavy like a stone.

The resoluteness of the Gurganj population resisted all Mongol attempts to capture the city. The Mongols thus applied the same tactics against the Gurganjs as they had in Samarkand. They left a part of their troops in ambush and started combat operations with a small number of soldiers. When these detachments came up to the walls of Gurganj "some short-sighted people rejoiced and believed that the number of the enemies was insignificant and that they dared to launch this adventuresome sortie for fun only."<sup>120</sup> Numerous cavalry and infantry detachments began pursuing "retreating" Mongols. At the intersection of gardens Bagh-i Khurram near Gurganj these troops were unexpectedly attacked by soldiers of Bughurji-noyan, who encircled and killed about 1000 soldiers.<sup>121</sup> However, about 2000 soldiers of Gurganj headed by *hajib* Oghul managed to get out of the encirclement and flee to Khurasan.<sup>122</sup>

In pursuing the Khorezmians, the Mongols managed to break through the gates Qabilan beyond outward wall of Gurganj but were repulsed not only by soldiers but also by common men and women, so at night the Mongols were fully thrown outside

the city, though they were about to reach at mahalla Tanur.

The next day, the Mongols again tried to break through the city via the gates of Qabilan, however, were repulsed by the troops of Amir Faridun Ghuri, who protected these gates.<sup>123</sup>

The siege of Gurganj dragged out and the Mongol commanders, including sons of Chingiz-khan, failed to get out of the situation until Jochi, the third eldest son of Chingiz-khan, arrived in Gurganj with his army.

Because Chingiz-khan had promised to give him the whole of Mawarannahr as *iqta'*, Jochi was keen to seize the rich town of Gurganj without destroying it. He thus sent his envoys to the townsfolk with a request that they surrender. However, Chagatay disagreed with his brother and insisted on Gurganj's destruction.

The Mongols resumed the siege of Gurganj and renewed their demand for surrender. The historian pointed out that "wiser residents of the town tended to conclude truce, especially as, before his death, 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad had advised the townsfolk to conclude peace with the Mongols".<sup>124</sup> However, the garrison and the residents of Gurganj categorically rejected all attempts by the Mongols to make them surrender, and continually repulsed the attacks of the Mongols who succeeded to fill up the ditch around the town and came up closer to its walls. The Mongols managed to destroy a dam on the Amu Darya and flood Gurganj. At the same time, however, a 3,000-strong Mongol detachment was massacred by the city defenders.<sup>125</sup>

The siege of Gurganj continued in vain for seven months.<sup>126</sup> Dissensions between the sons of Chingiz-khan and disputes for dominating positions prevented the Mongols from attaining their goal of seizing the city. Then Chingiz-khan subdued all the Mongol troops and princes to his younger son Ogedey.<sup>127</sup> Only thereafter did a well-organized assault of Gurganj started.

When the residents of Gurganj could no longer resist the Mongol assault, Sultan Khumar-Tegin and his retinue decided to open the city gates and surrender to the Mongols.<sup>128</sup> Having captured Gurganj, for seven days the Mongols engaged in street fighting with the defenders; they destroyed and burnt all houses and buildings and thus encircled the city survivors. The Mongols "seized living quarters one after another". When they seized one living quarter, people sought salvation in another quarter, they did their best and fought selflessly and protected themselves and their families against the enemy. In the end, there were only three living quarters (*mahalla*) left where people were standing in the cramped".<sup>129</sup>

At this moment, faqih 'Ala ad-Din al-Khayyati, *muhtasib* of Khorezm, went to the Mongols to ask for mercy. However, it was too late. Having lost a great number of soldiers,<sup>130</sup> the Mongol princes refused to show clemency. All the residents of the town were driven away and separated from and separated from those artisans (numbering about 100, 000) who were to be sent to Mongolia.<sup>131</sup> Then the Mongols killed all men and children, with 24 Gurganj residents per each of 50,000 Mongol soldiers.<sup>132</sup> After that, the Mongols ordered the women of Gurganj to undress, divided them into two groups and said: "The women of your town are excellent pugilists, so we want them to start fighting!". The unfortunate women of Gurganj were set at each other's throats. The Mongols rejoiced at this unpleasant

spectacle and then killed all the women who survived.<sup>133</sup> Having dealt with the population of the capital, the Mongols then set about destroying Gurganj. They destroyed the dam on the Amu Darya, and the water flooded the huge city. They destroyed valuable cultural monuments, including libraries where thousands of works on different branches of science were kept. Gurganj “became the abode of the jackal and the haunt of owl and kite”.<sup>134</sup> With the fall of Gurganj<sup>135</sup> combat operations of the Mongols in Khorezm were completed, and the field of campaign shifted to Khurasan.

Following ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad’s flight, the towns of Khurasan found themselves leaderless and abandoned. Each town had its own garrison, large or small. So these towns resisted the Mongols as best they could. Nevertheless, nearly all the large cities of Khurasan were easily conquered by the Mongols.

Nasa was the first city in Khurasan to resist the Mongols who pursued the sons of Khorezmshah. The Mongols besieged it for 15 days running with the help of 20 catapults. When the Mongols entered Nasa, they drove the townsfolk out of the city and ordered them to tie each other tightly. After that the Mongols exterminated 70,000 Nasa residents and “fed wild beasts and birds with them”. There was much bloodshed, raped women and killed children thrown on the corpses of their mothers! That was just in the one of the districts of Khurasan!”<sup>136</sup>

The prominent Khorezmshahid statesman Shihab ad-Din Abu Sa’d ibn Imran al-Khivaqi was taken prisoner and killed by the Mongols in Nasa. It was Shihab ad-Din who had earlier urged the Khorezmshah to muster all the troops of the state (400,000 soldiers) on the bank of Syr Darya and rout the Mongols on the borders of the kingdom.<sup>137</sup>

A similar fate befell Ozlagh-shah and Aq-shah, sons of ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad. They were caught in the village of Vashta, in the region of Khabushan. At first, they managed to defeat their pursuers; however, later on they were encircled and killed together with their soldiers.<sup>138</sup> ‘Ala ad-Din Muhammad’s third son Rukn ad-Din Ghursanjti hid himself from the Mongols in the fortress of Ustunavand, and managed to resist the Mongols for six months. After the fall of the fortress Rukn ad-Din was brought to Taymas-noyan, who ordered him to prostrate himself in homage. However, Rukn ad-Din refused and was executed mercilessly.<sup>139</sup>

During the summer and autumn of 1221, the Mongol army captured Balkh, Tirmidh, Zawzan, Andkhud, Merv, Nishapur, Tus, Hirat and other towns and fortresses in Khurasan. The populations of those towns which resisted the Mongols were all put to death. So too, however, were the populations of those towns and fortresses which surrendered to the advancing forces. Upon capturing Merv on 1 Muharram 618 AH (5 February 1221), for instance, the Mongols exterminated a huge number of residents.<sup>140</sup>

The defeat and collapse of the of Khorezmshahid dynasty took place very quickly, so the rulers of the other realms and of Caliphate that were far away from the region, could not even imagine that within several months the Mongols would sweep off all the countries in the east of the Muslim world. None of contemporaries of these terrible events could think that the powerful kingdom of the Khorezmshahs with its enormous military resources could so rapidly collapse under the assault of an enemy



with an army less than a third of the size of its own.

Chingis-khan did not immediately start his march westwards. Through the mediation of his informants he learned about strengths and weaknesses of 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad's government. Even after he learnt everything about this kingdom, Chingiz-khan did not risk starting his march immediately. He moved his army westwards only after he satisfied himself that 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad's policy of eliminating local rulers and his resultant unpopularity among the wider population meant that Khorezmshahid power was in fact precarious. As it transpired, the Khorezmshah's bureaucratic and fiscal apparatus proved to be alien for the population. His seemingly unconquerable army, mostly made of Turkic-nomads, completely forgot fighting ability in the open field. The army had no mobile sub-units of archers. In the course of combat operations, Khorezmshahid forces possessed no military reserves, while its tactical formation was beyond criticism: they had no vanguard forces, especially by the end of the kingdom; had no large military units in ambush, though the nature of combat operations on the plain called for such troops. The tactics which 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad had used during his fighting in Iran, Ghur or Mawarannahr, when he had managed to rout his enemies thanks to the number of his army and suddenness of attack, proved to be of no use in the course of his confrontation with the Mongols.

The first confrontations with the Mongols showed that the conduct of this war was to be defined by Mongol tactics and by the skilful use of reserves. Neither the Khorezmshah, nor his amirs had skills in this area, so they immediately felt the supremacy of the Mongol noyans. It was helplessness in military plans and thoughtlessness in actions that predetermined the outcome of all battles. From this it followed an idea of invincibility of the Mongols and confidence of 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad that the Mongols caught hold of ("claws and teeth") the country and that the Mongols are "enemy-conqueror", so it was necessary to conclude an armistice, not to fight with them.<sup>141</sup>

But no truce took place: the Mongols were not interested in establishing any state orders and standards of mutual relations with the population of conquered lands. The Mongols considered it safer to suppress any resistance on occupied lands by construing it as their goal to exterminate the population and to seize whatever spoils they could. And they attained this goal.

Writing as an eyewitness to the fall of the Khorezmshahid kingdom, an-Nasawi observes: "People witnessed disasters unprecedented in the past centuries. A horde came from the lands of the east, traversed areas up to Darband and from there moved to the territory of the Qipchaqs. As soon as this horde entered any land, they ravaged any population and destroyed town which they captured. The horde then returned via Khorezm unharmed and with spoils. In doing so, this army destroyed pastures of the country and animal yields. All this occurred over the course of just two years!

Bloodshed, pillage and destruction were so great that villages were abandoned, while farmers fled the region barefoot.

All the open and all the closed were uncovered; explicit and implicit were discovered; neither bleating, nor bellowing was heard: it was owls only that cried and their cries echoed back".<sup>142</sup>

**THE FATE OF THE EXILED KHOREZMIANS**

As was recounted in the previous chapter, when Jalal ad-Din learned about a conspiracy against him while at Gurganj, he left the capital together with Damir-Malik and 300 horsemen and, pursued by the Mongols, made his way to Nasa.<sup>1</sup> A Mongol detachment numbering 700 horsemen was waiting for him near Nasa. In the fighting the Mongols were defeated, and just a few of them escaped. Our chronicler notes that “for the first time the Muslim sword was stained with blood of the Mongols”.<sup>2</sup>

Having left Nasa, Jalal ad-Din went to Nishapur. While at Nishapur, he decided to confront the Mongols in a decisive battle, and with that end in view, in February 1221 “he sent messengers to different sites to muster troops and enlist support”.<sup>3</sup> However, the Mongols gave him no opportunity to gather his forces, so Jalal ad-Din hastily made his way to Ghazna. His father’s cousin Amin al-Mulk joined him near Qandahar together with a force of 10,000 Turkic horsemen.<sup>4</sup>

Jalal ad-Din and Amin al-Mulk’s troops now attacked a party of Mongols who were presently engaged in besieging Qandahar. The fierce fighting lasted for three days. The Mongols we read “believed that the enemy was was capable merely of running away from them like gazelles, that nobody would dare to attack them, that nobody could spear them, for spears became blunt. So, when they saw spears that thirsted to their throats and pierce their hearts, they broke into a run”.<sup>5</sup> The Mongols were smashed, and when Chingiz-khan learned about of the defeat of his army, “he was perturbed that his soldiers were cut by sharp swords and eaten by lame eagles like carrion”.<sup>6</sup> Incensed at this news, Chingiz-khan instructed his men to set off in pursuit of Jalal ad-Din, who now tried to flee to Ghazna.

Arriving in Ghazna, Jalal ad-Din was joined here by the chief of tribal detachment of Khalaj, Sayf ad-Din Ighraq, the ruler of Balkh A’zam-Malik, head of Afghan troops Muzaffar Malik and chief of Qarluq detachment al-Hasan. Each of these possessed 30,000 soldiers, while Jalal ad-Din was in command of 60,000 soldiers and Amin al-Mulk commanded 40,000.<sup>7</sup>

With a huge military force under his command, Sultan Jalal ad-Din withdrew his troops from Ghazna and attacked the Mongols who under the command of Tekechuk and Molghor laid a siege to the fortress of Valujan to the north from Charikar. Three days of fighting resulted in the death of 1,000 Mongols, while the rest managed to escape across the river Panj, destroying the bridge behind them.<sup>8</sup>

At this point, a 45,000-strong Mongol army headed by Shigi Qutuqu-noyan now advanced in the hope of defeating Jalal ad-Din. However, as a result of two days’ fierce fighting at Parvan (near Ghazna) the Mongols were routed. According to our chronicler, Jalal ad-Din “attacked the centre of Shigi Qutuqu’s army, broke up the enemy ranks, trampled down his banners, made him flee and desert his position. The Mongols were slaughtered, Jalal ad-Din slashed them with his sword, mindful of how

the Mongols had tortured him, his brothers and father, his country and relatives”.<sup>9</sup>

Shigi Qutuqu had to flee with part of his army to Talaqan, where Chingiz-khan was headquartered.<sup>10</sup> Chingiz-khan decided to deal personally with Jalal ad-Din who, over a short period of time, had decimated the Mongols. Chingiz-khan “came out against him, and his army overcrowded the plain”.<sup>11</sup>

We can only speculate how the fighting between Chingiz-khan and Jalal ad-Din would have ended, because a change of circumstances now compelled Jalal ad-Din to leave the battlefield.

After the defeat of the Mongols near Parvan, the sultan’s soldiers captured a large number of trophies. While the spoils were being divided, a quarrel broke out between Jalal ad-Din’s commanders, with the result that the Khalaj, Afghan and Qarluq commanders now left the field, disregarding Jalal ad-Din’s entreaties to continue the struggle against their Mongol common enemy. Our chronicler notes that “Muslims forces were weakened because of discord, and the Mongols benefited from this situation”.<sup>12</sup>

Afterwards Chingiz-khan succeeded in routing the Khalaj, Afghan and Qarluq armies (each taken separately), so there remained just one enemy – Jalal ad-Din who, despite huge losses, remained a formidable threat to Mongol power.

When Jalal ad-Din learned that Chingiz-khan had ordered his army to encircle and capture him, he hastily left Ghazna. In two weeks Ghazna was captured by the Mongols, but Jalal ad-Din remained at large. Having failed to capture the Sultan, Chingiz-khan now sent several advanced detachments in pursuit. They reached him at Gardiz, 50 km to the east of Ghazna. Jalal ad-Din suddenly attacked the advanced detachment, defeated it utterly and escaped from the Mongols again.<sup>13</sup>

Finally, Chingiz-khan caught up Jalal ad-Din near the banks of the river Sind. The resulting 3-day battle was so fierce that the brutality of previous confrontations paled by comparison. Chingiz-khan ordered his soldiers: “Don’t shoot an arrow at the sultan, I need him safe and sound!”. The Mongols obeyed this order and gradually encircled Jalal ad-Din. A greater portion of the sultan’s army was smashed, nearly all his amirs were killed, while the Mongols kept on forcing the enemy back to the banks of Sind.

On the third day of fighting (November 25, 1221), sultan had just 700 soldiers at his disposal to resist the enemy. When Jalal ad-Din realized that he had lost, he ordered to drown his harem in the river, and then swam across the river on horseback.

Jalal ad-Din’s bravery impressed Chingiz-khan so much that he banned his soldiers from pursuing the sultan. He told his sons: “Such sons should a father have! Having escaped the two whirlpools of water and fire and reached the shore of safety, he will be the author of countless exploits and troubles without number”.<sup>14</sup>

During this encounter, about 4,000 of Jalal ad-Din’s soldiers, under the command of amirs Kulbars, Bahadur, Kabkuh and Sa’d al-din ‘Ali, succeeded in getting over the right bank of Sind. In 619 AH, Chingiz-khan sent after remains of the sultan’s army a 20,000-strong army under the command of Torbey Toqshin and Bala-noyan; however, the Mongols could not stand the heat and came back from Multan.<sup>15</sup>

Jaded and weakened, Jalal ad-Din, together with a small group of hungry and

exhausted associates, found himself in North India, among a hostile population. It was the *rana* (king) of Rajputs from Shatr district in Jud mountains, who decided to take advantage of Jalal ad-Din's weakened state. With 10,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry under his command, the *rana* attacked Jalal ad-Din. "And Jalal ad-Din, relying on resoluteness and steadfastness of his soldiers", assaulted Hindu and personally killed the *rana*. The latter's army was smashed, and the sultan's soldiers sized a great quantity of horses, armaments and equipment of which they were in sore need.<sup>16</sup>

Jalal ad-Din's victory over the *rana* of Shatr had its effect on the behaviour of the neighbouring rulers of North India. Qamar ad-Din Kermani, deputy to the ruler of Sind, Uchcha, Multan, Lahore and Peshawar Sultan Nasir ad-Din Qubacha (1205-1227), was the first to express his obedience to Jalal ad-Din. Next came Qubacha who also acknowledged Jalal ad-Din's suzerainty.<sup>17</sup>

Shortly after Jalal ad-Din was joined by the amirs Sanjaqan-khan, Ilchi Pahlawan, Ur-khan, Sayirja and Tekcharuq Khankishi together with their detachments. These amirs had formerly dissociated themselves from his brother Ghiyath ad-Din Pir-shah. Our chronicler relates that "breathing herewith intensified and frozen hearts got warm". With such reinforcements, Jalal ad-Din led the army against possessions of Qubacha, who killed Shams al-Mulk, one of the sultan's vizier, and his son, as well as a son of Amir Amin al-Mulk. Following a short siege, Jalal ad-Din managed to capture the town of Kalor and the fortresses Parasravar and Tarnuj.<sup>18</sup>

Having lost much of his possessions, Qubacha enlisted the support of Sultan Shams ad-Din Il-Tutmish al-Mu'izzi (1211-1236), ruler of North India, and decided to fight against Jalal ad-Din. But he was routed, and had to abandon his camp and flee. This enabled Jalal ad-Din "to cover his archers and dress up his beggarly horsemen".<sup>19</sup>

After capturing Parasravar, Jalal ad-Din learned that the Mongols were pursuing him. He went to Multan and demanded from Qubacha a payment for peaceful passage across his lands (*na'l-baha*). Qubacha declined from paying and set out against sultan. After five hours of fighting the sultan left for Uchcha. Learning that the townspeople of Uchcha were refusing to submit, he gave orders for the city's destruction. Fakhr ad-Din as-Salari, governor of Qubacha, surrendered the town of Sadusan to the sultan, who then moved on toward Khatisar, Daval and Damrila, ruled by Malik Sinan ad-Din Khatisar, the eleventh representative of the Sumran line of the Rajput dynasty.

Camped at Daval and Damril, Jalal ad-Din sent a part of his army under the command of Amir Khass-khan to raid Nahrvala (Anhalvara), capital of Gujarat, and to seize camels.<sup>20</sup>

At that moment, Jalal ad-Din was informed that Shams ad-Din Il-Tutmish with 30,000 horsemen, 100,000 infantry and 300 elephants was advancing out towards him. After an initial skirmish, however, Il-Tutmish sent an envoy to the sultan asking for an armistic. He wrote to the sultan: "It is no secret that behind you there is an enemy of faith. Today, you are the Sultan of Muslims, and son of their Sultan. I cannot afford to come out against you. It is not for me to draw the sword against you! This might only happen in case of self-defence or precaution. If you find it expedient, I'll

marry my daughter to you in order to consolidate confidence and eliminate enmity”.<sup>21</sup> Jalal ad-Din welcomed his initiative but did not take any further steps.

While in India, Sultan Jalal ad-Din ordered the commemorative issue of silver and copper coins, and the khutba was read out in his name across almost all his territories.<sup>22</sup>

However, the rulers of Northern India did not take kindly to being ruled by a foreign sultan. Il-Tutmish, Qubacha and other rulers – princes (*ray=raja*); leaders of troops (*takakira*, pl. from *tkhakur - tagor*) and governors of the regions – together agreed to get rid of Jalal ad-Din. They decided to press the sultan’s army back to the bank of the river Panjashir, “where he would be unprotected and exterminated like a lizard”.<sup>23</sup>

In the meanwhile, two of Jalal ad-Din’s leading commanders, Yezidek Pahlawan and Sunqurjik, defected to Il-Tutmish. Owing to these amirs’ betrayal, the sultan convened a military council to decide on further steps: either to stay in India or to depart for elsewhere. The views of the amirs were divided. Some suggested consolidating positions in the country and conquering local rulers. However, Jalal ad-Din took the side of the amirs, especially those who abandoned Ghiyath ad-Din Pir-shah, who suggested going to Iraq and winning it back from Pir-shah. According to our chronicler, “those suggesting leaving India for Iraq stressed that it would be a daunting task to conquer Iraq, for there reigned presumption and obsequiousness of counsellors who were most concerned with taking care of their own security. They disdain Ghiyath ad-Din thinking that he is unreliable, with his policy too moderate and he himself too weak”.<sup>24</sup>

Jalal ad-Din decided to make his way to Iraq. With great difficulties, he and his soldiers crossed the deserts between India and Kerman. “They were gasping for a drink, not to mention the lack of food”. Following a lengthy journey which claimed many casualties along the way, Jalal ad-Din finally arrived in Kerman with just 4,000 soldiers.

*Hajib* Baraq was Ghiyath ad-Din Pir-shah’s governor in Kerman. When the Iraqi authorities learned that the Mongols under Tolan-Cherbi were approaching the country, Baraq decided to leave for India where Jalal ad-Din had already settled down. As soon as he reached Jiruft, he was attacked by Shuja’ ad-din Abu-l-Qasim, commander of the fortress at Juvashir (Guvashir). During the fighting Shuja’ ad-Din was betrayed by the Turks who went over to Baraq. Shuja’ ad-Din was captured by Baraq and executed. After that Baraq laid siege to Juvanshir where Shuja’s son took shelter. Baraq’s siege of Juvanshir lasted until the arrival of Sultan Jalal ad-Din.<sup>25</sup>

Jalal ad-Din chose Juvashir as temporary capital of his possessions and drew Shuja’s son close to him. This policy of sultan was disliked by Baraq who considered himself to be the sole master of Kerman. Though Baraq became related with sultan through marrying his daughter to him, our chronicler notes that he “schemed treachery and malicious intent”.

When Jalal ad-Din learned about Baraq’s treachery, he consulted with his retinue who recommended him to seize Baraq and execute him. They came up with the pretext of organizing a hunt, but Baraq pretended to be ill, and refused the invitation. He told the sultan conquered Kerman with his own sword and that his land was not a place for the Sultanal throne.<sup>26</sup> It was Jalal ad-Din’s vizier Sharaf al-Mulk who made a

stand for Baraq as saying: “Baraq is one of the first rulers and notables who voluntarily expressed his obedience. If we hasten to punish him for betrayal, hearts would be filed with hatred and indignation, sympathies would blow over and intentions change”.<sup>27</sup>

Jalal ad-Din decided to give Kerman to *hajib* Baraq, and headed to Fars. While at Shiraz, the ruler of Fars Atabek Sa‘d ibn Zangi acknowledged the sultan’s suzerainty, presented him with 500 horses and valuables, and gave him in marriage his daughter Malika-khatun. The ruler of Yazd Atabek ‘Ala ad-Dawla also arrived in Shiraz and “expressed his obedience to the Sultan”. Atabek presented Jalal ad-Din with numerous gifts and donations. In return, Jalal ad-Din granted him the *laqab* ‘Ata-khan’ and gave him a document confirming him in his possessions.<sup>28</sup>

From Shiraz Sultan Jalal ad-Din made his way for Isfahan. The residents of this town had repulsed the first siege of the Mongols and now, headed by the *qadi* of the town Rukn ad-Din Mas‘ud Sa‘id, heartily welcomed the sultan. “Isfahana gave him what was most valuable” we read. “namely arms and equipment for the troops”.<sup>29</sup>

As Isfahan was a part of Ghiyath ad-Din Pir-shah’s possessions, Ghiyath ad-Din greatly resented its submission to Sultan Jalal ad-Din. He decided to force his brother out of his possessions, and with that end in view Ghiyath ad-Din sent a 30,000-strong army to defeat him.

Faced with his brother’s decision to place his own interests above the common cause, Jalal ad-Din decided to take further steps to rally forces against the Mongol enemy.<sup>30</sup> He dispatched to Ghiyath ad-Din’s amirs “one of his most cunning courtiers”, Amir Akhur Odek, who invited the amirs to abandon Ghiyath ad-Din and join the forces of Jalal ad-Din. Some of the amirs agreed. Even Ghiyath ad-Din’s mother took the sultan’s side and persuaded her son to obey Jalal ad-Din for the common good. Over a short period of time all of Ghiyath ad-Din’s supporters went over to Sultan Jalal ad-Din. The local population under Ghiyath ad-Din’s rule accorded to Jalal ad-Din a warm welcome. His arrival put an end to the extortion and humiliation of the population by Ghiyath ad-Din’s soldiers and officials. With the passing of lands from the authority of Ghiyath al-Din to the control of Sultan Jalal al-Din, traditional customs were restored, and violence and arbitrary rule came to an end.<sup>31</sup>

In 621/1224, Jalal ad-Din moved toward Azerbaijan.<sup>32</sup> At the same time, Ighan-Taisi, *atabek* and maternal uncle of Ghiyath ad-Din, invaded Iraq from Azerbaijan at the head of a 50,000-strong army with the aim of capturing Hamadan, which Caliph an-Nasir had granted him as *iqta’*. This episode revealed the policy of the caliph, who, apprehensive of Jalal ad-Din’s possible campaign against Baghdad, began inciting powerful rulers and amirs to take the field against him.

But Jalal ad-Din learned about Ighan-Taisi’s approach, and at night came up to his camp at Hamadan, and encircled the camp just when they were engaged in sharing out the spoils from Azerbaijan and Arran. In the morning Ighan-Taisi realized that he had been surrounded by Jalal ad-Din, who he had assumed was now marching toward Baghdad. Ighan-Taisi sent his wife, Jalal ad-Din’s sister, to ask for mercy. Ighan-Taisi’s soldiers now joined in an alliance with the Khorezmshah, following



which the latter's military might noticeably increased.

It was no mere coincidence that sultan was going to campaign against Baghdad.<sup>33</sup> After the death in 1218 of al-Malik al-'Adil, ruler of Egypt and Syria, his three sons began ruling the realm: al-Malik al-Kamil ruled Egypt, while al-Malik al-Mu'azzam ruled Damascus, Jerusalem and Tabaria, and al-Malik al-Ashraf ruled in Jazira, Khilat and Mayafariqin. The brothers perpetually fought for the leadership position, and enmity between them reached its height when al-Malik al-Kamil and al-Malik al-Ashraf entered into an alliance against al-Malik al-Mu'azzam. Meanwhile, Sultan Jalal ad-Din now approached the caliph's own territories. Al-Malik al-Mu'azzam decided to unite with Jalal ad-Din to oppose his brothers. In 619 AH/1222 he sent Jalal ad-Din an embassy composed of Sufis headed by the *muhtasib* of Damascus as-Sadr al-Bakri. The *muhtasib* met with Jalal ad-Din and discussed the terms of their alliance.<sup>34</sup> When the Khorezmshah captured Azerbaijan in 1225, al-Malik al-Mu'azzam dispatched on behalf of himself and of Muzaffar ad-Din, ruler of Irbil, a message expressing their preparedness to conclude an alliance against al-Malik al-Ashraf.<sup>35</sup> Jalal ad-Din willingly agreed with the proposed terms, as an alliance would allow him to fight the caliph more decisively.<sup>36</sup>

When Jalal ad-Din routed Ighan-Taisi, he moved to Khuzistan where his army spent the winter, and in Muharram 622 AH (January 1225) he laid siege to Tustar. However, he failed to seize the town, so he had to move to Baghdad though notifying Caliph an-Nasir in advance. Jalal ad-Din's message to the caliph was delivered by the head of the army *diwan* Diya al-Mulk 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad an-Nasawi. In his message, Jalal ad-Din expressed his hopes that the caliph would be his ally in the struggle against the Mongols, bitter enemies of the Muslims. But the caliph remembered the relations between the Khorezmshahs and his father and grandfather – caliphs al-Mustadi (1170-1180) and al-Mustanjid (1160-1170). For this reason, an-Nasir did not respond to this message and sent a 20,000-strong army against Jalal ad-Din under the command of his mamluk Qush-Temur.

When Sultan Jalal ad-Din did not receive any answer from the caliph, he sent his troops to Iraq. A part of his troops seized Badraya and Baksaya, and advanced to Basra where amir Mil-Tegin, *shihna* of Basra, confronted him. After an unsuccessful 2-month siege of Basra, Jalal ad-Din had to withdraw his troops to Ghuta, where he was approached by a caliphal army under the command of Qush-Temur. In the battle that followed the troops of Qush-Temur were routed and he was killed.<sup>37</sup>

Jalal ad-Din's march to Baghdad cannot be explained only by his desire to enlist the caliph's aid in the struggle against the Mongols. In all probability, he in fact intended to take vengeance on the caliph whom he deemed responsible for the Mongol destruction of the Khorezmshahid kingdom and the death of his father Sultan 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad. To all appearances, Jalal ad-Din was aware of the secret correspondence between the caliph and the Mongols,<sup>38</sup> which is why during the march on Baghdad he wrote a letter to al-Malik al-Mu'azzam which said: "Get ready, we are going to attack the caliph, since he is a cause of the death of the Muslims, the cause of the death of

Muslims, the death of my father, and the invasion of infidels into the lands of Islam".<sup>39</sup>

This suggests that there indeed existed a secret correspondence between Caliph an-Nasir and the Mongols aimed at destroying the kingdom of Khorezmshahs. Besides, the caliph perceived Jalal ad-Din as a threat to the very existence of the Caliphate, so he even asked for help from the Ayyubid al-Malik al-Ashraf, although their previous relations were rather cold.<sup>40</sup>

When the residents of Baghdad learned about the defeat of Qush-Temur's army, they hastily erected fortifications and prepared for defence. The caliph allocated one million dinars for these purposes.<sup>41</sup> However, Jalal ad-Din stayed for 12 days around Baghdad, then withdrew his troops toward Azerbaijan. En route he laid siege to the town of Daquqa (March 1225). Capturing the city, he massacred the population and razed the walls to the ground, before continuing his march northwards.<sup>42</sup>

As soon as Jalal ad-Din approached the borders of Azerbaijan, he received letters from residents of Maragha, asking him to come to their assistance as soon as possible<sup>43</sup> in order to save them from disgraceful yoke of senior officials of the kingdom, and from the oppressions of women. They also suffered great privations from the actions of the Georgians who caught hold of Maragha and from the powerlessness of Atabek Uzbek who failed to ensure their security and the sanctity of their possessions".<sup>43</sup>

By that time the last atabek of Azerbaijan Uzbek had little to do with state affairs. His wife, the daughter of the last Seljuq Sultan Toghrul III Malika-khatun, had seized power. In lamenting the 'preponderance of women', Maragha's townsfolk were referring to Malika-khatun's arbitrary rule.<sup>44</sup>

In Jumada I 622 AH (May 1225) Sultan Jalal ad-Din seized Maragha without a blow.<sup>45</sup> While at Maragha, he endeavoured to get into contact with rulers of the countries bordered by Azerbaijan. In June 1225, he sent messages to the sultan of Konya 'Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I, ruler of Jazira al-Malik al-Ashraf, ruler of Damascus al-Malik al-Mu'azzam and ruler of Egypt al-Malik al-Kamil. Jalal ad-Din informed them that he had conquered Azerbaijan and was going to assault Georgia. In doing so, he was seeking to establish normal relations with his western and southern neighbours and thus secure himself against possible confrontation with them.<sup>46</sup>

It was Qadi Mijir ad-Din 'Umar ibn Sa'd al-Khorezmi, "the most outstanding scholar of the kingdom of Khorezm, whose proficiency in various sciences was known everywhere",<sup>47</sup> who delivered letters to the aforementioned rulers. The text of the messages were almost identical; the following is the message sent to Sultan 'Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I:

"Salam! We are pleased to address you our prayers, praise and eulogy... Great Sultan, Jamshid of the century, Alexander of the epoch, honour of religion and world, pole of Islam and Muslims, advocate of heavens and sun, shadow of Allah in the Universe pride of Seljuq kin – May his rule be eternal, Allah save his might!

"So keen is our desire to achieve happiness through alliance with you, and to establish unity with you, that our pen, however quick it may be, remains powerless to set it in writing. If the reverses of time and the revolutions of epoch place obstacles

to our corresponding with distant friends, the time is now ripe to lift the curtain of separation and discord and to open the gates of concord and love.

"There is parity between us, with benediction and mercy of Allah, in declaring holy war (*jihad*), in securing unity in our deeds, people and religion. The most suitable man for your love and friendship is the person who is one with you in language and faith!

"Your high position among the padishahs of the Maghrib (west) – may it remain high always! – is central to protecting the bounds of Islam and to cleansing people of godlessness and revulsion. Our might helps us to suppress the revolt of infidels in the countries of the Mashriq (east). If we fail to establish friendly relations in terms of propinquity of our peoples, if we fail to push forward on the path of unity; if we fail to ensure our interest and parry misfortune away – who will make friends with us? Where and how shall we find water and subsistence?

"With Allah's blessing and mercy, this letter has been compiled and dispatched to his eminence, for whom we wish everlasting gladness and joy, from the town of Maragha at the end of Jumada 622 AH (July 1225). At present, the town is decorated with our triumphant and victorious banners. We are sending you the great *sadr* of the Universe who reached the acme of knowledge, the foundation of the state (*as-sadr al-mu'azzam al-'alam mujahid qawam al-mulk*) Mujir ad-Dawla wa-l-Din Tahir Sharaf al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin, Iftikhar of Khorezm and Khurasan, the highest of governor-generals and qadi of qadis, this oldest rank in our state, so that he could open a path of friendship, and remove the dust of enmity from the mirror of hearts. His language reveals the highest level of our candour, raises the screen of animosity and blows open the gates of friendliness and unity!"

Sultan 'Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I gave the Khorezmshah's envoy a cordial welcome. The goal of the mission was attained: friendly relations between the two sultans were consolidated through the marriage of Ghiyath ad-Din Kay-Khusraw II (1236-1245), son of Kay-Qubad I, to the sister of Atabek Abu Bakr ibn Sa'd (1226-1260), ruler of Shiraz, and a relative of Jalal ad-Din. In a letter of reply composed by Majd ad-Din at-Tughra'i al-Asadabadi, Sultan Kay-Qubad I expressed his satisfaction with the establishment of friendly relations between the sultans.<sup>48</sup>

As well as from Sultan Kay-Qubad I, the Khorezmshah's message received a response from the ruler of Damascus al-Malik al-Mu'azzam. It was the *qadi* of Damascus Najm ad-Din Khalil who delivered this message to Khorezmshah and who, on behalf of his sovereign, negotiated a defensive and offensive pact with the Khorezmshah. Joining these alliances was a ruler of Irbil Muzaffar ad-Din Gok-Bori. The new allies of Jalal ad-Din mentioned his name in the *khutba* and on coins.<sup>49</sup>

While in Maragha, Sultan Jalal ad-Din sent a letter to *ra'is* Shams ad-Din at-Tughra'i, governor of Azerbaijan's atabek Uzbek. In this letter, he asked Shams ad-Din to allow his soldiers to enter the town and purchase provisions. The *ra'is* gave his consent, though soon afterwards the Khorezmians started plundering the townspeople and using violence. The townspeople appealed to the sultan who sent his *shihna* with a group of soldiers to prevent pillages. However, these soldiers settled down in Tabriz

and began extorting money. The townspeople appealed once again to the sultan.<sup>50</sup>

But the complaints of both the *ra'is* and the townspeople went unheard. Consequently, Nizam ad-Din at-Tughra'i (nephew of Shams ad-Din) solved the problem in his own manner: the residents killed the Khorezmians and organized town's defence. Then Jalal ad-Din sent troops of Tabriz and began besieging the town. Tabriz was encircled by catapults, siege artillery and scaling ladders; all the trees around the town felled. For seven days the Tabriz townsfolk headed by *ra'is* Nizam ad-Din Tughra'i fought against Khorezmians, and they asked for mercy only after the enemy came up closer to the town walls. Tabriz surrendered on 17 Rajab 622 AH (25 July 1225). As for Atabek Uzbek, he fled from Tabriz to Ganja when Jalal ad-Din was staying in Maragha.<sup>51</sup>

Malika-khatun, Uzbek's wife who still remained in Tabriz, asked Jalal ad-Din to guarantee the safety of her and her retinue and the inviolability of her property. She also asked him to grant her the town of Khoy where she might remain under the Khorezmshah's protection. Jalal ad-din complied with her request, and she went to Khoy.<sup>52</sup>

While at Tabriz, Jalal ad-Din sought to demonstrate his care and justice in respect of the townsfolk; he regularly accepted applicants and examined their complaints. He told the population: "You're witnessing my good deeds; I've built new buildings in Maragha that was fully destroyed. I'm just and I'm eager to rebuild your town".<sup>53</sup>

Ra'is Nizam ad-Din at-Tughra'i was appointed as a head of the town, and he kept on running the town administration. Jalal ad-Din stayed several days in Tabriz, entrusted his vizier Shams al-Mulk with supervising the situation in the town, and then took the field against Georgia.<sup>54</sup>

In Sha'ban 622 AH (August 1225), a 60,000-strong army of Georgians headed by Ivane Mkhargrdzeli concentrated at the fortress of Garni, near Dvin, with the intention of launching attack on Azerbaijan. In an-Nasawi's words, the Georgians launched an enormous army and sought "to give the Sultan a chance to understand the might and numerical strength of the Georgians. They hoped that the Sultan would conclude a truce with them and thus enable the Georgians to get rid of the threat. This is why they decided to take the field: but they forgot that the state of the Atabeks of Azerbaijan had collapsed".<sup>55</sup>

Juwayni reports that when Atabek Uzbek lost his power and went over to Sultan Jalal ad-Din, "the Georgians were seized with a desire to possess themselves of the country, wishing in the first place to drive out the Sultan and capture the kingdom of Tabriz and then to proceed to Baghdad to set up the Catholicos in place of the Caliph and turn mosques into churches".<sup>56</sup>

To all appearances, Juwayni - who wrote this story three decades after the events in question - imputed to the Georgians intentions which they never had. At any rate, in a response to the declaration of war made by Jalal ad-Din they wrote about their determination to defend the country: "We too were attacked by those Tatars whose behaviour towards your father - a man who ruled a larger territory than you, and who commanded a larger army - will be familiar to you. Indeed, the Tatars captured your country. But they did not frighten us, and in the end all they wanted was to escape

back to where they came from”.<sup>57</sup>

After Jalal ad-Din captured Dvin he took the field against the Georgian army near Garni. “When he reached Garni, he saw that the Georgians were camped on a hill. However, he was not daunted by their numerical strength, and waited all day long for the Georgians to go down the mountains but they did not...”.<sup>58</sup> Then Jalal ad-Din led his army against the Georgians, and the Georgians were utterly defeated and could no longer recover. 20,000 Georgian soldiers were killed, and scores of them, including famous prince Shalva Akhaltsikheli, were taken prisoners.<sup>59</sup>

Following his victory at Garni, Jalal ad-Din sent his troops across Georgia where they began pillaging the country and enslaving the population. In the course of these events, two former vassals of the atabeks of Azerbaijan - Sharaf ad-din Uzdar and Husam ad-Din Khidr, rulers of the district of Surmari, on the banks of the Arax - entered Jalal ad-Din’s service. Both rulers of Surmari served as guides to show the sultan’s army ways across passages and valleys deep into the Georgian lands.<sup>60</sup>

While moving toward Tiflis, Jalal ad-Din received a malicious letter from his vizier Sharaf al-Mulk who accused *ra’is* of Tiflis Shams ad-Din at-Tughra’i and his nephew Nizam ad-Din of plotting to kill Jalal ad-Din and return Tabriz to Atabek Uzbek.<sup>61</sup>

As is clear from the work of an-Nasawi, the vizier Sharaf al-Mulk began his career by denouncing and slandering various senior officials.<sup>62</sup> Realizing that Shams ad-Din at-Tughra’i and his nephew enjoyed great authority among Tabriz residents, the vizier unjustly claimed that they were conspiring with Atabek Uzbek. An-Nasawi points out that “Shams ad-Din at-Tughra’i was devout and just; he cared for his subjects and shielded them from fear, and he allowed nobody to transgress the boundaries of justice. If people in Tabriz were ever afflicted with unjust demands or excessive burdens, he came to their aid, admonishing corrupt officials and sending them off in disgrace”.<sup>63</sup> It was obvious that the vizier who was on the wrong side of the law could not make it up with such a person, and “with the help of liars and inveterate rogues who testified against at-Tughra’i and his brother’s son”.<sup>64</sup> The sultan thus decided to punish the ‘conspirators’.

Nizam ad-Din at-Tughra’i was immediately executed while *ra’is* Shams ad-Din was imprisoned and his property confiscated by the vizier.<sup>65</sup> Remorseful at his mistake, in 1228 the sultan again appointed Shams ad-Din at-Tughra’i as his governor to Tabriz.<sup>66</sup>

While at Tabriz, Sultan Jalal ad-Din married, at her behest, the wife of Atabek Uzbek, thus in violation of shari’a law. The Qadi of Tabriz opposed this marriage because the atabek had not granted his wife a divorce. However, on the basis of false evidence her marriage with atabek was dissolved, leaving the sultan legally free to marry Malika.<sup>67</sup>

From Tabriz the sultan directed his steps to Malika’s possessions – towns of Salmas and Urmiya together with the districts which he granted to his wife as a wedding present.<sup>68</sup> Then sultan moved to Tiflis, and on his way he captured towns of Ganja, Baylaqan, Shamkhor and Shutur.<sup>69</sup> The fugitive Atabek Uzbek was staying in Ganja. His governor of Ganja, *ra’is* Jalal ad-Din al-Qumi who “had riches, might

and huge power”, yielded the town to amir of Khorezmshah Ur-khan and expressed a wish to serve him.<sup>70</sup>

Uzbek fled from Ganja and hid himself in the fortress of Alinja-Qala near Nakhchivan, while maintaining his claim to the district of Ganja. However, having learned that the sultan’s army was engaged in marauding and plundering, Uzbek lodged a complaint to Khorezmshah which said as follows: “I did not allow even my retinue to engage in plundering. For this reason I ask you to settle harsh of those seeking to take possessions of this district”.<sup>71</sup> Sultan sent a detachment to protect the Ganja district.

While at Alinja-qala, Atabek Uzbek learned that “the Sultan was, step by step, conquering his country. He did not protest until he learned about his wife’s marriage to sultan. He asked an envoy who informed him about the marriage: “Was it with Malika’s consent or against her will?”. The envoy replied: “At her voluntary will and after testimony from her side. She gave presents to divorce witnesses and did favours to them”. According to Uzbek’s vizier Rabib ad-Din Dandan, “when Uzbek heard this news, he laid his head on a pillow, went hot and cold, and died in several days”.<sup>72</sup>

The death of Atabek Uzbek marked the end of the state of Azerbaijani atabeks. Territories dependent on descendants of Shams ad-Din Ildeniz passed under the control of Khorezmshah Jalal ad-Din Mankburni who ruled over Azerbaijan, Shirvan and Georgia up to the middle of 1231.<sup>73</sup>

In Muharram and Safar 623 AH (January and February 1226), Sultan Jalal ad-Din was engaged in preparing for the march against Tiflis. Before taking the field, Jalal ad-Din met at the fortress of Bjni with the Georgian commander-in-chief Avak, son of Ivane Mkhargrdzeli, and told him: “I have not come here to pillage Georgia, I’ve brought peace. For some reason, you’ve armed yourselves to oppose me, and the peace is broken. Now listen to me attentively, for you are one of the chief viziers of the Georgian court. Have you ever heard about my kin and the grandeur of my realm? I am the son of the supreme sovereign, the Khorezmshah: but fate has proved to be ill-disposed towards the house of the Khorezmshahs, and I have long been afflicted by Chingiz-khan. When it became clear that he was too strong and that I had no strength to stand up to him, I left the kingdom and made my way to Georgia with good intentions. I’ve heard about the might of your country and the bravery of Georgians. Now I want our countries to collaborate in the struggle against common enemy. I’ve heard that your king is a woman. Marry me to her and I’ll be a king of yours, and we’ll defeat our enemies. Should you fail to do what I advice, your country would be routed. If I go away, you’ll all the same be destroyed by Tatars who are already here. You won’t be able to withstand them, and you dispose of no might enough to fight against them. Send a messenger to the queen and inform her of my offer, for I don’t want Georgia to be routed, I’m just willing to defend it against the enemy, so if you back me, your country will live in peace”.<sup>74</sup>

Avak sent a messenger to the queen Rusudana (1222-1245), however, the latter rejected an offer of Khorezmshah, whereupon combat operations in Georgia resumed. Reinforced by detachments of Alans, Lakz and Qipchaqs, the Georgian army took the



field against Khorezmshah, however, Jalal ad-Din routed them, seized Somkhiti and pursued the retreating Georgians up to Tiflis.<sup>75</sup>

Queen Rusudana and her court moved to Kutais, leaving a large garrison in Tiflis under the command of brothers Memna and Botso Botsosdzeni. It was hard to predict the outcome of the battle, though in the end a Georgian detachment, retreating under pressure from the Khorezmians, failed to hold back the enemy, and the soldiers of Jalal ad-Din, not without the assistance of Muslims residing in Tiflis, burst into the town through the Ganja gates. During the street fighting the Georgian lost their commander Memna and had to hide themselves in the town's Isani citadel. The Khorezmians inflicted reprisals in the town, and a Georgian chronicler compared devastation of Tiflis with the destruction of Jerusalem by the Roman Emperors Vespasian and Titus.<sup>76</sup>

When queen Rusudana learned about the grievous state of the garrison in Isani, she ordered it to surrender. About 10,000 Georgian soldiers were taken prisoners. Jalal ad-Din gave them the option of adopting Islam, but the prisoners refused and, according to the Georgian chronicler, all of them were slaughtered on a bridge across the river Kura later called "the bridge of ten thousand of Tiflis martyrs".<sup>77</sup>

Tiflis was captured by Jalal ad-Din on 8 Rabi' I 623 AH (9 March 1226). An-Nasawi noted: "Sword dealt with Tiflis residents and the soldiers looted to their utmost. Nobody would be able to count the captured riches".<sup>78</sup>

After the capture of Tiflis Jalal ad-Din raided into Georgian provinces of Somkhiti, Kartli, Trialeti, Samtskhe, Tao, Javakheti and Artaani. Having captured East Georgia, he began minting here coins on his behalf.<sup>79</sup>

In Jumada II 623 AH (June 1226), while Jalal ad-Din was fighting in Georgia, he learned about the betrayal and revolt of *hajib* Baraq, his governor in Kerman. Baraq stopped rendering tribute to the sultan's treasury, and sent a letter to the Mongols, informing them that the sultan had few troops in Kerman and asking them to dispatch a campaign against Jalal ad-Din.<sup>80</sup>

Jalal ad-Din covered the entire lengthy distance from Tiflis to Kerman in 17 days. Earlier he sent an envoy to Baraq with orders for Baraq to obey. However, Baraq locked himself up in a strong fortress, the siege of which took much time. Meanwhile, Jalal ad-Din was engaged in preparing a march against Khilat, and after staying for several days near Isfahan he returned to Tiflis, especially as he was informed by vizier Sharaf al-Mulk about the assault of al-Malik al-Ashraf, ruler of Khilat, on sultan-owned lands. Baraq thereafter became an independent ruler of Kerman.<sup>81</sup>

While Jalal ad-Din stayed in Iraq, vizier Sharaf al-Mulk camped in Tiflis and decided to replenish his food supplies at the expense of neighbouring lands. He invaded Arzrum where his troops came to behave outrageously. With a large quantity of spoils, the vizier started his way back, however, was caught by *hajib* 'Ali, governor of al-Malik al-Ashraf to Khilat. The Sharaf's troops were routed, and the entire spoils were taken back. Sharaf al-Mulk accordingly called Jalal ad-din back from Kerman.<sup>82</sup>

Jalal ad-Din returned from Kerman to Tiflis in Ramadan 623 AH (September 1226) and shortly after assaulted the towns of Ani and Kars, seized the fortresses of

Kemah and Arzinjan.<sup>83</sup> After that he decided to lay a siege to one of the major footholds of Ayyubids on the bank of the lake Van – fortress Khilat. In order to trick Khilat's defenders, Khorezmshah motioned to withdraw troops to Tiflis. Then he made his way for Anatolia and on 13 Dhu-l-Qa'da 623 AH (5 November 1226) he besieged the fortress of Malazgird; but soon after he raised the siege and hastily moved his troops to Khilat, where he launched an assault on the fortress on 15 Dhu-l-Qa'da (7 November).

The troops of sultan came up to the town gates and joined battle, whereupon they burst into the suburbs of Khilat and reached the bazaar Suq ad-Da'iq. The population was ravaged: but some time later the residents of Khilat rose against the invaders and ousted them out of the town. In several days Jalal ad-Din tried to take the town by storm but failed again and again.

The siege of Khilat lasted for 40 days, up to 25 Dhu-l-Hijja 623 AH (15 December 1226), following which Jalal ad-Din had to raise the siege due to cold weather and snow, and in view of the fact that the Iva'it Turkmens were raiding Azerbaijan.<sup>84</sup>

Taking advantage of the fact that Jalal ad-Din was busy with besieging Khilat, the Iva'i captured Azerbaijani towns Ashtar and Urmiya, and levied *kharaj* from the residents of Khoy where sultan's wife Malika was staying. Besides, Iva'is made devastating raids across the country and cut off trade routes toward Tabriz, attacked a caravan of merchants and took from them merchandise and 20,000 head of cattle.

Informed about these events by Malika, Jalal ad-Din immediately punished the Iva'is. "There were countless casualties and decapitated. Jalal ad-Din ran their cattle off to Mughan, and 1/5 (*khums*) of spoils made up a 30,000 head of cattle".<sup>85</sup>

Upon returning to Tabriz, Jalal ad-Din learned that the Mongols had started a new march westwards and had already reached Damghan and environs of Ray. In the beginning of 624 AH (January 1227) Jalal ad-Din discontinued his rest and moved towards Isfahan, where he had extensive stocks of food and a powerful arsenal of weapons. Also, the town turned out "a sea of soldiers" for him. From Isfahan, Jalal ad-Din advanced a 4,000-strong detachment of horsemen that met with the Mongols but dodged a direct confrontation and returned to sultan's headquarters. When the Mongols reached the village of as-Sin, 30 km to the east of Isfahan, Jalal ad-Din inspected the army and an Isfahan home guard, whereupon he went to battle against the Mongol forces.

At the battle of Isfahan on 22 Ramadan 624 AH (5 September 1227) the Mongols were defeated utterly even despite the fact that the left flank of the sultan army was wholly destroyed by the Mongols. During the confrontation, Jalal ad-Din was abandoned by his brother Ghiyath ad-Din Pir-shah, who fled the battlefield with many of his troops.<sup>86</sup>

One of the leading Mongol commanders, Taynal-noyan, observed Jalal ad-Din's heroic conduct in the battle. "Truly", he said, "he is a hero of his time and a chief of his combatants"! In turn Tolui-khan, son of Chingiz-khan, in an attempt to justify the Mongol's defeat in this fighting wrote a letter to Jalal ad-Din which said that "the Mongols routed by Sultans are unworthy of our warriors. We turned them out from us!".<sup>87</sup>

'With this important victory over the Mongols, Jalal ad-Din had covered his weak

points in the east. He now hurriedly returned to Azerbaijan where *hajib* ‘Ali, governor of al-Malik al-Ashraf, had invaded with his army. This invasion was preceded by the developments that made Malika, Atabek Uzbek’s former wife, to appeal to him.

When the sultan was in Persian Iraq, Atabek Uzbek’s former mamluks Beklik as-Sadidi, Sayf ad-Din-Din Sunqurja, Nasir ad-Din Aq-Qush and others, previously employed by Jalal ad-Din, rose against him. “They set up tents in the environs of Tabriz”, we read, and in an attempt to break their word and violate the established order tried to restore the dynasty of Atabeks”.<sup>88</sup>

When the sultan’s vizier Sharaf al-Mulk learned that they were headquartered near Tabriz, he made necessary preparations for the fighting and “during the battle where swords were broken and spears cracked”, supporters of the atabek were defeated and put to flight. Aq-Qush and Beklik were crucified, and “Arran and Azerbaijan cleansed from those privy to the revolt, and from those who were disobedient”.<sup>89</sup>

After that, the sultan now received a report from the vizier that Malika, the atabek’s former wife, “was allegedly inciting the atabek’s supporters to oppose Jalal ad-Din in exchange for power”.<sup>90</sup> But the fact was that Sharaf al-Mulk hated Malika, and tried in every way possible to slander her and misappropriate her property and possessions. To escape from the vizier, Malika thus left the town of Khoy and took shelter at the fortress of Tala on the northern shore of lake Urmiya. Sharaf al-Mulk immediately arrived in Khoy and confiscated Malika’s property. Malika had tried twice to propitiate the vizier but he demanded absolute obedience from her. Having realized that all was in vain, Malika appealed to *hajib* Ali. “She asked him to save her provided she would yield him all fortress and lands she owned”.<sup>91</sup>

In Sha‘ban 624 AH (July-August 1227) *hajib* ‘Ali invaded Azerbaijan and captured the town of Khoy, as well as neighbouring fortress owned by Malika. At the request of the residents of Marand and Nakhichivan, *hajib* ‘Ali captured these towns as well. He could have seized other populated localities of Azerbaijan but contented himself with Jalal ad-Din’s treasury, returned to Khilat and took Sharaf al-Mulk’s daughter prisoner. Malika joined the *hajib* and took the road with him. As for the vizier Sharaf al-Mulk, he was equally cowardly and cruel and fled to Tabriz from *hajib* ‘Ali.<sup>92</sup>

These events were followed by the vizier Sharaf al-Mulk’s sending troops to Arran where his soldiers pillaged the property of the Turkman tribe Kujat-Arslan that settled down in Mughan. From here Sharaf al-Mulk moved toward the river Kura in an effort to invade the lands of Shirvan. He demanded from the Shirvanshah 50,000 dinars in tribute, but the Shirvanshah refused, saying that he would give money to the sultan alone.<sup>93</sup> Then Sharaf al-Mulk sent a 4,000-strong detachment of horsemen, but the Shirvanshah hid himself in the mountains, and the vizier decided to take Nakhichivan from the local ruler Jalaliya, sister of Atabek Uzbek. But the town’s defenders repulsed the vizier’s army, and the latter had to go back to the fortress Shamiran. While at the fortress, he was suddenly attacked by detachments of *hajib* ‘Ali from Khilat, so Sharaf al-Mulk fled to Marand, leaving

behind even his personal train.<sup>94</sup>

From Marand the vizier directed his steps to Tabriz while *hajib* 'Ali re-captured Khoy. In the meanwhile, Nakhichivan yielded to the *hajib* without his striking a blow, and he moved toward Tabriz. However, at that instant Sultan Jalal ad-Din came back from Iraq, immediately took back the regions lost through fault of the vizier. In 625/1228, in the battle of Berkri (north-east of lake Van) the army of Jalal ad-Din defeated utterly the detachments of *hajib* 'Ali who himself escaped by a miracle.<sup>95</sup>

Around this time, the former mamluk of Atabek Uzbek – 'Izz ad-Din Balban al-Khalkhali rose against Jalal ad-Din. Taking the opportunity of Jalal ad-Din's involvement in the war against the Mongols near Isfahan, as well as the invasion of *hajib* 'Ali in Azerbaijan, Balban captured the region and fortress of Khalkhal, another fortress in the district Ardebil.

When Jalal ad-Din returned from Iraq, he laid siege to Balban in the fortress of Firuzabad and compelled them to capitulate and surrender all previously captured fortresses.<sup>96</sup> 'Izz ad-Din Balban was a very powerful rival, so Jalal ad-Din sent a message on 12 Shawwal 625 AH (14 September 1228) to the ruler of Surmari Husam ad-Din Khidr to be delivered to *hajib* 'Ali in Khilat. The text was as follows:

"Jalal al-Dunya wa-d-Din Abu-l-Muzaffar Mankburni ibn Sultan Muhammad ibn Tekish, Khorezmshah, Assistant Amir of the Faithful, with the *'unwan*, "Victory from Allah only!"

"In the Name of Allah, merciful and gracious!

"The great Sovereign of the Universe, Lord just, victorious backed by Allah, winner, champion of faith, pride of state and religion, happiness of Islam and Muslims, lending a helping hand to maliks and sultans, winning vices and discord, Khusraw, monarch of Armenians. May long live his grandeur!

"You should know that all affairs of state are managed to comply with orders addressed to our mamluks and vassals. When we arrived in Azerbaijan, we adopted a firm decision to go to Armenians and to Syria, however, 'Izz ad-Din-Din Balban's revolt over-stepped the limits of what is acceptable, even although he could see our victorious banners. He availed himself of the situation and began inciting discord in the outskirts. To our thinking, it ought to have disrooted the revolt and tackle with state affairs. Therefore we organized a detachment of our servants to send them against mutineers in mid-Ramadan (August 1228).

"After that Balban escaped, and later on settled down in the fortress of Firuzabad while we stayed near the frontier of Khalkhal till the end of Ramadan to get foodstuffs and forage. When the holiday ended, we went to the fortress Firuzabad, while our mamlukes and troops stopped at the fortress walls. We encircled the fortress, so that a bird could not fly in, and ordered to install catapults...

"When the residents of the fortress saw our armaments and our army's military might, Balban realized that he had no alternative but ask for mercy. And he did this, whereupon he was pardoned...

"Three days ago Balban joined the ranks of our mamluks, and we gave orders to appoint a *wali* to govern every fortress. On 12 Shawwal 625".<sup>97</sup>

However, soon after Balaban went over to *hajib* 'Ali's side and using his military support took the field against Jalal ad-Din. The latter managed to decoy Balban into an ambush. He was detained and executed.<sup>98</sup>

In the meanwhile, a tribal association of Qipchaqs consisting of 50,000 tents came to serve Jalal ad-Din. With their help, the sultan tried to capture Darband,<sup>99</sup> but failed. On the other hand, Sharaf al-Mulk succeeded in getting hold of the province Gushtasfi from the Shirvanshah.<sup>100</sup>

The vizier might well have continued his annexation of Shirvan's territories, but the Shirvanshah now outpaced him and presented himself before Jalal ad-Din "without invitation, since he thought that it would be a great honor for him to kiss a Sultan's hand and set foot on his carpet. In doing so, the Shirvanshah would be protected against the reserves of fortune".<sup>101</sup>

Though the vizier advised the sultan "to arrest the Shirvanshah and annex his country to neighbouring possessions of Sultan, Jalal ad-Din disagreed with him and released the Shirvanshah. He presented him with garments of honour and observed all the ceremonies".<sup>102</sup>

Jalal ad-Din straightaway started his second great campaign against Georgia. When queen Rusudana learned about it, she "gathered together in Tiflis armies of the east and west, armies of Ers, Kahs, Somkhitars, Javakhs, Meskhs, Taoy, Dadiani, Abkhazs and Jiks, and, opening up the gates of the Dariel Pass, dispatched the Ossetians, the Durzüks and the other mountain peoples to wage war against the Khorezmians. Around the time that these forces reached Tiflis, the Sultan was camped near Bolnisi. When the Khorezmian sentry lines noticed their approach, they told Jalal ad-Din about it. A fierce battle commenced. At first, the Georgians enjoyed the upper hand. But God was angry with the Georgians and failed to repress his anger. So the royal army sustained a defeat and fled. The Sultan arrived back in Tiflis. He either pillaged, or destroyed what remained intact".<sup>103</sup>

After Jalal ad-Din defeated the Georgian army, he laid siege to Khilat for the second time (625/1228), until the harsh winter made him to retreat. He then advanced against Mush, Jabakhjur and Diyar-Bakr. The Khorezmians inflicted reprisals in these places, took lots of people prisoners and destroyed villages and crops.

When residents of towns Kharran, Saruj and others learned about Jalal ad-Din's approach, they deserted their homes and fled to Syria. Having ravaged south-eastern Anatolia, Jalal ad-Din returned to Azerbaijan.<sup>104</sup>

1229 saw the death of Ghiyath ad-Din Pir-shah, who together with his amirs had escaped from Jalal ad-Din after the fighting against the Mongols near Isfahan. First, he had fled to Khuzistan, from where he sent his vizier to Baghdad with a letter to Caliph az-Zahir (1225-1226) with a request to help him against his brother. In an effort to proceed with the political line of his predecessor al-Nasir, the caliph did his utmost to back Jalal ad-Din's adversary. The vizier returned from Baghdad "with promises of

assistance and generous benefaction: he came bearing 30,000 dinars".<sup>105</sup>

When Ghiyath ad-Din learned that the Mongols had been routed and that Jalal ad-Din was victorious, he fled to the Isma'ilis in Alamut. When Jalal ad-Din learned about this, he threatened to destroy their fortress unless they deliver up his brother. The head of Isma'ilis 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad III sent a message to him that said: "Your brother has taken shelter with us. He is Sultan and son of Sultan, we are not going to give him up to you, he will stay here and not be sent to your lands. We kindly ask you to be merciful to him and give us a warranty". Jalal ad-Din contented himself with this answer and left for Khilat.<sup>106</sup>

As for Ghiyath ad-Din, he left Alamut together with 500 horsemen for Kerman where he intended to take refuge with *hajib* Baraq. The latter welcomed him with a 4,000-strong detachment, but several days later he gave orders that Ghiyath ad-Din and his mother should be executed as punishment for organising a conspiracy against him. Baraq dispatched Ghiyath ad-Din Pir-shah's head to *qaan* Ogedey, with the accompanying message: "You had two enemies: Jalal ad-Din and Ghiyath ad-Din. I am sending to you the head of one of them".<sup>107</sup>

When Jalal ad-Din took the second field against Khilat and made several raids on south-eastern Anatolia, he received a message from the sultan of Konya 'Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I, who was presently at loggerheads with the Ayyubids. In his message, Kay-Qubad I encouraged Jalal ad-Din to start combat operations against the Ayyubids and promised him every possible assistance from his side.<sup>108</sup>

In Shawwal 626 AH (August 1229), Jalal ad-Din laid siege to Khilat for the third time. This siege proved to be a pinnacle of military successes and a turning point in his life and activity. Driven by hatred towards *hajib* 'Ali, governor of al-Malik al-Ashraf in Khilat, Jalal ad-Din ventured the third siege of Khilat. *Hajib* made several devastating raids on Azerbaijan and even captured Khorezmshah's treasury. Al-Malik al-Ashraf realized that after the capture of Khilat Jalal ad-Din would launch an offensive on his possessions and do away with him. Accordingly, he decided to sacrifice *hajib* 'Ali, and with that end in view declared that *hajib* had invaded Jalal ad-Din's possessions without any order of him and without his knowledge. Al-Malik al-Ashraf appointed 'Izz ad-Din Aybek as governor-general of Khilat and ordered him to arrest *hajib* 'Ali.

When Jalal ad-Din came up to Khilat, an envoy from 'Izz ad-Din Aybek arrived to express Aybek's "submissiveness and humbleness". By appointing Aybek as governor in Khilat, al-Malik al-Ashraf ordered him "to obey Sultan and follow his instructions. He considers himself to be a member of Sultan's entourage like other Sultan armies worldwide".<sup>109</sup>

However, Jalal ad-Din was firm in besieging Khilat, and he demanded *hajib* 'Ali's surrender. By order of al-Malik al-Ashraf, *hajib* 'Ali was executed for meddling in state affairs, so Jalal ad-Din failed to satisfy his vengeance.<sup>110</sup>

Jalal ad-Din thus started besieging Khilat. 12 catapults were installed to shell the town, and a long and merciless siege began. Bolstered up by the townsfolk, the besieged troops vehemently defended themselves. Time passed and winter came, but Jalal ad-Din failed to capture the town. Deep frost and heavy snowfall compelled him to send



his soldiers to neighbouring villages to warm themselves and seek respite. Starvation broke out in the town: the population ate all the cattle, dogs, cats, mice, dead bodies and carrion.<sup>111</sup> About 20,000 emaciated people succeeded in getting out of the town, though practically all of them later died from dystrophy.

The governor of Khilat 'Izz ad-Din Aybek repeatedly appealed to his sovereign for help but received no support. Khilat, as an-Nasawi wrote, "was a burden for invaders and misfortune for residents".<sup>112</sup> Finally, one of the amirs Isma'il al-Iva'i broke down and secretly agreed with Jalal ad-Din that he would take steps to accelerate the town's surrender. As a reward, Jalal ad-Din granted him the town of Salmas and some possessions in different parts of Azerbaijan as *iqta'*.<sup>113</sup>

At night, Isma'il al-Iva'i let a rope down the town walls and some time later the Khorezmians burst into Khilat. At the insistence of his amirs and khans, Jalal ad-Din gave his consent to a general pillage, and over the course of three days the Khorezmian soldiers plundered and killed the townsfolk. Khilat was captured following an eighteen-month siege on 14 April 1230.<sup>114</sup>

Juwayni refers to a text of the deed (*fath-nama*) issued by Jalal ad-Din on the occasion of Khilat's seizure:

"Praise and thanksgiving unto the Creator – glorious and sublime is His name! – who hath caused victory and triumph to accompany our fortune-begetting counsel and our empire-increasing banners!

"By a single movement a whole clime comes into the possession and control of the servants of our house – to which God grant eternity! – and with another step a whole army is imprisoned in our might and subjected to our command. And "this is of the favour of my Lord, to try me whether I will be thankful or unthankful". \*

"And thus our banners, with triumph embroidered upon them and bearing the effigy of victory, for eight months (from August 1129 to April 1230) formed a circle round the town and environs of Khilat... Great numbers of soldiers from Diyar-Bakr and the banks of the Euphrates, from Egypt and Syria, and some also from the lands of the East and from the Turcoman and Turkish tribes had crowded together into the town...

"The madness of pride had penetrated the core of these rebels' hearts so that no room was left for the acceptance of admonishment. Finally, at the end of Jumada I (April 1230) our victorious followers received permission to fight, and orders were given that everyone should make a breach where he stood and every man seek entry in the place in front of him. Our lion-like retinue and valiant followers, who had long wearied of their standing idle and had in all manner of ways begged leave to do battle, engaged for three days and nights in a bitter struggle, seeking to enter the town from every side.

"On Sunday 28 Jumada I (15 April 1230), at sunrise when the towers and battlements had been decked out with a vanguard of banners and standards as the heavens with stars and shouts and cries arose from every side of the town, the opponents of our house took refuge in a castle in the middle of the town and our victorious followers

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\*Koran XXVII, 40

busied themselves with looting and pillaging. And although the people of Khilat, in view of their persistence in error, had no right to mercy, yet it was our just and benevolent counsel to spare their lives, and we gave command to our men to desist from plundering.

“Some of our opponents, perceiving that the road of flight was closed and the gate of our all-embracing mercy open, proffered excuses and sought pardon, saying: “O Lord! We have dealt unjustly!”\*.

“And today the brothers of al-Malik al-Ashraf, viz. Mujir ad-Din and Taqi ad-Din, as also ‘Izz ad-Din Aybek, the ruler of Arzan [Husam ad-Din Toghrul] and the amir Aqşam, every one of them, together with Asad al-Mihrani and all the officials of the Ayyubids, *nolentes volentes*, strung upon the string of allegiance...”<sup>115</sup>

Also, a wife of al-Malik al-Ashraf and a daughter of Ivane Mkhargrdzeli Tamta was taken prisoner in Khilat and later became Jalal ad-Din's wife.<sup>116</sup>

The sultan of Konya ‘Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I saw in Jalal ad-Din a menacing potential threat that he tried to ward off through directing it to the struggle against Ayyubids with whom the Seljuqs of a Rum fought for lands in the south in Anatolia. Jalal ad-Din's military actions in the area of the lake Van and to the south took place in the direct proximity from possessions of ‘Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I. This fact led the Seljuq to devise measures aimed at warding off threads from Jalal ad-Din who, sooner or later, depending upon circumstances could invade lands of the Konya Sultanate.

‘Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I tried to draw Jalal ad-Din's attention away from affairs in the west by directing his attention to the prospects of relations with the Mongols. However, ‘Ala ad-Din did not think of supporting Jalal ad-Din in his struggle against the Mongols but rather of turning the Khorezmshahid state into a buffer against the Mongols. The sultan of Konya was apprehensive that Jalal ad-Din's military actions would result in a Mongol invasion and thus threaten security of his own possessions. When, in reply to a letter from the Konya sultan in Tughtab, the Khorezmshah sent a message to Konya, ‘Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I told Jalal ad-Din's envoys the following: “We have a great respect for the triumphant Sultan. I should like to inform him that his lofty intentions, as the instigation of certain traitors, \*\* rebounded to the advantage of Khilat turned out in favour of Khilat, and his actions are extremely unreasonable. We believe that today the most acceptable thing for us to do is to seek peaceful agreement with the Mongols. If acceptable, let the Sultan do his best to open the door for peace talks. On behalf of all Muslims it would be helpful if the Sultan could immediately send envoys to the Mongols. There is hope that with the help of endearing words, money and gifts both parties would be able to put out the fire of discord.

“Beyond any doubts, the Sultan is well aware that if he will act in that direction he is able to play our cards right. Should the Sultan succeed in adopting this decision and thus fostering the prosperity of his state, then he would free up his troops from

\* Koran, VII, 23/22

\*\* The reference here is to Jalal ad-Din's vizier Sharaf al-Mulk, who was a staunch opponent of sultan ‘Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad and incessantly incited Jalal ad-Din to attack the lands of the Konya Sultanate.

campaigning against the Christians of Georgia and the neighbouring lands, and would instead use them in campaigning against Arran. Should the Sultan send envoys to the Mongols and ask for an armistice, refrain from oppressing Muslim countries and aimless bloodshed, we would spare neither gold nor silver for this to happen. However, if deceived by traitors (vizier Sharaf al-Mulk is meant here – Z.B.) he should reject this advice, it is necessary then to give him a perspicuous advice from a collation of Muslim rulers. We are seeking to attain our goals and we shall choose a path of stopping the threats, and struggle for our interests to be respected”.<sup>117</sup>

Incited by the vizier Sharaf al-Mulk, Jalal ad-Din had for a month given no answer to the message of ‘Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I and instead, beguiled his envoys with feasts and pleasures. Finally, even Jalal ad-Din’s courtiers began showing their displeasure with his delay in responding. However, no reply was ever given.

During a siege of Khilat, Jalal ad-Din received a letter from his sister Khan-Sultan who, while in Mongolian captivity, had become married to Chingiz-khan’s son Jochi. Her letter had something in common with the above cited message of Sultan ‘Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I. She wrote to Jalal ad-Din as follows: “The Khaqan has been informed of your might and grandeur of your possessions. Therefore he has decided to become related with you and agree about demarcation of your possessions with the Jayhun river: you’ll possess all beyond this line. Hence, if you are in a position to oppose the Mongols, take vengeance on them, fight against them: if you succeed, do whatever you like; if you fail, seek a chance to make your peace with them while they are still eager to do it!”.

As an-Nasawi laments, however, Jalal ad-Din failed to reply to his sister’s letter.<sup>118</sup>

Still trusting in Jalal ad-Din’s good sense, the sultan of Konya ‘Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I hoped that he would now confront the Ayyubids, who were Konya’s enemies. However, at that moment a cousin of ‘Ala ad-Din and ruler of Arzan ar-Rum Rukn ad-Din Jahan-shah came to express his submissiveness to Khorezmshah, noting that in the past Rukn ad-Din Jahan-shah had been at loggerheads with ‘Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I and was a vassal of al-Malik al-Ashraf and jointly with *hajib* ‘Ali opposed Khorezmshah. However, “when he saw that the kingdom of Khorezmshahs had consolidated its might and that Khilat would soon be captured, he wrote a letter to the Sultan asking for mercy”.<sup>119</sup> Then Rukn ad-Din arrived at the Khorezmshah’s headquarters where he was heartily and cordially welcomed and instructed to take part in the war against the Ayyubids.

Over this same period, Sultan ‘Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I sent envoys to Jalal ad-Din who presented him with “gifts and valuables in an effort to please him”.<sup>120</sup>

However, the envoys of the Konya sultan failed to reach Jalal ad-Din. Not only were the envoys received as representatives of a worthless vassal, but they were also humiliated and insulted. When the envoys “reminded the sultan of the enmity between themselves and the ruler of Arzan ar-Rum and asked him to allow them to take Arzan ar-Rum from the ruler and, even better, give the ruler to them and thus unburden their grudge and hatred to him”, Jalal ad-Din categorically rejected the demands of

the Konya representatives. Even worse, vizier Sharaf al-Mulk coarsely added: "Should Sultan allow, I'd invade your country and forcibly capture it!"<sup>121</sup>

The envoys of 'Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I failed to settle their differences with Jalal ad-Din and came back with a reply that could not satisfy their sovereign. They told him that "all their efforts to establish friendly relations between the two parties, resume agreements on mutual aid and support were unavailing".<sup>122</sup>

It was his fear of unpredictable actions of Jalal ad-Din and his army, as well as a threat to the very existence of all minor possessions in Asia Minor, Syria and North Mesopotamia, that urged the Konya sultan 'Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I to establish a coalition against Jalal ad-Din. The coalition included the ruler of Damascus al-Malik al-Ashraf, the ruler of Khoms Ibrahim Shirkuh, the ruler of Khartabert Urtuk-khan, the ruler of Aleppo Shams ad-Din Sawab, the sultan of Mayafariqin Shihab ad-Din Ghazi and the sultan of Banyas al-'Aziz 'Uthman. In his message to al-Malik al-Ashraf 'Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I wrote: "It is impossible to stop Jalal ad-Din without military force, and all the efforts to please him were unavailing. There is nothing left for us but to coordinate our words and deeds and protect our powers".<sup>123</sup>

Caliph al-Mustansir (1226-1242) tried to hinder internecine wars of Muslim sovereigns and bring them to reason in the face of the terrible danger of the new Mongol invasion. However, he failed to reconcile Jalal ad-Din with the members of the coalition.<sup>124</sup>

To all appearances, Jalal ad-Din did not regard Ayyubids as serious rivals, and considered occupied Khilat as a part of his own territory. Testifying to this is the fact that "he was carried away by restoring the town, rebuilding it, and new regretted that he gave his permission to plunder and destroy Khilat. He allocated 4,000 dinars from the treasury for restoration of walls destroyed by catapults, and they were erected very quickly. He divided the Khilat area into *iqta'* to the khans and amirs".<sup>125</sup>

The fact that after the capture of Khilat Jalal ad-Din moved his army westwards, to Malazgird, not southwards where Sultan Alp-Arslan routed the army of Byzantine Emperor Roman Diogenes, went to show that he intended to destroy the Konya Sultanate. Around this time Rukn ad-Din Jahan-shah, a vassal of Jalal ad-Din and a ruler of Arzan, told him that talks were under way between the Ayyubids and the sultan Konya about joint actions against the Khorezmshah. Rukn ad-Din advised Jalal ad-Din:

"It would be more reasonable if we launch an offensive before they combine their efforts: otherwise, the situation will aggravate. It is essential to fight against each party on its own while they are separated and camped far from each other. This would be much more effective than allowing them to undertake joint operations".<sup>126</sup>

Jalal ad-Din and Rukn ad-Din Jahan-shah agreed on joint actions "in five days" to take the field against Ayyubids from Khartabert and thus stymie their joining with the Konya army. Unexpectedly Jalal ad-Din fell ill, and even his entourage began to think that he would not pull through the disease. Rukn ad-Din hurried Jalal ad-Din to take the field and regularly informed him about the advance of enemy army. However, it was the Khorezmshah's disease that disturbed the scenario, so the time was lost.

While at Sivas, coalition allies gathered together and advanced toward Arzinjan across the Western Euphrates valley. Marching opposite them were the troops of Jalal ad-Din, though none of them had an idea of the plans of another party.

On 25 Ramadan 627 AH (7 August 1230), on a plain near Mt. Yassi Chaman, near Arzinjan, the first clash took place between a detachment of Jalal ad-Din's men and 3,000 mounted troops of 'Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I. Jalal ad-Din brought forward 700 horsemen who defeated these troops utterly. "Just a cloud of dust remained from Seljuqs of ar-Rum, and this cloud rose high above the battlefield. In the end, a camp of allies learned causes of this rout".<sup>127</sup>

Rukn ad-Din Jahan-shah recommended Jalal ad-Din to continue the offensive and finish off the enemy. But Jalal ad-Din declined to do this. It was this procrastination after the battle of Yassi Chaman that saved the allies' army from defeat.

A general engagement between Jalal ad-Din and the coalition occurred on 28 Ramadan 627 AH (10 August 1230). Jalal ad-Din's forces were utterly defeated, and Jalal ad-Din abandoned his troops and fled Khilat.<sup>128</sup> Soon after, he called off the remains of his army to Azerbaijan. Some of Jalal ad-Din's amirs were taken prisoner, while others fled to Mughan and "left their Sultan to the mercy of greedy rascals and hungry villains".<sup>129</sup>

Despite Jalal ad-Din's defeat, the allies desisted from making headway into his own possessions: "The fear and reverence before him paralysed their souls, so they did not dare to pursue him and came back".<sup>130</sup>

On behalf of the allies al-Malik al-Ashraf started peace talks. He entered into correspondence with Jalal ad-Din's vizier Sharaf al-Mulk, saying: "In truth, your Sultan is the Sultan of Islam and Muslims, their support, their barrier and wall between them and the Mongols. It is not a secret for us that his father's death damaged Islam and purity of faith. We know that his weakness came from weakness of Islam, and the damage he suffered turned against all malignant persons. You have experienced the vicissitudes of epoch; you have learnt to apprehend what is useful and what is harmful, tasted of sweetness and bitterness of life – cannot you awake his desire to join our efforts?" Why don't you call him to concord which is so praiseworthy both in the beginning and the end?

"I am a guarantor on behalf of 'Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad and my brother al-Malik al-Kamil. I should like to know if he needs our help and support. I'm ready to foster the solution of his problems, both near at hand and far off. I'm eager to do everything to remove dislike and cause of this discord".<sup>131</sup>

At first, Jalal ad-Din was obstinate but later on came to terms and swore an oath that he abandoned a claim to Khilat and its district. And again, Jalal ad-Din categorically rejected to make a vow to 'Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I that he had no claims to his lands. However, he learned about the Mongolian invasion in Iraq and their advancement toward Azerbaijan, he "had to make a vow".<sup>132</sup>

Having learned about Jalal ad-Din's defeat at Yassi Chaman, head of Isma'ilis 'Ala

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\* See, Koran IV, 51/54; LXXIII,6.

ad-Din Muhammad III, who regarded Jalal ad-Din as a threat to his possessions, “sent a message to the Mongols about the precarious position of Jalal ad-Din and his flight, so he began hurrying them to finally crush the enemy and gain victory”.<sup>133</sup>

Jalal ad-Din suspected the Isma‘ilis of collusion with the Mongols and even succeeded in discovering a name of the Isma‘ili envoy to the Mongols. In this connection Jalal ad-Din sent his *munshi* Shihab ad-Din an-Nasawi to Alamut with a view to identifying the content of their message to the Mongols. However, the Isma‘ilis justified their embassy to the Mongols by the fact that “our land borders upon the Mongols and that we have to negotiate with them to ward off troubles”.<sup>134</sup> However, this was not true: the Isma‘ilis decided to take vengeance on Jalal ad-Din for his cruelty towards them and for his seizure of their lands.

In a while, when the Mongols approached the borders of Azerbaijan, Jalal ad-Din’s vizier Sharaf al-Mulk intercepted a regular letter of the Isma‘ilis to the Mongols which urged the Mongols to make haste in attacking Jalal ad-Din.<sup>135</sup>

When the Mongols received messages of the Isma‘ilis in 628/1230-31, they immediately invaded Azerbaijan and occupied the whole country. In desperate situation Jalal had to apply to all the rulers with whom he had recently been at loggerheads and who decimated his army.

In his message he wrote: “The army of the Mongols is enormous, and the soldiers of dependent countries are afraid of them. If you don’t help them with soldiers and equipment, I’ll be lost, and you’ll be in no position to resist them. Faced with the threat to your children and all Muslims lives, you’d better assist them with a detachment, so that the Mongols meet with a rebuff and our soldiers perk up. If failed, you’ll get what you deserve”.<sup>136</sup>

However, nobody helped Jalal ad-Din. Even worse, when his vizier Sharaf al-Mulk saw that the danger was growing, he began scheming against his sovereign. He sent messages to the rulers of neighbouring lands, insulting Jalal ad-Din and requesting assistance in seizing the Khorezmshah’s possessions. “He aspired to enlist their consent that he would rule Arran and Azerbaijan with his name on the *khutba*. He sent letters to ‘Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I and al-Malik al-Ashraf which expressed his obedience to both, and denouncing the Khorezmshah as “helpless villain”.<sup>137</sup>

Some of these letters were intercepted by Jalal ad-Din, and the vizier was arrested and later executed.<sup>138</sup>

Around this time Jalal ad-Din was staying in Mughan where he went hunting with Mujir ad-Din Ya‘qub, brother of al-Malik al-Ashraf captured by Jalal ad-Din in Khilat. From here Jalal ad-Din sent messengers to the troops that wintered at different places. However, the Mongols attacked these winter camps earlier than the messengers arrived, so his plan to muster the troops came unstuck. Even worse, the Mongols tracked him down and attacked his camp at night. Jalal ad-Din contrived to save himself, following which he sent Mujir ad-Din Ya‘qub to his brother with the following message: “The Mongolian invasion has caused suffering not only to him personally and to his own possessions. All the lands of Islam are faced with ruin. Only by the united joint efforts



of the whole Muslim community and can we stop the Mongolian invasion".<sup>139</sup>

As a result, Jalal ad-Din went to Arran where he hoped to muster a part of his army and Turkmen tribes and thus rebuff the Mongols at Ganja. However, the residents of Ganja were tired of Jalal ad-Din's authority and rose in rebellion against his local representatives. They slaughtered Jalal ad-Din's men and sent their heads to the Mongols, saying that they had defied the Sultan.<sup>140</sup>

The revolt in Ganja was headed by a craftsman called Bandar. However, the forces were unequal, and the military experience of the Khorezmians tipped the balance in favour of the sultan. His soldiers burst into Ganja and dealt shortly with the mutineers. Jalal ad-Din demanded from the town nobility to give up the names of the mutineers, and arrested 30 people, including Bandar. He gave orders for the mutineers to have their heads chopped off near the town walls, while Bandar was executed publicly and cut into pieces.<sup>141</sup>

Jalal ad-Din spent seventeen days in Ganja pending an answer to his message to the rulers of neighbouring countries. However, his expectations proved to be unavailing. Instead of combating the Mongols, Jalal ad-Din threw his troops about different parts of the country, and these troops were involved in pillaging not only Arran and Georgia but lands of the Konya Sultanate as well which great embittered local rulers.<sup>142</sup>

Jalal ad-Din's passiveness may be explained as being due to his disappointment at the position of neighbouring Muslim sovereigns and his awareness of the desperate situation. It was no mere coincidence that during a meeting with his private secretary Jalal ad-Din conceded that he did not expect them to help him.<sup>143</sup>

Jalal ad-Din left Arran for Asia Minor from where he intended to return to Isfahan by a roundabout way. In doing so, he hoped "to consolidate his position and stand on his own feet".<sup>144</sup> Sultan traversed Khilat to Amid (Diyar-Bakr) and intended to leave his train here and travel light to Isfahan together with his family. However, the ruler of Amid, al-Malik al-Mas'ud, daunted at the consequences of the Khorezmshah's stay in his possessions, decided to instigate Jalal ad-Din to take the field against 'Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I who took several fortresses from him: "Truly, ar-Rum is an attainable goal for the Sultan, and he is in position to capture this country; he will have no rivals and he will rule it unimpeded. If the Sultan gains victory over the ruler of ar-Rum and relies of friendly Qipchaqs, the Mongols will be afraid of him, and thus victory will be assured".<sup>145</sup> Al-Malik al-Mas'ud promised Jalal ad-Din to join him with 4,000 horsemen if he takes the field against the Konya sultan.

Jalal ad-Din welcomed the plan put forward by al-Malik al-Mas'ud, and changed his mind to go to Isfahan, so he put up at a settlement near Amid. A chronicler notes that Jalal ad-Din "resembled a drowning man clutching at straw".<sup>146</sup>

In mid-Shawwal 628 AH (August 1231) Jalal ad-Din gave himself up to debauchery and hard drinking. After one such feast, Jalal ad-Din was in a drunken sleep, unaware that the camp had been encircled by the Mongols. They were about to capture his marquee but suddenly Amir Ur-khan with his soldiers came up and kept off the Mongols. Taking the opportunity, servants placed the drunken Jalal ad-Din on a

horse and sent him galloping off.

The Mongols gave chase, and then Jalal ad-Din ordered Ur-khan to cause a diversion, so that he could leave the enemy behind. According to al-Nasawi, “Jalal ad-Din escaped from the Mongols alone, and this was his mistake”.<sup>147</sup> In the meanwhile, Amir Ur-khan with his 4,000-strong cavalry managed to escape from the Mongols and arrived in Isfahan. He seized the town and swayed over it for a while, “until the Tatars attacked him. After that Ur-khan was imprisoned in Fars till 639 (1241-42)”.<sup>148</sup>

In the meanwhile, Jalal ad-Din made his way for Amid, where he hoped to take refuge behind its walls. But the townsfolk did not let him into the town. Jalal ad-Din left Amid and, chased by the Mongols and deserted by his associates, he directed his steps to the mountains near Mayafariqin.

Jalal ad-Din was pursued by 15 Mongols. Two of them caught up with him, but he killed them, and the others dropped behind. Near the village of ‘Ayn Dar, the sultan was seized by the Kurds who robbed and tried to kill him. Then Jalal ad-Din told a leader of the gang: “The fact is that I am a sultan, so do not be hasty in doing away with me. You have a choice: either bring me to the ruler of Mayafariqin al-Malik al-Muzaffar Shihab ad-Din Ghazi, Ghazi, who will give you a reward, or send me to my country, and you will become a prince”.<sup>149</sup>

The Kurd agreed to help Jalal ad-Din and went to find a horse. Jalal ad-Din remained under his wife’s supervision. During the host’s absence another Kurd armed with a spear came to the nomad camp and asked the woman: “Who is this Khorezmian?”. She replied that it was the sultan, who was currently under her husband’s protection. However, this Kurd, whose brother had been killed by the Khorezmians in Khilat, decided that there was no way the prisoner could be the sultan, so he killed Jalal ad-Din with his spear.<sup>150</sup>

Thus ended the life of Khorezmshah Jalal ad-Din Mankburni. He was killed in mid-Shawwal 628 AH (between 17 and 20 August 1231).<sup>151</sup>

The Kurds took away all Jalal ad-Din’s jewellery and the ornaments on his horse. Several days later, one of these Kurds came to Amid dressed in Jalal ad-Din’s clothes and arms. He was seen by one of Jalal ad-Din’s mamluks, who informed al-Malik al-Muzaffar of this news. Al-Malik al-Muzaffar gave orders that the Kurd in question should be executed, together with the entire male population of the village where Jalal ad-Din was murdered. The personal effects and arms of Jalal ad-Din were found and later identified by amirs. His remains were brought to Mayafariqin. Al-Malik al-Muzaffar asked Jalal ad-Din’s uncle Utur-khan if the body was really that of Jalal ad-Din. Utur-khan confirmed that this was so, and began to weep. Jalal ad-Din was buried at night near Mayafariqin, and his grave was razed to the ground to prevent any future violation.

When al-Malik al-Ashraf was informed about the death of Sultan Jalal ad-Din, he did not rejoice, as some expected, but spoke as follows: “You are congratulating me on his death? But you will still reap the consequences of his death, for, by Allah, the Mongols are sure to invade the lands of Islam. From now on there is no one like Jalal

ad-Din to be solidly behind us and Gog and Magog".<sup>152</sup>

Ibn al-Athir crowns his enormous chronicle with a grievous description of the Mongol invasion that affected the countries and provinces of the Near East. Fifty years later, Ibn al-Athir's successor Ibn Wasil experienced that second Mongolian invasion which Ibn al-Athir had predicted, witnessing the fall of Baghdad in 1258 and its destruction by the Mongol forces. He wrote:

"Beyond any doubts, Allah punished Jalal ad-Din for his sins and granted no respite to him but rooted him out. Still, his death marked the extermination of Muslims by the Mongols. After the death of his father 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad, after the destruction of the countries by the Mongols and the carnages over the population Jalal ad-Din fled to India, then turned back. His might increased, his position consolidated, so he captured Kerman, Persian Iraq, Azerbaijan and Arran, and he had an enormous army. If he had behaved decently and justly, if he had not shed no blood, he could have fought the Mongols properly and his army could have been a buffer between us and the Mongols. However, he led a vicious life, sinned, made injustices, was at loggerheads with his neighbours, behaved treacherously and caused displeasure. That led to his death and to the ruin of his army. Next came the Mongolian invasion and the Mongol's triumph over the countries of Islam. If Allah wishes something, He brings about its causes".<sup>153</sup>

Of the same view was Ibn al-Athir who noted: "Jalal ad-Din was a person of bad behaviour who misruled his kingdom. He was at loggerheads with all neighboring rulers; he encroached upon lands of all his neighbours. This is why they all deserted him, and nobody came to his assistance".<sup>154</sup>

However, Jalal ad-Din's private secretary Shihab ad-Din an-Nasawi paints another picture: "He was swarthy, shortish, Turkic-speaking though versed in Persian as well. As for his bravery, he was a lion of lions and the most courageous of daredevils horsemen. He was gentle, never angry or swore. He was serious, never laughed, just smiled and was a man of few words. He loved justice, but a seditious age got the better of him and changed his character. He liked to ease the life of his subjects, but he ruled in an epoch of decay, so he resorted to violence".<sup>155</sup> Jalal ad-Din was staunch under difficult conditions and indifferent to hard trial.<sup>156</sup>

After the murder of Khorezmshah Jalal ad-Din the rumour got about that his armour bearer (*silahdar*), not Jalal ad-Din, was killed. For instance, Ibn al-'Ibri (Bar Hebraeus) points out: "Some say that the person killed was not Jalal ad-Din but his armour bearer. That day Jalal ad-Din was armless and was not wearing the clothes of a Sultan. He was dressed like a Sufi and tramped around the provinces. People say that Jalal ad-Din was noticed in such-and-such a country or town; that in 652/1254 a party of merchants crossed across the river Jayhun and that in the midstream the guards detained an unknown poor man who accompanied the merchants. When the guards tried to find out who he was, it turned out to be Jalal ad-Din. They seized and began beating and questioning him. However, he did not give up and died under torture. Of course, he was not the Khorezmshah: this is impossible to believe, and he was obviously a madman".<sup>157</sup>

After the death of Khorezmshah Jalal ad-Din, a great number of his soldiers,

representatives of Turkic tribes, including Qipchaqs, was scattered in the countries and provinces of the Near East. Our sources refer to them as Khorezmians and, in all probability, this generic term substituted for tribal titles. These also included *katibs*, *faqih*s and other figures of Iranian origin. This group of people was an impressive force with which local rulers had to reckon. The sultans of Konya and Ayyubid princes that had for some period closed their ranks resumed their strife and struggle for territories and dominant position in the region. In the course of this struggle they availed themselves of the military units of Khorezmians. Besides, these units enabled local rulers to secure themselves against the Mongolian invasion. As a result Seljuq sultans and Ayyubid princes hired Khorezmians, allotted them substantial pilots *iqta'* in the localities liable to the Mongolian invasion, i.e. borderlands.

After Jalal ad-Din's death his amirs and chiefs of tribes elected amir Husam ad-Din Qir-khan Malik as their leader, though, as the historian puts it, he was not distinguished by particular bravery and "was negligent in his business".<sup>158</sup>

In August 1231, Konya sultan 'Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I proposed that Qir-khan Malik and his associates – amirs Barakat-khan, Yilan-Bughu, Saru-khan Khanberdy, Sayf ad-Din Sadiq-khan, Atlas-khan, Nasir ad-Din Kushlu-khan, etc. should serve him together with their armies. The amirs made a declaration of loyalty to the sultan and received the region of Arzrum as *iqta'* and three hundred garments of honour. Qir-khan received Arzinjan as *iqta'*.

Around this time, enmity again broke out between the Ayyubid princes, and the sultan of Konya 'Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I decided to make use of the Khorezmians for conquering the Ayyubid possessions. In 1233, the sultan, with the help of the Khorezmians, recaptured Khilat from his former ally al-Malik al-Ashraf. Afterwards Barakat-khan received Amasiya and the surrounding district as *iqta'*, while Kushlu-khan received Larendé and Yaghan-Toghdi-khan received Nighde.<sup>159</sup>

The expansion of the Konya Sultan into Ayyubid territory forced the Ayyubids to take counter-measures. The senior Ayyubid dynast and ruler of Egypt al-Malik al-Kamil headed the alliance of his relatives and started conquering lands in the south of Anatolia. However, the sultan of Konya, with the help of the Khorezmian amirs, managed to cut off all mountain passes on the way of the Ayyubid troops, so the latter had to retreat.

Amir Qir-khan Malik took part in the siege of Kharput and Amid in 632/1234; his soldiers pillaged and plundered everything they could. However, Sultan 'Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I failed to achieve his goal of capturing Urfa, Siverek, Raqqá and other towns in southern Anatolia formerly controlled by the Ayyubids, which failure he blamed entirely on the Khorezmian amirs.

The infuriated Kay-Qubad I decided to launch a new campaign against the Ayyubids. He mustered his troops, appointed his son 'Izz ad-Din Qilij-Arslan as heir to the throne, and another son Ghiyath ad-Din Kay-Khusraw as deputy to Arzinjan (Amir Qir-khan Malik received Sivas as *iqta'* in place of Arzinjan). However, on 4 Shawwal 634 HA (4 May 1237) Sultan 'Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I was poisoned, and Ghiyath ad-Din Kay-Khusraw, not 'Izz ad-Din Qilij-Arslan, ascended to the throne.<sup>160</sup>

Amir Qir-khan Malik made a declaration of loyalty to the new sultan, though initially he was among those amirs who had sought to give the throne to 'Izz ad-Din Qilij-Arslan. However, Amir Sa'd ad-Din Kopek accused Qir-khan Malik of refusing to serve the sultan and of withdrawing his troops to other countries. In considering that Amir Qir-khan Malik knew all military secrets of the Sultanate and its armies and could use them to the detriment of sultan, Sa'd ad-Din Kopek opined that if Qir-khan Malik would be imprisoned, other amirs be afraid of sultan and obey him.

Qir-khan Malik was shut up in the fortress Zamantu where he fell ill and died. When other Khorezmian amirs learned about this, they were frightened that they would suffer the same fate, so they abandoned their possessions and allotments and together with their families and fellow tribesmen left Anatolia. However, when leaving the Konya Sultanate, the Khorezmians were engaged in pillaging and extorting, whereupon unrest broke out in the country. Sultan Ghiyath ad-Din Kay-Khusraw sent troops in pursuit of the Khorezmians to thus stymie their departure from the country, but the Khorezmians comprehensively defeated the sultan's army utterly and seized a great quantity of spoils.

After that the Khorezmians took service with ruler of al-Jazira, Ayyubid al-Malik as-Salih who settled them down in the districts of Kharran, Urfa, Saruj and Raqqa.<sup>161</sup>

For ten years (1237-1246) the Khorezmian military played an important role in events in the Middle East. During this period, the Khorezmian military units were headed by Amir Muhammad Barakat-khan ibn Dawlat-Malik with his residence in the fortress of Kharran. Ayyubid al-Malik as-Salih even became related with Barakat-khan by marrying him to his relative.<sup>162</sup>

In Muharram 635 AH (September 1237), the ruler of Damascus al-Malik al-Ashraf died, and in Rajab of the same year (March 1237) the ruler of Egypt, the senior Ayyubid al-Malik al-Kamil also died, so the enmity between the Ayyubid princes came to a head. In this period, the Khorezmians felt themselves infringed by al-Malik as-Salih, so they took the field against him, plundered his possessions and even tried to seize him in the flesh. They captured his treasury and all his valuables, divided them, and assumed mastery over the lands of al-Malik as-Salih. Meanwhile, the latter contrived to flee from them and take refuge in Sinjar. While at Sinjar, he faced attacks of his personal enemy, the ruler of Mosul Badr ad-Din Lu'lu. Al-Malik as-Salih asked for peace, but Badr ad-Din rejected his request, threatening to capture and put him in an iron cage and take him to Baghdad.

Then al-Malik as-Salih called to the Khorezmians for help; he promised not to oppress them, and pledged to grant them Sinjar, Kharran and Rukha. The Khorezmians defeated Badr ad-Din Lu'lu utterly and confiscated all his treasure and valuables.<sup>163</sup>

With the help of the Khorezmians al-Malik as-Salih drove the army of the Konya sultan away from Amid and helped his son Turan-shah out the siege.<sup>164</sup>

Thus, al-Malik as-Salih availed himself of the military aid of the Khorezmians who protected him against sorties made by his opponents. Note that the authority of the Khorezmians rose, and al-Malik as-Salih made any concessions to the Khorezmians in order to keep tranquillity and preserve his power.

Confident in the Khorezmians' support, al-Malik as-Salih got down to seizing

possessions owned by the younger representatives of the Ayyubid family. In Jumada II 636 HA (January 1239), al-Malik as-Salih captured Damascus owned by the ruler of Egypt al-Malik al-'Adil. When assisting al-Malik as-Salih in seizing new possessions, the Khorezmians did not confine themselves to receiving gifts from their sovereign. They ventured to conquer neighbouring lands. They came to an agreement with a vassal of al-Malik as-Salih, the ruler of Hama al-Malik al-Muzaffar, and decided to capture Homs in 1239 owned by Asad ad-Din Shirkuh. However, the latter paid a great ransom and the Khorezmians abandoned Homs.<sup>165</sup>

In Ramadan 637 AH (April 1240) al-Malik as-Salih took the field against his brother al-Malik al-'Adil, ruler of Egypt, and in Dhu-l-Qa'da the same year (June 1240) captured Cairo, arrested his brother and proclaimed himself as ruler of Egypt. Without a patron in Syria, the Khorezmians made raids on different towns and fortresses. In 638/1240, they assaulted the fortresses of Ja'bar and Balis, captured them and pillaged and killed a greater portion of their residents.<sup>166</sup> Ruthless raids of the Khorezmians in the Ayyubid possessions served purpose of the ruler of Mosul Badr ad-Din Lu'lu who in 638 AH captured the Ayyubid fortress of Sinjar over which he retained control until his dying day in 657/1257.<sup>167</sup>

In the meantime, the Khorezmians kept on committing acts of violence in the Syrian lands. In Rabi' I 638 AH (October 1240), 12,000 Khorezmians jointly with the troops of Badr ad-Din Lu'lu attacked the town of Aleppo. Despite the residents determination, all resistance was crushed. The Khorezmians captured numerous prisoners and rich trophies but Aleppo held out. The Khorezmians pillaged and destroyed town's districts, killed locals. After that, the Khorezmians destroyed the town of Manbij and massacred its population.<sup>168</sup>

Having returned to Kharran for a short while, the Khorezmians later crossed the Euphrates near Raqqa and captured and plundered the towns of Jubul, Tell A'zaz, Surmin and Ma'arra. The populations of these towns fled in fear from the Khorezmian cavalry.

Coming to the aid of Aleppo residents and townspeople of other towns of Syria were the armed of the ruler of Khoms al-Malik al-Mansur, and deputy of al-Malik as-Salih in Damascus al-Salih Isma'il. These troops began chasing the Khorezmians who left for Shayzar and then toward Hama, Salmia and Rusafa in an effort to reach Raqqa.

Later in Sha'ban 638 AH (March 1241) the Khorezmians were caught up in midstream of Euphrates when fighting broke out. The Khorezmians put forward a strong echelon and contrived to cross the river. However, on the 21<sup>st</sup> of Ramadan (9<sup>th</sup> of April, 1241) the Ayyubids reached the Khorezmians who had to escape as fast as they could. Ayyubids pursued them before the night fell and took scores of them as prisoners. After that, the Ayyubids took the field against a residence of Khorezmians – town Harran and captured it. The Khorezmians left for Ana. Then they lost towns, once owned by them: Nisibin, Daru, Raqqa, Ruha, Saruj and Ra's al-'Ayn.<sup>169</sup>

Having been comprehensively defeated on Syrian territory, the Khorezmians were obliged to look for new places of residence. In 630/1241 an alliance was concluded between them and the ruler of Mayafariqin al-Malik al-Muzaffar who obliged them



to protect his possessions in case of assault from the Konya sultan Ghiyath ad-Din Kay-Khusraw.<sup>170</sup> In turn, the ruler of Mayafariqin undertook to launch a joint offensive against Amid. But during their approach they were attacked by the Ayyubid army, which expelled them from the vicinity of Amid and then proceeded to carry out raids on the territory of al-Malik al-Muzaffar before returning to Aleppo.<sup>171</sup>

In Safar 640 AH (August 1242) a bitter conflict broke out between the Khorezmians and Ayyubids in the vicinity of Khabur. The Khorezmians and their ally al-Malik al-Muzaffar were defeated utterly and fled leaving their loads behind. The Ayyubids captured rich spoils of war and treasury of al-Malik al-Muzaffar.<sup>172</sup>

The sultan of Konya advanced several times against the Khorezmians, but he then made peace with them, promising them *iqta'*, though only on the frontiers of the sultanate. But the Khorezmians did not accept these conditions and went southwards, to Syria.<sup>173</sup>

Here the Khorezmians began to adopt a nomadic way of life until in 624/1244 the ruler of Egypt al-Malik as-Salih invited them to enter his service. In an attempt to beat off an attack of the ruler of Damascus as-Salih Isma'il and his allies – ruler of Karaka al-Malik an-Nasir, ruler of Homs al-Malik al-Mansur and crusaders to whom he granted the towns of Shakif, Tabaria, Askalon and Jerusalem,<sup>174</sup> al-Malik as-Salih came to an agreement with the Khorezmians about their joint campaign against his enemies.<sup>175</sup>

Under the command of amirs Husam ad-Din Barakat-khan, Khanberdy, Saru-khan and Kushlu-khan, an army of 10,000 horsemen crossed the Euphrates; from there one group made its way to the Bekaa valley; another group advanced to Damascus destroying and smashing up populated localities, killing their residents. The ruler of Damascus took refuge in the citadel, while the Khorezmians swiftly moved via Palestine, captured the towns Khalil, Tabaria and Nablus, destroyed and pillaged them. Finally they reached Jerusalem. On 11 July 1241 the Khorezmians captured Jerusalem, slaughtered all the Christians, took relics of saints out of churches, burnt them down. About 6,000 crusaders took shelter in the citadel of Jerusalem. Through the mediation of the ruler of Karaka al-Malik an-Nasir the crusaders managed to leave the town. When the knights moved away from Jerusalem, the Khorezmians attacked them and massacred nearly all of them. Just 300 knights succeeded to reach Jaffa.<sup>176</sup>

From Jerusalem the Khorezmians moved towards the Mediterranean sea coast and after a short siege captured the town Ghaza. They sent an envoy to Cairo who informed the local authorities that they had arrived at command of al-Malik as-Salih. The latter ordered them to stay in Ghaza and delivered them a great quantity of clothes, horses and money.<sup>177</sup>

The sultan of Egypt al-Malik as-Salih fitted out a large army under the command of amir Rukn ad-Din Beybars and sent it to Ghazza to join the Khorezmians.<sup>178</sup>

The Syrian Ayyubides realized that the united Egyptian-Khorezmian troops posed a great threat to their security, so they made necessary preparations to give a general battle. To repulse the enemy, the Syrian Ayyubids concluded a military alliance with crusaders.

The opponents entered battle on October 17, 1244 at the village Kharbiya, near

Ghazza. The right flank of the Syrian Ayyubids was made of the crusaders – 1,500 horse guards and 10,000 infantry. These troops were commanded by Tyre's lord Phillip of Monfor, Yaffa's count Walter Bryenne, archbishop of Tyre Peter. The left flank included the troops of Karaka's ruler, and the centre – the troops of Hama's ruler. The Egyptians and Khorezmians launched an offensive. The fierce fighting marked the defeat of the Hama's troops, then the Khorezmians encircled the crusaders and slaughtered nearly all of them. About 800 knights were taken prisoners, just a few of them escaped. Total number of casualties made up above 30,000 soldiers of Syrian Ayyubides and crusaders. The Khorezmians seized a great quantity of spoils of war captured count Walter Bryenne and other distinguished knights.<sup>179</sup>

According to the historian, "that was a great day. The history of Islam has never seen anything like even in the epoch of Salah ad-Din (Saladin)".<sup>180</sup>

On 15 Jumada I 642 AH (18 November 1244), the news of the victory over the Syrian Ayyubids and the crusaders reached Cairo, and great festivities on this occasion were held. Captive crusaders and heads of the killed were shown to the townsfolk.<sup>181</sup>

As a result of these military expeditions, the Egyptian sultan sieged, with the help of the Khorezmians, Ghaza, the Palestine seaboard and Jerusalem. After that, Sultan al-Malik as-Salih decided to annex Syria. He fitted an additional expedition and sent it to Palestine where it joined the army of amir Rukn ad-Din Beybars and the Khorezmians. From Ghaza the united forces moved towards Damascus and besieged it. The siege intensified, and the ruler of Damascus asked for a truce. The town was surrendered to the Egyptians on 8 Jumada I 643 AH (1 October 1245), provided that its ruler would leave the town together with his property and servants for Baalbek.

An event took place during the surrender of Damascus that marked a change in the policy of the Egyptian Ayyubids towards the Khorezmians. They were prohibited to enter the town as victors. Instead, they were offered to own *iqta'* on the Mediterranean coast. However, the Khorezmians that played a key role in conquering Damascus without striking a blow, expected to get much greater allotments in Syria, including their share for participating in seizure of Damascus. The Khorezmian amirs considered the Ayyubids' behaviour an affront to their dignity, and decided to remove themselves from subordination to the Egyptian sultan.<sup>182</sup>

The Khorezmians abandoned Damascus and on their way back plundered the town's environs. Their decision to break off with the Egyptian sultan was brought to the notice of Egypt's distinguished commander, Amir Rukn ad-Din Beybars, who was staying in Ghaza. Beybars enjoyed popularity among the Khorezmians; even better, he was married to a Khorezmian, backed them and came down on the side of the Khorezmians in this conflict. After that the Khorezmians informed Karaka's ruler al-Malik an-Nasir about their decision. The latter welcomed their decision, as he sympathized with the Khorezmians (his wife was a Khorezmian as well).<sup>183</sup>

The Khorezmians quickly captured Jerusalem and Nablus, expelling the Egyptian sultan's governors. They then sent a letter to the former ruler of Damascus who was staying in Baalbek, and he supported the Khorezmians as well.

Thus, a coalition was formed to oppose the Egyptian sultan. The united force took the field against Damascus, however, the town was strongly fortified and it was not easy to seize it. A long siege lasted for three months.<sup>184</sup>

Under these circumstances, feelings of relationship were manifest in Ayyubid princes. The Egyptian sultan applied to his relatives for help, and the rulers of Aleppo and Khoms opposed the Khorezmians. The latter had to raise the siege of Damascus and came to meet the opponent. At the same time, Khorezmians' ally amir Rukn ad-Din Beybars, under the pretext of urgent matter, was called to Cairo. When he arrived in the town, he was detained, shut up in a fortress and killed.<sup>185</sup>

On 7 or 8 Muharram 644 AH (25 or 26 May 1246) a violent battle took place near Homs between the Egyptian army, rulers of Aleppo and Khoms and Bedouins, on the one hand, and the Khorezmians and their allies, on the other. The Khorezmians' allies were the first to break order and flee, thus determining the outcome of the battle. The Khorezmians were beaten utterly. Their commander-in-chief, amir Husam ad-Din Barakat-khan, fell in action. His head was displayed on public view in Aleppo. All of the Khorezmians' military transport was seized by the Ayyubids. Scores of the Khorezmians were taken prisoners, while survivors scattered across the provinces of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine were mercilessly pursued. One Khorezmians party of together with the ruler of Karaka made their way for Aleppo. The ruler of Aleppo welcomed his relative cordially while the Khorezmians that arrived with him were arrested. After that, the Ayyubids laid siege to Karaka, where al-Malik an-Nasir and some of the Khorezmians were hiding; to save his own life, al-Malik an-Nasir betrayed the Khorezmians to the besiegers.

The last groups of the Khorezmians were routed near Karaka on 17 Rabi' II 644 AH (September 1 1246). After that, one party of Khorezmians remains in Syria, another part left for Egypt, the third under the commander of amir Kushlu-khan deserted to the Mongols.<sup>186</sup>

This battle marked the end of the activities of the Khorezmian detachments in the countries of the Near East in 1246. Far from their homeland, the soldiers of the last Khorezmshah and their sons, with no funds to live, had to serve various feudal lords and to participate in internecine wars. Many of them lost their lives in these conflicts. After 1246, the Khorezmians effectively disappear from the Arab historical record.

The chronologically last report on the Khorezmians is provided by Rashid ad-Din, vizier to the Ilkhans, in his "Collected Chronicles": In Jumada II 658 AH (June 1260) when Hulagu-khan was staying in Syria, he sent a Mongolian envoy with 40 servants to Egypt with an ultimatum to obey Chingiz-khan, pay a tribute, arrive in the headquarters of Hulagu-khan and ask for *shihna*, otherwise "prepare for war".<sup>187</sup> The chronicle says that some amirs of Khorezmshah Jalal ad-Din, after trials, came to Egypt. They were received by Mamluk sultan al-Malik al-Muzaffar Sayf ad-Din Qutuz (1259-1260) who "welcomed, queried them and presented with gifts". When messengers from Hulagu-khan arrived, Qutuz called the amir for consultations. The Khorezmian amir Nasir ad-Din Muhammad Kaymuri said: "If we pray Hulagu in

patronage, it is not shameful, and it would be unreasonable to drink from a bowl with poison and thus move towards the death. Hulagu's promises and obligations are not kept, because after reaching agreements with Khur-shah, head of Isma'ilis, Caliph al-Mustasim and others were killed, so if we come to see him, he will do the same with us".

Qutuz replied: "Should we fail to be ahead the Mongols and repulse them, Egypt would be devastated, as was the case with other countries. In dealing with the people who encroach upon our country, we have three choices: to make peace, to fight, or to abandon our homeland. Then Nasir ad-Din Kaymuri said: "There is no use in making peace, because they cannot be trusted to keep their word!" So Sultan Qutuz decided to fight against the Mongols.<sup>188</sup>

The battle between the Egyptian Mamluk troops and the Mongols took place on 25 Ramadan 658 AH (4 April 1260) near 'Ayn-Jalut, Palestine. The fighting ended with the defeat of the Mongols and their flight.

As for Sultan Qutuz, al-Maqrizi noted: "They say that his name was Mahmud ibn Mamdud, his mother was a sister of Sultan Jalal ad-Din Khorezmshah, his father was a son of his paternal uncle Jalal ad-Din. Qutuz was taken prisoner by Tatars who sold him in Damascus from where he was taken to Cairo".<sup>189</sup>

Remnants of the Khorezmians settled in Egypt, in north of Syria and Iraq, and in south-west Anatolia. In the north of Iraq descendants of the Khorezmians still reside in the villages of Mosul and Kirkuk districts. They call themselves Turkmens. In Anatolia, they are called Khurzumlu and live in the villages called today Khurzum. There are eight villages of this sort in the vilayat Manisa (Turkey), on shore of the Aegean Sea.

According to Ibn Bibi, after the death of Khorezmshah Jalal ad-Din Mankburni, one of the amirs Saru-khan served the Konya sultan 'Ala ad-Din Kay-Qubad I.<sup>190</sup> Saru-khan, in the view of Turkish researchers,<sup>191</sup> was a founder of the dynasty of Sarukhanids who owned the vilayat of Manisa. This dynasty continued to 815/1412.<sup>192</sup>

In Eastern Anatolia, the Khorezmians settled down in the districts Kutakhia and Alashehir, their descendants live now in the villages Khorzom Ashirei-Ovachik, Khorzom Alayaka, Khorzom Sazdere, Khorzom Keserler, Khorzom-i Enbelli.<sup>193</sup> Besides, there are three villages in Urfa vilayat called Khorezm where descendants of the Khorezmians from Syria reside nowadays.<sup>194</sup>

So ended the epoch of the Khorezmians who together with Khorezmshah Jalal ad-Din Mankburni left their motherland and settled down in different regions of the Near East as a result of the Mongolian invasion.

## NOTES

### Chapter 1

<sup>1</sup> Gharchistan is a mountainous region to the east of Badghis, along the upper Murghab river. All details regarding Anush-Tegin are provided by Ibn al-Athir, Juwayni, Rashid ad-Din, Ibn Khaldun and Hafiz-i Abru.

<sup>2</sup> *Rashid ad-Din*, vol. 1, f. 311a: *wa hamchinin Sultan Muhammad Khorazmshah jadd-i a'la-yi u Nushtakin Gharcha'i bud ham az nizhad Oghuz az awlad Bekdili bud*; Hafiz-i Abru, f. 329b: *salatin-i Khorezm ki jadd-i a'la-yi ishan Nushtegin Gharcha bud az nizhad-i Oghuz az awlad-i Bekdili budand*. – quote to: Kafesoğlu, p. 37 (this important detail remained unnoticed by V.V.Bartold).

<sup>3</sup> *Qazwini*. *Guzida*, p. 480; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 356.

<sup>4</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 278.

<sup>5</sup> *al-Husayni*, p. 87.

<sup>6</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 278; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 190.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 8, p. 184; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 4, p. 124; *Ibn Kathir*, vol. 12, p. 154.

<sup>8</sup> *al-Husayni*, p. 87; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 8, p. 194.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 8, p. 184; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 190.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 8, p. 286-287; *Ibn al-Jawzi*, vol. 9, p. 205; *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 164-165, 197.

<sup>13</sup> *Diwan-i Amir Mu'izzi*. Ed. by Abbas Iqbal. Tehran [n.d.], p. 295-298.

<sup>14</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 278; *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 236.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*; see also: *Awfi*, vol. 1, p. 35-38; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 357.

<sup>16</sup> *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 236.

<sup>17</sup> *as-Safadi*, vol. 7, p. 195.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 8, p. 336-337; *al-Bundari (al-Isfahani)*, p. 154.

<sup>19</sup> For details about this figure see *Bartold*, vol. 1, p. 383-390.

<sup>20</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 279; *Ibn al-Athir* (vol. 9, p. 3) relates this attempt in a different manner. He states that during the hunt Sanjar personally captured a number of Qarluqs whom Arslan, khan of Samarqand, had ordered to kill him. It is quite probable that at this moment Atsiz was near Sanjar and helped him to prevent the plot.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 8, p. 336-337; *al-Husayni*, p. 87; *al-Bundari (al-Isfahani)*, p. 159; *Ibn al-Athir*. *Atabeks*, p. 44-45.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibn al-Jawzi*, vol. 10, p. 35.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 8, p. 349; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 279.

<sup>24</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 279-280; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 358.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 8, p. 364.

<sup>26</sup> Manghishlaq is a strong fortress within the limits of Khorezm. Located between Khorezm, Saksin and regions of Ruses, near the sea where Jayhun flows into; this is Tabaristan (Caspian) sea" (*Yaqut*, vol. 8, p. 183-184). See also: *Bartold*, vol. 3, p. 479-481.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 8, p. 364.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid*. *Juwayni* (vol. 1, p. 280) says that Atliq was captured and brought to the sultan, who ordered for him to be cut into two. See also: *Khondamir*. *Habib*, p. 358.

<sup>29</sup> See manuscript from collection LO IVAN S 816, f. 143b-145b: *Fath-i Khorezm bar dast-i sultan-i a'zam shahanshah-i mu'azzam Sanjar ibn Malik-shah*.

<sup>30</sup> For details about this missive of Sultan Sanjar see: *Köymen*. *History*, p. 318-327.

<sup>31</sup> See also: *Sabiti*, p. 94-97.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 8, p. 364.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 9, p. 7; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 191; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 280; *Qazwini*. *Guzida*, p. 481.

<sup>34</sup> See: *Mar'ashi*, p. 236-237. Kabud-Jama is a district in the eastern part of Astarabad. The rulers of the district were titled *ispahbad* on behalf of the Khorezmshahs.

- <sup>35</sup> *Narshakhi*, p. 23.
- <sup>36</sup> MS. LO IVAN C 816, f. 124b-125b; *Sabiti*, p. 97-99.
- <sup>37</sup> *Watwat*. Rasa'il, part 1, p. 13 ff.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, p. 15.
- <sup>39</sup> *al-Bundari (al-Isfahani)*, p. 178; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 8, p. 361-362; *Ibn al-Jawzi*, vol. 10, p. 72; *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 168-169.
- <sup>40</sup> For the Qara-khitay, see: *Bartold*, vol. 1, p. 386-437; *Köymen*. History, p. 323 ff.
- <sup>41</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 2; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 192.
- <sup>42</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 3.
- <sup>43</sup> *Ibid*; *Narshakhi*, p. 24.
- <sup>44</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 3.
- <sup>45</sup> See about the origin of the term of *gur-khan*: *Bartold*, vol. 2, part 1, p. 50 and footnotes 9 and 10; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 62 and footnote 4.
- <sup>46</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 3.
- <sup>47</sup> *Ibid*, p. 4; *al-Bundari (al-Isfahani)*, p. 276-277.
- <sup>48</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 4.
- <sup>49</sup> See: *Wittfogel*, History, p. 639. *Al-Husayni* (p. 92) gives a highly exaggerated figure of 700 000 soldiers, and suggests that Sanjar had 70,000 horsemen; according to Bar Hebraeus (vol. 2, p. 376), the *gur-khan* had 300,000 soldiers, but Sanjar had 100,000.
- <sup>50</sup> See: *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 376; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 4; *al-Husayni*, p. 92; *al-Bundari (al-Isfahani)*, p. 276-278; *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 168-169; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 192, Qatavan "is a village five farsakhs from Samarqand" (*Yaqut*, vol. 7, p. 137). According to V.V. Bartold, Dargham – is a name of the stream. See: *Yaqut*, vol. 4, p. 53: "Dargham is a small town or district in the Samarqand region. It consists of several villages. Famous for its wine".
- <sup>51</sup> For example, *Hamdallah Qazwini* (*Guzida*, p. 459) writes: "After this march the power of Sultan Sanjar war undermined, and he lost his place in the hearts of people".
- <sup>52</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 4; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 192.
- <sup>53</sup> *al-Husayni*, p. 93; *al-Bundari (al-Isfahani)*, p. 256.
- <sup>54</sup> For Abu-l-Fadl al-Kirmani (d. 1149), see: *Brockelmann*, vol. 1, p. 641.
- <sup>55</sup> See: *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 4; *Ibn al-Jawzi*, vol. 10, p. 95; *al-Bayhaqi*. *Tatimmat*, p. 153-154; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 280; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 192-193.
- <sup>56</sup> MS. LO IVAN S 816, f. 142b-143b; *Sabiti*, p. 100-101; *Köymen*. *Tarih*, p. 339-341; *Kafesoglu*, p. 55-56.
- <sup>57</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 5.
- <sup>58</sup> *Ibid*; *Bayhaqi*, *Tarih-i Bayhaq*, p. 277, 283; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 193.
- <sup>59</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 356.
- <sup>60</sup> *al-Bundari (al-Isfahani)*, p. 280-281.
- <sup>61</sup> See: *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 281. *M. Köymen* (*Tarih*, p. 343 and note 1) writes that the first line of the verse may be regarded as consistent with the course of events; however, the second line is absolutely false, for before the battle at Qatavan all fightings of Atsiz ended with his defeats. See also *Kafesoglu*, p. 54 and next.
- <sup>62</sup> For the family of Burhan and his representatives, see *Bartold*, vol. 2, part 2, p. 515-518.
- <sup>63</sup> *Nizami 'Arudi*, p. 50.
- <sup>64</sup> *Ibid*, p. 51. According to *Narshakhi* (p. 23), Bukhara's *wali* was called 'Ali-Tegin.
- <sup>65</sup> *al-Husayni*, p. 93;
- <sup>66</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 282; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 7.
- <sup>67</sup> *al-Husayni*, p. 93; *al-Bundari (al-Isfahani)*, p. 257.
- <sup>68</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 282; *Qazwini*, *Guzida*, p. 480; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 128.
- <sup>69</sup> *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 170.
- <sup>70</sup> *Sabiti*, p. 104-106.
- <sup>71</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 282.
- <sup>72</sup> See: *Yaqut*, vol. 8, p. 462; *Al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 381.
- <sup>73</sup> *al-Husayni*, p. 93.
- <sup>74</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 282-283; see also: *Köymen*. *Tarih*, p. 347-348.



<sup>75</sup> V.V.Bartold does not mention another group of Khorezmshah's envoys, and refers only to the mission of Ahu-Push.

<sup>76</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 284.

<sup>77</sup> *Sabiti*, p. 102-103.

<sup>78</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 284.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 285. See also: *Bartold*, vol. 1, p. 392.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 33.

<sup>82</sup> See here *Bosworth*. *Gaznavids*

<sup>83</sup> See: *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 149, 357-358.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 33; *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 358. *Nizami 'Arudi* (p. 101, 125) points out that the battle took place at the gate of Auba (village?).

<sup>85</sup> The event is referred to in a triumphant letter of Sanjar sent to various sovereigns on the occasion of Ghurid defeat. See: *Köymen*. *Tarih*, p. 378-379.

<sup>86</sup> According to *Juzjani* (vol. 1, p. 360-361), Sanjar ordered to convey 'Ala ad-Din al-Husayni all the treasures, horses, camels, cattle, etc.

<sup>87</sup> *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 361. This statement of Sanjar is rather reminiscent of a will of sagacious sovereign; otherwise, it is a later loan of Juzjani himself.

<sup>88</sup> See about it: *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 165, 168, 170; *al-Husayni*, p. 90, 92; *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 276-277; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 82.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 5.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibn al-'Ibri*, p. 243.

<sup>91</sup> *al-Husayni*, p. 243.

<sup>92</sup> *al-Bundari (al-Isfahani)*, p. 276.

<sup>93</sup> See: *Bartold*, vol. 1, p. 392 and ff.

<sup>94</sup> *Badi'*, p. 80-82, 84-85.

<sup>95</sup> *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 173.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>97</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 37-38; *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 174-175; *al-Bundari (al-Isfahani)*, p. 281-282.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 38; *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 175; *al-Bundari (al-Isfahani)*, p. 282-283.

<sup>99</sup> For the decline of the Eastern Seljuq Empire see: *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 38-40; *Rawandi*, vol. 1, 175-179, as well as detailed studies by Köymen and Bartold on the Oghuz uprising.

<sup>100</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 286; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 128.

<sup>101</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 286; see also: *Bartold*, vol. 1 ("Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion").

<sup>102</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 286.

<sup>103</sup> *Bayhaqi*. *Tarikh-i Bayhaq*, p. 271.

<sup>104</sup> *Watwat*. *Ara'is*, f. 25a-b.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 27a-b.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 26b-27a.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 23b-24a (*be khaqan-i a'zam Jalal ad-Dunya wa-d-Din Abu-l-Qasim Mahmud ibn Muhammad ibn Bughra-khan... dar tahniyat-i an ki u-ra sipah-i Khurasan be padishahi nishandand nuwisad*).

<sup>108</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 286. Shahrstan is a small town in the Nasa district (*Yaqut*, vol. 5, p. 315).

<sup>109</sup> See: *Watwat*. *Ara'is*, f. 25a-b: "*Wa malik-i Nimruz Abu-l-Fadl Nasr ibn Khalaf as-Sajazi dar istid'a-yi u be mu'awanat-i sultan-i a'zam...*". The letter is given with some abridgements.

<sup>110</sup> On f. 25b-26a of *Ara'is al-khawtir* there is another letter of Atsiz to the ruler of Sijistan in which the Khorezmshah is once again reminded of the importance of "the greatest jihad" and "the greatest march", as well as of the fact that delay in this matter cannot be allowed. See also MS. LO IVAN C 816, f. 50b-52a.

<sup>111</sup> *Watwat*. *Ara'is*, f. 26a.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 20b-21a.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, f. 27b-28a (a letter to 'Ala ad-Din al-Husayni, the Ghurid ruler).

<sup>114</sup> *Bartold*, vol. 1, p. 394. See also: *Köymen*. *Tarih*, p. 464-465.

- <sup>115</sup> *Watwat*. Ara'is, f. 28a-29b; MS. LO İVAN C 816, f. 55a-57a; *Köymen*. Isyan, p. 618-620.  
<sup>116</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 50; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 287.  
<sup>117</sup> *Rashid ad-Din*, trans. vol. 1, book 2, p. 80.  
<sup>118</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 50; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 194.  
<sup>119</sup> See: *Bartold*, vol. 1, p. 395.  
<sup>120</sup> *al-Husayni*, p. 115.  
<sup>121</sup> *Watwat*, Rasa'il, part 1, p. 4, 14, 16, 18.  
<sup>122</sup> *Ibid*, p. 5.  
<sup>123</sup> *Ibid*, p. 7.  
<sup>124</sup> *Ibid*.  
<sup>125</sup> *Ibid*, p. 13.  
<sup>126</sup> *Ibid*, p. 14.  
<sup>127</sup> *Ibid*, p. 18.  
<sup>128</sup> *Ibid*, p. 18-19.  
<sup>129</sup> *Ibid*, p. 22-24.

## Chapter 2

- <sup>1</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 287; *Qazwini*. *Guzida*, p. 490; *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 239; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 129.  
<sup>2</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 50; *al-Bundari (al-Isfahani)*, p. 201.  
<sup>3</sup> *Watwat*. Ara'is, f. 45b-46a.  
<sup>4</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 50; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 194.  
<sup>5</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 288.  
<sup>6</sup> See: *Bartold*, vol. 1, p. 396.  
<sup>7</sup> *Ibn al-Jawzi*, vol. 10, p. 168.  
<sup>8</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 48-49; *al-Bundari (al-Isfahani)*, p. 240-242.  
<sup>9</sup> *Watwat*. 'Umdat, f. 2a-4a (the first letter).  
<sup>10</sup> See: *Buniyatov*. Atabeki.  
<sup>11</sup> *Watwat*. Ara'is, f. 40a-b (be sultan-i a'zam Rukn ad-Dunya wa-d-Din Arslan-shah nuvisad).  
<sup>12</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 56-57.  
<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*, p. 56.  
<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*.  
<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*, p. 74-75; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 289.  
<sup>16</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 40, 56, 57, 59, 78.  
<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, p. 82.  
<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*.  
<sup>19</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 289.  
<sup>20</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 59.  
<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, p. 90, 91.  
<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*.  
<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, p. 82.  
<sup>24</sup> *al-Husayni*, p. 141.  
<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*.  
<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*, p. 141-142.  
<sup>27</sup> *Bayhaqi*. *Tarikh-i Bayhaq*, p. 284.  
<sup>28</sup> *al-Husayni*, p. 142.  
<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*.  
<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*.  
<sup>31</sup> *Ibid*, p. 129.  
<sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, p. 130-131; *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 280.  
<sup>33</sup> *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 280.  
<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, p. 282; *al-Husayni*, p. 132-134; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 104; *al-Bundari (al-Isfahani)*, p. 304; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 48.

- <sup>35</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 47; see: *Bartold*, vol. 1, p. 396 and next; vol. 5, p. 547-548; Pritsak. *Die Karachaniden*, p. 53, 54.
- <sup>36</sup> *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 239.
- <sup>37</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 288-289.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>39</sup> *Bartold*, vol. 5, p. 547-548.
- <sup>40</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 89. Muslim name of Qilich-Tamgach-khan's Muslim name was Abu-l-Muzaffar Mas'ud. A well-known poem by Muhammad az-Zahiri as-Samarqandi *Sindbad-nama* (see Russian trans., p. 19) and verses of poet Suzani.
- <sup>41</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 89.
- <sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 114; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 289; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 194; *Al-Qalqashandi*. Ma'asir al-inafa, vol. 2, p. 55; al-Hanbali, vol. 4, p. 226.
- <sup>43</sup> *Watwat*. Rasa'il, part 1, p. 25-26.
- <sup>44</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 114; *An-Nasawi*, p. 73-74; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 289; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 96.
- <sup>45</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 114; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 290; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1; book 2, p. 96; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 194.
- <sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>47</sup> Her name was Pyu-suvan. She was a sister of *gur-khan Yi-liyekh* (1151-1163) and a daughter of the sister of Yeh-lu Tashi (1124-1143). See: *Wittfogel*. History, p. 621, 624.
- <sup>48</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 114; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 290; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 96.
- <sup>49</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 114; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 290-291; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 96; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 194.
- <sup>50</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 291.
- <sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 115; *Ibn Isfandiyar*, vol. 2, p. 129; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 195.
- <sup>52</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 115; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 291; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 97; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 195. See: *Bartold*, vol. 3, p. 124-125.
- <sup>53</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 115; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 291; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 97; *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 245.
- <sup>54</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 115.
- <sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 292; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 97; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 195.
- <sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>59</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 115.
- <sup>60</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 293; *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 181-182; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 98.
- <sup>61</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 115; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 293; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 98.
- <sup>62</sup> The same sources.
- <sup>63</sup> According to Ibn Isfandiyar (vol. 2, p. 147), Khorezmshah Tekish sent his troops to Nishapur at the request of the town's residents.
- <sup>64</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 294-295; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 98.
- <sup>65</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 295.
- <sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 296.
- <sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 297; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 99.
- <sup>68</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 297; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 99.
- <sup>69</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 115; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 287; *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 182; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 99.
- <sup>70</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 297; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 99.
- <sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>72</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 298.
- <sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 298-299; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 99.
- <sup>74</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 301.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 116; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 197.
- <sup>76</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 117; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 198.

- <sup>77</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 299.
- <sup>78</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 117; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 199.
- <sup>79</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 117, 230; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 300; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 100; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 132; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 199.
- <sup>80</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 300.
- <sup>81</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 117, 229, 230; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 300-301; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 100; *al-Hanbali*, vol. 4, p. 297.
- <sup>82</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 230; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 301; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 100; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 199.
- <sup>83</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 114.
- <sup>84</sup> *al-Baghdadi*, p. 12-18: *Manshur-i ayalat-i Jand ki bar nam-i khudawand-zada-yi jahan khaqan-i mu'azzam... isdar uftada ist.*
- <sup>85</sup> *Ibid*, p. 38-43.
- <sup>86</sup> *Ibid*, p. 148. This letter is dated back to 577 AH by V.V. Bartold (vol.1, p. 403, note 4).
- <sup>87</sup> *al-Baghdadi*, p. 156-161.
- <sup>88</sup> For Uran's kin see *Köprülü*. Uran, p. 227-243.
- <sup>89</sup> *al-Baghdadi*, p. 171-176. Kyran descended from the tribe of Tekish' mother.
- <sup>90</sup> *Yaqut* (vol. 5, p. 316): "Shahrkend is a town in Turkestan, near Jand. It is journey of ten days, or slightly less, between Shahrken and Khorezm (Gurganj)".
- <sup>91</sup> *al-Baghdadi*, p. 153-156.
- <sup>92</sup> *Ibid*, p. 189.
- <sup>93</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 241-242.
- <sup>94</sup> *al-Baghdadi*, p. 125-131: *fath-nama dar an waqt ki lashkar be janib-i Bukhara raft wa fath-i shahr-i Bukhara hasil gasht.*
- <sup>95</sup> *Ibid*, p. 130.
- <sup>96</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 242.
- <sup>97</sup> *al-Baghdadi*, p. 146-149 (first letter to Ghiyas ad-Din al-Ghuri).
- <sup>98</sup> *Ibid*, p. 149-152 (second letter to him; dated Dhu-l-Hijja 576 AH (April 1181)).
- <sup>99</sup> *Ibid*, p. 153-156 (third letter to him).
- <sup>100</sup> *Ibid*, p. 156-161 (fourth letter to him).
- <sup>101</sup> *Ibid*, p. 161-165 (fifth letter to him).
- <sup>102</sup> *Ibid*, p. 198-201 (sixth letter to him). V.V. Bartold opines that the demonstrative appeal "son" concerns all local rulers, including Ghiyas ad-Din al-Ghuri. However, in this case *farzand* is attributable to Toghan-shah, son of Mu'ayyid Ay-Aba.
- <sup>103</sup> *Ibn Isfandiyar*, vol. 2, p. 130, 136, 137; *Mar'ashi*, p. 254-255; *An-Nasawi*, p. 241.
- <sup>104</sup> *al-Baghdadi*, p. 182-185.
- <sup>105</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 95.
- <sup>106</sup> *al-Husayni*, p. 148.
- <sup>107</sup> *al-Baghdadi*, p. 165-168 (the first letter addressed to Atabek Jahan-Pahlawan).
- <sup>108</sup> *Ibid*, p. 168-171 (the second letter addressed to him).
- <sup>109</sup> *Ibid*, p. 171-176 (third letter to him).
- <sup>110</sup> *Ibid*, p. 176-182 (fourth letter to him).
- <sup>111</sup> *Ibid*, p. 186-190 (letter to Shirvanshah).
- <sup>112</sup> *al-Husayni*, p. 155; *al-Bundari (al-Isfahani)*, p. 302.
- <sup>113</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 224, 230.
- <sup>114</sup> *al-Husayni*, p. 155-156; *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 354; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 224, 230; *Nishapuri*, p. 90; *al-Yazdi*, p. 173.
- <sup>115</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 230; *Nishapuri*, p. 90; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 299-300.
- <sup>116</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 290; *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 336, 350; *al-Husayni*, p. 156-157.
- <sup>117</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 230; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 300; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 100.
- <sup>118</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 130; *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 336; *al-Yazdi*, p. 174; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 302.
- <sup>119</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 230; *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 340-341; *al-Husayni*, p. 161.
- <sup>120</sup> *al-Husayni*, p. 161-162.

- <sup>121</sup> Ibid, p. 162-163.
- <sup>122</sup> Ibid, p. 163. Mushkuya is a small town near the area of Ray.
- <sup>123</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>124</sup> Ibid, p. 163-164; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 230; *al-Yazdi*, p. 176; *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 340-341; *Nishapuri*, p. 91; *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 467; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 302-303; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 101; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 201-202.
- <sup>125</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 231; *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 345; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 102.
- <sup>126</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 304; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 102; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 132.
- <sup>127</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 203; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 303-304; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 102.
- <sup>128</sup> *as-Suyuti*, p. 454-455.
- <sup>129</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 232; *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 346; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 304.
- <sup>130</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 232; *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 347; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 304.
- <sup>131</sup> *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 346-347.
- <sup>132</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 232; *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 347-349; *Ibn Isfandiyar*, vol. 2, p. 160; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 202-203; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 137.
- <sup>133</sup> *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 350-351; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 307.
- <sup>134</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 234.
- <sup>135</sup> *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 357.
- <sup>136</sup> Ibid, p. 358-359; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 308.
- <sup>137</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 234; *Ibn al-Fuwati*, vol. 4, part 1, p. 283-284; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 141.
- <sup>138</sup> *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 353-354.
- <sup>139</sup> Ibid, p. 354.
- <sup>140</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>141</sup> *az-Dhahabi*. Al-‘Ibar, part 5, p. 278.
- <sup>142</sup> *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 365-366.
- <sup>143</sup> Ibid, p. 367-368.
- <sup>144</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>145</sup> Ibid, p. 368; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 311.
- <sup>146</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 241.
- <sup>147</sup> Ibid, p. 248; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 312; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 205.
- <sup>148</sup> *Ibn as-Sa‘i*, p. 19, 24.
- <sup>149</sup> *Kermani*. Al-Muzaf, p. 6-7.
- <sup>150</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 248; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 313.
- <sup>151</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 248; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 313-314; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 138; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 205-206.
- <sup>152</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 250; *adh-Dhahabi*. Al-‘Ibar, part 5, p. 292; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 314-315; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 138; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 206.
- <sup>153</sup> *Zahir Faryabi*. Diwan. Meshhed, 1337 AH, p. 294.
- <sup>154</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 250; *Ibn as-Sa‘i*, p. 34; *Ibn al-Fuwati*, vol. 4, part 2, p. 1007.
- <sup>155</sup> *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 471; *as-Subki*, p. 331-332.
- <sup>156</sup> *al-Hanbali*, vol. 4, p. 324; *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 241.
- <sup>157</sup> *An-Nasawi* (p. 87) writes that “Terken-khatun came from the Bayat tribe, one of the branches of the Yemek tribe”. According to *Juwayni* (vol. 2, p. 465), she came from the tribe Qangli. *Juzjani* (vol. 1, p. 240-241) says that Terken-khatun was a daughter of Qipchaq khan Aqran (Qiran?)
- <sup>158</sup> *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 240-241.
- <sup>159</sup> *Awfi*, vol. 1, p. 39-40.
- <sup>160</sup> *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 471.
- <sup>161</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 315; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 134.
- <sup>162</sup> *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 472.

### Chapter 3

- <sup>1</sup> *Ibn Isfandiyar*, vol. 2, p. 166-167.
- <sup>2</sup> *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 369-370.
- <sup>3</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 265; *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 372; *Ibn Isfandiyar*, vol. 2, p. 169.
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 250.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, p. 250, 253; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 138; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 207.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 253; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 316; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 139; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 208.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 253; *Ibn al-Wardi*, vol. 2, p. 168; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 316; *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 252, 380-381; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 139; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 208-209.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 256-257; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 139; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 202.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 258; *Ibn as-Sa'i*, p. 84; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 318-319; *Rashid ad-din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 140.
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 257; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 317.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 257.
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid*; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 211.
- <sup>13</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 317; *Ibn as-Sa'i*, p. 83-84.
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 258, 259; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 319; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 140.
- <sup>15</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 259; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 319-320.
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 261; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 320-321; *Ibn as-Sa'i*, p. 121.
- <sup>17</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 321.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 261.
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, p. 262.
- <sup>20</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 322; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 136.
- <sup>21</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 322.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, p. 322-323; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 140.
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 262-263; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 323-324; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 140; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 215.
- <sup>24</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 325; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 136, 215.
- <sup>25</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 269; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 325; *Ibn as-Sa'i*, p. 153.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 272; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 326; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 155 (see also pp. 156-159 for further details).
- <sup>27</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 327.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, p. 328.
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 277-278; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 328-329; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 215-217.
- <sup>30</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 278; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 329.
- <sup>31</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 279; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 329-330; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 217-218.
- <sup>32</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 331; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 137.
- <sup>33</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 84.
- <sup>34</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 330-331.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 279-280; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 218-219.
- <sup>36</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 285; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 219-220.
- <sup>37</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 286; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 332; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 137.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 286.
- <sup>39</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 332.
- <sup>40</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 286.
- <sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, p. 288; *Ibn Isfandiyar*, vol. 2, p. 172; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 220.
- <sup>42</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 291; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 340.
- <sup>43</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 292.
- <sup>44</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 333-334; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 138.
- <sup>45</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 292; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 334; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 223-224.



- <sup>46</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 292.
- <sup>47</sup> *Ibid*, p. 291; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 359; *Ibn as-Sa'i*, p. 237-238.
- <sup>48</sup> See: *Bartold*, vol. 2, part 2, p. 515-518.
- <sup>49</sup> *Nizami 'Arudi*, p. 50.
- <sup>50</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 341.
- <sup>51</sup> *Ibid*; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 137.
- <sup>52</sup> See: *an-Nasawi*, p. 65-66.
- <sup>53</sup> Bukhara was occupied by the Khorezmshah in 604/1207. See *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 291; *Narshakhi*, p. 23-24.
- <sup>54</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 343. V.V.Bartold and other authors incorrectly read the name of the amir as Burtan, that this is not right.
- <sup>55</sup> *Awfi*, vol. 1, p. 51.
- <sup>56</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 349, 351.
- <sup>57</sup> *Ibid*, p. 351.
- <sup>58</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 293; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 351-352; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 138.
- <sup>59</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 293.
- <sup>60</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>61</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 352; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 138.
- <sup>62</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 239; *Ibn as-Sa'i*, p. 237-239; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 220.
- <sup>63</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 336-340. Here amir is called Kezli.
- <sup>64</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 293; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 353.
- <sup>65</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 293-294; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 335-336.
- <sup>66</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 294; *Ibn as-Sa'i*, p. 224-225.
- <sup>67</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 356; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 180.
- <sup>68</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 342.
- <sup>69</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 294.
- <sup>70</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 66-68; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 294; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 347-349; *Ibn as-Sa'i*, p. 241. The accounts of an-Nasawi and Juwayni on the date and causes of exile to Nasa are different; however in this case a preference has to be given to Juwayni, for his report is confirmed by Otrar coins of 607 AH minted on behalf of Muhammad ibn Tekish (see: *Davidovich*. Barab)
- <sup>71</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 360.
- <sup>72</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 65; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 344-349; *Awfi*, vol.1, p. 73, 112, 201.
- <sup>73</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 70.
- <sup>74</sup> *Ibid*, p. 297.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 294; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 394.
- <sup>76</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 294; *Ibn as-Sa'i*, p. 241.
- <sup>77</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>78</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>79</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 395-396. See other information: *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 295; *Ibn as-Sa'i*, p. 241; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 225-226.
- <sup>80</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 295.
- <sup>81</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 396.
- <sup>82</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 295-296; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 349 and the next; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 226-228.
- <sup>83</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 330; *Ibn Arabshah*, p. 236-237; *Ibn Abi Hadid*, p. 70.
- <sup>84</sup> *Rawandi*, vol. 1, p. 372. See also: *Ibn Isfandiyar*, vol. 2, p. 169; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 105.
- <sup>85</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 282.
- <sup>86</sup> *Jarbazkani*, p. 5.
- <sup>87</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 305, 306.
- <sup>88</sup> *Ibid*, p. 307, 309.
- <sup>89</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 340.
- <sup>90</sup> *Ibid*, p. 340-341.
- <sup>91</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 309; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 701-702; *Ibn Isfandiyar*, vol. 2, p. 175; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 193-194.
- <sup>92</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 57; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 309, 313; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 391; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 231.

- <sup>93</sup> According to Ibn al-Athir (vol. 9, p. 308), Kerman came under Khorezmshahid rule in 611/1214.
- <sup>94</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 308; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 228-229; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 196.
- <sup>95</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 308.
- <sup>96</sup> *Ibid*, p. 312; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 391; *An-Nasawi*, p. 57; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 231.
- <sup>97</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 313; *An-Nasawi*, p. 57.
- <sup>98</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 313; *An-Nasawi*, p. 57; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 365; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 186; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 231.
- <sup>99</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 57.
- <sup>100</sup> *Ibid*, p. 57-58; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 231.
- <sup>101</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 58; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 366; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 186.
- <sup>102</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 58 and next; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 313; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 366; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 118, *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 186; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 231-232.
- <sup>103</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 45, 61; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 313; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 366; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 231; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 118.
- <sup>104</sup> The same sources.
- <sup>105</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 46, 63; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 313, 314; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 365-366; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 186; *Ibn Khaldun*, 232.
- <sup>106</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 45; *as-Subki*, p. 336.
- <sup>107</sup> See: *adh-Dhahabi*, *Tarikh al-Islam*, and manuscript of the library Topkapi, no. 3015, f. 131a-b.
- <sup>108</sup> *Ibn as-Sa'i*, p. 139.
- <sup>109</sup> *Ibn ad-Dubaysi*, vol. 2, f. 72a.
- <sup>110</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 102. In all probability, he is a son of the famous author of *Kitab al-ansab*, member of the well-known family of Shafi'ite scholars.
- <sup>111</sup> *Ibn as-Sa'i*, p. 167-168.
- <sup>112</sup> *Ibid*, p. 262; *Ibn ad-Dubaysi*, vol. 2, f. 301a-302b.
- <sup>113</sup> *Ibn as-Sa'i*, p. 262.
- <sup>114</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 55.
- <sup>115</sup> *al-Hamawi Muhammad*, p. 272.
- <sup>116</sup> *As-Subki*, p. 330.
- <sup>117</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 204, 269.
- <sup>118</sup> *as-Safadi*, p. 96-97.
- <sup>119</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 391-392; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 186.
- <sup>120</sup> See: *an-Nasawi*, p. 55-56.
- <sup>121</sup> *Ibid*, p. 56.
- <sup>122</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>123</sup> *Ibid*, p. 57.
- <sup>124</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 313; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 364-365; *Ibn al-Fuwati*, vol. 4, part 2, p. 1085; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 232-233.
- <sup>125</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 353; vol. 2, p. 391.
- <sup>126</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 241.
- <sup>127</sup> *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 582-583; *adh-Dhahabi*. *Al-'Ibar*, vol. 5, p. 48; *Ibn Kathir*, vol. 13, p. 76; *As-Safadi*, p. 377; *Ibn Taghriberdi*, vol. 6, p. 219-220.
- <sup>128</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 64.
- <sup>129</sup> *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 582, 599.
- <sup>130</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 55.
- <sup>131</sup> *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 583.
- <sup>132</sup> *Mirkhwand*, vol. 3, part 3, p. 74; *Khondamir*. *Habib*, p. 140.
- <sup>133</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 64.
- <sup>134</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 313; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 366-367.
- <sup>135</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 64.
- <sup>136</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 313; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 366-367; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 187; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 233.
- <sup>137</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 65.

<sup>138</sup> See: *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 313; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 392. The failure to comply with the Khorezmshah's instructions for the caliph's name to be removed from the *khutba* in Samarqand, Herat and Khorezm is explained by V.V. Bartold as being due to the fact that Terken-khatun's influence in these places was strong, and she disapproved of her son's actions.

## Chapter 4

<sup>1</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 378; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 170.

<sup>2</sup> *al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 519.

<sup>3</sup> *Watwat*. *Rasa'il*, part 1, p. 8.

<sup>4</sup> *Rawandi*, vol. 2, p. 355.

<sup>5</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 322.

<sup>6</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 57.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid*, p. 61.

<sup>8</sup> *as-Subki*, p. 330.

<sup>9</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 64.

<sup>10</sup> *Tarikh-i Sistan*, p. 363.

<sup>11</sup> *ad-Diyarbakri*, vol. 2, p. 369.

<sup>12</sup> *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 262.

<sup>13</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 55.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibn al-'Ibri*, p. 234; *as-Subki*, p. 335; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 191; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 231.

<sup>15</sup> *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 496.

<sup>16</sup> *Vardan*, p. 175.

<sup>17</sup> *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 243; *Ibn al-'Imad al-Hanbali* (vol. 5, p. 63) writes: "They say that Jalal ad-Din had 300, 000 soldiers, but it is also said that they had more soldiers".

<sup>18</sup> *as-Subki*, p. 331.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, p. 330.

<sup>20</sup> *al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 514.

<sup>21</sup> *ad-Diyarbakri*, vol. 2, p. 381; *al-Hanbali*, vol. 5, p. 73.

<sup>22</sup> *Rawandi*, vol. 2, p. 355; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 313; *An-Nasawi*, p. 128, 153, 196, 239, 343.

<sup>23</sup> See the decree of Ghiyath ad-Din Pir-shah in the collected works of *Rashid ad-Din Watwat* (*Rasa'il*, part 2, f. 11b and next.) See also: *Horst*, p. 39, 108, doc. Zh 1).

<sup>24</sup> *Horst*, p. 39.

<sup>25</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 227, 239.

<sup>26</sup> *as-Subki*. *Mu'id*, p. 33.

<sup>27</sup> *al-Husayni*, p. 131-132.

<sup>28</sup> *Horst*, p. 119, docs. I 9, I 14.

<sup>29</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 146; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 230.

<sup>30</sup> *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 102.

<sup>31</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 67, 71.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, p. 54, 186.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, p. 92, 180.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, p. 269, 270-271.

<sup>35</sup> *al-Ansari*, p. 12.

<sup>36</sup> *Horst*, p. 42, doc. B 7.

<sup>37</sup> *Watwat*. *Rasa'il*, part 1, p. 11-12.

<sup>38</sup> *An-Nasawi*, p. 156, 231.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*, p. 63.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid*, p. 84.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, p. 97-98.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid*, p. 108.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, p. 115.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*, p. 90.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, p. 59.

<sup>46</sup> Horst, p. 159-161, doc. Iks 1-5.

<sup>47</sup> See about *shihna*: *Ibn al-Jawzi*, vol. 8, p. 317-319.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 91.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, p. 117.

<sup>50</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 187, 188, 206, 270, 294.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 282; *Rawandi*, vol. 2, p. 365.

<sup>52</sup> *Watwat*. Rasa'il, part 1, p. 11; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 191.

## Chapter 5

<sup>1</sup> See: *Lambton*. Structure, p. 69 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 67.

<sup>3</sup> *al-Baghdadi*, p. 78ff.

<sup>4</sup> See: *Horst*, p. 105-106.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 103, 105.

<sup>6</sup> *Lambton*. Structure, p. 67; *Horst*, p. 26-27.

<sup>7</sup> *Horst*, p. 27-28.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 8, p. 130; see also: *Bartold*, vol. 1, p. 288.

<sup>9</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 76-77, 148-149.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibn al-Fuwati*, vol. 4, part 3, p. 269-270. It is supposed that the vizier died during Qarluqs' raid on Mawarannahr in 1155.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, p. 496-497.

<sup>13</sup> *al-Bundari (al-Isfahani)*, p. 181.

<sup>14</sup> *al-Bayhaqi*. Tatimmat, p. 146-147.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibn al-Fuwati*, vol. 4, part 4, p. 788; *Watwat*. Rasa'il, part 1, p. 62, 86.

<sup>16</sup> *al-Hanbali*, vol. 4, p. 188.

<sup>17</sup> *Watwat*. Rasa'il, part 1, p. 45-46; part 2, p. 62, 86.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 248, 250; *Khondamir* (Wuzara, p. 231, 240-241) calls this vizier Nizam al-Mulk Sa'd ad-Din Mas'ud ibn 'Ali al-Abhari. According to as-Subki (p. 309), this vizier was killed by Isma'ilites in Jumada I 596 AH (February 1200). See also *Juwayni*, vol. I, p. 162.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 251; as-Subki, p. 309.

<sup>20</sup> *al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 389.

<sup>21</sup> For this figure see *Storey*, part 1, p. 613-614.

<sup>22</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 73.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p. 76.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, p. 77.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibn Abi Usaybi'a*, part 3, p. 26.

<sup>27</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 77, 90.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid; *Khondamir*, Wuzara, p. 233.

<sup>29</sup> *Watwat*. Rasa'il, part 1, p. 77.

<sup>30</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 67, 96.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p. 69.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, p. 82.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, p. 146-147.

<sup>34</sup> *al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 348, 389.

<sup>35</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 70, 71, 89; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 376, 377, 383, 474-475.

<sup>36</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 145, 172, 176, 337, 338; vol. 2, p. 379-380.

<sup>37</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 70, 131-132. According to *Juwayni* (vol. 2, p. 461-463) and *Juzjani* (vol. 1, p. 285), the vizier was called Shams al-Mulk Shihab ad-Din as-Sarakhsi.

<sup>38</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 70, 77, 153, 189, 190; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 469.

<sup>39</sup> *Horst*, p. 124-125, doc. K 1.

- <sup>40</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 148.
- <sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, p. 284.
- <sup>42</sup> For details see: *An-Nasawi*, p. 280 ff.
- <sup>43</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 177.
- <sup>44</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>45</sup> *Ibid*, p. 195-196.
- <sup>46</sup> *Ibid*, p. 192-193.
- <sup>47</sup> *Ibid*, p. 194.
- <sup>48</sup> *Ibid*, p. 276.
- <sup>49</sup> *Ibid*, p. 277.
- <sup>50</sup> *al-Qalqashandi*. Subh, vol. 5, p. 449-450.
- <sup>51</sup> *al-Husayni*, p. 162.
- <sup>52</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 75.
- <sup>53</sup> *Ibid*, p. 184, 214.
- <sup>54</sup> *Ibid*, p. 283.
- <sup>55</sup> *Ibid*, p. 206.
- <sup>56</sup> *Ibid*, p. 233.
- <sup>57</sup> *Ibid*, p. 235.
- <sup>58</sup> *al-Qalqashandi*. Subh, vol. 4, p. 20; vol. 5, p. 457.
- <sup>59</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 129-130, 226 ff.
- <sup>60</sup> *Ibid*, p. 226-227.
- <sup>61</sup> *Ibid*, p. 227-228.
- <sup>62</sup> *Ibid*, p. 228.
- <sup>63</sup> *al-Qalqashandi*. Subh, vol. 5, p. 461.
- <sup>64</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 81; *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 177.
- <sup>65</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 92.
- <sup>66</sup> *Ibid*, p. 113.
- <sup>67</sup> *Ibid*, p. 141, 184, 214.
- <sup>68</sup> *al-Qalqashandi*. Subh, vol. 4, p. 22.
- <sup>69</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 247.
- <sup>70</sup> *al-Qalqashandi*. Subh, vol. 4, p. 10-11; vol. 5, p. 469.
- <sup>71</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 67; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 278-279.
- <sup>72</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 190, 247.
- <sup>73</sup> *al-Qalqashandi*. Subh, vol. 4, p. 10; vol. 5, p. 469.
- <sup>74</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 129.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibid*, p. 146.
- <sup>76</sup> *Ibid*, p. 146-147.
- <sup>77</sup> *al-Qalqashandi*. Subh, vol. 5, p. 460.
- <sup>78</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 219.
- <sup>79</sup> *al-Qalqashandi*. Subh, vol. 5, p. 462.
- <sup>80</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 198-200.
- <sup>81</sup> *al-Qalqashandi*. Subh, vol. 4, p. 11.
- <sup>82</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 92, 241.
- <sup>83</sup> *Ibn al-Fuwati*, vol. 5, p. 733.
- <sup>84</sup> *al-Qalqashandi*. Subh, vol. 4, p. 8; vol. 5, p. 463.
- <sup>85</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 115.

## Chapter 6

<sup>1</sup> *al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 434.

<sup>2</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 7, p. 191-192.

<sup>3</sup> *as-Sam'ani*, f. 516b; "Madina in Merv is an internal town of Merv"; f. 548a: "Madina in Nishapur is an internal town of Nishapur" and i.e.

<sup>4</sup> *al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 519; *Yaqut*, vol. 3, p. 79.

- <sup>5</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 3, p. 80.
- <sup>6</sup> *al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 519.
- <sup>7</sup> See in particular: *Bartold*, vol. 3, p. 403-404.
- <sup>8</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 137-138.
- <sup>9</sup> *al-Qurashi* (by index).
- <sup>10</sup> *al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 520.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>12</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 137; *Al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 520; *Yaqut*, vol. 3, p. 475; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 126; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 215.
- <sup>13</sup> *al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 520; *Yaqut*, vol. 3, p. 475.
- <sup>14</sup> *al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 514.
- <sup>15</sup> *Watwat*. *Rasa'il*, part 1, p. 74-75.
- <sup>16</sup> *al-Hanbali*, vol. 3, p. 378.
- <sup>17</sup> *Carpini P.* and *Rubruck G.*, p. 46; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 127; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 216.
- <sup>18</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 127; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 215.
- <sup>19</sup> *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 281, vol. 2, p. 1100; *Bukhari*, vol. 2, p. 177. See also: *Bartold*, vol. 1, p. 504, note 1.
- <sup>20</sup> *al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 521.
- <sup>21</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 125; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 215.
- <sup>22</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 8, p. 223.
- <sup>23</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 125; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 215.
- <sup>24</sup> For more details about the duty of *muhtasib* see: *al-Qurashi* (by index), and also *Horst*, p. 95-96.
- <sup>25</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 138; *Ibn al-Fuwati*, vol. 4, part 2, p. 1018, no.1507.
- <sup>26</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 6, p. 10.
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 7, p. 236.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, 6, p. 289.
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 1, p. 177-178; *Qazwini*. *Guzida*, p. 251.
- <sup>30</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 3, p. 503; *al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 528-529.
- <sup>31</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 4, p. 53.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 5, p. 21.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 6, p. 314.
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 7, p. 202.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 8, p. 325.
- <sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, p. 462; *al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 567.
- <sup>37</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 5, p. 28.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, p. 73.
- <sup>39</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 8, p. 183-184.
- <sup>40</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 3, p. 475.
- <sup>41</sup> *Qazwini*. *Guzida*, p. 251.
- <sup>42</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 3, p. 475.
- <sup>43</sup> *al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 520.
- <sup>44</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 3, p. 475.
- <sup>45</sup> *Ibid*, p. 475, 478-479.
- <sup>46</sup> *Ibid*, p. 425.
- <sup>47</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 6, p. 289.
- <sup>48</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 7, p. 378.
- <sup>49</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 8, p. 320.
- <sup>50</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 6, p. 370.
- <sup>51</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 2, p. 43.
- <sup>52</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 3, p. 476.
- <sup>53</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 1, p. 257.
- <sup>54</sup> *al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 509; *Yaqut*, vol. 2, p. 81.



<sup>55</sup> For details see: *Bartold*, vol. 3, p. 378-393 (noting also the relevant literature for the history of the town). See also: *Narshakhi*, p. 35, 47-48.

<sup>56</sup> See: *as-Sam'ani*; *Yaqut* (index entry).

<sup>57</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 77-78; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 187; *Narshakhi*, p. 23-24.

<sup>58</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 6, p. 66.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 2, p. 339-340.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 6, p. 353.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 7, p. 244.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid*, p. 377.

<sup>63</sup> See: *as-Sam'ani*; *Yaqut* (index entry).

<sup>64</sup> *Al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 543-544.

<sup>65</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 5, p. 121-123; *Al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 535; *Qazwini. Guzida*, p. 237.

<sup>66</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 5, p. 123; *Al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 535-536; *Qazwini. Guzida*, p. 237; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 121; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 208.

<sup>67</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 2, p. 15.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 7, p. 303.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 5, p. 132.

<sup>70</sup> *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 207.

<sup>71</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 1, p. 254; vol. 2, p. 15.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 2, p. 291.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 3, p. 38.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 4, p. 390.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 5, p. 147.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 6, p. 269.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid*, p. 358.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid*, p. 387.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 7, p. 287.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid*, p. 318.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 8, p. 415.

<sup>82</sup> *Al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 536.

<sup>83</sup> *Eberhard*, p. 141-142. The meaning of some plays is ambiguous.

<sup>84</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 7, p. 250-251; *Al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 554.

<sup>85</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 5, p. 212-214; *Al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 538.

<sup>86</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 6, p. 37; *Al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 554.

<sup>87</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 3, p. 402-403.

<sup>88</sup> See about it: *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 91-95; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 201-203.

<sup>89</sup> *Yaqut*, vol. 2, p. 382-383.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 1, p. 180.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid*, p. 230-231.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid*, p. 374.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid*, p. 374-375.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 8, p. 273, 286-287.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 3, p. 180.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 2, p. 288.

<sup>97</sup> *al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 465-466. See *as-Sam'ani* (f. 559a, 560a): *Nasa – bi-fath an-nun; hazihi-n-nisba ila baldat bi-Khurasan yuqal laha Nasa wa-n-nisba al-mashhura ila hazihi-l-balda an-Nasawi wa-n-Nasa'i* ("Nasa is *fatha* above the letter *nun*. This *nisba* goes back to the famous town in Khurasan, which is named as Nasa, and the *nisba* is related to the same town of An-Nasawi and an-Nasa'i").

<sup>98</sup> See: *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 153.

## Chapter 7

<sup>1</sup> See MS LO IVAN C 816, f. 143b. The *tiraz* is a piece of precious fabric; on its edges, names

and laqabs of caliph or sultan are embroidered in gold. As a garment of honor, the tiraz was handed over to emirs and vassals as a gift of sovereign. Like the proclamation of the khutba and the stamping of coins in the sovereign's name, the tiraz was a symbolic demonstration of power. For discussion, see *Groman*. Tiraz

<sup>2</sup> See: *Bayhaqi*. Tarikh-i Bayhaq, p. 277, 283; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 5.

<sup>3</sup> *Al-Husayni*, p. 142.

<sup>4</sup> *Kermani*. Al-Muzaf, p. 43 and next; *Kermani*. Simt, p. 20; Muhammad ibn Ibrahim, p. 219-221.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 279.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 278.

<sup>7</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 332; *Mirkhwand*, vol. 4, p. 137.

<sup>8</sup> *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., 1, book 2, p. 193.

<sup>9</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 343, 359.

<sup>10</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 45, 61; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 313.

<sup>11</sup> See: *Thomas*. The Chronicles, p. 90-91, nos. 71, 72, 74, 75.

<sup>12</sup> *Markov*. Inventarnyi katalog, p. 299-300, nos. 32-45. Samarqandi coin issues have been published in numerous numismatic studies; it is unnecessary to cite all of them here.

<sup>13</sup> *Fraehn*, p. 146, no. 11; *Artuk I.*, *Artuk C.*, p. 430, nos. 1308-1309.

<sup>14</sup> *Davidovich*. Barab, p. 124-129.

<sup>15</sup> *Davidovich*. Numizmaticheskie materialy, p. 105.

<sup>16</sup> *Markov*. Inventarnyi katalog, p. 297, no. 4; *Davidovich*. Termezskii klad, p. 43-55; *Davidovich*. Klady, p. 219-221 (klad no. 49).

<sup>17</sup> *Davidovich*. Klady, 219-224 (klad no. 48), 225-227 (klad no. 49).

<sup>18</sup> *Davidovich*. Klady, 231-232, no. 2 (klad no. 51).

<sup>19</sup> *Artuk I.*, *Artuk C.*, p. 430, no. 1307.

<sup>20</sup> *Lane-Poole*. Catalogue, 184, nos. 611-616; *Sourdel*, p. 109, nos. 1038-1040.

<sup>21</sup> *Wilson*, 437, no. 1.

<sup>22</sup> *Markov*. Inventarnyi katalog, p. 301, nos. 55-56.

<sup>23</sup> *Tizengauzen*. Vostochnye monety Linevicha, p. 294, no. 6.

<sup>24</sup> See: *Thomas*.

<sup>25</sup> *Artuk I.*, *Artuk C.*, p. 431, no. 1310.

<sup>26</sup> *Sourdel*, p. 107, nos. 710-711; *Bivar*, p. 377-378, nos. 3-5.

<sup>27</sup> *Tizengauzen*. Novye numizmaticheskie priobreteniia Linevicha, p. 231, no. 13.

<sup>28</sup> *Tizengauzen*. Novoe sobranie vostochnykh monet Komarova, p. 65, no. 26; *Markov*. Inventarnyi katalog, p. 300-301, nos. 53-54.

<sup>29</sup> *Sourdel*, p. 103, no. 610, p. 104, no. 641.

<sup>30</sup> *Schulman*, p. 10, nos. 132-133.

<sup>31</sup> *Tizengauzen*. Novoe sobranie vostochnykh monet Komarova, p. 66-67, no. 31; *Markov*. Inventarnyi katalog, p. 301, nos. 57-59.

<sup>32</sup> *Tizengauzen*. Vostochnye monety Linevicha, p. 295, no. 9; *Schulman*, p. 10, no. 124; *Sourdel*, p. 107, nos. 704-709.

<sup>33</sup> *Lane-Poole*. Catalogue, p. 186, nos. 601-602.

<sup>34</sup> *Pakhomov*, p. 122 and further; *Kapanadze*, p. 68-73.

<sup>35</sup> *Davidovich*. Iz oblasti denezhnogo obrascheniia, p. 93-99.

<sup>36</sup> *Bol'shakov*. Srednevekovi gorod, p. 158.

<sup>37</sup> *Davidovich*. Iz oblasti denezhnogo obrascheniia, p. 110-112.

<sup>38</sup> *Litvinskii*. O nekotorykh momentakh razvitiia srednekovogo goroda, p. 63; *Davidovich*. Iz oblasti denezhnogo obrascheniia, p. 115-117.

<sup>39</sup> *Fraehn*, p. 146, no. 9; *Markov*. Inventarnyi katalog, p. 297-298, 976, nos. 1-3, 19-21, 1-a; *Khodjaniiazov*. Klad zolotykh monet XII v., p. 92-93, nos. 4, 5, 7; *Lunin*. K topografii, p. 188; and others.

<sup>40</sup> *Khodjaniiazov*. Klad zolotykh monet XII v., p. 90-93.

<sup>41</sup> *Davidovich*, *Popov*. Klad mednykh monet Mukhammada b. Tekesha, p. 92-96.

<sup>42</sup> In characterising the "Qarakhanid variant" of money circulation, I draw upon the materials

and conclusions of various works by *E.A. Davidovich*: *Denezhnoe obraschenie v Maverannakhre*, p. 119-125; *Zoloto v denezhnom khoziaistve*, p. 55-69; *Iz oblasti denezhnogo obrascheniia*, p. 102-110; *Kanibadamskii klad*, p. 186-200; *Klady*, 190-192; *O dvukh Karakhanidskikh kaganatakh*, p. 75-76.

<sup>43</sup> My description of this variant is with reference to the works of *E.A. Davidovich*, notably “*Zoloto v denezhnom khoziaistve*”, p. 59-62; *Iz oblasti denezhnogo obrascheniia*, p. 103-105.

<sup>44</sup> *Ehrenkreutz*, p. 262-265; 274-275.

<sup>45</sup> A detailed study by *T. Khodjaniiazov* (“*Denezhnoe obraschenie v gosudarstve Velikikh Sel’dzhukov*”) provides no exact information about hallmark of Seljuq dinars in which gold is 10% (p. 34; no source indicated). Hallmark of dinars in the second half of the 11 century is distorted (p. 37: gold of 4 hallmark which is impossible; silver – 52/2 hallmark which is obvious misprint) but it may be restored (see *Davidovich. Iz oblasti denezhnogo obrascheniia*, p. 101): gold hallmark – 388, silver – 570. *T. Khodjaniiazov* reports (p. 34-35) that medieval authors mention “two kinds” of Seljuq dinars (from “red gold” and dinars *rukni* – low-standard); however, medieval authors are not indicated.

<sup>46</sup> *Khodjaniiazov. Denezhnoe obraschenie*, p. 68, 75, 79, 80, 81, 83, 86-88.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid*, p. 80-81, 88.

<sup>48</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 264; *Davidovich. Zoloto v denezhnom khoziaistve*, p. 59-60.

<sup>49</sup> *Tizengauzen. Novoe sobranie vostochnykh monet Komarova*, p. 69-70, nos. 40-43, 45-46; *Sourdel*, p. 118-119, 121-125, 127, 128, 131-132, nos. 1282-1288, 1296, 1297, 1301-1369, 1374-1416, 1431-1449.

<sup>50</sup> The description is based on materials given in the following articles: *Davidovich, Popov. Klad mednykh monet Mukhammada b. Tekesha*, p. 97-99; *Davidovich. Mukhammad b. Tekesh i poslednie Karakhanidy*.

<sup>51</sup> *Davidovich. Iz oblasti denezhnogo obrascheniia*, p. 100, nos. 4-7; *Davidovich. Klady*, p. 231-234, klad no. 51.

<sup>52</sup> *Davidovich. Iz oblasti denezhnogo obrascheniia*, p. 99-101.

## Chapter 8

<sup>1</sup> *Juzjani* calls him thus (vol. 1, p. 238).

<sup>2</sup> See: *Rypka J. Poets*, p. 560, 563.

<sup>3</sup> *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 238.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibn Isfandiyar*, trans., p. 62.

<sup>5</sup> See: *Watwat. Rasa'il*, part 1, p. 11.

<sup>6</sup> See: *Isfahani Jamal ad-Din*; *Samarqandi*, p. 148-154.

<sup>7</sup> *Isfahani Kamal ad-Din*; *Samarqandi*, p. 148-154.

<sup>8</sup> *Samarqandi*, p. 109-114.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, p. 121-126.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*, p. 136-138.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibn al-Fuwati*, vol. 4, part 2, p. 1027.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 4, part 3, p. 257-258, # 2246.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*, p. 269-270.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 5, p. 305.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*, p. 655.

<sup>16</sup> *al-Bayhaqi. Tatimmat*, p. 166-167.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, p. 153-154; see also *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 8, p. 4.

<sup>18</sup> *al-Bayhaqi. Tatimmat*, p. 166-167.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, p. 172-173; see also: *Nizami 'Arudi*, p. 106-107; *Watwat. Rasa'il*, part 1, p. 66-67; *Samarqandi*, p. 137.

<sup>20</sup> *Yaqut. Udaba'*, vol. 1, p. 320-321.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 5, p. 274-275.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, p. 410-411; see also: *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 4; *Ibn al-Fuwati*, vol. 5, p. 678.

<sup>23</sup> *Yaqut. Udaba'*, vol. 5, p. 41.

- <sup>24</sup> *as-Subki*, p. 305.
- <sup>25</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 52.
- <sup>26</sup> *Yaqut. Udaba'*, vol. 1, p. 188.
- <sup>27</sup> See: *Storey*, part 1, p. 198.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, p. 545; see also: *Khalidov*, p. 74.
- <sup>29</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 277.
- <sup>30</sup> See: *Brockelmann*, SB 1, p. 849.
- <sup>31</sup> *Ibn al-Fuwati*, p. 584.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, p. 591.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, p. 608; *Yaqut. Udaba'*, vol. 5, p. 411-412.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibn al-Fuwati*, vol. 5, p. 681.
- <sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, p. 759.
- <sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, p. 781.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, p. 806.
- <sup>39</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>40</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 4, part 1, p. 1087.
- <sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, p. 1098.
- <sup>42</sup> For details about az-Zamakhshari, see: *Ibn Khallikan*, vol. 3, p. 321-328; *Ibn al-Fuwati*, vol. 4, part 2, p. 1116-1117; vol. 4, part 3, p. 392-393.
- <sup>43</sup> *Ibn al-Fuwati*, vol. 4, part 3, p. 392-393.
- <sup>44</sup> *Watwat. Rasa'il*, part 1, p. 66.
- <sup>45</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 149-150.
- <sup>46</sup> *Ibid*, p. 197.
- <sup>47</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 98.
- <sup>48</sup> See: *Brockelmann*, vol. 1, p. 491, no. 28; 1; SB 1, p. 895.
- <sup>49</sup> See: *Melioranskii*, p. VIII, XVI, 16, 21; *Köprülü. Harezmsahlar devrinde bir Türk lisancisi*, p. 441-444.
- <sup>50</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 86.
- <sup>51</sup> Two manuscripts of this work are kept in the library of Topkapi no. 3565 (dated 1191) and no. 3566 (dated 1145) in Istanbul.
- <sup>52</sup> *Watwat. Rasa'il*, part 1, p. 66.
- <sup>53</sup> *al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 510.
- <sup>54</sup> *Naji Ma'ruf*, vol. 2, p. 63.
- <sup>55</sup> *al-Hanbali*, vol. 4, p. 205-206; see also: *Naji Ma'ruf*, vol. 2, p. 61.
- <sup>56</sup> *Yaqut. Udaba'*, vol. 5, p. 238.
- <sup>57</sup> *Ibid*, p. 239.
- <sup>58</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 149.
- <sup>59</sup> *al-Hanbali*, vol. 4, p. 178.
- <sup>60</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 5, p. 64.
- <sup>61</sup> *Awfi*, vol. 2, p. 345.
- <sup>62</sup> *Ibid*, vol. 1, p. 142-144. This person seems to be identical to Sadr ad-Din al-Husayni. The latter had the work under the same title. The use of the *nisba* al-Husayni does not preclude the use also of 'al-Nishapuri' as a second.
- <sup>63</sup> See: *Storey*, part 1, p. 613-614.
- <sup>64</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 302; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 113.
- <sup>65</sup> *Muhammad ibn Najib Bakran. Jahan-name*. Moscow, 1960.
- <sup>66</sup> *Horst*, p. 121, doc. I 12.
- <sup>67</sup> *Ibid*, p. 164-165, doc. Aa 3.
- <sup>68</sup> *Ibid*, p. 165, doc. Aa 4.
- <sup>69</sup> *Ibid*, p. 145, doc. U 5.
- <sup>70</sup> *al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 528; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 322.
- <sup>71</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 93-94.
- <sup>72</sup> *Ibn al-Fuwati*, vol. 4, part 4, p. 676.

<sup>73</sup> Horst, p. 163, doc. 3 2.

<sup>74</sup> Watwat. Rasa'il, part 1, p. 41-42.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, p. 42-43.

<sup>76</sup> an-Nasawi, p. 241; Ibn al-Fuwati, vol. 5, p. 733.

## Chapter 9

<sup>1</sup> an-Nasawi, p. 87.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 73.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 87.

<sup>4</sup> Juwayni, vol. 2, p. 466; Ibn Khaldun, p. 235-236.

<sup>5</sup> an-Nasawi, p. 66-67, 83-84, 87; Juwayni, vol. 2, p. 466.

<sup>6</sup> Ibn al-Athir, vol. 9, p. 330.

<sup>7</sup> an-Nasawi, p. 69-70; Ibn Khaldun, p. 233-234.

<sup>8</sup> an-Nasawi, p. 50-51.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 51; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 9, p. 295.

<sup>10</sup> Ibn al-Athir, vol. 9, p. 295.

<sup>11</sup> an-Nasawi, p. 51-52.

<sup>12</sup> Ibn al-Athir, vol. 9, p. 296.

<sup>13</sup> Juwayni, vol. 1, p. 65-66, 70-71.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, p. 71-72; Rashid ad-Din, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 183.

<sup>15</sup> Juwayni, vol. 1, p. 66, 73; Rashid ad-Din, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 183.

<sup>16</sup> See about these discourses: Juwayni, vol. 1, p. 66 and next.

<sup>17</sup> See: Juwayni, vol. 1, p. 44 and next; Secret History, § 235-239.

<sup>18</sup> Vladimirtsov, p. 23.

<sup>19</sup> Juwayni, vol. 1, p. 66 and next; Rashid ad-Din, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 179, 183; Secret History, § 236.

<sup>20</sup> Juzjani, vol. 1, p. 270-271; vol. 2, p. 963-964.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, vol. 2, p. 966.

<sup>22</sup> Juwayni, vol. 1, p. 78; Bar Hebraeus, vol. 2, p. 481; Ibn al 'Ibri, p. 229; Rashid ad-Din, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 187.

<sup>23</sup> Juzjani, vol. 1, p. 272; vol. 2, p. 966.

<sup>24</sup> Juwayni, vol. 1, p. 77-78; Rashid ad-Din, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 187-188.

<sup>25</sup> Bar Hebraeus, vol. 2, p. 481-482; Ibn al-'Ibri, p. 229.

<sup>26</sup> an-Nasawi, p. 77-78. Rashid ad-Din (trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 188) gives somewhat different version of Chinghiz-khan's message to the Khorezmshah: "Merchants from your side came to see us, and we sent them back in a manner you'll know about it. Besides, we sent, together with them, to your country several merchants and instructed them to bring to our country rarities and uncommon fabrics of your land. The grandeur of your family and nobleness of your kin are not a secret for anyone! Extensiveness of your state and all-subduing power of your orders are the command both for nobility and mob in the greater part of the earth. For me, you are a dear son and the best of Moslems! Now that borders closer to us have been cleansed from enemies and conquered, and neighborhood rights identified, reason and nobleness demand from both parties to pave the way for mutual understanding, we must undertake to help each other in trouble and ensure security of our roads, so that merchants from various countries, whose visits contribute to peace and tranquility, could travel without fear. In this case and owing to accord between us, there will be no reason for anxiety, and dissention and disobedience will disappear!". See also: Ibn Khaldun, p. 236-237; as-Subki, p. 332.

<sup>27</sup> an-Nasawi, p. 78-79; Ibn Khaldun, p. 237.

<sup>28</sup> Juwayni, vol. 1, p. 23, 78-79; Rashid ad-Din, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 188.

<sup>29</sup> Secret History, § 254; see also: Ibn al 'Ibri, p. 230; Bar Hebraeus, vol. 2, p. 482. Ibn al-Athir, vol. 9, p. 330-331; Ibn Khaldun, p. 237.

<sup>30</sup> Juwayni, vol. 2, p. 370.

<sup>31</sup> Juzjani, vol. 1, p. 267.

- <sup>32</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 53-54; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 371-372; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 2, book 2, p. 190-191.
- <sup>33</sup> *As-Subki*, p. 334.
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 332; *An-Nasawi*, p. 54; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 372-373; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 190; *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 269-270.
- <sup>35</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 54.
- <sup>36</sup> *as-Subki*, p. 332; *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 482; *Ibn al 'Ibri*, p. 230; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 79; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 188.
- <sup>37</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 79. According to *Juwayni* (vol. 1, p. 79) and *Rashid ad-Din* (trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 188-189), Ghayir-khan was insulted by the behaviour of a Hindu merchant to contemptuously rejected his invitation. Then he hankered after property of merchants and detained them as informing Khorezmshah about them. 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad ignored Chingiz-khan's message and ordered to execute all people who arrived with the caravan and confiscate all the goods. Of the same view is *Bar Hebraeus* (vol. 2, p. 482) (*Ibn al-Ibri*, p. 230). *Ibn al-Athir*'s information is somewhat different (vol. 9, p. 331): when Ghayir-khan informed the Khorezmshah about the arrival of the caravan and a huge quantity of goods, the Khorezmshah ordered him to kill all the merchants and confiscate their goods. Then the goods were sold to merchants of Bukhara and Samarqand, and the money gained were misappropriated by Khorezmshah. See also: *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 272; vol. 2, p. 966-968; *as-Subki*, p. 332; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 237.
- <sup>38</sup> *Sokrovennoe skazanie*, § 254; see also: *Lubsan Danzan*, p. 224.
- <sup>39</sup> *An-Nasawi*, p. 79-80. *As-Subki* (p. 332-333) narrates about his own variant of Chingiz-khan's message: "Inform me: what has happened? Is it your desire? If it happened against your will, then we demand blood of the killed from your deputy to Otrar who ought to be delivered in the most humiliated and disgraced form. But if you did at your will, you are responsible for this. I'm not your coreligionist and disapprove your actions. You profess Islam, and these merchants were of your religion. How do you regard an order you gave?". See also about it: *as-Suyuti*, p. 469.
- <sup>40</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 80; *as-Subki*, p. 333.
- <sup>41</sup> *Ibid*; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 331.
- <sup>42</sup> *as-Subki*, p. 333.
- <sup>43</sup> *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 482-483 (*Ibn al 'Ibri*, p. 230); *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 80-81; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 189.
- <sup>44</sup> *Karpini P. and Rubruk G.*, p. 80. For more details see: *Gumilev*, p. 291 and next.
- <sup>45</sup> *Eberhard*, p. 139-140.
- <sup>46</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 331.
- <sup>47</sup> *Ibid*, p. 361.
- <sup>48</sup> *al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 1, p. 218.
- <sup>49</sup> *Ibn Wasil*, manuscript, f. 84a. *Ibn Wasil*'s comments confirm: *Abu-l-Fida* (vol. 3, p. 136), *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi* (p. 634), *Mirkhwand* (vol. 4, p. 24-25).
- <sup>50</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 331; *as-Subki*, p. 333; *Ibn Taghriberdi*, vol. 6, p. 248.
- <sup>51</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 331; *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 515.
- <sup>52</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 376; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 192.
- <sup>53</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 80; see also: *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 332.
- <sup>54</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 375; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 191.
- <sup>55</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 81.
- <sup>56</sup> *Ibid*.
- <sup>57</sup> *as-Subki*, p. 334.
- <sup>58</sup> *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 496; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 82; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 191.
- <sup>59</sup> *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 496; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 83; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 191.
- <sup>60</sup> For more details about the siege of Otrar see: *An-Nasawi*, p. 81; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 83-86; *Rashid ad-din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 198-199; *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 496-497.
- <sup>61</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 82.



<sup>62</sup> *Bartold*, vol. 1, p. 473.

<sup>63</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 82.

<sup>64</sup> For the ruins of Sighnaq, see: *Bartold*, vol. 1, p. 238; Yakubovskii.

<sup>65</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 86-87; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, p. 199.

<sup>66</sup> For the location of these towns see *Bartold*, vol. 1, p. 236.

<sup>67</sup> See: *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 87-88; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 200. About localization of Ashnas see: *Bartold*, vol. 1, p. 236.

<sup>68</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 80; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 88; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 191, 200. Qutlugh-khan was the uncle (by mother) of Ozlagh-shah, Khorezmshah's son.

<sup>69</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 88-90; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 200.

<sup>70</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 90-91; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 201.

<sup>71</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 91; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 201.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 333.

<sup>73</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 91-94; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 201-202. See about Damir-Malik's next fortune: *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 94-95; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 202-203.

<sup>74</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 98-100; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 204.

<sup>75</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 100-102; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 204-205.

<sup>76</sup> This data is referred to by modern events of *Ibn al-Athir* (vol. 9, p. 332) and *Juzjani* (vol. 1, p. 273; vol. 2, p. 976). According to *Juwayni* (vol. 1, p. 102), *Ibn al-Ibri* (p. 233; *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 505) and *Rashid ad-Din* (trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 205), the beginning of encirclement of Bukhara is dated by Maharram of 617 (March, 1220).

<sup>77</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 81. Besides those mentioned by *an-Nasawi*, there were also other amirs of Khorezmshah in Bukhara: Hamid-Pur, a brother of *hajib* Baraq, a founder of the Qutlughkhanid dynasty in Kerman, who went over to the Khorezmshah, and also to Sevinj-khan after the battle with qara-khitays in 1210. The army in Bukhara numbered 20,000 soldiers, according to *Ibn al-Athir* (vol. 9, p. 332), *Ibn al-Ibri* (p. 233=*Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 505) and *as-Subki* (p. 334); according to *Juzjani* (vol. 2, p. 978), it numbered 12, 000. *Juwayni* reports that except for a garrison, there were 20, 000 subsidiary forces in Bukhara.

<sup>78</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 88.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>80</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 332.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid*, p. 333.

<sup>82</sup> For details about Bukhara's destiny, see: *An-Nasawi*, p. 88; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 332-333; *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 505-506=*Ibn al-Ibri*, p. 233-234; *as-Subki*, p. 334-335; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 97-107; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 205-206.

<sup>83</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 88-89.

<sup>84</sup> See: *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 333; *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 512=*Ibn al-Ibri*, p. 234; *Juzjani*, vol. 2, p. 979-980; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 116-117; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 206. *As-Subki* (p. 335) notes that there were 50, 000 local Khorezm soldiers and 70, 000 volunteer guards.

<sup>85</sup> According to *Ibn al-Athir* (vol. 9, p. 333), the Mongols annihilated 70, 000 soldiers, and according to *Juzjani*, (vol. 2, p. 979), – 50, 000.

<sup>86</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 118-119.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid*, p. 120-122. Rukn ad-Din Kart was was an ancestor of the founder of the dynasty of Karts, rulers of Herat (1278-1389). It may be supposed that *Juwayni* saw and read this label. According to *Juwayni*, it was Alp-Erkhan with 1,000 soldiers that contrived to escape. See also *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 513.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibn al-Ibri*, p. 235; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 120, 122; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 208.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 333; *Juzjani*, vol. 2, p. 980.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 333.

<sup>91</sup> *An-Nasawi*, p. 73.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid*, p. 90.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 334; *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 277; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 378; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 209-210.

- <sup>94</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 145; vol. 2, p. 379.
- <sup>95</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 90. According to *Juwayni* (vol. 2, p. 380-381), the Khorezmshah was in Nishapur till Thursday 7 Rabi' 617 AH (May 112 1220) and ignored requests to fortify the town. See also: *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 334.
- <sup>96</sup> *An-Nasawi*, p. 90-91. When the Mongols besieged Ardahan, a wali of the fortress presented them these trunks as a ransom.
- <sup>97</sup> For details of Khorezmshah's escape see: *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 381-385; *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 276-277; *as-Subki*, p. 336; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 210-213.
- <sup>98</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 91.
- <sup>99</sup> *Ibid*, p. 70, 100.
- <sup>100</sup> *Ibid*, p. 93.
- <sup>101</sup> *Ibid*, p. 241-242.
- <sup>102</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 334; *as-Subki*, p. 336; *Ibn al-Fuwati*, vol. 4, part 2, p. 1079-1080.
- <sup>103</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 91; *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 598; *as-Subki*, p. 337.
- <sup>104</sup> The capital of the Khorezmshah is titled Jurjaniya in Arab sources. The local population called their own town Urgench or Gurganj. The town was often called Khorezm.
- <sup>105</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 83.
- <sup>106</sup> See: *An-Nasawi*, p. 65-66, 83-84; *as-Subki*, p. 338.
- <sup>107</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 84.
- <sup>108</sup> *Ibid*, p. 85; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 467; *as-Subki*, p. 335, 337.
- <sup>109</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 335.
- <sup>110</sup> *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 226.
- <sup>111</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 85.
- <sup>112</sup> *Ibid*; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 468; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 240.
- <sup>113</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 100.
- <sup>114</sup> *Juwayni* (vol. 1, p. 124) calls this man as *sipahsalar* 'Ali Durughani (see also *Bartold*, vol. I, p. 500). However, behavior of 'Ali Kuh-i Darughan is not consistent with the title of *sipahsalar*. To all appearances, the point here is about coincidence of names of two different men.
- <sup>115</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 101.
- <sup>116</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 124; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 215.
- <sup>117</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 124.
- <sup>118</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 102, 104.
- <sup>119</sup> *Ibid*, p. 137.
- <sup>120</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 125.
- <sup>121</sup> The figure of 100,000 given by *Juwayni* (vol. 1, p. 125) is unlikely. More reliable is the estimate of *Rashid ad-Din* (trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 215).
- <sup>122</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 159; *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 513.
- <sup>123</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 125; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 215.
- <sup>124</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 127; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 216.
- <sup>125</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 137-138; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 125-126; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 215; *Ibn al-Ibri*, p. 235.
- <sup>126</sup> So, *Rashid ad-Din* (trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 216). According to *Ibn al-Athir* (vol. 9, p. 343) and *Ibn Khaldun* (p. 252), siege of the town lasted for five months. *An-Nasawi* reports (p. 136) that the siege of Urgench began in Dhu-l-Qa'da 617 AH (January 1221) and ended in Safar 618 (April, 1221), i.e. the defense lasted for four months the same figure is mentioned by *Juzjani* (vol. 2, p. 1097).
- <sup>127</sup> *Secret History*, § 258; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 216.
- <sup>128</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 126.
- <sup>129</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 138.
- <sup>130</sup> *Rashid ad-Din* (trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 216) writes that "Khorezmians exterminated a great number of the Mongols, so that hills consisted of bones of the killed and are currently (later 13-earlier 14 centuries) scattered about the environs of old Khorezm".
- <sup>131</sup> *Ibn al-Ibri* (p. 235) and *Juwayni* (vol. 1, p. 127) write that there were 100, 000 artisans.
- <sup>132</sup> According to *Rashid ad-Din* (trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 217). See also: *An-Nasawi*, p. 138.

It appears that the number of the killed amounted to 120, 000 persons.

<sup>133</sup> *Juzjani*, vol. 2, p. 1100-1101.

<sup>134</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 127-128. According to *Juzjani*'s report (vol. 1, p. 281; vol. 2, p. 1100), there remained only two undamaged objects in Gurganj: Kushk-i Akhjuk ("Old castle") and Sultan Tekish's tomb. See notes: 19 to Chapter 6.

<sup>135</sup> For more details about the Mongolian offensive on Gurganj see: *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 341, 343; *Yaqut*, vol. 2, p. 383-384; *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 513; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 123-128; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 214-217.

<sup>136</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 96-97.

<sup>137</sup> For Shihab ad-Din al-Khivaqi, see: *An-Nasawi*, p. 93-97; *Al-Qazwini Dhakariya*, p. 355-356; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 322.

<sup>138</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 107. According to *Juwayni* (vol. 2, p. 402-403), Ozlagh-shah and Aqshah were captured by Mongols and Ghaznavids. *Rashid ad-Din* (trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 214) notes that the Mongols killed them together with the people who were by them being unaware of that they were tsarevitches.

<sup>139</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 114-117; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 475-476; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 244-245.

<sup>140</sup> According to *Ibn al-Athir* (vol. 9, p. 342) and as-Subki (p. 339), the Mongols for only one day killed 700, 000 (!) men in Merv. Hafiz-i Abru (*Dorn* 290, f. 160a) claims that those "killed" in Merv had been counted for several days, a figure stood at 1,300 thousand (!) and more in addition to those out of the list».

Details about the actions of the Mongols in Merv see: *Juwayni*, vol. 1, 153-168.

<sup>141</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 100, 138.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid*, p. 89.

## Chapter 10

<sup>1</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 102, 104.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, p. 105; *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 514.

<sup>3</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 108; see also: *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 403.

<sup>4</sup> Amin al-Mulk obeyed Chingiz-khan and received a *yarliq* from him during the escape of Khorezmshah 'Ala ad-Din Muhammad. Jebe and Subetey were ordered not to plunder the possessions of Amin al-Mulk (in Herat and the surrounding area). However, Toghachar-noyan violated this ban and ordered his soldiers to pillage the possessions of Amin al-Mulk. The latter resisted the Mongols and, fearing Chingiz-khan, left for Ghazna, and joined Jalal ad-Din near Qandahar. See: *Secret History*, § 257; *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 287; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 220-221.

<sup>5</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 109.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 110; see also: *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 343.

<sup>7</sup> Various sources estimate Jalal ad-Din's total number of troops at 50,000 or above. See: *An-Nasawi*, p. 124-125; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 343; *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 514; *Juzjani*, vol. 2, p. 1016; *Vardan*, p. 177; *Gandzaketsi*, p. 122; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 404, 463; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 200.

<sup>8</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 125; *Juzjani*, vol. 2, p. 1016; *Vardan*, p. 177; *Gandzaketsi*, p. 122; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 405; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 221. *Ibn al-Athir* (vol. 9, p. 343) describes the battle at Valiyan as the first victory over the Mongols.

<sup>9</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 125.

<sup>10</sup> *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 288-289; vol. 2, p. 1006, 1042; *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 514; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 406-407; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 221-222. *Ibn al-Athir* (vol. 9, p. 343-344) describes the battle at Parvan as the second victory of Sultan Jalal ad-Din over the Mongols.

<sup>11</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 125.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 344; see also: *An-Nasawi*, p. 125-126; *Juzjani*, vol. 2, p. 1031; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 407-408, 463; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 222.

<sup>13</sup> See: *an-Nasawi*, p. 127. Other sources do not mention this victory of Jalal ad-Din over the

advanced Mongolian troops. Juwayni (vol. 2, p. 408-409) points out that the troops of Chingiz-khan caught up the rearguard of Jalal ad-Din under the command of Ur-khan and smashed it.

<sup>14</sup> For more details about the battle of Jalal ad-Din with the Mongols near the bank of Sind see: *An-Nasawi*, p. 127-129; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 344; *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 515-516; *Ibn al-Tbri*, p. 236; *Juzjani*, vol. 1, p. 292-293; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 408 and further; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 223-224, 257.

<sup>15</sup> *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 515-516; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 141-142; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 224.

<sup>16</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 130.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, p. 131; *Juzjani*, vol. 2, p. 742-744; *Juwayni*, vol. 1, p. 141-142; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 224.

<sup>18</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 132-133; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 415.

<sup>19</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 133-134; see also: *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 415; *Rashid ad-Din*, translation, vol. 1, book 2, p. 238.

<sup>20</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 134; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 415-417; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 238.

<sup>21</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 135.

<sup>22</sup> See: *Thomas*, *The Chronicles*, p. 90-91, nos. 71-75.

<sup>23</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 135.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid*, p. 135-136.

<sup>25</sup> Muhammad ibn Ibrahim, p. 222; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 417, 469, 476-478; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 238, 244, 246.

<sup>26</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 139-140; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 478-479; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 239.

<sup>27</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 140.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid*; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 418; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 262; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 239-240.

<sup>29</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 141.

<sup>30</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 141; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 419-420; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 134; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 262; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 240-241.

<sup>31</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 142-143.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 358.

<sup>33</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 152-153; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 358.

<sup>34</sup> *Abu Shama*. Dhayl, p. 131.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid*, p. 142.

<sup>36</sup> *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 669; *al-Yunini*, vol. 1, p. 140.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 355.

<sup>38</sup> See the previous chapters on this correspondence.

<sup>39</sup> *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 634; *Ibn Taghriberdi*, vol. 6, p. 260-261.

<sup>40</sup> *Abu Shama*. Dhayl, p. 163.

<sup>41</sup> *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 634; *Ibn Taghriberdi*, vol. 6, p. 260-261.

<sup>42</sup> For details about Sultan Jalal ad-Din's operation in Iraq see: *An-Nasawi*, p. 154; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 356; *al-Hamawi Muhammad*, f. 149b; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 421-423; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 134; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 2, book 2, p. 241; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 264.

<sup>43</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 154-155.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 358; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 135; *Yaqut*, vol. 1, p. 202-203.

<sup>45</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 155.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibn Bibi*, p. 142.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid*, p. 142-146; see also: *Turan*. Documents, p. 82-84.

<sup>49</sup> For more details about these parleys see: *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 358; *An-Nasawi*, p. 166; *Abu Shama*. Dhayl, p. 144.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 358.

<sup>51</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 155-156; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 358.

<sup>52</sup> *An-Nasawi*, p. 156; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 425.

- <sup>53</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 358-359.
- <sup>54</sup> *Ibid*, p. 359; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 424-426; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 135; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 242; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 270.
- <sup>55</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 157.
- <sup>56</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 426.
- <sup>57</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 359.
- <sup>58</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 157-158.
- <sup>59</sup> For more details about the battle near the Garni see: *an-Nasawi*, p. 157-159; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 359; *Kartlis Tskhovreba*, p. 169-171; *Vardan*, 175-176; *Armianskie istochniki*, p. 24, 30, 70; *Gandzaketsi*, p. 114-115; *Orbelian Stepanos*, p. 225-226; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 424-427; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 242-243. See also: *Baratov*, p. 122-123; *Javakhishvili*, p. 47-48.
- <sup>60</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 159, 160.
- <sup>61</sup> *Ibid*, p. 160.
- <sup>62</sup> *Ibid*, p. 146-149.
- <sup>63</sup> *Ibid*, p. 160.
- <sup>64</sup> *Ibid*, p. 161.
- <sup>65</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 359-360.
- <sup>66</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 161-162.
- <sup>67</sup> *Ibid*, p. 164; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 361; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 424; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 135; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 242.
- <sup>68</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 164.
- <sup>69</sup> *Ibid*, p. 163.
- <sup>70</sup> *Ibid*; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 360.
- <sup>71</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 360.
- <sup>72</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 164; *al-Husayni*, p. 167; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 425-426; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 135; *al-'Umari*. Maniya al-udaba', p. 210.
- <sup>73</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 294 and further.
- <sup>74</sup> *Kartlis Tskhovreba*, p. 172-174; *Histoire de la Géorgie*, p. 502-503.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 366.
- <sup>76</sup> See: *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 366-367; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 431-432; *Kartlis Tskhovreba*, p. 174-177; *Gandzaketsi*, p. 155; *Vardan*, p. 176.
- <sup>77</sup> *Kartlis Tskhovreba*, p. 177-178; see also: *Sabinin*, p. 147-154.
- <sup>78</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 168.
- <sup>79</sup> See: *Pakhomov*, p. 122 ff; *Kapanadze*, p. 68-73.
- <sup>80</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 367.
- <sup>81</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 168-170; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 367-368; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 433; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 275.
- <sup>82</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 368.
- <sup>83</sup> *Ibid*, p. 369-370; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 276.
- <sup>84</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 171; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 370; *al-Hamawi Muhammad*, f. 156b-157a; *Ibn al-Adim*, p. 199; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 435-436; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 136; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 276.
- <sup>85</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 172; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 370-371.
- <sup>86</sup> For details about the battle see: *An-Nasawi*, p. 181-186; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 374, 376; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 436-438; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 1, book 2, p. 243-244.
- <sup>87</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 185; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 376.
- <sup>88</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 198.
- <sup>89</sup> *Ibid*, p. 199, 200.
- <sup>90</sup> *Ibid*, p. 200.
- <sup>91</sup> *Ibid*, p. 202.
- <sup>92</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 374; *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 420; *al-Hamawi Muhammad*, f. 167b; *Ibn al-Adim*, p. 202; *Ibn Taghriberdi*, vol. 6, p. 270.
- <sup>93</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 206-207.
- <sup>94</sup> *Ibid*, p. 210.
- <sup>95</sup> *Ibid*, p. 215.

- <sup>96</sup> Ibid, p. 216-217.
- <sup>97</sup> *al-Hamawi Muhammad*, f. 176b-179b.
- <sup>98</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 216-217, 266-267.
- <sup>99</sup> Ibid, p. 220-221.
- <sup>100</sup> Ibid, p. 222-223.
- <sup>101</sup> Ibid, p. 223-224.
- <sup>102</sup> Ibid, p. 224.
- <sup>103</sup> *Kartlis Tskhovreba*, p. 182-183; *an-Nasawi*, p. 224-225.
- <sup>104</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 378.
- <sup>105</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 189.
- <sup>106</sup> *al-Hamawi Muhammad*, f. 171a-b; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 375-376; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 281.
- <sup>107</sup> For details see: *an-Nasawi*, p. 186-191; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 467-468; *Ibn Khaldun*, p. 282; *Ibn al-Fuwati*, vol. 4, part 4, p. 1184-1185; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 2, p. 31-32.
- <sup>108</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 216.
- <sup>109</sup> Ibid, p. 230.
- <sup>110</sup> Ibid, p. 231; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 379-380.
- <sup>111</sup> *An-Nasawi*, p. 240, 248; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 380; *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 659.
- <sup>112</sup> *An-Nasawi*, p. 240, 241.
- <sup>113</sup> Ibid, p. 248.
- <sup>114</sup> For details about the siege of Khilat see: *An-Nasawi*, p. 248 and next; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 380-381; *Ibn al-Ibri*, p. 245; *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 660-662.
- <sup>115</sup> *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 445-449. *Fath-nama* comes with abridgements.
- <sup>116</sup> *Gandzaketsi*, p. 116.
- <sup>117</sup> *Ibn Bibi*, p. 146-150.
- <sup>118</sup> *an-Nasawi*, p. 232.
- <sup>119</sup> Ibid, p. 232, 233.
- <sup>120</sup> Ibid, p. 246.
- <sup>121</sup> Ibid, p. 246-247.
- <sup>122</sup> Ibid, p. 247.
- <sup>123</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>124</sup> Ibid, p. 253-254.
- <sup>125</sup> Ibid, p. 251.
- <sup>126</sup> Ibid, p. 254.
- <sup>127</sup> *al-Hamawi Muhammad*, f. 196b; see also: *Ibn Bibi*, p. 153-154.
- <sup>128</sup> For details about the battle near Yassi Chaman see: *an-Nasawi*, p. 256-257; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 381; *Ibn Bibi*, p. 154-159; *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 662-664; *Ibn Wasil*, Manuscript, f. 266b-267a; *al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 1, p. 240; *Ibn al-Adim*, p. 259; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 146-147; *Ibn al-Wardi*, vol. 2, p. 220; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 2, p. 29.
- <sup>129</sup> *An-Nasawi*, p. 251.
- <sup>130</sup> *Bitlisi*, p. 413.
- <sup>131</sup> *An-Nasawi*, p. 258.
- <sup>132</sup> Ibid, p. 259; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 382.
- <sup>133</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 383.
- <sup>134</sup> *An-Nasawi*, p. 263.
- <sup>135</sup> Ibid, p. 266.
- <sup>136</sup> *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 2, p. 30; see also: *an-Nasawi*, p. 273-274; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 384.
- <sup>137</sup> *An-Nasawi*, p. 275.
- <sup>138</sup> For more details about the activity of vizier Sharaf al-Mulk on the eve of his death see: *An-Nasawi*, p. 274-276, 279, 280-283, 284; *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 384; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 454; *Rashid ad-Din*, translation, vol. 2, p. 30.
- <sup>139</sup> *An-Nasawi*, p. 273.
- <sup>140</sup> Ibid, p. 278, 285.
- <sup>141</sup> Ibid, p. 286.



- <sup>142</sup> Ibid, p. 287.
- <sup>143</sup> Ibid, p. 288.
- <sup>144</sup> Ibid, p. 288, 292.
- <sup>145</sup> Ibid, p. 292.
- <sup>146</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>147</sup> Ibid, p. 293.
- <sup>148</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>149</sup> Ibid, p. 295.
- <sup>150</sup> Ibid, p. 295-296. 297.
- <sup>151</sup> For details about the last days of Khorezmshah Jalal ad-Din see: *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 666, 668-669; *Gandzaketsi*, p. 117; *Vardan*, p. 176-177; *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 529-530 (*Ibn al-ʿIbri*, p. 247); *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 459-460; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 147-151; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 2, p. 31; *al-ʿUmari*, Maniya al-udabaʾ, p. 124-125; *Ibn Taghriberdi*, vol. 6, p. 276-277; *al-Hanbali*, vol. 5, p. 130-131.
- <sup>152</sup> *An-Nasawi*, p. 296; *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 669-670.
- <sup>153</sup> *Ibn Wasil*, MS, f. 265b-266a.
- <sup>154</sup> *Ibn al-Athir*, vol. 9, p. 383.
- <sup>155</sup> *An-Nasawi*, p. 296-297.
- <sup>156</sup> Ibid, p. 181.
- <sup>157</sup> *Ibn al-ʿIbri*, p. 247; *Juwayni*, vol. 2, p. 460; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 2, p. 31.
- <sup>158</sup> *An-Nasawi*, p. 171-172.
- <sup>159</sup> *Ibn Bibi*, p. 170-174; *al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 1, p. 247.
- <sup>160</sup> *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 536-537; *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 703; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 158; *Ibn al-Wardi*, vol. 2, p. 236.
- <sup>161</sup> See: *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 699; *Bar Hebraeus*, vol. 2, p. 537; *Ibn Bibi*, p. 188-189, 190-191; *Ibn al-Wardi*, vol. 2, p. 237; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 159; *Ibn Taghriberdi*, vol. 6, p. 297; *al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 1, p. 255.
- <sup>162</sup> *Ibn Bibi*, p. 203. During the period in question Shihab ad-Din an-Nasawi, author of “Biography of Sultan Jalal ad-Din Mankburni” was the vizier of Barakat-khan.
- <sup>163</sup> *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 704; *Ibn al-Wardi*, vol. 2, p. 239; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 162; *Ibn Taghriberdi*, vol. 6, p. 299-300; *al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 269-271.
- <sup>164</sup> *Al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 271-272.
- <sup>165</sup> Ibid, p. 280; *Ibn al-Wardi*, vol. 2, p. 240; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 163.
- <sup>166</sup> *Al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 302.
- <sup>167</sup> Ibid, p. 302-303, 421.
- <sup>168</sup> *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 735; *Ibn al-Wardi*, vol. 2, p. 244; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 167; *al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 303; *Ibn al-Adim*, p. 255-258; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 2, p. 125.
- <sup>169</sup> *Ibn al-Wardi*, vol. 2, p. 244-245; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 168; *al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 303.
- <sup>170</sup> *Al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 309; *Ibn al-Adim*, p. 261; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 168.
- <sup>171</sup> *Al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 309-310; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 169; *Ibn al-Wardi*, vol. 2, p. 246.
- <sup>172</sup> *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 737-738; *Ibn al-Wardi*, vol. 2, p. 247; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 170-171; *al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 311; *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 2, p. 126.
- <sup>173</sup> *Ibn al-Adim*, p. 261-262.
- <sup>174</sup> *Ibn Shaddad*, p. 236.
- <sup>175</sup> *Al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 315; *Ibn Kathir*, vol. 13, p. 164.
- <sup>176</sup> See: A History of the Crusades, p. 661-692.
- <sup>177</sup> *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 745; *al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 316; *Ibn Taghriberdi*, vol. 6, p. 323; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 172; *Ibn al-Wardi*, vol. 2, p. 249.
- <sup>178</sup> *Ibn al-Wardi*, vol. 2, p. 249; *Abu Shama*. Dhayl, p. 147; *al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 316; *Ibn Taghriberdi*, vol. 6, p. 323.
- <sup>179</sup> *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 745-746; *al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 317; *Ibn al-Wardi*, vol. 2, p. 249; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 172-173; *Ibn Taghriberdi*, vol. 6, p. 323.
- <sup>180</sup> *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 745. Salah ad-Din Ayyubi defeated an army of Crusaders on July 4, 1187, near the village of Hattin (between Nasiriya and Tiberias Lake).

<sup>181</sup> *Ibn al-Wardi*, vol. 2, p. 249; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 172; *al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 317-318; *Ibn Taghriberdi*, vol. 6, p. 324.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibn al-Wardi*, vol. 2, p. 251; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 174; *al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 322-323; *Ibn Taghriberdi*, vol. 6, p. 324.

<sup>183</sup> *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 174; *Ibn Taghriberdi*, vol. 6, p. 324-325; *al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 322; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 175.

<sup>184</sup> *Abu Shama*. Dhayl, p. 175; *Ibn Taghriberdi*, vol. 6, p. 325; *al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 322; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 175.

<sup>185</sup> *Al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 323.

<sup>186</sup> *Sibt ibn al-Jawzi*, p. 760-761, 764; *Ibn al-Wardi*, vol. 2, p. 253-254; *Abu-l-Fida*, vol. 3, p. 175-176; *al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 323-325; *Ibn Taghriberdi*, vol. 6, p. 325-326.

<sup>187</sup> For the text of the ultimatum see: *al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 427-428.

<sup>188</sup> *Rashid ad-Din*, trans., vol. 3, p. 51-52.

<sup>189</sup> *Al-Maqrizi*, vol. 1, part 2, p. 435; see also: al-Yunini (vol. 1, p. 368, 369), where words of Qutuz: "I am Mahmud, son of Mamdud. I am the one who smashed the Mongols and took revenge upon them for my uncle Khorezmshah" are cited. See also: *Tekindağ*. Qutuz, p. 1057.


<sup>190</sup> *Ibn Bibi*, p. 188.

<sup>191</sup> *Uzunçarşili*. Beylikler, p. 84 and further.


<sup>192</sup> *Ibid*, p. 89.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid*, p. 39.

<sup>194</sup> *Köprülü*. Horezmşahlar, p. 293.



Genealogy of Seljuquides



**DYNASTIC CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES****Caliphs which ruled during studied period**

al-Mustazkhir	1094-1118
al-Mustarshid	1118-1135
ar-Rashid	1135-1136
al-Mustafi	1136-1160
al-Mustanjid	1160-1170
al-Mustadi	1170-1180
an-Nasir	1180-1225
az-Zahir	1225-1226
al-Mustansir	1226-1242
al-Mustasim	1242-1258

**Atabeks of Azerbaijan**

Shams ad-Din Ildeniz	1136-1175
Jahan Pahlawan	1175-1186
Qizil-Arslan	1186-1191
Abu Bakr	1191-1210-11
Uzbek	1210-11-1225
Hamush	1225-1230

**Mamluks – sultans of Persian Iraq**

Izz ad-Din Geghcha	d. 1204
Shams ad-Din Aytoghmish	d. 1213
Nasir ad-Din Mengli	d. 1215
Sayf ad-Din Oghlimish	d. 1218

**Rulers of Mazandaran (Bavandids)**

Shakhriyar ibn Karin	1073-1109
Karin ibn Shahriyar	1109-1117
Ali abn Shakhriyar	1117-1139
(Rustam ibn Karin – pretendent	1117-1121)
Shah-Ghazi Rustam ibn Ali	1139-1163
Hasan ibn Rustam	1163-1171
Ardashir ibn Hasan	1171-1205
Shah-Ghazi Rustam ibn Ardashir	1205-1210

**Ghurids***(Ghur and Ghazna)*

Sayf ad-Din Muhammad	1161-1163
Ghiyath ad-Din Muhammad	1163-1203
Shahab ad-Din Muhammad	1203-1206
Ghiyas ad-Din Mahmud	1206-1212
Baha ad-Din Sam	1212-1213
Ala ad-Din Atsiz	1213-1214
Diya ad-Din Muhammad	1214-1215

*(Bamiyan and Toharistan)*

Shams ad-Din Sam	1145-1163
Baha ad-Din Sam	1163-1192
Jalal al-Din Ali	1192-1206
Fahr ad-Din Mas'ud	1206-1216

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- GAIMK – Gosudarstvennaya Akademiya istorii materialnoy kulturi.  
 GIM – Gosudarstvenniy Istoricheskiy muzey (Moscow).  
 GPB – Gosudarstvennaya publichnaya biblioteka im. M.Ye.Saltikova-Shedrina (Leningrad).  
 ZVORAO – *Zapiski Vostochnogo otdeleniya (Imp.) Russkogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva.*  
 NAA – *Narodi Azii i Afriki. Istoriya, ekonomika, kul'tura.*  
 NE – *Numizmatika i epigrafika.*  
 PPV – *Pismennye pamyatniki Vostoka. Istoriko-filologicheskie issledovaniya. Ezhegodnik.*  
 CA-Sovetskaya arkheologiya.  
 TVORAO – *Trudi Vostochnogo otdeleniya Imperiyskogo Russkogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva.*  
 EV – *Epigrafika Vostoka.*  
 DI – *Der Islam.*  
 DTCFD – *Dil ve Tarih Coğrafıya Facültesi Dergisi.*  
 IA – *Islâm ansiklopedisi.*  
 JASB – *Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.*  
 JESHO – *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient.*  
 TM – *Turkiyat mecmuası.*  
 TTKB – *Türk Tarih Kurumu. Belleten.*  
 WZKM – *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes.*



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